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Thesis Abstract. 
The thesis is entitled "Aircraft Maintenance Engineering: Developing an AJrcraft Maintenance 
Programme using Reliability Centred Maintenance / MSG3 Analysis Taking into Consideration ETOPS 
and Low Utilisation", It brings together and explains an area that the author feels is not well 
documented or published today in the world of aviation maintenance management, yet it is 
fundamental to the continued airworthiness of an aircraft, it can be considered as the building block for 
maintaining the inherent reliability and airworthiness of the design. It is the author's experience that too 
many times operators have attempted to carry out the function of maintenance engineering with out full 
understanding of the reasons and implication of their actions, thus ending up with an ineffective and 
non applicable collection of maintenance activities that can only add to the expense of the technical 
operation and even at times contribute to the possibility of occurrences. The thesis also goes on to 
develop new decision tree diagrams based upon Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) / 
Maintenance Steering Group 3 (MSG3) analysis for the use in developing the Maintenance and 
Reliability Programme and incorporating new aspects of aircraft operation. 
Two statements or themes that motivate the basis of many of the topics through out the thesis 
are... 
1. You cannot improve the airworthiness or reliability of an original design by maintenance actions 
on an aircraft system, component or structure but only return that aircraft system, component or 
structure to its original inherent reliability of design. 
2. You can cause the degradation of the airworthiness or reliability of an original design by 
maintenance actions on an aircraft system, component or structure. 
These two statements are built upon early in the thesis in defining the Nature of Failure and then 
the RCM / MGS3 analysis process used for defining the scheduled maintenance tasks. This 
process is reviewed in detail showing where it is most effective and at other time insufficient 
requiring supplementing with life controls or even system redesign. 
The thesis examines exactly what is the Aircraft Maintenance Programme and identifies that it is 
the definition of scheduled maintenance tasks that are both effective & applicable in maintaining 
the inherent reliability of the aircraft and the on going development of the scheduled maintenance 
tasks through the Reliability Programme and the efficient management of accomplishment and 
recording of the scheduled maintenance tasks. An area that the author considers as largely 
misunderstood with in the industry of aircraft maintenance engineering. 
The objectives of the thesis can be broadly summarised as the following 
0 Define present industry standards. 
" Identify & Define new original improvements to those standards. 
" Identify new original standards for ETOPs & Low Utilisation issues. 
" Identify & Define original effective management methods for the standards & their 
improvements. 
While the original aspects of the thesis can be defines as... 
1. New Enhancements to the RCM / MSG3 Process for Producin-q the Scheduled 
Maintenance Tasks: 
" Clarification of the Nature of Failure & RCM 
" Insertion of the ETOPS Question to MSG3 
" 
Identifying when life limitations are required on non damage tolerant structural items 
" Adopting the ETOPs standards as normal practices for all aircraft 
" New Low Utilisation assessment to MSG3 
" An economic comparison of RCM / MSG3 Maintenance Programmes against non RCM 
MSG 3 defined Programmes 
2. New Standards for Maintenance Engineering Planning: 
" The Definition of Maintenance Engineering Planning 
" 
Establishing a standard for Maintenance Engineering Planning 
Establishing the critical link between Maintenance Engineering Planning & Human 
Factors 
3. New Standards for conductino The Reliability Pro_qramme: 
Establishing the essential need for Reliability Monitoring 
Establishing a simple new standard for Reliability Monitoring incorporating ETOPs 
standards 
Getting to the Root Cause of failures 
Reassessment of the Maintenance Programme through Optimisation Studies 
4. The Use of Maintenance Programme Control Software: 
" New MPCS Assessment Standards 
" 
New MPCS Selection Standards 
" 
New MPCS Implementation Standards 
5. New Standards for Management of a Simple Organisation: 
0 Identifies the Regulatory Standard for a European JAA operator 
* Defines a simple Organisation to meet the regulations 
0 Defines what must be in place to meet the standards 
In summary the Thesis fills the gap in the understanding and documenting of the Maintenance 
Programme Process for Aircraft and brings the Engineering discipline into the 21st Century, by 
defining and integrating existing standards and developing new standards as a single 
Maintenance Programme Process. Furthermore the theories and processes defined in the thesis 
are very topical and have undergone careful practical application in the support of a wide and 
narrow body fleet over the last 4 years. They have been extensively discussed with other industry 
professionals and industry organizations such as ICAO and IATA and then also presented to a 
major aircraft manufacturer and aircraft maintenance service provider for possible inclusion in 
part into their standards. The thesis has been met with interest by all these parties. 
The Proposal for Future Work can be surnmarised as three tasks. These are 
The author continues to attempt to formalise the new recommendation defined in the 
thesis as industry standards working with ICAO, IATA, the Regulators, the Manufacturers 
and Industry. 
0 The author will plan to conduct a Maintenance Programme Optimisation study using the 
method defined in the thesis section 6 for a fleet of five B737-NG's. 
The author will continue to encourage other Industries out with aviation to adopt the 
Maintenance Programme philosophy such as submarines, ships, military equipment and 
even plants. 
I herby give the City University Librarian permission to make single of multiple copies of 
text from this book as required. 
ckrsvtýl 
Mark J Pierotti. 
Mark J Pierotti. 
Ph. D. Thesis, 
School of Engineering, 
City University, 
London. 
July 2005. 
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1. Thesis Introducdon. 
The maintenance of aircraft is today a discipline and function that every operator must take very 
seriously for two main reasons. Firstly it is the legal requirement of every aircraft operator to ensure 
the continued airworthiness of his aircraft, this is regulated extensively. Secondly the maintenance 
of aircraft is one of the most cost consuming aspects of the operation of aircraft, not to manage the 
maintenance of the aircraft in an efficient and cost effective manner will result in massive cost 
excesses, eating away at the operators profits. The maintenance programme is the building block 
ensuring the continued airworthiness of an aircraft. The maintenance programme defines what 
scheduled maintenance tasks should be carried out and when those tasks should be carried out. It 
is my opinion that the maintenance programme is much greater that what some operators realise 
today. Not only is it a collection of scheduled maintenance tasks with their respective intervals but 
also a process and method of continued development and validation of those scheduled 
maintenance tasks ensuring that all the tasks accomplished, do bring value to the ongoing 
airworthiness of the aircraft. This on going monitoring process of the scheduled maintenance tasks 
is referred to as the Reliability Programme. The Reliability Programme along with the Scheduled 
Maintenance Tasks and with the processes and procedures involved in maintaining the 
Programme together can be referred to as the Maintenance Programme. 
The thesis start in earnest with section 2 where the nature of failure of structures and systems is 
described and it is established why we need to carry out maintenance. The P-F interval is 
described and establishes that by understanding the P-F interval we can start the process of 
analysis defining maintenance tasks. This section continues to define and describes the process 
called Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) better know in aircraft maintenance as Maintenance 
Steering Group 3 (MSG3) philosophy. It explains that through a process of analysis of individual 
components, systems and structures we can realise the full inherent reliability of design of those 
components, systems and 
-structures 
through establishing effective and applicable scheduled 
maintenance tasks. A series of decision diagrams is explained that will lead to task identification or 
indeed the need to redesign the system or structure. This section describes the design 
philosophies of Safe Life, Fail Safe and DamageTolerant and how these design philosophies can 
affect the maintenance actions to be carried out. It identifies that at times RCM / MSG3 
maintenance tasks are at times insufficient and Life Limitations may have to be applied to structural 
items that are not damage tolerant whose failure if goes undetected can lead to catastrophic 
functional failures. 
The establishing and development of the Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) is described in 
section 3. This describes where the aircraft manufacturers, regulators and later also the operators 
have establish MSG 1, MSG 2 and finally MSG 3 philosophies in an attempt to create an effective 
and applicable collection of scheduled maintenance tasks-It identifies the regulations, both JAA 
and FAA, and industry standards applicable to the establishment of an effective aircraft 
maintenance programme and builds upon them to define an efficient method for an Airline or 
Operator to establish their own applicable Maintenance Programme. 
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Section 4 develops what is described in section 3 and introduces new procedures improving the 
Maintenance Programme definition process, introducing the philosophies of Extended Twin Jet 
Operations (ErOPs) maintenance standards as applicable to all aircraft and all operations. In 
section 4 it is shown that ErOPs standards can easily be inserted into the RCM / MSG 3 process 
as well as into to the every day maintenance standards of all aircraft establishing a more effective 
maintenance programme. The section then also goes on to examine the custornisation of a 
maintenance programme in particular to the Low Utilisation environment. Here it is described the 
importance of considering the operational context and utilisation of an aircraft and where 
adjustments must be made to ensure that the maintenance programme is effective for a Low 
Utilisation operation. The process of the RCM / MSG 3 decision diagram is adapted to review the 
effects of the operational environment and of low utilisation. Section 4 also presents an economic 
comparison of Scheduled Maintenance Programmes established by RCM / MSG3 to those of non 
RCM / MSG 3 methods; it examines using a simple model the economic benefits from conducting 
an MSG3 scheduled maintenance programme versus a non MSG3 programme and defines in 
maintenance cost per operational flight hour for each of the maintenance programme types. 
Having established the maintenance schedule tasks using the methods described in section 2,3 
and 4 Section 5 defines how to plan, prepare, implement and manage the maintenance schedule. It 
defines the need for short term, medium term, long term maintenance planning and also production 
planning and control, describing effective and efficient ways to conduct the planning process. The 
section goes on further to describe what non routine findings are and how they are important to the 
maintenance programme process. This section also describes the effects of human factors and the 
regulations related to them. 
Section 6 deals with the Reliability Programme describing the essential need for this process in the 
context of an RCM / MSG 3 Maintenance Programme. The section continually defines that with out 
a simple reliability monitoring function in place the maintenance programme is incomplete. A simple 
system is defined as well as a more complex system that will ensure that the maintenance 
programme is effective and applicable. This section identifies regulation and industry standards 
applicable to reliability monitoring and builds upon them defining new improvements to the present 
standards. It defines methods for data gathering, for data reporting and areas where those involved 
in the maintenance programme process need training, from flight crew to maintenance staff. 
Scheduled Maintenance Optimisation Process is described and defined as a new process for 
reviewing and revising the Maintenance Programme through analysis again using the RCM / MSG 
3 decision diagram. 
Section 7 describes how Maintenance Programme Control Software (MPCS) can be utilised to 
assist in effective Maintenance Programme control and management. This section identifies the 
Super User system for selection and implementation of a MPCS establishing a new industry 
standard that will enable the best selection and most efficient implementation. 
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Section 8 identifies the regulations for an aircraft maintenance engineering organisation. It defines a 
simple organisation and a more complex organisation that meets the required regulation and will be 
effective in managing the Maintenance Programme of a fleet of aircraft. 
Finally section 9 the conclusion, brings together and summarises all the original thought and 
recommendations for new standards in each section of the thesis clarifying and substantiating their 
value and section 10 describes recommendations for further work to be undertaken continuing the 
spirit of the thesis in developing the Aircraft Maintenance Programme Process as a whole and for 
other industries. 
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2. Reliabilitv Centred Maintenance. 
2.1 Maintenance: An Engineering Requirement 
2.1.1 Maintenance Philosophies before RCM. 
The Second World War instigated a massive leap in the operational use of the airplane. It soon 
became apparent that the machines were required to be kept in a condition that allowed the aircraft 
not only to carry out a successful mission once but to ensure that it could again repeatedly carry out 
other missions and also as well to ensure the safety of the operating crew. The maintenance of the 
machine therefore became an engineering discipline that required careful technical consideration. 
When should the engine be taken off the aircraft? 
When should the Nng control cables be replaced? 
What maintenance tasks on the landing gear should be done? 
Maintenance Engineering or Maintainability was not in the early days a prime consideration to the 
design engineer or the manufacturer, but became one of the prime considerations to the owner and 
operator, whose concern was to operate the machine to its best ability and to minimize its non 
availability due to failures. 
After the war and the role of the aircraft in the civilian world was diverted from flying military 
missions to mass people transportation by profit seeking corporations, a new element of economics 
now factored into the maintenance question. 
How can I maintain my aircraft so that it meets the operational requirements, thus reducing the 
probability of failure, in a cost effective manner? 
The maintenance engineers of that time believed in a cause-and-effect relationship between 
scheduled maintenance and operating reliability. This was based on the concept that mechanical 
parts wear out and the reliability of any equipment is directly related to it's operating age. Following 
on from this it was accepted that the more frequently the equipment was overhauled the less likely 
the equipment would suffer mechanical failure. The only open question was at what time of 
operating life should the scheduled maintenance take place to assure reliable operation? The DC 8 
Manufacturers Recommended Maintenance Programme called for 339 components to be 
overhauled at a hard time regardless of condition. This of course had spares holding implications 
and aircraft downtime implication. 
The FAA was looking closely at engine failure rates and discovered that the idea that by 
overhauling an engine or a component increases its resistance to failure was flawed. The traditional 
hard time policies appeared to be ineffective at controlling failure rates. The FAA in the 1960's was 
frustrated that airlines could not control their component failure rate even by reducing their hard 
time overhaul intervals or by increasing their workscope of the overhaul task. The FAA went on to 
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address the problem by forming a task force consisting of representatives from the FAA and the 
airlines, to investigate the capabilities of scheduled maintenance. The work of this group lead to a 
FAA / Industry Reliability Programme, issued in November 1961. The introduction to that 
programme stated.... 
The development of this programme is towards the control of reliability through an analysis 
of the factors that effect reliability and provide a system of actions to improve low reliability levels 
when they exist... in the past, a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the control of overhaul 
periods to provide a satisfactory level of reliability. After careful study the Committee is convinced 
that reliability and overhaul time control are not necessarily directly associated topics, therefore 
these subjects are dealt with separately. 
The traditional concept that overhaul actions was an important factor in a component or systems 
failure rate was being challenged head on by this work group. 
2.2 An introduction to the theory of RCM. 
2.2.1 The Nature of Failure. 
Some definitions of Failure 
An unsatisfactory outcome or condition. Webster International 1998 
An inability to function. Collins 2000 
Break down or ceasing to function. Encarta 1999 
All mechanical parts are subject to forces that will reduce its ability to perform its function. 
These forces are wear, corrosion and fatigue. The experience of these forces ultimately will be the 
cause of the part to no longer be able to achieve its intended function. The function of the part can 
be defined as, (SAE JA101 I Aug 99), what the owner or user of a physical asset orsystern wants it 
to do. The ceasing of the part to perform its required function is when the part can be classified as 
failed. The role of scheduled maintenance is to identify prior to, and subsequently take action to 
prevent through a maintenance action, the failure and more importantly the consequences of the 
failure. This subject of scheduled maintenance will be dealt with in detail further at a later stage. A 
failure consequence is, (SAE A 1011 Aug 99), the ways in which the effects of a failure mode or a 
multiple failure matter. (Evidence of failure, impact on safety, the environment, operational 
capability, direct and indirect repair costs). A Failure Mode is A single event, which causes a 
Functional Failure, where a Functional Failure is a state in which a physical asset or system is 
unable to perform a specific function to a desired level of performance (SAE JA 1011 Aug 99). 
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To give an example of a fuel pump that has been designed to produce a flow of 15 litres per 
second. The pump is capable of producing 20 litres per second, the operator requires a minimum 
performance of 10 litres per second. As far as the operator is concerned as long as the pump 
performs at a minimum of 10 litres per second the pump has not failed. Even when the pump is 
producing below its design performance of 15 litres per second as far as the operator is concerned, 
there has been no functional failure of the pump. This examples shows that there could be at least 
three performance measures for finding a failed.... 
1. Preset Specifications. 
2. User Requirements. 
3. Designer Specifications. 
(See fig 2.1) 
Note: The topic of how and when to select a failure finding scheduled task will be dealt with later. 
A basic recognized general definition of failure perhaps used in the non aviation-engineering world 
is... 
"Failure is defined as the inability of any asset to do what its users want it to do" (J Moubrey RCM 
2000) 
Of course, this definition is too course for aviation engineering application because of regulations 
and safety margins. (See fig 2.2) 
Area of Failure 
Fig 2 1. General Failed State. 
Designed Specification 
Preset Specification 
User Specificabon 
Area of Failure 
Fig 22 Aviation Failed State. 
Desgm Speoficabon 
RegUatory Specificabons 
User Speaficabon 
In summary, the exact dividing line between satisfactory and unsatisfactory conditions will depend 
not only on the function of the item in question, but on the nature of the equipment in which it is 
installed and the operating context in which the equipment is used. The determination will therefore 
vary from one operating organisation to another. Within a given organisation however, it is essential 
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that the boundaries between satisfactory and unsatisfactory condition be defined for each item in 
clear and unmistakable terms. This means that the individual component failure effect must be 
considered for failure implication on the complete function of the system. 
Functional Failure and Potential Failure. 
Functional Failure: "A state in which a physical asset or system is unable to perform a specific 
function to a desired level of performance" (SAE JA 1011 Aug 99). 
A complete failure of a component or a system in so much that it ceases to function at all is a 
functional failure but so is the failure of that component or system to function to e required standard. 
To be able to define the functional failure we must understand the completely the workings and 
functions of the component or system and the implication that component or system has on other 
components or systems. For example, the cabin conditioning and pressurisation system is to not 
only create a comfortable temperature controlled environment for passengers inside the cabin, but 
it is also to supply passengers with adequate air that will allow them to breathe. Functional failures 
of components with in the system may not cause a functional failure of the complete system but 
may raise the cabin temperature by a few degrees. It is very important that all the system functions 
are understood so as the functional failures can be defined. (This is a very important aspect of 
RCM for determining failure-finding tasks when developing the scheduled maintenance programme 
that will be discussed later). 
Potential Failure: "An Identiffiable condition that indicates that a functional failure is either about to 
occur oris in the process of occurTing"(SAEJAIOI I Aug 99). 
Prior to a functional failure occurring, evidence of the imminent failure should be available. It should 
be possible to detect when a system or component is in this potential failing stage. Once a positive 
detection has been made of a component or system entering the potential failure stage, it can be 
removed from service and replaced thus preventing the functional failure from occurring. The ability 
to determine a potential or functional failure depends upon three factors... 
A clear definition of the functions of the component or system. 
0A clear definition of the conditions that constitute a functional failure. 
0A clear definition of the conditions that indicate the imminence of the failure. 
Failure Mode. 
Failure Mode: "A single event, which causes a functional failure. "(SAE JA 1011 Aug 99). 
The component and system function is understood and the functional failures have been identified. 
It should then follow that the failure modes (cause of the failure) be recognized. For example, the 
fuel distribution system's function is to transfer metered fuel from the wing tanks to the engines. A 
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functional failure could be fuel starvation to the engines, the failure mode is the fuel pump impeller 
bearing has seized thus stopped pumping fuel. Understanding and recognizing the failure modes 
assist us in rectifying the failure mode and restoring the function of the system. 
Dealing with a failure mode when a functional failure has occurred is of course a reactive 
maintenance action. A proactive maintenance action would mean detecting the failure mode prior 
to a functional failure and dealing with it before a functional failure has occurred or when a potential 
failure is imminent. By identifying the failure modes prior to a functional failure you can identify 
maintenance actions to rectify the failure mode or identify maintenance actions that will prevent the 
failure mode, but not all failure modes are preventable through proactive maintenance actions, 
some failure modes require re design, improved operating procedures or improved operator 
training. 
An Example of Understanding Functional Failure and Failure Modes. 
An Integrated drive generator (IDG) is responsible for generating three phase 115 / 200v, 4001-lz 
AC power to supply an aircraft electrical system. The IDG is cooled by oil flowing through the 
component, if the oil flow is restricted or reduced, thus it looses its required cooling ability, the result 
will be an increase in IDG temperature, thus a functional failure of the IDG is imminent. By 
understanding the function of the IDG and its cooling system a functional failure of the IDG due to 
temperature increase has been identified, due to loss of cooling oil and this is recognized as a 
failure mode. Then the design engineer can introduce an IDG temperature warning light or better 
an oil pressure warning light to monitor the system and make evident to the operator to shut the 
system down when a functional failure is imminent. This is failure mode prevention by design. 
Equally a proactive maintenance action of frequent checking the IDG cooling oil level, ensuring a 
sufficient quantity exists in the system and toping it up as required is a proactive maintenance 
action to prevent a failure mode. Only by understanding the possible failure modes can a proactive 
redesign or proactive maintenance action be identified to prevent failure modes from occurring. 
Non-Deterioration Attributed Failure Modes. 
The mistake often made in the maintenance engineering profession is that maintenance is 
regarded as dealing with failure modes caused by deterioration of the system or component alone. 
Some other categories of failure modes often go missed. Such as human error induced failure 
mode or design flaw induced failure mode. To be considered thoroughly and complete, all natures 
and categories of failure modes must be considered. By recognizing human error or design 
induced failure modes the maintenance action may be quite different than if the failure mode is 
attributed directly to deterioration or wear out. The topic of design induced failure modes will be 
dealt with when the RCM analysis of the failure is carried out and often redesign of the system is a 
recommendation or a requirement of the analysis to prevent the failure, but the human error aspect 
of failure is about many issues such as correct training, clear and correct procedures, the right 
working environment. AM of these issues will be explored further later in the thesis. 
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Root Cause of the Failure Mode. 
While it is important that the reason for the failure mode is recognized at the "Root Cause", so an 
appropriate maintenance action can be determined, this could mean that one would go on forever. 
E. G. 
Subject: Fuel Pump in a fuel delivery system. 
Function : The fuel pump is to move fuel from the wing tanks to the engine fuel management 
system at a constant pressure of 30 psi and a minimum flow of 9,000kg/h. 
Functional Failure : Fuel supply to the engine is not sufficient to sustain constant ignition. 
Failure Mode : The fuel pump has failed in supplying the correct fuel pressure due to an impeller 
failure. 
but we could go further... 
- 
Failure Mode 2: The fuel pump impeller failure was due to the attaching nut braking off. 
Failure Mode 3: The impeller attaching nut broke off due to the nut not being split pin locked at 
manufacture. 
Failure Mode 4: The split pin was not inserted at manufacturers because the assembly procedure 
was not clear to the assembling production worker. 
The "Root Cause" was Human Factors, unclear work procedures for the assembly staff member. 
But for the purposes of identifying a manageable maintenance task for an identifiable failure mode 
we could stop at the first failure mode and as a reactive maintenance task replace the pump, or as 
a proactive design task add a pressure monitoring light in line of the pump to indicate low pressure. 
By not getting to the root cause an incorrect maintenance action could be decided upon. For 
example the failure mode analysis could of stopped at impeller attaching nut broke of, and the 
maintenance action to be taken is to inspect the impeller attachment nut for security and 
serviceability. While this will prevent the failure it does not address the root cause and costs time 
and money to rectify a defect that can be stopped in total by an alternative action. 
Reasons for failure modes will be examined in more detail later as this is a very important issue in 
the continued development of the aircraft maintenance programme. 
Consequence and Effects of Failure. 
The failure effects describes what happens if the failure mode actually occurs, i. e. the consequence 
of not preventing the failure mode. The consequence of failure can be anything from the modest 
cost of replacing a component to the destruction of a system and subsequent loss of lives. Later we 
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will see that the consequence of failure determines the priority of the maintenance activity or design 
improvement required to prevent its occurrence. 
The more complex any piece of equipment is, the more ways in which it can fail. All failure 
consequences can however be grouped in one of the following four categories... 
0 Safety Consequence. Involving possible loss of equipment and its occupants. 
9 Operational Consequence. Involves an indirect economic loss, such as a flight delay, as well 
as the direct cost of repair. 
0 Non Operational Consequence. Involves only the direct cost of repair. 
0 Hidden Failure Consequence. No direct impact but increases the likelihood of multiple failure. 
Safety Consequence. 
Does the failure cause a loss of function or secondary damage that could have a direct effect on 
operating safety? 
Suppose the fuel line to the engine fuel control unit became disconnected and caused fuel to be 
sprayed on the hot engine casing. This functional failure of the loss of engine thrust from fuel 
starvation would not in its self cause threat to the aircraft loosing altitude as the other engines could 
maintain forward thrust and altitude, but the secondary threat of an engine fire and possible 
subsequent wing fire would cause a great threat to both the aircraft and passenger lives. In this 
case the secondary effects are sufficient reasons to classify the failure as critical. A Critical Failure 
is a failure that could have a direct effect on safety. The impact of the failure must be immediate if 
the failure is to be considered direct that is the adverse effect must be one that will be felt before the 
planned completion of the flight. Further more a critical failure must result from a single failure and 
not as a result of a multiple failure, or some combination of this failure and another that has not yet 
occurred. An important fact follows from this... 
A ciffical failures will be evident to the operating crew. ff a failure has no evident resufts, it can 
not by definflion have a direct effect on safety. (Reliability Centred Maintenance F. S. Nowlan 
1978) 
What this means is that a failure that goes unnoticed or does not cause the cessation or 
interruption of a planned flight, i. e. whose consequence of failure is not evident to the operating 
crew or one that can be lived with without a threat of catastrophic results, can not be considered 
critical. 
Operational Consequence. 
Does the failure have a direct adverse effect on operational capabilfty? 
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In this case consequences are economic. The implications of the failure are the costs of non 
operation and the costs of repairing the failure mode. The failure of an inflation bottle for an escape 
slide, i. e. the bottle pressure is below the acceptable minimum. This does not prevent the aircraft 
from being dispatched to complete a flight, but restricts the number of passengers able to fly on 
board. The cost of the failure is the loss of revenue by a reduction of potential passengers and the 
cost of removing the slide and sending it for a bottle replacement. 
Hidden Failure Consequence. 
By definition hidden failures have no direct adverse effect (if they did they would not be hidden), but 
if a hidden failure goes undetected it potentially could have catastrophic consequences. For 
example the hydraulic pressure for the B737NG hydraulic flying controls is obtained by system A 
and system B engine driven hydraulic pumps. The hydraulic pressure is maintained at around 
3000ps! and if it drops below a pressure of 2000psi the standby hydraulic pump will start to 
supplement the reduction in pressure. A failure of the standby hydraulic pump will not be evident to 
the crew until the operation of the pump is required, so it is possible that the pump is in a failed 
state but hidden to the operating crew. The consequence of any hidden functional failure is 
increased exposure to the consequence of a multiple failure. 
Failure Protective Devises. 
Protective devices are increasingly being used in aircraft system design in an attempt to eliminate 
or at least reduce the consequences of failure. Modem aircraft protective devises work in one of six 
different ways... 
Aert Systems: to make the operating crew aware of an abnormal condition. These systems can be 
used for hidden failures as well as potential evident failures. The Master Caution system will alert 
the operating crew to failures and potential failures of critical systems as soon as they are detected. 
Hydraulic pressure low, fuel Pressure low, anti ice failure, equipment cooling failure, IRS failure will 
all cause a Master Caution warnings. Some of these failures will be evident and some may be 
hidden. While other alert systems will register failures but not annunciate them to the operating 
crew as they are detected because these failures are not regarded as critical and will not affect the 
normal operation of the aircraft. These failures can be brought to the attention of the maintenance 
crew when the aircraft is on the ground through maintenance messages in the aircraft's central 
computer system, that is interrogated by the receiving ground maintenance crew. The Built in Test 
Equipment (BITE) systems are now on almost all individual avionics components as well as many 
systems. The BITE will continuously initiate internal tests that will result in pass or fail light indication 
on the aircraft central computer or on the individual component. 
Shut down systems: These systems detect potential failures and to prevent them from becoming 
failures shut the system down. For example the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) start cycle include a 
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fuel flow and turbine exhaust gas temperature (TGT) monitoring system. If a certain fuel flow does 
not result in a reduction in TGT, it means that ignition has not taken place, therefore the detection 
system will stop the start cycle and shut down the engine operation, thus preventing a failure. 
Relief systems: These systems, usually used in pneumatic or hydraulic systems, will monitor the 
status of operation and enable a relief to take place when a failure mode has been reached. For 
example the hydraulic system of the B737NG maintains hydraulic pressure at 3000psi. The fluid 
reservoir experiences a head pressure of approximately 45psi to ensure positive feed to the 
pumps. If the head pressure rises above 65psi a relief valve will open in the reservoir and vent the 
excess pressure through a vent line and expelled overboard through a drain mast. 
Standby systems: These systems will not normally be operative until the failure of the prime system 
has occurred. Usually only essential systems have standby systems. The electrical power system 
is an example of a standby system with multiple redundancy built in. The main power for supply the 
main aircraft bus bars comes from AC generators, in the event of a generator failure or engine 
failure which will result in the generators failure to generate AC power, standby DC batteries will 
supply inverted DC to AC power on line through a standby power control unit. The standby system 
will now supply the essential electrical systems With AC power. 
Redundancy by Design systems: Modem Airliners have most critical systems duplicated by 
independent similar systems. For example the elevator of the B737NG is moved by two actuators. 
one actuator from the hydraulic system pressurized by engine number one driven pump and the 
other actuator from the hydraulic system pressurized by engine number two. Both these systems 
are similar in design but independent in function. The failure of system one will mean that system 
two will continue the operation of the elevator. 
Detection and Extinguishing systems: These systems are typically fire detection and extinguishing 
systems. Where a detector monitors temperature rise or air particle composition and activates an 
extinguishing to put out a fire. Engine fire systems (temperature detection) and cargo fire systems 
(temperature and particle detection) are typical areas that would employ such systems. 
The emergence of protective devices, protective systems and BITE has in irs self become a 
subject of failure assessment. The successful function of these devices is essential and is 
depended upon for safe operation of the aircraft. So a functional failure of a detection system may 
be a hidden failure and may allow for the possibility of a multiple failure. 
Multiple Failures and Failure of a Protective Device. 
A MuMple Failure is an event that occurs if a protected function fails while its protective device or 
Protective Systern is in a failed state. (SAE JAIOII Aug 99). Mso if a duplicated system 
(redundancy designed) is in a failed state and subsequently the duplicate system also fails. 
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Suppose systems A and B have a probability of surviving a2 hour flight 0.99 (99% chance of not 
failing, and a 11% chance of failing, which is a very high probability of failures rate), if system A and 
its protective device B( or duplicated system) are functioning in an aircraft at take off there are four 
possible out comes... 
0 System A survives and protective device B survives: P=0.99 x 0.99 = 0.9801 
0 System A survives and protective device B fails: P=0.99 x 0.01 = 0.0099 
0 System A fails and protective device B survives: P=0.01 x 0.99 = 0.0099 
0 System A fails and protective device B fails: P=0.01 x 0.01 = 0.0001 
This means there is a probability of 0.0001, that is once in 10,000 flights, that both system A and its 
protective device B will fail at the same time. ' 
Take for example a Boeing 737NG aircraft with two CFM156-7B engines. The actual world wide 
fleet figures of utilisation is 111,1185,593 engine hours. The rate of in flight engine shut down (IFSD) 
for that engine is 0.002 per 1,000 engine flight hours, (CFMI Fleet Highlights Jan 31 2002). This 
equates to a single failure every 500,000 engine flight hours. So the P(engine failure) = 1/500,000 
0.000002. P(engine survival) =1-0.000002 = 0.999998. 
0 Engine 1 survives and engine 2 survives: P=0.999998 x 0.999998 = 0.999996000004 
0 Engine 1 survives and engine 2 fails in flight: P=0.999998 x 0.000002 = 0.00000 1999996 
0 Engine 1 fails in flight and engine 2 survives: P=0.000002 x 0.999998 = 0.00000 1999996 
0 Engine I fails in flight and engine 2 fails in flight: P=0.000002 x 0.000002 = 0.000000000004 
So while the probability of a single engine in-flight failure is 0.000001999996, equating to a single 
failure every 500,000 flight hours, a double in flight engine failure has a Probability of 
0.000000000004. This equates to a double in-flight engine failure every 250,000,000,000 engine 
flight hours. 
The Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) is taken from a sample size and sample time. The 
inverse of the MTBF, i. e. 1/MTBF is the probability of failure rate. For example if a hydraulic pump 
has a MTBF of 10,000 flight hours, that means 10,000 flight hours is the average utilisation of a 
sample set of pumps. The probability that the pump will fail is P(failure) = 1/10,000 = 0.0001. 
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The Failure Process. 
A reduction in failure resistance can be the start of the failure process. This process involves a 
direct interaction between stress and resistance to failure. Fig 2.3 
Resistance to ladure 
Functonal Faitire 
Evosure to Wm 
The continued exposure to stress ultimately causes the aircraft's ability to resist failure to fail, 
resulting in a functional failure of the item. The continued exposure can be quantified in a variety of 
units. Calendar time, flight hours, pressurisation cycles, landings, engine cycles. AJI of these units of 
measure expose the aircraft to an element of stress. 
Unit of Measure Stress Effect Failure Mode 
Calendar Time Environmental Corrosion due 
to oxidation 
Structural Failure 
Flight Hours Wear due to usage Component Failure 
Pressurisation Cycles Fatigue due to fuselage 
expansion and contraction 
Structural Failure 
Landings Fatigue impact forces Structural Failure 
Engine Cycles Thermal cracking due to 
thermal cycle 
Structural Failure 
Table 2.1 
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The Functional Failure takes place when the stress and resistance to failure curves intersect., when 
the stress exceeds the remaining resistance to failure. This model is a simple model and is only 
Failure 
A B 
3 tress 
C D 
-alluie 
Stress 
applicable to a few failure modes, where a simple single type of stress is experienced. 
The figures above, Fig 2.5, show four scenarios of failure resistance that could be experienced in 
normal operation of an aircraft over a period of time. If we assume that the aircraft has an inherent 
designed ability to resist stress, and we assume different scenarios of the aircraft coping with that 
stress.... 
A: Resistance to stress remain constant over time, even though an increasing amount of stress is 
experienced. Ultimately as the applied stress intersects with the resistance to stress a functional 
failure is experienced. This scenario could be experienced as a result of inadequate maintenance 
not detecting a failing attachment. As the attachment gradually further fails, cyclic loads increase on 
other structure ultimately causing failure. 
B: Resistance to stress remains constant until a sudden excessive amount of stress is experienced 
that has the effect that it alters the inherent design resistance to stress thus resulting in a lowering 
of the aircraft's ability to resist stress permanently. No functional failure occurs on this occasion 
since the stress curve does not intersect with the resistance to stress curve. This scenario could 
occur when excessive stress is experienced during a heavy landing and permanent damage is 
done reducing the inherent resistance to failure and the damage is not detected or repaired thus 
the inherent resistance to failure is not restored. 
C: Resistance to stress remains constant until a sudden excessive amount of stress is experienced 
that has the effect that it alters the inherent design resistance to stress thus resulting in a lowering 
of the aircraft's ability to resist stress momentarily at the point the excessive stress is experienced. 
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The aircrafts inherent design resistance to stress recovers after the event passes. No functional 
failure occurs on this occasion since the stress curve does not intersect with the resistance to 
stress curve. This scenario could be after a heavy landing a special inspection is carried out and 
damage is detected and rectified, thus restoring the inherent design resistance to failure. 
D: Resistance to stress remains constant until a sudden excessive amount of stress is experienced 
that has the effect that it alters the inherent design resistance to stress thus resulting in a lowering 
of the aircrafts ability to resist stress at the point the excessive stress is experienced. The aircrafts 
inherent design resistance to stress does not recover and as a result of the damage to the aircraft 
the ability to resist stress continues to decrease until an intersection of the resistance and stress 
curves occur and a resulting function failure is experienced. This scenario could be the aircraft 
experiencing clear air turbulence and descending at an abnormal rate that causes excessive stress 
on the tail plane attachments. As a result damage is experienced on the attachments and goes un 
detected and un rectified. The inherent design resistance to stress not only is reduced but 
continues to reduce further until the tail attachments fail and the tail becomes detached from the 
aircraft causing a massive functional failure. (Latter we will consider the implications of scenario D, 
and in my opinion the necessary adjustment that should be made to any maintenance schedule 
when an other than ordinary event is experienced, increasing the applied stress on the aircraft or 
any system or component. ) 
The four graphs in fig 2.5 assume a simple system, in reality an aircraft is made of many simple 
stress bearing systems, making up a very complex system, that has many different stress 
resistance abilities and many different failure modes. With simple systems failure tends to 
concentrate around an average age, (age being time exposed to stress such as time in operation). 
With complex systems, unless the complex system has a dominant failure mode, the failure ages 
tend to be dispersed widely and are unrelated to operating age. Never the less, even in a complex 
system no matter how numerous the failure modes may be, the basic failure process still applies, 
the interaction between stress and resistance to failure. 
The aeroplane as a whole, fts basic structure, fts systems, and the various items in ft 
operate in an environment, which causes stress to be imposed upon them. The magnitudes, the 
duration and the frequencies, with which specific stresses are imposed are all very vadable. In 
many cases the real spectrum of environmentally produced stresses is not known. The abilfty to 
withstand stress is also variable. It differs from piece to piece of new nominally identical equipment 
due to material differences, variation in the manufacturing process, etc. The abilfty to with stand 
stress may also vary with the age of the piece of equipment. It is implied that an instance of 
environmental stress that exceeds the failure resistance items at a particular time constitutes failure 
of that itern at that time. (F. S Nowlan Unked aldines. 1960). 
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Failure and Operating Age. 
It used to be understood that as the age of a mechanical item increased the conditional probability 
of that component failing also increased. It was then deduced that as the age of the component 
increased towards a certain time, (this time would be calculated based on mean time between 
failure rates), to remove & apply an overhaul to that component would reinstate that components 
reliability & restore that component in the place at the start of the conditional probability failure 
curve. Fig 2.6A shows a traditional rate of failure curve over operating time. If maintenance 
programme developer is looking for a time interval to use for when to remove the component for 
overhaul, he may choose the MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures). The danger of this is that he 
will only prevent 50 percent of failures from happening but the component will have failed many 
times. The MTBF is not a good interval to use for an overhaul task. In fact the opinion of conducting 
overhauls for the sake of it is no longer an advisable task. Why encore expensive costs of removing 
a component when it has not failed or has not even started to exhibit failure behaviour. Latter we 
will look at this in detail and show how it is much more effective and appropriate to monitor the 
condition and performance of the component & remove it for overhaul when it exhibits failure 
behaviour. So removing components at pre defined operating ages for overhaul is an idea in the 
past. As identifying the ideal time in respect of operating age is not necessary, but identifying when 
a component no longer carries out the function as required is a more appropriate time to use for a 
removal task. Figure 2.613 shows the useful life as the period of time before the wear out stage. Use 
of this measure of time is more appropriate as an interval for removal. 
No of 
Failur Ptob 
of 
Failure 
OperatingAge 
Useful Life 
Fig 2 6A Fig 2 6B 
The original concept with regards to conditional probability of failure, where the condition is survival 
during a certain period of time, that probability of failure is directly related to operating age. As the 
operating age increases in the beginning there will be no or little increase in the probability of 
failure, a point will be reached, the wear out age, where the probability of failure will increase 
dramatically. Fig 2.7A shows the second generation concept, the bath tub curve, that probability of 
failure as the component is first introduced to operation is high, infant mortality, as a result of 
manufacturing defects, but settles down until the wear out age is reached where the probability of 
failure dramatically increases. In the late 70's United Airlines developed numerous conditional 
probability curves for failed aircraft components and finally identified six conditional probability of 
failure curves that stand. 
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Fig 27 
Fig 27 Shows age related probability of failure patterns. In each case the vertical axes represents 
the conditional probability of failure and the horizontal axes represents operating age since 
manufacture or since last overhaul. The six curves are derived from reliability analysis conducted 
over a number of years, during which all the items analysed were found to be characterised by one 
or the other age relationships shown. The data was taken from a United Airlines reliability study. 
A Representing 4% of aircraft components. The Bathtub Curve; starts with a period of infant 
mortality that appears at the initial stage of operation, due to manufacturing defects. A period of 
stable failure is followed by the Wear Our Stage where the component has a high probability of 
failure. 
B: Representing 2% of aircraft components. A constant level of failure probability followed by the 
Wear Out Stage. 
C: Representing 5% of aircraft components. Gradually increasing failure probability with no Wear 
Out Stage. 
D: Representing 7% of aircraft components. Low failure probability when the component is new 
followed by a quick increase to a constant level. 
E: Representing 14% of aircraft components. Constant probability of failure at all ages. 
F: Representing 68% of aircraft components. Infant Mortality stage followed by a constant or very 
slowly increasing failure probability. Particularly prominent with Electronic / Avionic equipment. 
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Curve A, B&C represents 11 % of aircraft components. Because components that exhibit this kind 
of probability of failure do have a point related to operating age when their probability of failure is 
high could benefit from a limit on their operating age. Curves D&E represents 21% of aircraft 
components that can not benefit from a life limitation as they have no real relationship between 
operating age and increasing probability of failure. Curve F represents 68% of aircraft components. 
Curve F: Is the most common pattern of the six probability of failure curves. The curve indicates 
that when the component is first or reintroduced to the aircraft it has a high probability of failure. 
This period is referred to as the Infant Mortality stage, and is due to many reasons... 
0 Poor design. Not capable of the task asked of it. A new modification unproven in the field. 
0 Poor quality of manufacture. Poorly assembled components by inadequately trained 
production staff. 
Poor quality of overhaul or repair. Poorly repaired components or incomplete overhauls. 
Overhauling a component does not return the component to its inherent reliability state and 
even introduces possibility of human error. 
0 Incorrect installation. Damage to the component at installation or miss alignment. 
0 Incorrect operation. The crew are not adequately trained and misuse the component. 
0 Unnecessary or Excessive invasive maintenance. Maintenance for the sake of it or with out 
a complete reason can disturb a perfectly operating piece of equipment. 
2.2.2 Failure Management through Scheduled Maintenance Tasks. 
A Reliability Centred Maintenance programme's objective is to maintain as far as possible, or to 
restore as far as possible a component or systems inherent design reliability through scheduled 
maintenance tasks. RCM takes into account that the conditional probability of failure of some failure 
modes will increase with age (or exposure to stress), but also that this is not the case for all failure 
modes and in fact some failure modes will not change or the conditional probability of failure will in 
fact reduce with age. The RCM process considers the failure consequences of the failure mode 
and also will consider the direct and indirect costs of the maintenance task and of the failure mode. 
Not only is the objective of RCM to reduce (ultimately to eliminate) the probability of the failure 
consequence through scheduled maintenance tasks, it also attains to apply only scheduled 
maintenance tasks, that have a purpose directly related to the prevention of the failure 
consequences from occurring. Scheduled maintenance tasks can be described in the form of four 
basic tasks 
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1. On Condition Tasks : (Predictive or Condition Monitoring). Used where a clearly defined 
potential failure period (P-F period) exists for the failure mode under consideration. For 
example a tyre inspection every day, the tyre stays installed if the wear is not to a certain limit, 
and is removed if the wear is at or beyond a certain limit The survival of the tyre is based on 
the condition it passes the inspection. 
2. Scheduled Discard Task : Used where a clearly defined age of increased conditional 
probability of failure exists for the failure mode under consideration. For example the 
passenger life jackets part number P0124W have a discard life of 10 years. The manufacturer 
has through studies shown that the useful life of the jackets, i. e. the period of time prior to when 
the wear out stage starts, is 10 years. After that the jackets have a high probability of failure 
due to the perishing rubber components. The cost of removal, replacing & restoring the jackets 
will cost more than purchasing a new jacket so the old jacket is discarded. 
3. Scheduled Restoration Task : Used where a clearly defined age of increased conditional 
probability of failure exists for the failure mode under consideration and the restoration task 
restores the components resistance to failure to a level that is tolerable. For example the main 
landing gear of a B737 built by Manesco, has a restoration life of 12 years or 15,000 cycles 
which ever is sooner. Manesco have through studies shown that the gears useful life is at 12 
years due to environmental effects or 15,000 cycles due to operating stress and the probability 
of failure rises considerable at this point which is the start of the wear out stage. But by 
restoration of the gear & its components the inherent reliability of the gear can be restored. 
4. Failure Finding Task : Used where the task can confirm that all components covered by the 
failure mode under consideration, are functional. (Not used for evident failure modes. ) For 
example a standby hydraulic pump that is not normally in use, is intentionally brought on line by 
perhaps simulating a failure of the main pumps, (pulling their circuit breakers) the performance 
of the standby pump is then monitored for correct function. 
The selection of the scheduled maintenance task to be accomplished, consists of determining an 
effective and applicable task. Applicability depends on the failure characteristics of the component 
or system under investigation, this means the scheduled maintenance task can only be applicable if 
it can detect a potential failure state, such as the end of the useful life or the beginning of the wear 
out stage. The effectiveness of a task can only be apparent if the task results in the avoidance of 
the failure consequences. 
Al scheduled maintenance tasks must meet the following criteria 
In the case of an evident failure mode that has safety consequences, the task shall reduce the 
probability of the failure mode to a level that is acceptable to the authorities, the manufacturer 
and the operator. If it is found that no scheduled maintenance task can be regarded as 
applicable and effective to address this failure mode redesign of the system must take place. 
(here it can be seen that the process of RCM is not only to identify scheduled maintenance 
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tasks to address failure modes, but also to identify areas of the design that need to be re 
designed. )
In the case of hidden failure mode where the associated multiple failure has safety 
consequences, the task shall reduce the probability of the hidden failure mode to an extent 
which reduces the probability of the associated multiple failure to a level that is acceptable to 
the authorities, the manufacturer and the operator. (Again if no scheduled maintenance task 
can be found applicable and effective re design must be considered. ) 
In the case of an evident failure mode that does not have safety consequences, the direct and 
in direct costs of doing the task shall be less that the direct and in direct costs of the failure 
mode when measured over comparable periods of time. 
In the case of a hidden failure mode where the associated multiple failures do not have safety 
consequences, the direct and indirect costs of doing the task shall be less than the direct and 
indirect cost of the multiple failures plus the cost of repairing the hidden failure mode when 
measured over a comparable period of time. 
2.2.3 The P-F Interval. 
The P-F Interval, Range or Period is the interval between the point at which the potential failure 
becomes detectable and the point at which a potential failure degrades into a functional failure. 
(This period is also known as the failure development period and the lead time to failure). 
Point where failure 
starts Pont where failure process can be detected 
Res to 
Failure 
P- '--, 
Operating Time Functional 
Failure 
Fig 28 
Figure 2.8 explains the P-F Curve. Where P is the point where the Potential Functional Failure has 
started and can be detected, as the reduction to resistance to failure is significant enough that it can 
be measures in relative terms. If the failing component is left undetected and uncorrected, F is the 
point where the Functional Failure will occurred. The P-F Interval is the time between when the 
Potential Failure process starts and when the Functional Failure has occurred. Note that the failure 
process may start well before the P point, but the reduction to resistance to failure is not sufficient 
enough that it can be detected. 
If an on condition task entails checking for potential failure, so that action can be taken to prevent 
the functional failure or to avoid the consequences of the functional failure. e. g. a visual inspection 
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for cracking of the gear up lock. The gear up lock is subject to stress each time the gear is 
extended and retracted and the components resistance to failure will reduce. Evidence of cracks 
can be found as a function of usage, in this case as a function of landings & takeoffs (aircraft 
cycles). Test data shows that the internal cracking can start at 10,000 cycles but at this time there is 
no threat to the component and therefore no need to replace or repair. Visible cracks to the naked 
eye start at 12,000 cycles. At 16,000 cycles the up lock will experience a functional failure if the 
cracks are left unattended. So in this case the P-F Interval is P=12,000cycles and 
F=16,000cycles. That means the window of opportunity to detect the cracks is 4,000cycles, to 
enable a possible repair. The longer the cracks are left to develop the larger the repair required. If 
the visual inspection is conducted at 9,000 cycles nothing will be found even at 11,000 cycles, it is 
not expected to result in finding a crack. 
In choosing an interval for an on condition task it is crucial that the P-F Interval is considered. For 
example, we know that based on design information that the Gear Up Lock will probably fail at 
16,000 cycles and the P-F Interval starts at 12,000 cycles. So an on condition inspection with an 
interval of 4000 cycles will be a waste of time twice, i. e. first inspection 4,000 cycles & second 
inspection 8,000 cycles, but at third inspection, 12,000 cycles we are entering the P-F Interval and 
could expect to find visible cracks. But further more the fourth inspection at 16,000 cycles we are at 
the functional failure point and could result in an expensive repair or in the worst case a failure. So 
the ideal interval for an on condition inspection in this case may be the following... 
Start Inspection at 10,000 cycles. This will detect early cracks if any visible. 
Repeat Inspection at every 2,000 cycles. This will allow three further inspection to take place in the 
P-F Interval at 12,000,14,000 and finally at 16,000 cycles. If no cracks are found the up lock can 
continue to exist untouched even at 18,000,20,000 cycles and so on till cracks are detected. 
ýnspedion 1 at 
12,000 
Inspection 2 
at 14,000 Inspection 3 at 
16,000 
Inspection 4 at 18,000 
12,000 cycles 
I 
cycles 
1 
16,000 cycles 
Time in Operation Potential Failure ' Functional Failure 
Fig 29 
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Figure 2.9 shows the example described above with the addition of including not only the initial 
inspection but also each repeat inspection interval. The manufacturer has determined that the the P 
-F Interval is 12,000 cycles to 16,000 cycles. He has stipulated that the inspections should start at 
12,000 cycles and should be repeated every 2,000 cycles. This way the inspector has two chances 
of detecting the failure before the probable Functional Failure. Since the Functional Failure is 
probable at 16,000 cycles it can be expected that the failure will definitely appear at 16,000 cycles 
so a third inspection and even a fourth inspection at 18,000 cycles will ensure that the appearance 
of a crack will be detected. 
Complying with Manufacturers Structural Inspections. 
Manufacturers fatigue stress inspection requirements are given in terms of cycles or flight hours. 
The interval the manufacturer gives is calculated from in service experience or from simulated 
cycles. If an operator carries out the inspection requirements much earlier than recommended by 
the manufacturer, he is in fact not meeting the intention of the inspection, but wrongly claiming 
compliance with the inspection. 
e. g. FAA AD 2001-14-08 Mandates the Boeing Structural Inspection Service Bulletin B737-53-2050 
to be done no later than at 20,000 cycles. 
All B737 operators are anxious to comply with the AD and to carry out the inspection. If Airline "N' 
carries out the inspection at 10,000 cycles and claims he has met the intention of the AD and the 
SIB and can close the inspection with no findings, he is in fact not meeting the intent of the 
inspection. The manufacturer knew at 10,000 cycles there was no threat of findings. The Airline is 
now in danger of allowing cracks in the area addressed by the AD and SIB to go undetected as they 
will not carry out the inspection at the manufacturer recommended interval when the cracks are 
believed to appear. 
SB 737-53-2050 Y AD 2001 
-14-18 
Inspection Inteival No Latef than 
20,000 cycles 
15,000 cycles 1 25,000 cycles 
Time in Operation Potential Failure ' Functional Failure 
Ra 2 10 
Figure 2.10 shows the example given above for manufacturers inspection SB 737-53-2050 which 
has been mandated by FAA AD 2001-14-18. The manufacturer has calculated thorough in service 
findings and through simulation that if a crack is to appear it will appear between the P-F Interval 
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of 15,000 to 25,000 cycles. To ensure early detection for the ability of an economic repair, but to 
ensure that the inspecton is carried out early enough into the P-F Interval, he has required the 
inspection to be done at 20,000 cycles. Due to the operational requirements an airline can not 
always conduct the manufacturers inspections right on the time they are required, so schedule 
them before the manufacturers call out time at the convenience of the operation. But if the airline 
conducts the inspection before 15,000 cycles, the P-F interval start 
, 
he will not find evidence of 
cracking, and will falsely consider the inspection requirement met and closed with no findings. 
The practice that I recommend for both type of inspections described in Fig 2.9, the repeating 
inspection and in Fig 2.10 the once off inspection is that they should not be first conducted at less 
than 90% of the manufacturers recommended time. This would ensure that the P-F Interval has 
been entered. This is especially appropriate for the once off inspection, where the crack can 
develop in the P-F Interval and go undetected. Also for the repeating inspection where downtime 
and manpower will be wasted early, but the saving grace is that the repeating inspections may 
detect the cracks. The alternative to this is that the manufacturer instead of giving a time not to 
exceed before doing the inspection a time range should be given. For example SB 737-53-2050 to 
be conducted before 20,000 cycles but no sooner than 15,000 cycles. 
Consideration to Events that will reduce the P-F Interval. 
The P-F Interval for a structural inspection takes into consideration normal operating conditions. 
But consideration to significant events that might affect the components or aircrafts resistance to 
failure and subsequently move the P-F Interval to the left should also be considered. For example 
if an aircraft experiences clear air turbulence and drops in altitude suddenly 10,000 feet, so much 
so that the resistance to stress line meets or comes close to the stress experienced line, such as 
shown in fig 2.5 B or D and subsequently does not recover to the structures inherent design 
resistance to stress level. This may well affect the P-F Interval for certain functional failures so in 
turn the inspection threshold should be adjusted. 
e. g. Manufacturers structural inspection of the vertical stabiliser attachments SB 737-53-2103 is to 
be accomplished at no later than 15,000 flight hours. This inspection has been recommended by 
the manufacturer due to the report of findings on four in operation aircraft who found cracking In the 
location at 18,320,22,134,21,258 and 23,040 flight hours. After structural engineers had looked 
closer at the problem aP-F Interval has been calculated and the inspection interval of 15,000 
flight hours is to be applied by operators. 
Now consider that all of the aircraft with findings never experienced significant unusual stress loads. 
No sudden drop in altitude, no clear air turbulence, no heavy landings, no excessive banks, then 
the resistance to stress of the aircraft can be considered as normal and usual. But consider an 
aircraft that has experienced manoeuvring exceedances or unusual stressful events that has 
caused the vertical stabiliser to permanently reduce it's ability to resist failure, then the inspection 
intervals for that component of the aircraft and structure should be reassessed for interval 
adjustment, or investigative inspections to determine exactly how the components are affected 
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should take place. While excessive stressful events are often evident to the operating crew and 
often reported to the maintenance and engineering sections, these events should be logged and 
considered for structural effect and permanent movement of the P-F Intervals as a result of the 
events. But often the continuous minor exceedances go un noticed and un reported. Over an 
aircraft's life this can be considerable and can have an effect on shifting the P-F Intervals of 
certain components. 
It is my opinion that significant events do not only merit once off inspection as a result of the 
exccedance, for example chapter 5-51-01 of the B737 maintenance manual calls for detailed 
additional structural inspections to be carried out on an aircraft when a heavy landing is reported 
by the pilot, flater we will be exploring the importance of Pilot reports and the impact on the 
maintenance programme). These structural inspections include inspection of sensitive areas that 
could be affected by the excessive force induced by the structure as a result of the heavy landing. 
Once carried out this inspection is not repeated and if no damage is detected no further inspection 
requirements or adjustments to the maintenance programme are required. While the inspection 
detailed in 5-51 
-01 takes care of visible signs of structural damage it does not take care of the non 
visible damage, such as the affect on the P-F Interval for the involved components of structure. 
C B 
S tress 
Fig 21 IA Fig 21 1B 
In figure 2.11 A we see the resistance to failure curve C that was considered earlier. This could be 
the theoretical curve representing the main plane to fuselage attachments. Under normal conditions 
stress loads are experienced and subsequent normalisation of design resistance to failure then 
occurs. Figure 2.11 B suggests that the forces experienced in the heavy landing affect the design 
resistance to failure in such a way that the design resistance to failure is not reinstated but the 
ability to resist failure is permanently reduced and is not detectable externally by inspection 5-51- 
10. In this case the P-F Interval for the main plane fuselage attachments is shifted to the left. 
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Point wheie failure Point where failure 
starts Pont where failure process can be detected starts Pont where failure process can be detected 
Res to Res to 25,000 flight cycles Failure 5,000 flight cycles Failure 
45,000 flight cycles 
F 
35,000 flight cycles 
Operating Time Functional Operating Time Functional 
Failure Failure 
Fig 2 12A Fig 2.12B 
Figure 2.12A suggests the main plane to fuselage attachments have a design P-F Interval of 
35,000 to 45,000 flight cycles. Figure 2.12B suggest after the significant event of a heavy landing 
(the heavy landing is taken as an example only to demonstrate a possible scenario), the P-F 
Interval has shifted to the left, and is now 25,000 flight cycles to 35,000 flight cycles. This could 
mean that any scheduled maintenance inspection from the maintenance programme or any 
additional manufacturers service bulletin inspection whose interval has been determined by the 
design P-F Interval now has a possibility of missing the P-F Interval thus allowing the crack to start 
and proceed to a functional failure with out detection. Or the cracks detection will be at a stage in 
the P-F Interval where the rectification action will be economically excessive. 
My suggestion here is that consideration should be given to significant events, as a result of the 
undetectable internal damage that affects the P-F Interval, that occurs as a result of these 
significant stressful event. Thus consideration to the reduction of scheduled maintenance 
inspections intervals should follow. Equally not only significant events should be considered for a 
shift in the P-F Interval but also operating environment. At a later stage in the thesis we will 
consider the affects of in operational data and operational conditions to the maintenance 
programme. 
2.2.4 RCM Analysis, the Process. 
Reliability Centred Maintenance refers to a scheduled maintenance programme designed to realise 
the inherent reliability capabilities of the aircraft and its systems, thus allowing the aircraft and its 
systems to operate as they were designed, through analysis utilising a "top down approach" or 
consequence of failure approach. Reliability Centred Maintenance is a process that will ensure that 
all the following seven questions are answered... 
a. What are the functions and associated required standards of performance of the aircraft and 
systems in its present operating context (functions)? 
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b. In what ways can it fail to fulfil its functions (failure modes)? 
c. What causes each functional failure (mode)? 
d. What happens when each failure occurs (failure effect)? 
e. In what way does each failure matter (failure consequence)? 
f. What should be done to predict or prevent each failure (proactive tasks and task intervals)? 
g. What should be done if a suitable proactive task cannot be found (default actions)? 
The process of evaluating failure consequence and maintenance tasks is facilitated by a decision 
diagram technique. The first step is to decide on a level of analysis 
. 
If the level of analysis is too 
high the analysis becomes too superficial, while if the level is too low the analysis can become 
unmanageable and unintelligible. 
(Note: The RCM philosophy described from now on is that recognised and described by the 
ATA in the MSG-3 Revision 2001.1 document. Later in the thesis, chapter 3, the 
development of the initial RCM philosophy to get to MSG-3 Revision 2001.1 will be 
described). 
Deciding Upon the Level to Conduct the Analysis. 
When considering the failure modes of an aircraft gas turbine engine, a possible failure mode 
would be a blocked fuel line. The fuel line is part of the fuel system 
, 
so it would be better and more 
appropriate to address the fuel system as a system in its self rather than as an analysis of the 
complete engine. 
The aircraft lends itself to an almost obvious level with three major areas of divisions. These are 
the.. 
Aircraft Systems. 
2. Aircraft Structure. 
3. Aircraft Powerplant. 
Each major division can be further partitioned into functional areas utilising the -Air Transports 
Associations Specification 100 (ATA 100) System chapterisation and sub system chapterisation. 
30 
Aircraft Systems Aircraft Structures Aircraft Powerplant 
21 Air-conditioning 51 Structures 71 Power Plant 
22 Auto Flight 52 Doors 72 Engine 
23 Communications 53 Fuselage 73 Engine Fuel & Control 
24 Electrical Power 54 Nacelles / Pylons 74 Ignition 
25 Equipment & Furnishings 55 Stabilisers 75 Air 
26 Fire Protection 56Wndows 76 Engine Controls 
27 Flight Controls 57 Wings 77 Engine Indication 
28 Fuel 78 Exhaust 
29 Hydraulic Power 79 Oil 
30 Ice & Rain Protection 80 Starting 
31 Instruments 
32 Landing Gear 
33 Lights 
34 Navigation 
35 Oxygen 
36 Pneumatics 
38 Water & Waste 
49 Auxiliary Power Unit 
Table 22 
Table 2.2 shows the standard ATA 100 Chapters covering the aircraft systems, structures and 
powerplant. If we use these chapters to identify the areas for study, we can then conduct the RCM 
analysis of the sub chapters to identify the Significant Items. A significant item is one whose failure 
could affect operating safety or have a major economic consequence. The definition of a major 
economic consequence will vary from one operator to another but in most cases it includes any 
functional failure whose failure mode involves high repair costs. The failures that are of concern 
are those which have serious consequences. Thus an RCM programme directs tasks at a relatively 
small number of items, those systems, sub systems and assemblies whose functional failure would 
be significant at the equipment level either immediately or downstream in the event of a hidden 
failure. 
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Aircraft 
DhAsion 
rS-t-ructures 
4--rA 
Syst. 
Subsysten 
Fig 2 13 
I Powerplant I 
Figure 2.13 shows the partitioning of an aircraft into its major functional areas, going to the ATA 
subsystem level. This level is considered the highest manageable level. Le. one which is high 
enough to avoid unnecessary analysis, but low enough to be properly analysed and ensure that all 
functions, failures, and causes are covered. It may be in some cases necessary to go to the 
component level of a subsystem if it is felt that a significant item exists at that level. The objective is 
to find the level of each system or assembly that can be classified as significant. 
A Significant Items are those items whose failures 
a. could affect safety (on ground or in flight), 
b. could be undetectable or are not likely to be detected during operations, 
c. could have significant operational impact, 
d. could have significant economic impact. 
The danger of selecting too low a level can result in identifying thousands of significant items rather 
than hundreds. For example, the eight attachment bolts of the wheel hub, would be a too low a 
level to conduct analysis. As the analysis of the failure modes of the wheel itself would involve the 
dentification of the failure mode of hub separation due to hub attachment bolt failure. So often ATA 
subsystem and using engineering judgement with a knowledge of the RCM analysis process will 
reduce the amount of significant items without missing failure modes. (in actual fact the 
manufacturer prepares the identification of the Significant Items separately for the group about to 
conduct the RCM analysis). 
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The splitting of the aircraft into systems and subsystems enables the potential identification of 
significant items. Detailed analysis of those potential items will then identify actual significant items 
that may benefit from scheduled maintenance. This involves identifying the failure consequences 
then qualifying them as significant or non significant. Even when an item is identified as significant 
as a result of its failure consequence it may not in fact benefit from scheduled maintenance. These 
items must then be further analysed for an alternative action, such as redesign. 
The identification of the significant item requires asking four questions of that subsystem. These 
four questions will identify whether the subsystem or item is in fact a significant item. The question 
investigates the failure consequences of the item or subsystem.... 
1. Could the failure have an adverse effect on safety on the ground or in flight? 
If the aircraft is unable to continue a flight path or if injury might occur to a flight cabin or crew 
member, passenger, or ground crew due to the failure, then adverse effect on safety exists. 
2. Is the failure undetectable during operations? 
Is the flight or cabin crew aware of the failure of the system by some cockpit or cabin 
indications? Is subject to a logbook write up? 
3. Could the failure have significant operational economic impact? 
If the failure results in flight delay (i. e. it can not be deferred per the MEL or it requires more 
than 15 minutes to repair), it will have a significant operational economic impact. 
4. Could the failure have significant non-operational economic impact? 
If the failed system is costly to repair and could be the subject of preventative maintenance, 
then it has significant non-operational economic impact. 
If the answer to any of these question is yes, then the subsystem or component is considered as a 
Significant Item and is then subject to a complete RCM analysis. 
ATA System- Description Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 slgnfflcant 
Subsystem 
kem 
26-16 Cargo Bay Smoke Y Y Y N Y 
Detection 
1-ig 2.14 
Figure 2.14 shows the analysis of the B737NG Cargo smoke detection subsystem ATA 26-16. This 
subsystem answers yes to three of the four questions so is classified as a significant item and is 
therefore subject to further RCM analysis. 
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Analysis of Failure Consequences. 
Before starting the RCM analysis of functional failures it is required to understand the complete set 
of functions required of a system or item, then from that define what constitutes a functional failure. 
This process also demands knowledge of the failure modes and possible failure effects of each 
failure. 
Taking the example given in Fig 2.14 of the Significant Item ATA 26-16 the Cargo Bay Smoke 
Detection System we must first understand the system and its components in its complete context. 
26-00 Fire Protection 
1 26-10 Fire Detectýioýn 
26-11 
-00 Engine Fire 26-12-00 Wheel Well 
Deteclion 
II 
Fire Detedon 
1 26-20 Fire Extinguishing I 
26-13-00 Cargo Bay 26-14-00 Over Heat 26-15-00 APU Fire 
Smoke Detedon 
II 
Detedon 
II 
Detection 
26-13-XI Cargo Bay Smoke Detector Unit 
26-13-X2 Cargo Electronic Unit 
26-13-X3 Cargo Fire Control Panel 
A full functional description of the system is required for study to ensure that a complete 
understanding of the system, subsystem and its components functions is obtained to enable the 
RCM analysis to be conducted in detail and properly. Later in the thesis we will see actual 
examples of RCM analysis, for now we will continue to examine the theory of the process. Once 
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each function of each system, subsystem and component has been defined, it is now possible to 
evaluate the actual consequence of failure. 
The aircraft has been divided then subdivide into systems & subsystems using the ATA 100 
chapters & subchapters. Each subsystem has been subjected investigation to identify whether as 
a result of their failure consequences, they can be identified as a Significant Item. Then for each 
significant item the following must be identified... 
1. Function(s) 
- 
the normal characteristics of an item. 
2. Functional Failure(s) 
- 
Failure of an item to perform its intended function within specified limits. 
3. Failure Effect(s) 
- 
what is the result of a functional failure 
4. Failure Modes (Causes) 
- 
why the functional failure occurs 
When listing the four items above, care should be taken to identify the functions of all protective 
devices. These include devises with the following functions: 
a. to draw attention of the operating crew to abnormal conditions. 
b. To shut down equipment in the event of a failure. 
c. To eliminate or relieve abnormal conditions which follow a failure. 
d. To take over from a function that has failed. 
Using the RCM Decision Tree to Identify The Consequence Of Failure. Level 1. 
The consequence of functional failure depends up on both the nature of the function and the nature 
of the failure. Hence the importance of identifying and listing items 1 to 4 above. The RCM decision 
tree has two levels of investigation. The first level evaluates each functional failure to determine the 
Failure Effect Category. 
Failure Effect Catewries. 
0 Safety (Category 5) 
0 Operational (Category 6) 
* Economic (Category 7) 
0 Hidden Safety (Category 8) 
0 Hidden Non Safety (Category 9) 
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RCM Level 1. Functional Failure Evaluation. ý 
Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the 
operating crew during the perforrnance of nomial duties? 
Yes 
Does the functional failure or 
secondary damage resulting from the 
functional failure have a direct adverse 
effect on oDeratina safetv? 
Yes I No 
No 
Does the combination of a hidden 
functional failure and one additional 
failure of a system related or back 
up function have an adverse effect 
on operating safety? 
Does the functional failure have a direct 
adverse effect on operating capability? 
Yes I No 
Operational Effect: Non Operational Hidden Safety Hidden Non Safety Safety Effect: Cat 5. Task Cat 6. Task desirable if it Economic Effect: Effect: cat 8. Task Economic Effect: cat 9. Task required to assure safe operation reduces risk to an 
acceptable level. 
Cat 7. Task desirable ff it required to assure the desirable to assure the availability 
costs less than repair. availability necessary necessary to avoid economic effects 
to avoid effects of of multiple failures. 
404 
multiple failure. 
10 
Impact Immediate Impact Delayed 
Fig 2 15 
RCM Level I analysis the Functional Failures. Figure 2.15 is the Level I decis! on diagram I used to 
analyse significant items and hidden functions on the basis of failure consequence. Failures that 
affect safety or operating capability have an immediate impact, since the aircraft can not be 
dispatched until they have been corrected. The impact of non-operational failures and hidden 
failures is delayed in the sense that correction can be deferred to a convenient time and location. 
The first question asked of the functional failure is whether we will know when a failure has 
occurred. 
1. Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the 
performance of normal duties? 
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This question must be asked of each function of the significant item under analysis. The loss of a 
function of an item may well be evident but any secondary functions that have been affected may 
not be evident to the operating crew. The operating crew consist of qualified flight and cabin crew 
personnel who are on duty. Remember earlier we said that any functional failure which has a direct 
effect on operational capability will always be evident to the operating crew. If the loss of a function 
is not evident, the loss of that function has no immediate impact. This means that if the answer to 
the first question is no, then the failure could go undetected, that means scheduled maintenance to 
try to identify a hidden functional failure is required. The scheduled maintenance task should not 
necessarily be selected to attempt to prevent the failure of the hidden function but to detect the 
failure to allow rectification of the failure to take place to prevent the possibility of a multiple failure. 
(see + below). Any credit taken for flight crew checks for the detection of a failure must be 
supported by conformation that the check is in the duties of the crew member detailed in the 
Aircraft Flight Manual. If the answer to the question is yes, the functional failure will be evident to 
the operating crew, then we need to analyse how serious are the consequences of the failure by 
asking further questions. 
Z Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure 
have a direct adverse effect on operating safety? 
This question must be asked for each functional failure and for each failure mode. In most cases of 
modern aircraft the answer is no except in a few exceptional cases such as engine failure. A yes 
answer to this question means that preventative maintenance is mandatory and can be considered 
effective only if it prevents all occurrences of this type of failure. This failure is categorised as 
Category 5 Evident Safety. If the answer to this question is no, the next consideration is economic. 
4. Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operational capability? 
The consequences in this case may be interruption to the operation, reduced capability of the 
aircraft, delay, and diversion or flight cancellation. In these cases scheduled maintenance is not 
required for safety reasons but may be desirable for economic reasons. Thus if the answer to this 
question is yes the scheduled maintenance task must be cost effective, that means less expensive 
that the failure consequences. A proactive maintenance task is only worth doing if it costs less over 
a period of time that the cost of the operational consequence plus the cost of repairing the failures 
which it is meant to prevent. A yes answer to this question is categorised as Category 6 Evident 
Operational Economic. A no answer is categorised as Category 7 Evident Non Operational 
Economic. 
Non Evident Hidden Failures. Question 3 leads from a no answer to question I and deals with 
the hidden non evident failures. 
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I Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system 
related or back up function have an adverse effect on operating safety? 
If the answer to this question is no, the failure is then a hidden functional failure. As detailed earlier 
the issue with a hidden failure is the possibility of a multiple failure occurring. So to enable this issue 
to be addressed the following question must be analysed., A no answer to this question is 
categorlsed as Category 9 Hidden Non Safety Economic while a yes answer to this question is 
categorised as Category 8 Hidden Safety. 
Now we have the answer to the three questions of the level 1 analysis we can go to the second 
level to evaluate a possible maintenance task to address each failure possibility. 
Using the RCIVI Decision Tree To Identify Scheduled Maintenance Tasks. Level 2. 
Section 2.2.2 describes some of the aspects of the scheduled maintenance task.... 
The selection of the scheduled maintenance task to be accomplished consists of determining an 
effective and applicable task. Applicability depends on the failure characteristics of the component 
or system under investigation, this means the scheduled maintenance task can only be applicable if 
it can detect a potential failure state, such as the end of the useful life or the beginning of the wear 
out stage. The effectiveness of a task can only be apparent if the task results in the avoidance of 
the failure consequences. 
The second level analyses the Failure Mode (Cause) and attempts to find a task that is both 
applicable and effective in preventing the Failure Mode (Cause) from happening. This phase of 
RCM analysis involves a systematic study of each failure mode to determine whether one of the 
four basic maintenance tasks will satisfy both the criteria for applicability and specific conditions for 
effectiveness. 
The Four Basic Maintenance Tasks. 
I. On Condition Task 2. Scheduled Discard Task 
3. Scheduled Restoration Task 4. Failure Finding Task 
Depending upon the Failure Effect Category of the Level One analysis, the Level Two analysis will 
change a little. The applicable and effective conditions for the scheduled maintenance task for the 
different categories change... 
Cat 5. Evident Safety Effect: The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is required to assure 
safe operation. (See fig 2.16) 
Cat 6. Evident Operational Effect: The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is desirable if it 
reduces risk to an acceptable level. (See fig 2.17) 
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Cat 7. Evident Economic Effect: The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is desirable if the 
cost is less than the repair. (See fig 2.18) 
Cat 8. Non Evident Safety Effect: The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is required to 
assure the availability necessary to avoid the safety effects of a multiple failure. (See fig 2.19) 
Cat 9. Non Evident Non Safety: The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is desirable to 
assure the availability necessary to avoid economic effects of a multiple failure. (See fig 2.20) 
In the endeavour to maximise the effectiveness of the scheduled maintenance task, modem RCM 
techniques have taken the four basic tasks and developed them further for the use with modem 
complex systems such as the aircraft. This further development of the RCM technique is referred to 
as MSG3. Later we will look closer at the implication of MSG3 that depart from true RCM, for now it 
is required that the MSG3 scheduled maintenance tasks are those considered for the level 2 
analysis of the Failure Mode (Cause). The Four Basic maintenance tasks are developed further to 
produce five proactive scheduled maintenance tasks... 
The MSG3 Six Basic Maintenance Tasks. 
MSG3, later described in detail, takes the RCM tasks further 
1. Lubrication / Servicing (LU/SV) 2. Operational / Visual Check (OPNC) 3. Inspection / Functional 
Check (IN/FC) 4. Restoration (RS) 5. Discard (DS) 6. Combination of Tasks. 
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RCM Level Z Evaluating The Proposed Maintenance Tasks thr Category 5, Evident Safety Effects. 
I Lubdcafion / Servidn 
InspecHon 1FuncHonal 
Check 
1 
l> 1 
Restorabon 
Is a lubricadon or servicing 
task applicable or effecUve? 
] 
Yes I No 
Is an Inspection or 
Functional check to detect 
degradation of fUnction 
awlicable or effective? 
Yes No 
Is a restoradon Itask to 
reduce failure rate 
applicable or effecfive? 
Yes I No 
Is a discard task to avoid 
failures or to reduce the 
failure rate applicable or 
effeclive? 
Discard 
No 
Yes 
I 
Yes 
Is there a task or 
combination of tasks 
applicable " effective? 
No 
Task I Combination most 
effective must be done. 
Redesign is Mandatory 
Figure 2 16 RCM Level 2 Evaluating The Proposed Maintenance Tasks for Evident Safety Failure 
Effects Category 5 The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is required to assure safe 
operation. A# questions in this caLe_q-o& must be asked. If no applicable and effective task(s) result 
from this analysis, then redesign is mandatory. 
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RCM Level Z Evaluating The Proposed Maintenance Tasks for Categoty 6, Evident Operational Effects. 
I Lubdcabon/ S 
Inspecton / Fundonal 
Check 
I Restorabon 
I Discard I 
Is a lubrication or servicing 
task applicable or effecdve? 
Yes I No 
Is an Inspection or 
Functional check to detect 
degradation of function 
aDDlicable or effective? 
-4- 
1 
Yes No 
Is a restoration task to 
reduce failure rate 
applicable or effective? 
. 
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No 
Yes 
V 
Is a discard task to avoid 
failures or to reduce the 
failure rate applicable or 
effective? 
Yes 
No 
Redesign May Be 
Desirable. 
Figure 2 17 RCM Level 2 Evaluating The Proposed Maintenance Tasks for Evident Operational 
Failure Effects Category 6. The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is desirable if it reduces 
the risk of failure to an acceptable level. After the Lubrication question has been answered, a yes 
answer to any of the other questions will result in the analysis being completed. if the analysis 
shows no selection of task and the operational penaftles are severe, redesign may be desirable. 
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RCM Level Z Evaluating The Proposed Maintenance Tasks thr Category 7, Evident Economic Effects. 
Is a lubricalion or servicing 
task applicable or effective? 
Lubdcafion/ Servicin 4 
Yes No 
I 
Is an Inspection or 
1-unctional check to detect 
degradation of function 
aDDlicable or effective? 
InspecUon / Functional 
.41 
Check 
Yes No 
Is a restoration task to 
reduce failure rate 
applicable or effective? 
Restorabon 
.4 
No 
Yes 
I Is a discard task to avoid 
failures or to reduce the 
failure rate applicable or 
effective? 
I 
I Discard 
No 
Redesign May Be 
Desirable. 
Figure 2 18 RCM Level 2 Evaluating The Proposed Maintenance Tasks for Evident Economic 
Failure Effects Category 7. The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is desirable if the cost 
of the task is less than the repair resulting from not doing the task After the Lubrication question 
has been answered, a yes answer to any of the other questions will result in the analysis being 
completed If the analysis shows no selection of task and the economic penalties are severe, 
redesign may be desirable. 
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RCM Level 2 Evaluating The Proposed Maintenance Tasks for Category 8, Non Evident Safety Effects. 
I Lubdcadon/ 
Operational I Visual 
Check 
I 
lo, 
I 
Inspecdon / Funcdon 
Check 
Is a lubdcabon or servicing 
task applicable or effective? 
Yes I No 
Is a check to verify 
operation applicable or 
effective? 
Yes 
No 
Is an Inspection or functional 
check to detect degradation of 
function applicable or effective? 
4 
No 
Yes 
Is a restoration task to 
reduce the failure rate 
applicable or effective? 
Yes 
Restorabon 41 No 
Is a discard task to avoid 
failures or reduce the failure 
rate applicable or effective? 
Yes 
Discard 
No 
IF Yes 
Is there a task or 
combination of tasks 
applicable & effective? 
No 
Redesign Is Mandatory 
Task /Combination 
most effective must 
be done 
Figure 219 RCM Level 2 Evaluating The Proposed Maintenance Tasks for Non Evident Safety 
Failure Effects Category 8. The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is required to assure 
the availability necessary to avoid the safety effects of a multiple failure. 
categg& must be asked If no applicable and effective task(s) result from this analysis, then 
redesign is mandatory. 
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RCM Level 2 Evaluating The Proposed Maintenance Tasks for Cat 9, Non Evident Non Safety Effects. 
Is a lubricafion or servicing 
task applicable or effective? 
Lubdcation / Servidn 
yes No 
IF 
Is a check to vedfy 
operation applicable or 
effecdve? 
Operational / Visual 
Check 
Yes NO 
Is an Inspection or functional 
check to detect degradation of 
fUnction applicable or effective? 
Inspedon / Fundon No 
Check 
I 
Yes 
Is a restorabon task to 
reduce the failure rate 
applicable or effective? 
Restmfion 
Yes No 
Is a discard task to avold 
failures or reduce the failure 
rate applicable or effecfive? 
yes 
Discard 
No 
Redesign May Be Desirable 
Figure 220 RCM Level 2 Evaluating 7he Proposed Maintenance Tasks for Non Evident Non 
Safety Failure Effects Category 9. The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is desirable to 
assure the availabiW necessary to avoid the economic effects of a multiple failures. After, the 
Lubrication question has been answered, a yes answer to any of the other questions will result in 
the analysis being completed. If the analysis shows no selection of task and the economic penalties 
are severe, redesign may be desirable. 
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The Six Possible Scheduled Maintenance Tasks. 
As we had seen earlier the four basic RCM scheduled maintenance tasks.. 
1. On Condition Task 
2. Rework Task 
3. Discard Task 
4. Failure Finding Task 
were further developed to an MSG3 application to six possible scheduled maintenance tasks 
1. Lubrication / Servicing Task 
2. Operational / Visual Check 
3. Inspection / Functional Check 
4. Restoration Task 
5. Discard Task 
6. Combination of Tasks. 
... 
each task is considered for each significant item and the question of whether the task is 
applicable and effective is asked of each failure effect. The order of the questions is as a result of 
the complexity of the scheduled task, starting with the least complex task first. 
1. Lubrication / Servicing Task: Any act of lubrication or servicing for the purpose of maintaining 
inherent design capabilities can qualify as applicable if by replenishing the consumable, the 
rate of functional deterioration is reduced. Next the task must qualify as effective. The 
qualification criteria differs for each category. For Safety category the task must reduce the risk 
of failure. For Non Safety Operational category the task must reduce the risk of failure to an 
acceptable level. For Non Safety Economic the task must be cost effective. 
2. OperationalNisual Check: This task is for hidden categories only. An operational check is a 
task to determine that an item is fulfilling its intended purpose. The check does not require 
quantitative tolerances. This is a failure finding task. A visual check is an observation to 
determine that an item is fulfilling its intended purpose. The check does not require quantitative 
tolerances. The operational/visual check can qualify as applicable when positive identification 
of the failure is possible. Next the task must qualify as effective. The qualification criteria differs 
for each category. For Safety category the task ensure adequate availability of the hidden 
function to reduce the risk of a multiple failure. For Non Safety Economic the task must ensure 
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adequate availability of the hidden function in order to avoid economic effects of multiple 
failures and be cost effective. 
3. Inspection/Functional Check: (On Condition task) An inspection is an examination of an item 
against a specific standard. A functional check is a quantitative check to determine if one or 
more functions of an item perform within specific limits. An Inspection/Functional check is 
applicable when a reduced resistance to failure is detectable, and there exists a reasonable 
consistent interval between deterioration condition and functional failure, the reduction in failure 
resistance must be gradual and the rate must be predictable. It must be possible to define a 
potential failure condition. Next the task must qualify as effective. The qualification criteria 
differs for each category. For Safety category the task must reduce the risk of failure to assure 
safe operation. For Non Safety Operational the task must reduce the risk of failure to an 
acceptable level. For Non Safety Economic the task must be cost effective, Le. the cost of the 
task must be less than the cost of the failure prevented. 
The definition of an (On Condition) Inspection is available from ATA Booklet MSG3 revision 2002.1. 
In this booklet the inspection is standardised to three types of inspection.... 
An inspection is: 
A. GENERAL VISUAL INSPECTION (GVI) 
A visual examination of an interior or exterior area, installation or assembly to 
detect obvious damage, failure or irregularity. This level of inspection is made 
from within touching distance, unless otherwise specified. A mirror may be 
necessary to enhanced visual access to all exposed surfaces in the inspection 
area. This level of inspection is made under normally available lighting conditions 
such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight or drop-light and may require removal 
or opening of access panels or doors. Stands, ladders or platforms may be 
required to gain proximity to the area being checked. 
OR 
B. DETAILED INSPECTION (DE7) 
An intensive examination of a specific item, installation or assembly to detect 
damage, failure or irregularity. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a 
direct source of good lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate. Inspection aids 
such as mirrors, magnifying lenses, etc. may be necessary. Surface cleaning 
and elaborate access procedures may be required. 
OR 
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C. SPECIAL DETAILED INSPECTION (SDI) 
An intensive examination of a specific item, installation, or assembly to detect 
damage, failure or irregularity. The examination is likely to make extensive use of 
specialized Inspection Techniques andlor equipment Intricate cleaning and 
substantial access or disassembly procedure may be required. 
4. Restoration Task: The work necessary to return the item to a specific standard. Since 
restoration may vary from cleaning or replacement of single parts up to a complete 
overhaul, the scope of each assigned restoration task has to be specified. A restoration 
task is applicable if the item shows functional degradation characteristics at an identifiable 
age and a large proportion of units must survive to that age. There must be an identifiable 
age at which there is a rapid increase in failure probability. It must be possible to restore 
the item to a specific standard of failure resistance. The qualification criteria differs for 
each category. For Safety category the task must reduce the risk of failure to assure safe 
operation. For Non Safety Operational category the task must reduce the risk of failure to 
an acceptable level. For Non Safety Economic category the task must be cost effective, 
i. e. the cost of the task must be less than the cost of the failure prevented. 
5. Discard Task: The removal of an item from service at a specified life limit. Discard task 
are normally applied to so called single celled parts such as cartridges, canisters 
cylinders, engine disks, safe life structural members etc. A discard task is applicable 
when the item shows functional degradation characteristics at an identifiable age and a 
large proportion of units must survive to that age, Le. there must be an Identifiable age 
that at which there is a rapid increase in failure probability (for safety items all 
components must survive to the scheduled removal time). In addition it should not be 
possible or cost effective to restore that component to a condition of low failure probability 
or the criteria for an on aircraft functional check or inspection can not be met. The 
qualification criteria differs for each category. For Safety category a safe life limit must 
reduce the risk of failure to assure safe operation. For Non Safety Operational category 
the task must reduce the risk of failure to an acceptable level. For Non Safety Economic 
category the task must be cost effective, i. e. the cost of the task must be less than the 
cost of the failure prevented. 
6. Combination: This task is for safety categories only. Since this is a safety category 
question and a task is require, all possible avenues must be analysed. To do this a review 
of the task(s) that are applicable is necessary. From this review the most effective task(s) 
must be selected. 
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MSG3 Scheduled Maintenance Task Development. 
Original RCM techniques identified the four basic scheduled maintenance task. MSG3 applied that 
logic further developing the four basic tasks into five tasks and a task combination. The scheduled 
on condition task is a task to detect potential failures. Therefore the subject must manifest 
symptoms of a failing period, the P-F range. The task must be capable of identifying physical 
evidence of a reduced resistance to failure. The definition of the inspection interval is dependant on 
technical data from the design engineers or even better from in operation experience. As described 
in previous section 2.2.2 on the scheduled maintenance task, the interval of the on condition task 
must be sufficient enough to ensure detection of the potential failure in the P-F range before the 
failure occurs. MSG3 logic developed the on condition task to Inspection or Function check. The 
inspection task which can be either GVI, DIET or SDI as shown above, is to visually detect a 
potential failure, while the function check is to measure and identified a potential failure in the 
performance of a system or component. The MSG3 task description develops further the idea of 
the RCM on condition task understanding that specifics are required and identifies the difference 
between the Visual and the functional checks. The scheduled failure finding task is a task to detect 
non evident failures. Although such tasks are intended to locate functional failures rather than 
potential failures, they can be viewed as a type of on condition maintenance, since the failure of a 
hidden function can be considered as a potential failure of a multiple system. The MSG3 task 
description develops further the idea of the RCM failure finding task detailing it as an operational or 
visual check to determine that the system or component is fulfilling its intended purpose. Lubrication 
and servicing tasks were additions to the RCM scheduled maintenance tasks that took, into 
consideration the needs of serviceable systems and components where a preventative 
maintenance task such as replenishing the lubricant level when required can prevent functional 
failures. It can also be considered in some respect as an on condition inspection task, if the level of 
lubricant is below 8 quarts you are in a potential failure range, and the rectification action to prevent 
the failure is to top up the lubricant level. 
The Addition of the Lubrication and Servicing Task to the classical RCM tasks. 
Considering closer the lubrication and servicing implications of a system or component. Failure due 
to lubrication is associated with two types of failure modes. The first is due to the lack of lubricant 
available, as a result of loss of the level of lubricant. The second failure mode is a failure of the 
effectiveness of lubricant due to physical and chemical changes to'the properties of the lubricant, 
such as oxidation, shearing of the oil molecules or degradation through contamination of the oil or 
grease (such as moisture ingression). 
The introduction of the servicing task was required to address the components and systems that 
are subject to lubrication, in their own right rather than the task being a part of the on condition 
inspection for lubricant level or Discard task for lubricant replacement. The servicing task was 
considered to be significant and important enough to merit ifs own designation. Even today modem 
RCM does not include the lubrication or servicing task as a task in their own right, but MSG3 
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philosophy does. At a latter stage in this document we will examine the differences in modem RCM 
versus the aircraft application of the philosophy called MSG3. 
Task Interval selection. 
Once the scheduled maintenance task has been identified that meets both the applicable and 
effective criteria, an interval has to be allocated to the task that is appropriate for the task based on 
available known or calculated data or if that is not available good engineering judgment. 
Normally for a new piece of equipment such as a new aircraft type, the component failure data is 
not readily available. In these cases simulated data may be used but the in operational 
performance of the subject must be carefully monitored to show the appropriateness of the chosen 
interval, or to justify an adjustment of the interval. This subject of in operation monitoring will be 
studied in more detail at a later stage. If a similar system or component is used in other applications 
or aircraft types then the in operation data for that installation can be possibly appropriate for use in 
the new scenario. Again engineering judgement must be used. The environment that component or 
system operates in could have an effect on its failure modes. 
A scheduled maintenance task should not be allocated a lesser interval than it merits just because 
it is easy to access. Doing tasks more often than necessary increases the chance of maintenance 
error or human induced error. This is especially true on invasive maintenance tasks when access 
may be difficult or elaborate. Reliability issues with a component or system can at times be related 
to the hand of man as a result of continued disturbance. A good example of an invasive task is too 
frequently entering the fuel tanks, rather than a single entry to carry out multiple tasks. Tank entry is 
very invasive, panels & seals are disturbed, tight areas are accessed where delicate components 
are located, easily bumped or disturbed. 
Possible sources of Information available to assist in an appropriate task intervals are... 
" Manufacturers tests and simulation's 
" Manufacturers recommendation's 
" In service experience of the subject 
" In service experience of a similar subject 
" Best Engineering judgment 
The selected interval also depends upon the scheduled maintenance task e. g. 
Lubrication / Servicing (Failure Prevention): The usage rate, the amount of consumable In the 
container and the deterioration characteristics of the consumable. 
Inspection / Function check (On condition task, Potential Failure Finding): Intervals are governed by 
the P-F interval, so there should be a clearly defined Potential failure condition. The task interval 
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should be less than the shortest likely interval between the point at which the potential failure 
becomes detectable and the point that which the item fails, but not so long that the potential failure 
interval is nearing the end of the range and the resulting repair will not be economical or practical. 
Restoration task intervals (Failure Avoidance): Depend upon useful life of the item under 
consideration, where the conditional probability of failure increases significantly. A sufficiently large 
proportion of the failures should occur after the selected interval. 
Operational / Visual check (Failure Finding task): Intervals are governed by the consequence of the 
multiple failure and the mean time between occurrences of the hidden failure. Consideration must 
be given also to the fact that the task itself may leave the hidden function in a failed state. 
Task Interval Parameters 
Earlier in section 2.2.1 we examined the variety of interval parameters or units of measures. 
9 Calendar Time 
0 Flight Hours 
Flight Cycles/landings 
Engine / APU hours / cycles 
The most appropriate unit of measure or combination of units of measure should be determined. 
This would become apparent after analysing the failure mode and determining its nature of failure 
resulting from fatigue, wear, environmental or any other implications. Table 2.1 in section 2.2.1 
details the available units of measure. 
e. g. An Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) has been allocated after RCM analysis two Lubrication / 
Servicing tasks. The first to check the lubricant level and the second to replace the lubricant in total 
due to degradation of the lubricant. Now we have to identify the interval for both these tasks. 
Scheduled Maintenance Task: Check IDG Lubricant Level. Manufacturers information 
recommends that this is accomplished every 300 flight hours, as the IDG will on average loose 
oil through the air vent at a rate of 0.0005 quarts per hour and through leakage of the main 
shaft seal at a rate of 0.00 15 quarts per hour. The IDG sump is full when 2 quarts of oil are in 
the sump and requires replenishing when it reaches1.25 quarts of oil for normal operation. This 
means that the IDG can be expected to operate for 375 hours before any servicing is required. 
The 300 flight hours interval recommended by the manufacturer allows for a 75 hour margin. In 
service operation of the same part number IDG on another engine shows that the loss of oil 
detailed by the manufacturer is on the high side and the data gathered by the airline suggest 
50 
that an interval of 400 flight hours is more appropriate and the task requirement is developed 
not only to inspect and service the oil level as required, but to inspect and service the oil level 
to ftill. 
2. Scheduled Maintenance Task: Replace IDG Lubricant. The lubricant manufacturer has advised 
the IDG manufacturer that his oil in the environment of the IDG will maintain its chemical and 
physical ability to cool and to lubricate for 3000 flight hours of usage. A scheduled 
maintenance task is planned for to replace the lubricant at the manufacturers 
recommendations of 3000 flight hours. As well as replacing the lubricant at this time, a sample 
of the oil is sent to the laboratory for spectral analysis to determine how the oil differs from its 
original specification. This analysis will describe how the operational time has affected the 
ability of the oil to perform to the original specification. From these results the intervals can be 
confirmed as effective and applicable or the interval can be escalated to a more appropriate 
interval. 
So it can be seen from both the examples above that hours of utilisation are the most appropriate 
interval parameters. Calendar days would not be appropriate as a parked aircraft that is not flying 
will not experience lubricant degradation and landings also is not a function of the oil usage or 
degradation. Equally the following example shows the appropriateness of other interval 
parameters.. 
3. Scheduled Maintenance Task: Inspect Flap Attachment for Cracking. The RCM analysis has 
identified this task as a significant item with aP-F interval, therefore an On Condition 
inspection is called for. In this case the inspection has been identified as a Detailed Inspection 
to be accomplished every 10,000 landings. This interval is in line with the manufacturers 
calculation, simulations or in service experience with similar designs. Landings are selected as 
the appropriate parameter as it is the landing cycle that most stress is induced on that section 
of the structure as flaps are used extensively for take off and landings and at those stages of 
flight the flaps are subject to significant aerodynamic forces. 
Later in section 6 we will look closely at not only the importance of verifying that the scheduled 
maintenance tasks selected through the RCM process are applicable and effective but also that the 
intervals and parameters selected for the significant items are appropriate in the operating context 
of the aircraft. This is done through In Operation Reliability Monitoring. 
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2.3 Application of RCIVI to produce an Aircraft Maintenance Programme. 
Section 2 describes the Reliability Centred Maintenance analysis process as a process 
that considers a significant item from the perspective of the consequence of failure of that 
item, then examines further that item to determine an applicable & effective preventative 
maintenance task. In section 2.2.4 we identified three major areas for categorising the 
complete aircraft, they were Systems, Engines and Structures. The RCIVI analysis process 
described so far can be applied directly to Systems and Engines identifying applicable and 
effective scheduled maintenance tasks, but some difficulty appears in it's application in the 
exact form when it comes to analysing Structures and structural significant items. We will 
now look specifically at the application of RCM analysis to the three significant categories 
of Systems, Engines and then Structures. We will now consider the differences required in 
approach to analysing each of the three significant categories. 
2.3.1 Analysis of Systems. 
The systems category includes all the components and systems required for operating the 
aircraft except the power plant itself. Most systems are composed of numerous separate 
assemblies or components, linked by electrical, mechanical or hydraulic lines. Even in new 
aircraft a lot of the systems will not be brand new designs but will have seen active 
operation in a previous application. As a result of this the performance behaviour and 
reliability will be predictable and known. RCM analysis of systems to produce a scheduled 
maintenance programme focuses on using the traditional decision trees as detailed in 
section 2.2A onwards. This standard decision process focuses on the effects of failure 
utilising the inherent reliability of the system design. 
Below are some examples of the application of the standard system RCM analysis as 
detailed in section 2.2.4.... 
Analvsis of a Landina Gear Brake Assembiv. 
The brake assembly for the main landing gear of the Boeing 737 Next Generation is 
classified as a significant item because the primary function of the braking system is to 
provide stopping capability after landing or during ground operations. Since a complete 
loss of the system would clearly have safety consequences, it is necessary to consider 
how the brake assembly contributes to the overall system function. The full braking 
capacity of the system is rarely used and its effect is masked by the availability of reverse 
thrust from the engines as well as the brakes available on other wheels on the same gear 
bogie. As a result the pilot may not notice a reduction of capability of the braking system in 
stopping the aircraft due to the reverse thrust and the multiple brake bogies. This means 
the item will have hidden functions as well. 
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Step 1: Significant System Description of Hydraulic Brake System ATA 
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I FFT MAIN IANDINO OFAR 
Boeing 737-6/7/8/9 (Next Generation) 
HYDRAULIC BRAKE SYSTEM 
- 
BRAKE ASSEMBLY ATA Chapter 32-41-00 
Vendor Name: Bendix 
Part No: 277A6000-706 
General 
The main landing gear wheel brakes use hydraulic pressure to slow or stop the airplane during 
landing and taxi. 
Location 
Each wheel brake is on a main landing gear axle. 
Phvsical Description 
The brake assembly is a rotor-stator unit that operates using hydraulic pressure. The assembly 
uses multiple steel discs as rotors and stators. 
Each main landing gear wheel brake has these components: 
0 Stators 
Rotors 
Pressure plate 
Piston/adjusters (6) 
Axle bushings 
Wear indicator pins (2) 
Brake hose connection/hydraulic bleed port. 
Functional Description 
The brake assembly has bushings. These bushings attach to replaceable sleeves on the landing 
gear axle. 
A torque takeout slot on the brake assembly aligns with a torque pin on the bottom of the main 
landing gear inner cylinder. The slot and pin transmit brake torque to the main landing gear strut. 
A retention cable connects both brakes together on each main landing gear. The cable keeps the 
brake on the axle if the wheel falls off the airplane. 
Piston/adjuster assemblies apply brake system hydraulic pressure to the pressure plate. The 
pressure plate forces the stators and rotors together in the brake housing. This slows or stops the 
wheel. The pistons automatically adjust for brake wear. 
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Step 2: Significant System Redundancy and Testability Analysis. 
Redundancy Features. 
One brake per wheel and two wheels per gear. Hydraulic power from three possible sources. 
Hydraulic system A, hydraulic system B and the accumulator. Thrust reverses provide an additional 
method to stop the aircraft. Wheel well is designed to prevent critical secondary damage by debris 
from tyre failure. 
Built in Test Equipment. 
Brake wear indicators for visual inspection. 
Brake pressure gauge in flight deck. 
Step 3: Significant SyStern Dispatchability and Reliability Analysis. 
Dispatchability. 
MEL allows one brake inoperative, but gross take off and landing weights to be reduced. 
Known in service reliability data. 
1. Quantity per a/c: 4 (2 per main gear) 
2. MTBUR: 132 landings. Once the wear pin sits flush with the housing, the brake must 
be changed. 
3. Operational Conditions that might affect the life of the brake. 
A. Pilot training 
B. Runway quality 
C. Landing Weight of aircraft. 
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Step 4: Significant System Failure Analysis. 
Functions Functional Failure Mode Failure Effect 
Failure 
1 To provide A. No braking 1. Brake wear to Wheel skid, causing tyre to blow 
stopping action. point of out; audible noise and vibration. 
capability on seizure. Visible extensive secondary 
command damage to systems within wheel 
during well; requires correction before 
operation. dispatch. 
B. Reduced 1. Leaking By the incorrect or inconsistent 
braking pistons. hydraulic pressure or also with 
action. 2. Leaking hose. brakes reduced torque due to 
3. Brake presence on contaminants on 
contamination. the pad or disk surfaces the 
aircraft will require a longer 
distance to stop. 
2. To release A. Dragging 1. Malfunction of Increased wear of pad or disk; 
brakes. brake adjuster. overheating of brake and tyre 
may cause fuse plugs to blow, 
with landing on a flat tyre and 
secondary damage from the 
failure; requires correction 
before dispatch. 
3. To contain B. External 1. Damaged or Slow loss of hydraulic fluid from 
hydraulic hydraulic distorted one system. 
fluid. leaks. seals. 
The classification of this item is that it definitely is significant and does have hidden functions, 
meaning that under certain failure conditions the failure effect will not be evident to the operating 
crew. (. Remember from section 2.2.4 earlier: A significant item is one whose failure could affect 
operating safety or have a major economic consequence). 
Each bogie on the B737NG has two wheels, each wheel has a multiple disk brake assembly 
consisting of four stators and four rotors (see exhibit above). The brakes are powered by six 
pistons. Each piston can be driven by three pressure sources, normally system B, alternately 
system A and in other conditions the brake accumulator will supply gas pressure to pressurise the 
hydraulic barking system, (the accumulator can supply pressure for six full brake applications). 
With out this pressurisation source replication and redundancy, it may have been possible for each 
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wheel to experience different reduced braking pressures that would result in a critical failure 
causing the aircraft to veer as well as have an increased stopping distance. One of the failure 
effects 2AII can result in a possible blow out. The secondary damage from the blow out can be 
caused by rubber departing from the tyre. Brake assemblies can be replaced in the field, but the 
time required could cause delays. The aircraft can also be dispatched with one brake unit 
inoperative, but incurs a penalty in operating weight. 
Note that in this case the primary function of the brake system, to provide stopping capability, is 
subject to two failure possibilities, they are no braking action and reduced braking action. Each of 
these functional failures must be considered separately. 
Step 5: Significant System Consequence of Failure Analysis. 
Decision Logic. Level 1. 
Lets start with the function that can result in functional failure 1 
-A-1, the function failure caused by 
the failure mode of the brake failure due to excessive wear. 
Question 1: EVIDENT OR HIDDEN FAILURE. 
IS THE OCCURANCE OF A FUNCTIONAL FAILURE EVIDENT TO THE OPRATING CREW 
DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR NORMAL DUTIES? 
This question asks if the operating crew will be aware of the loss (failure) of the function during 
performance of normal operating duties. The operating crew consists of qualified flight 
compartment and cabin attendant personnel who are on duty. Normal duties are those duties 
associated with the routine operation of the aircraft on a daily basis. Ground crew are not part of 
the operating crew. Flight Crew "Normal Duties" are described in part in the Regulatory Approved 
sections of the Aeroplane Flight Manual (AFM) and must be accomplished by the operating crew. 
With new aircraft designs the AFM might not be yet available. If credit Is being taken for a crew 
normal duty task it must be written down & submitted with the analysis. 
Answerl: YES. 
If the brake pads are allowed to wear to beyond a certain point, they come loose from the rotor and 
jam between the rotors and stators, causing the brakes to seize. The wheel will therefore not rotate 
on landing, the tyre will skid and blow out, throwing pieces around the wheel well. The resulting 
noise and vibration will be evident to the flight crew thus the answer to this question Is YES. 
A YES answer means we proceed to question 2. 
Question 2 DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT ON SAFETY. 
DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OR SECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE 
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY? 
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For a YES answer, the functional failure must have a direct adverse affect on operating safety. 
Direct: To be direct the functional failure or resulting secondary damage must achieve fts effect by 
fiself, not in combination wfth other functional failures. 
Adverse Effect on Safety: Safety shall be considered as adversely affected if the consequence of 
the failure condition would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft and or might 
cause serious or fatal injury to human occupants. 
Operating., This is defined as the time interval during which passengers and crew are on board for 
the purpose of flight 
Definflions from the Air Transport Association of America. 
Answer 2. No. 
The loss of braking function of one of the four wheels is not in itself critical., so the answer to the 
first part of the question is no. The answer to the second part is also no, because the failure has 
been taken into account in the design of the wheel well. So the secondary damage from the 
occasional tyre failure will not be critical. 
Afthough a scheduled maintenance task is not required for safety reasons, the secondary damage 
does have serious operational consequences. 
A NO answer means we proceed to question 4. 
Question 4. OPERATIONAL EFFECT. 
DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING 
CAPABILrrY? 
This question asks if the functional failure could have an adverse effect on operating capability: 
a) requiring either the imposition of operating restrictions or correction prior to further dispatch; or 
b) requiring flight crew use of an abnormal or emergency procedures. 
Answer 3. YES. 
The answer to this question is YES for the following reasons. The failed brake will require either 
being declared as unserviceable and being disconnected. This action results in aircraft weight 
carrying penalties in the form of total weight restrictions as per the Minimum Equipment List (MEL). 
This means less payload an adverse effect on operating capability. AJso if the failing brake unit 
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results in a tyre burst, the result will be replacing the tyre. To do this take a spare tyre, equipment 
and time. One of these variables may not be readily available and result in a delay or a flight 
cancellation, again an adverse effect on operating capability. 
We have now reached the end of Level 1 and find as a result of the last question, question 4, being 
YES the failure effect analysed can be categorised as a Category 6 Evident Operational failure 
effect. 
Step 6: Significant System Scheduled Task Selection. 
Decision Logic. Level 2. 
Category 6 Operational Effects: A scheduled maintenance task is desirable if it reduces risk to an 
acceptable level. The Level 2 task analysis must be now carried out. In this case we start by asking 
about the affect of lubrication.... 
Question 6A: IS A LUBRICATION OR SERVICING TASK APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE? 
Answer: NO. 
The brake unit has no facility or requirement for lubrication or servicing. 
A NO answer means continuing to the next question 
Question 613: IS AN INSPECTION OR FUNCTIONAL CHECK TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF 
FUNCTION APPLICABLE & EFFECTIVE? 
Answer: YES. 
The brake unit has a wear indicator pin. The indicator pin will show when the brake pads have wom 
to a near or an actual unacceptable level that may result if further used, in seizing of the brake unit. 
So by inspecting the wear indicator pin at regular intervals a brake unit can be seen to be ready for 
replacement due to brake pad wear. This meets the condition that for an on condition Inspection to 
be applicable the subject must have a potential failure condition. 
Due to obtaining a YES answer there is no need to continue with the other questions 
In this case a scheduled maintenance task, an inspection of the brake wear pin, has been the out 
come of the Level 2 decision logic. The scheduled maintenance task can be said to be applicable 
and effective on the following grounds (section 2.2.4 details the criteria for inspection ) 
... 
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Applicable Criteria: Reduced resistance to failure must be detectable and a reasonably consistent 
interval between deterioration condition and functional failure. The case of the brake unit fits this 
condition as the under normal operating conditions a brake will last for 521 landings on average 
and the presence of the wear indicator pin will show when a brake unit nears the end of its life. 
Effective Criteria 
- 
Safety: The task must reduce the risk of failure to assure safe operation. Again in 
the case of the brake unit the wear indicator pin will show when the brake is approaching the end of 
its usable life. This will allow the aircraft to be dispatched with the knowledge that the brake will be 
able to enable brake applications. The wear indicator pin will also show how worn the brake unit is. 
On average the brake pin Will protrude out of the casing 1 mm for every 5 landings. Once the 
yellow portion of the indicator shows the brake must be replaced, from this the dispatching engineer 
can be confident that under normal conditions the brake unit will sustain the flight out and back at 
least. 
Effectiveness Criteria 
- 
Operational: The task must reduce the risk of failure to an acceptable level. 
Again as with the last paragraph, the wear pin will indicate approximately under normal conditions 
how long the brake unit can stay in service. This will allow an operational decision to be made. For 
example if the aircraft has only 1 mm remaining on the wear pin, that means 5 landings and the 
aircraft is scheduled for a7 sector flight, it would make operational sense to replace that brake now 
before departure from base to eliminate the possibility of a brake change away from base where 
there may be no facilities resulting in a delay. 
Effectiveness Criteria 
- 
Economic: The task must be cost effective. Le. the cost of the task must be 
less than the cost of the failure prevented. In this case to inspect the wear pin takes about 30 
seconds per brake, to replace a seized brake will take about 2 man hours and the resulting repair 
due to over heating may cost thousands of pounds. 
So after considering all the criteria for the inspection it can be said that a scheduled inspection of 
the wear indicator pin is applicable and effective in the case of resulting functional failure from the 
failure mode of the brake unit wearing to the point of seizure. 
Now we have verified the task, we need to next identify an appropriate interval to conduct the task, 
(ref section 2.2.4). 
Possible sources of Information available to assist in an appropriate task intervals are 
Manufacturers tests and simulation's 
Manufacturers recommendation's 
In service experience of the subject 
In service experience of a similar subject 
Best Engineering judgment 
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The selected interval also depends upon the scheduled maintenance task. 
Inspection (On condition task, Potential Failure Finding): Intervals are governed by the P-F 
interval, so there should be a clearly defined Potential failure condition. The task interval should be 
less than the shortest likely interval between the point at which the potential failure becomes 
detectable and the point that which the item fails, but not so long that the potential failure interval is 
nearing the end of the range and the resulting repair will not be economical or practical. 
Taking all the above into consideration 
" Manufacturers tests and simulation's 
" Manufacturers recommendation's 
The manufacturers data shows that the MTBUR is 132 landings with the three standard deviations 
79 landings being at the lower end and 185 at the higher end. This range of landings will capture 
99% of failures. 
" 
In service experience of the subject 
" 
In service experience of a similar subject 
In service experience of Bendix part numbers on other aircraft, have an average life of around 150 
landings some being removed as early as 60 landings. It can be seen that the pilots performance, 
availability of thrust reversers and the runway conditions can play a big part In the life of the brake 
unit. 
* Best Engineering judgment 
So taking all the available information into consideration, it can be summarised as follows... 
The MTBUR being 132 with the lower three sigma 79 landings we could start the wear pin 
inspections at that time and repeat them every landing and expect to capture 99% of failing brake 
units due to wear. The wear pin starts to show early before the brake unit wears to failure, so for 
operational reasons the brake unit can be monitored at regular intervals easily thus the inspector 
can anticipate the failure as the pin moves closer to the guides. The earliest brake removal to date 
in service due to wear was at 60 landings. 
The interval selection can be made at an initial inspection interval of 60 landings with confidence 
that all previously failed brakes due to wear would be captured, but in case of special conditions 
perhaps dropping the interval to 50 landings will give a 16.6% safe region. But the inspection at 50 
landings could show that the wear pin has sufficient protrusion not to call for the brake unit to be 
replaced, but it may require changing before the next 50 landings and that would go un noticed if 
the inspection was not carried out for another 50 landings. The options open here for the group 
conducting the analysis are as follows 
...... 
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1. Adopt an initial inspection of the wear pin at 50 landings and repeat every subsequent 5 
landings, and if the wear pin is flush it should be replaced. 
2. Adopt the interval of 50 landings but recommend to modify the pin to show when the brake unit 
would have less than 50 normal landings left and call for the brake unit change to carried out. 
3. Adopt a lower interval of say every 15 landings and modify the wear pin with a coloured band 
and call for the unit to be replaced when the coloured band is all that is showing. 
4. As this is an easily accessible task allocate the task to the daily check and the task will be 
conducted prior to every first flight of the day or more appropriately would be at the end of each 
flying day as this will give the technicians time to replace the brake unit if a potential failure 
condition exists. (This approach brakes the rule of inspections should never be carried out 
because the access is easy, but is appropriate in this case! ). 
These intervals and suggestions are appropriate for normal operation but in the case of abnormal 
operation such as heavy and hard landings or landings with out thrust reverse the brake wear 
inspection should be called after every landing, as should many other relevant inspections. 
After the detailed analysis my recommendation would be the following 
Firstly the brake wear indicator pin should be modified with a coloured band to show 50 landings 
remaining at normal wear rates. The inspection should then be at an interval of every 50 flights. 
Since the prevention of the failure depends upon the indicator the rule should be that the brake unit 
must be replaced once the wear pin is flush with the housing, but notice should be taken of the 
yellow band position in relation to the housing and the inspector conducting the daily check should 
dispatch the aircraft with a condition, if the pin shows the yellow band level or lower to the housing, 
that the unit should be re inspected every 5 flight, then the unit will be replaced once the wear pin is 
flush. In fact a flush wear pin does not mean no landings are available, but as stated earlier 5 
landings can still take place with that unit. 
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2.3.2 Analysis of Structures. 
The analysis of the structure of the aircraft considers all the load carrying elements including not 
only the basic airframe but also the fuselage, wings, tail assembly and a variety of other load 
carrying assemblies and components: 
" Engine nacelles and pylons. 
" Flight control surfaces. 
" 
Landing Gear legs and assemblies. 
Integral fuel tanks. 
" The pressurized skin. 
" 
Windows and doors. 
" Bulkheads and decks. 
An aircraft structure and its elements are subject to two classifications of loads and forces during 
normal operation: 
Ground Loads 
Taxiing. Landing. Towing. Hoisting. 
Air Loads 
Flight Manoeuvres, Gusts. 
The magnitude of the induced loads will be a function of the operating conditions such as: 
" Runway condition. 
" Weather and air quality. 
" Pilot training. 
" Operating procedures. 
The two classifications of loads experienced by an aircraft can be further divided Into the following.. 
0 Surfaces forces: which act upon the surfaces of the structure e. g. aerodynamic and hydrostatic 
pressure. 
Body forces: which act over the volume of the structure and are produced by gravitational and 
inertial effects. 
Regulatory terminology for structural loading limits is as follows. Limit Load which is the maximum 
load the structure is expected to experience under normal operating conditions, the Proof Load 
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which is the product of the limit load and the proof factor (1.0 to 1.25), and the Ultimate Load which 
is the product of the limit load and the ultimate factor (1.5 usually). The aircraft structure must with 
stand the proof load with out detrimental distortions and should not fail until the ultimate load has 
been achieved. 
The design ability of the structure must be in harmony with the operating context and the scheduled 
inspection programme must be to identify areas of structure that may show evidence of reduced 
resistance to failure. This can be evident by fatigue, cracking, corrosion and other forms of 
deterioration that will impair the structures load carrying ability. 
Because most reduction in failure resistance will not be evident to operating crew, bar catastrophic 
failures, most of the RCM analysis of structural items falls under the category of the safety non 
evident branch of the decision tree logic. Hence this means there is normally only two out comes 
for scheduled maintenance tasks with structural items, on conditions inspections or discard. This in 
turn implies that all the structural elements of an aircraft should be subject to scheduled 
maintenance task as all elements are subject to the environment and failure resistant reduction 
forces. The challenge is that the prediction of when to inspect as a function of the anticipated 
resistance failure reduction is most appropriate. Due to many functions this point in operational time 
will differ greatly from one assembled structure to another due to not differences in design or 
materials but in manufacturing and assembly inaccuracies. This means the theoretical P-F interval 
should be adjusted downwards considerably to ensure the capture of all manufacturing and 
assembly inaccuracies to ensure that all P-F intervals are caught before the end of the range. 
Safe Life, Fall Safe and Damage Tolerant Structural Design. 
Safe Life Fail Safe Damage Tolerant 
Fig 2.21 
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1. Safe Life: Where the supporting structure has a defined in-service life. At that life regardless Of 
condition the structural element is removed and replaced for a new Rem. That Safe Life interval 
will be well before the ultimate design life is reached. 
2. Fail Safe: If one structural member fails the other member can carry the load. In this state the , 
second member is now open to secondary failure, so it is crucial that even though redundancy 
is built into the design by a second load bearing path, evidence of that failure must be available 
through an inspection plan or through a monitoring devise, which are not used often in 
structural fail safe devices but only in systems. 
3. Damage Tolerant: Cracks that nay appear are very visible and detectable to inspection. These 
cracks are evident to inspection long before the structural element approaches failure. 
Structural Design Strength. 
Aircraft structures are designed to withstand many different kinds of loads, such as those caused 
by air turbulence, flight manoeuvres, landings and take offs. For commercial air transport aircraft 
manufacture in the USA FAR 25 details the regulatory requirements for design, for the UK the CAA 
BCAR's now JAA JAR 25 details the load carrying abilities and regulatory structural design 
requirements for air transport aircraft. For example FAR 25.341 below details the US built aircraft 
regulatory standard for air transport aircraft with respect to Gust Loads... 
25.341 Gust Loads 
a. The aeroplane is assumed to be subject to symmetrical vertical gusts In level ffighL The 
resulting limit load factors must coffespond to the conditions determined as IbIlows: 
1. Positive (up) and negative (down) rough air gusts of 661ps at Vb Phe design speed thr 
maximum gust intensity] must be considered at aftitudes between sea level and 20,000 
feeL The gust velocity may be reduced linearly from 66 fps at 20,000 feet to 38 fps at 
50,000 feet 
Z Posftive and negative gusts of 50 fps at Vc [design cruising speed] must be considered at 
afifludes between sea level and 20,000 feet The gust velocfty may be reduced linearly 
from 50 fps at 20,000 feet to 25 fps at 50,000 feet. 
a Positive and negative gusts of 25 fps at Vd [design dive speed] must be considered at 
altitudes between sea level and 20,000 feet. The gust velocity may be reduced Anearty 
from 25 fps at 20,000 feet to 12.5 fps at 50,000 feet. 
During the development and certification of any new aircraft the manufacturer conducts numerous 
tests to confirm that each structural assembly can with stand the specific design loads with out 
damage or permanent deformation. Design loads with this objective are called Um# Loads. There 
are also requirements that the structure be able to withstand at least 150% (factor 1.5) of the limit 
load with out collapsing, (experiencing a functional failure). When design loads are factored 
upwards in this way they are called UlUmate Loads. The present airworthiness requirements for 
design strength have been effective in protecting against functional failures as long as the specific 
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load carrying capabilities of the structure are persevered. After the aircraft enters into service the 
operating organisation is responsible both for preserving the design strength of the structure and 
also for ensuring that the operating gross weight of the aircraft does not exceed the maximum 
weight at which the structure can satisfy various load requirements. 
Ultimate Load 
Proof Load 
Load Limit 
Fig 2.22 
The Fatigue Process. 
Although adequate precautions are taken to ensure that an aircraft's structure possesses sufficient 
strength to withstand the most severe expected gusts or manoeuvring loads, there still remains the 
problem of fatigue. Fatigue damage can be produced in a variety of different ways. Cyclic Fatigue 
is caused by repeated fluctuating loads. Corrosion fatigue is fatigue accelerated by surface 
corrosion of the metal penetrating inwards so that the metal strength deteriorates. Small scale 
rubbing movements and abrasion of adjacent parts cause fretting fatigue, while thermal fatigue is 
produced by stress fluctuations induced by thermal expansion and contractions. Finally high 
frequency stress fluctuations, due to vibration excited by jet or propeller noise cause sonic or 
acoustic fatigue. All the loads to which an aircraft structure is subjected are repeated many times 
throughout the course of ifs operating life. Although any single load application may be only a 
fraction of the load carrying capability of the element, the stress imposed by each one reduces the 
remaining margin of failure resistance. The problem of structural deterioration due to corrosion and 
wear may be largely eliminated by an appropriate inspection programme and the application of 
suitable protective treatments. Similarly an effective inspection programme can find fatigue related 
problems with aircraft structure resistance failure such as cracks from resulting in structural loss of 
elements. But similarly as production corrosion control methods can prevent or reduce the problem 
of corrosion from compromising an aircraft structure so can fatigue consideration at the design 
stage of an aircraft structure, thus eliminating by design the problem of fatigue. Aircraft built in the 
UK follow BCAR (now JARs), while aircraft built in the US follow FAR's. All three regulations state 
similar principles that, an aircraft throughout its operational life shall be such as to ensure that the 
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probability of a disastrous fatigue failure shall be extremely remote (that is, the probability of failure 
is expected to be less than 10-7) under the action of the repeated loads of variable magnitude 
expected in service. Eventually, as a result of these cumulative reductions of failure resistance, a 
small crack will appear in the metal. Until the crack reaches the stage at which it is visible, there is 
little change in the strength of the affected element. Thereafter as internal stresses cause the crack 
to propagate, the strength of the element is reduced at an ever-increasing rate. 
The fatigue process has two aspects. Because the effects of repeated loads are cumulative, as 
operating age increases, the age interval before a crack will appear decreases, that is there is a 
reduction in the in the remaining time before crack initiation, the appearance of a visible crack. The 
operating age at which a fatigue crack first appears in a structural item is referred to as the fatigue 
life of the item. (Fatigue life in this context means the time to crack initiation. In some contexts it can 
mean the age at which a failure occurs due to fatigue). The second aspect is the reduction in the 
strength, or load resisting capability, of the item associated with crack propagation. Both fatigue life 
and the rate of crack propagation vary not only with the material from which the item is made but 
also with its size and shape and manufacturing process by which it was produced. For this reason 
fatigue tests must be conducted on actual individual elements and assemblies to determine their 
individual fatigue characteristics. JAR 25 and FAR 25 Large Aircraft Certification, do require a 
combination of analysis and testing of certain structural assemblies of the aircraft. Finite Analysis, 
Matrix Analysis are acceptable only partially and in certain circumstances. 
The fatigue process in a single structural element is illustrated in fig 2.23. When the structure is new 
the element can withstand an ultimate load, or 150% of irs design limit load. As the element ages in 
service its failure resistance (time to crack propagation) decreases with repeated load applications 
until a fatigue crack appears. Up to this point its load resisting capability is relatively unchanged. 
Now however the crack will propagate, and the strength of the element will decrease accordingly. 
At some point the crack will reach a length at which the element can no longer withstand the limit 
load, it then becomes a critical crack. If the element is subjected to the limit load it will fracture 
immediately, but when the continued loads are much lower then the limit load it will fracture 
immediately, but even then when the continued loads are much lower than the limit load, the rate of 
crack growth will become so rapid that fracture can not be prevented by scheduled maintenance. 
If the item that fractures is a monolithic element and is not part of a redundant assembly, the 
fractional failure is usually critical. If the item is one element of a multiple load path assembly, the 
fracture reduces the load carrying capabilities of the assembly but does not result In a complete 
loss of function. The resulting redistribution of the load to the remaining element does however 
accelerate the fatigue process in those elements. This is illustrated In fig 2.24. The cracking or 
fracture of the first element reduces the residual strength of the assembly. After this the load 
carrying capability will remain relatively constant until a crack initiates in the second element, which 
result in a transition to a still lower residual strength. The amount of reduction in each case will 
depend on the contribution of each element to the total strength of the assembly. 
The difference between these two situations has lead to two basic structural design practices to 
prevent critical failures. The older, and perhaps better known, practice is the safe life design, which 
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applies to structural elements with little or no redundancy. A newer practice is damage tolerant (fail 
safe) design. This term has two applications the first refers to a redundant fail safe structure with 
two separate load carrying members, but also refers to monolithic portions of the structure 
characterised by easy detectable cracks with slow propagation rates. A structural assembly is said 
to be damage tolerant if after the complete fracture of any one element it can still withstand the 
damage tolerant loads specified by the appropriate airworthiness authorities. A monolithic element 
is considered amage tolerant if the rate of crack propagation is slow enough for at least two 
inspections to be feasible during the interval from crack initiation to a crack of critical length. 
Design ultimate load 
150 
100 
1 Design limit load 
Appried load (cycles) 
crack initiation 
Fig 2.23. Model of the effect of failure or fatigue on the strength of a single structural element exposed to cyclic loads. Note: 
the Y axis is percentage of design load. 
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member 
50 
Design ukimate load crack initiation 
. 
second member 
100 1 Design limit load 
fractu e second 
member 
Appried load (cycles) 
Fig 2.24. Model of the effects of fatigue on the strength of a multiple load path (redundant fail safe) structural assembly 
exposed to cyclic loads. 
Note: the Y axis is percentage of design load. 
RCM / Decision Tree Analysis of Structures. 
Damage Tolerance requires that all cracks be shown to be detectable. This requirement by the 
FAA in the 1977 was one of the reasons that motivated the development of Reliability Centred 
Maintenance Programmes (RCM). Keeping in mind earlier explanations of RCM that the primary 
objective of a structural maintenance programme is to maintain the inherent airworthiness through 
out the operational life of the aircraft in an economical manner. RCM analysis addresses the need 
to develop a maintenance programme through the use of a logical decision process In order to.. 
MaAmise safe operation 
Maximise operating efficiency 
0 Minimise the loss of the inherent design reliability 
Restoration of the inherent design reliability 
Maximise aircraft availability by the use of preventative maintenance. 
With a particular view to structural implications 
0 To make use of the damage tolerance design criteria to find cracks 
" To prevent cracks from propagating to critical lengths 
" To prevent multiple failures 
" To prevent failures on adjacent structural elements due to multiple load path 
" Corrosion Prevention and Control 
" Age Exploration. To identify the effects of ageing and continued utilisation of aircraft structures. 
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Structurally Significant Items. 
Just as in identifying Maintenance Significant Items in the analysis of systems reference section 
2.3.1, in the analysis of structures we must identify Structurally Significant Items in order to conduct 
the RCM analysis of the aircraft structure. Just as we did in the analysis of systems we must first 
identify the structure of the aircraft into structural categories. In the analysis of systems we used the 
ATA 100 chapterisation specification, again in the case of structures the aircraft can be structurally 
broken down to the highest manageable level within the ATA 100 brake down by zones. 
Aircraft 
Zone 
1 Sub Zone 1 
struchm 
Assently 
S 
st. cvä 
Detal 
I Sub Zon Sub Zone I 
Fig 2.25 
A Structuraly Significant Item (SSI) is any detail, element or assembly, which contlibutes 
significantly to cary3dng flight, ground, pressure or control loads and whose failure could affect the 
structural integ* nessesary for the safety of the aircraft. (Boeing Structural Working Group). " 
So the generic term structuraly significant item is used to denote each specific structural region that 
requires scheduled maintenance as part of an RCM programme to guard against the fracture of 
significant elements. Such an item may be defined as the significant element itself, or it may be 
defined in terms of specific regions on the element which are the best indicators of its condition. In 
this sense a structurally significant item is selected in much the same way as a functionaly 
significant item, which may be a system, a sub system or an assembly, or a significant part of an 
assembly. 
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In order to help in selecting structural significant items from the established list of structural items 
categorised as shown in fig 2.25, a list of questions (identification aids) supporting the definitions 
are: 
Is the failure a threat to safety? 
Does its failure directly affect operational capability? 
Could scheduled maintenance cost effectively prevent or delay on aircrfat failure? 
Is the structural item a critical monolithic (single load path) item? 
Is the structural item subject to a relitively high consentration of tensile stress? 
Is the structural item subject to tensile stress at a high frequency? 
Is the structural item a major structural attachment or opening? 
Is the structural item (or does it contain) a load path discontinuity? 
Is the structrual item primary structure? 
Note: If the answers to all of the above questions are NO then the item is not an SSI. 
At this stage it is also appropriate to define some an other structural term... 
Principal Structural Element (PSE) (Ref FAA A C25-571): PSEs are those that contribute 
significantly to canying, flight, ground and pressurisation loads, and whose failure could result in 
catastrophic failure of the aircraft. 
The SSI Numbering System. 
Each zone will be examined and the ATA chapterisation system will be used. For example with 
zone 400 pylons. Structural item Strut to wing attachment 54-51 is nominated as the first items to 
be analysied so is designated as Item 01. The complete number for this first item in zone 400 is 54- 
51-101. 
The Analysis Process. 
The aircraft has now been split into zones using the ATA chapterisation system. Structuraly 
Significant Items have been identified and numbered. Those items of structure that are not 
identified as an SSI will be exemined under the Zonal inspection programme that will be covered 
later. For all SSI's Acidental Damage (AD), and Enviromental Deterioration (ED) evaluations are 
performed. This evaluation will result in a maintenance task, the further evaluation of the Fatigue 
Damage (FD) analysis is not an RCM analysis technique but uses an analysis process defined in 
FAR 25.571 and also JAR 25.571. If during the analysis the SSI is classified as "Damage Tolerant', 
a residual strength evaluation must be carried out to identify the fatigue Damage Tolerant Rating 
(DTR). 
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The analysis process objective is to result in scheduled maintenance tasks for the aircraft structure. 
Each SSI is assessed in terms of its significance to continued airworthiness, susceptibility to any 
form of damage and degree of difficulty involved in detecting such damage. Requirements for 
detecting Accidental Damage (AD), Environmental Deterioration (ED), and Fatigue Damage (FD) 
form the basis of the RCM process for the structures scheduled maintenance programme. The 
primary objective of the structural maintenance programme is to maintain the inherent 
airworthiness throughout the operational life of the aircraft. To achieve this, the tasks in this 
programme must meet the detection requirements from each of the AD, ED and FD assessments. 
Sources of Damage or Deterioration. 
The sources of damage to be considered when developing the structural maintenance programme 
are as follows.. 
A. Accidental Damage, (AD) "Physical deterioration of an item caused by contact or impact with 
an object or influence which is not part of the aircraft, or by human error during manufacture, 
operation of the aircraft, or maintenance practices ý (as defined by the Air Transport 
Association ofAmerica, ATA MSG3 2000). AD is characterised by the occurrence of a random 
discrete event which may reduce the inherent level of residual strength. Sources of such 
damage include ground and cargo handling equipment, foreign objects, erosion from rain or 
hail, lightning, runway debris, spillage, freezing, thawing also those resulting from human error 
during aircraft manufacture, operation or maintenance. 
B. Environmental Deterioration, (ED) "Physical deterioration of an item's strength or resistance 
to failure as a result of chemical interaction with its climate or environmentm (as defined by the 
Air Transport Association of America, A TA MSG3 2000). ED is characterised by structural 
deterioration as a result of a chemical interaction with its climate or its environment. 
Assessments are required to cover corrosion, stress corrosion and deterioration of non metallic 
materials. Corrosion may or may not be time / usage dependant. For example deterioration 
resulting from breakdown of surface protection is more probable as the calendar age 
increases, conversely, corrosion due to galley spillage is a randomly occurring event hence 
AD. 
C. Fatigue Damage, (FD) 'The infliation of a crack or cracks due to cyclic loading and 
subsequent propagation". (as derined by the Air Transport Association of America, ATA MSG3 
2000). FD is characterised by the initiation of a crack or cracks due to cyclic loading and 
subsequent propagation. It is a cumulative process with respect to aircraft usage, fight hours or 
flight cycles. 
For new aircraft maintenance programmes the RCM process is based on the assessment of 
structural design information, fatigue and damage tolerance evaluation in accordance with the FAR 
25 or JAR 25 and in service experience with similar structure or test results. 
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Inspection Requirements. : 
Inspection requirements in relation to the damage sources are as follows.. 
A. Accidental Damage, (AD), stress corrosion and some other forms of corrosion are random in 
nature and can occur at any time during the aircraft service life. Therefore inspection 
requirements apply to all aircraft types throughout their operational life. 
B. Some forms of corrosion are time / usage dependant and more likely to occur as the fleet ages. 
In such cases operator and manufacturer experience on similar in service structure can be 
used to establish a threshold for the Environmental Deterioration (ED), tasks. An age 
exploration programme may be required to be established to identify the exact effects of usage 
/ age on the structure. 
C. Due to the process mandated by the FARs and JARs for aircraft structural design, detectable 
cracking due to Fatigue damage (FD) is not expected in the early years of operation. For an 
operator with a fleet of aircraft those aircraft with the highest number of flight cycles may be 
susceptible to FID. 
In summary the structural maintenance programme is based on an assessment of structural design 
information, fatigue and damage tolerance evaluations, service experience with similar structure 
and pertinent test results. 
The RCM analysis of structure should include the following considerations.. 
1. The source of structural deterioration. 
AD 
b. ED 
c. FD 
2. The susceptibility of the structure to each source of deterioration. 
3. The consequence failure and deterioration. 
a. Effect on aircraft. E. g. loss of function or reduction of residual strength. 
b. Multiple element failure. 
c. The consequences caused by the interaction of structural item damage or failure with other 
aircraft systems. 
d. In flight loss of structural items. 
4. The applicability and effectiveness of various methods of detecting structural deterioration, 
taking into account inspection thresholds and repeat intervals. 
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The Rating Scheme for SSI*s. 
RCM structural analysis uses a rating scheme to assist in deciding on an inspection interval and 
makes full use of the designers and manufacturers technical information. The rating scheme uses a 
five factor scale that identifies the importance of the SSI under analysis. The five factors can be 
generally described as. 
-- 
0 The effect of failure of the item on residual strength. 
The anticipated crack free life (fatigue life) of the item. 
The crack propagation characteristics of the item. 
Susceptibility of the item to corrosion. 
Susceptibility of the item to accidental damage. 
(F. S Nowlan et al of United Aldnes 1978. Rating scale for the rive factors of stnictural RCM 
analysis. ) 
Reductionin 
residual 
strength 
Fatigue IIW Crack 
propagation* 
Susceptibility 
to corrosion 
Susceptibility 
to AD 
Rating 
Large Short Rapid High High I 
Moderate Medium Moderate Moderate Moderate 2 
Small Long Slow LOW LOW 3 
Very small Very long Very slow Very low Very low 4 
Fig 2 26 Rating scales for the rive factors that determine structural inspection intervals. Each 
structurally signifficant Hem is ranked on a scale of I to 4 for each of the factors that apply. The 
lowest of these rankings represents the class number assigned to that ftem. 
*These two ratings for an internal Item may be increased by I if there is external evidence of failure 
orpotential failure. (The structural analysis takes into consideration whether an SSI is available for 
inspection externally or internally. External visibility is considered as more evident hence more 
available for detection of failure or potential failure. ) 
The above Fig 2.26 has been further developed by Boeing and the Air Transport Association (ATA) 
through the Maintenance Steering Group (MSG), (we will later look closer at the ATA MSG and the 
development of RCM by that group). The following rating tables were developed by Boeing and 
the ATA... 
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Environmental Deterioration (Corrosion and Stress) Ratinq EDR. 
EDR = Detectability + Susceptibility 
Detectability = Visibility + Sensitivity to Damage Size 
Poor Adequate Good 
Visibility (of SSI for 
inspection) 
0 1 2 
High Medium Low 
Sensitivity (to 
damage size) 
0 1 2 
Susceptibility = Environmental Protection + Exposure to Adverse Environments 
Standard Proven or Improved Special Attention 
Environmental 
Protection 
0 2 
Probable Possible Unlikely 
Exposure to Adverse 
Environment 
0 1 2 
75 
Accidental Damaqe Ratinq ADR. 
ADR = Detectability + Susceptibility 
Detectability = Visibility + Sensitivity to Damage Size 
Poor Adequate Good 
Visibility (of SSI for 
Inspection) 
0 1 2 
High Medium Low 
Sensitivity (to 
damage size) 
0 1 2 
Susceptibility = Residual Strength After AD + Likelihood of AD 
Low Medium High 
Residual Strength 
After AD 
0 1 2 
Probable Possible Unlikely 
Likelihood of AD 0 1 2 
Rating Environmental Deterioration (ED). 
When assessing an SSI for ED using the factors the rating system should include consideration 
and evaluation of susceptibility and detectability of corrosion and stress corrosion with regards to 
the following.. 
Susceptibility to corrosion is assessed on the basis of probable exposure to an adverse 
environment and adequacy of the protective system. Considerations should be given to the 
following... 
A. The SSI's exposure to a deteriorating environment, e. g. cabin condensation, galley and toilet 
spillage etc. (Note: spillage is considered as inevitable therefore comes under ED rather then 
AD). 
B. The SSI's contact with dissimilar metals, (potential for galvanic activity). 
C. The SSI's protective surface treatment probability of breakdown, e. g. deterioration of paint and 
primer, sealant or bonding. 
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Material characteristics coupled with the likelihood of sustained tensile stress, are used to assess 
susceptibility to stress corrosion. 
Detectability (Timely Detection) is determined by sensitivity to relative size of damage and visibility 
of the SSI for inspection. 
There are to types of corrosion to be rated for ED. Most types of corrosion are observable as 
surface deterioration which results in a measurable reduction in the cross section of the of the 
element, this is referred to as ED (C). Stress corrosion however is more difficult to detect, referred 
to as ED (S). This form of corrosion is caused by the combined effects of environmental or 
sustained or cyclic tensile stress, and it can lead to the spontaneous collapse of the metal with no 
macroscopic signs of impending failure. Stress corrosion develops as fine intercrystalline or 
transcrystalline cracks in the metal itself. Since there may be no external evidence of deterioration, 
we must rely on non destructive techniques to detect the deterioration such as eddy current 
inspection. In a moist environment stress corrosion cracking can occur under stresses much lower 
than the yield stress of the material. The problem is most common in high strength aluminiurn 
alloys that have been strengthened by improper heat testament, or incorrecty installed parts 
where a preload is imposed or even a poor choice of materials. 
[Note: Rating system evaluation should be made taking into account the requirement (by RCM / 
MSG3 guidelines) for each operator to control the aircraft structure at corrosion level 1 or better. ]
Rating Accidental Damage (AD). 
When assessing an SSI for AD using the factors the Accidental Damage rating system should 
include consideration of the following.. 
A. The SSI, under assessmenfs susceptibility/ likelihood to minor (not obvious), accidental 
damage based on frequency of exposure and location of damage from: 
1. Ground handling equipment. 
2. Cargo handling equipment. 
3. Resulting from human error during the manufacturing, maintenance or operational 
process. 
4. Weather effects such as hail, rain etc. 
5. Debris on the runway. 
6. Lightening strikes. 
7. Water entrapment. 
B. The residual strength of the SSI after accidental damage has been sustained. 
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C. The detectability /visibility of the damage on the SSI after the accidental damage has been 
sustained. This will include the growth rate of the damage, such as crack propagation rate or 
rate of delamination (freeze / thaw cycle implications). 
Rating Fatigue Damage (FD). 
When assessing a SSI for FD the rating system must lead to inspections that provides a high 
probability of detecting fatigue damage in the fleet before such damage reduces any aircraft's 
residual strength below allowable levels. To achieve this, the rating system should consider the 
folloWing.. 
A. Residual strength, including the effects of multiple site fatigue damage, where appropriate. 
B. Crack growth rate, including effects of multiple element fatigue damage, where appropriate. 
C. Damage detection period which corresponds to the interval for the fatigue damage to grow 
from the threshold of detection (detectability) to the limiting size defined as critical (P-F 
range). This period will vary according to the inspection method used, and may be influenced 
by structural parts or processes, e. g. sealant obscuring parts of the damage. 
D. Detection standards for applicable inspection methods, e. g. Non Destructive Testing 
techniques uch as X Ray or eddy current. 
E. Applicable inspection levels and methods, (e. g. visual or NDT), directions (e. g. external or 
intemal). 
It should be understood that the RCM process for structures with regards to AD and ED ratings is 
largely judgmental based upon past experience with similar structure. These ratings account for 
susceptibility to and delectability of damage and determine the basic structural inspection 
requirements for the SSI. While for a FD rating of a SSI that is classified as "Damage Tolerant' (we 
will see below the decision process that involves this) a residual strength evaluation must be 
performed. If the maximum allowable damage identified in this analysis is not "malfunction 
evident7 (i. e. evident to the operator during the routine operation), then a crack evaluation must be 
performed, that should consider damage at multiple sites. Damage tolerance rating systems are 
used to determine inspections for detecting FD. In addition, ED (Corrosion or Stress corrosion) and 
AD may require an inspection. Improved inspection access and or redesign of the SSI may be 
required if no practical and effective visual and or non destructive inspection area available. If this is 
not feasible for the manufacturer then the SSI must be categorised as "Safe Life" and a hard life 
time put against the SSI, e. g. some of the Landing Gear parts (SSI*s) of a B737NG have safe lives 
of 75,000 landings regardless of their condition, this example will be examined in more detail later 
in the thesis. SSI's classified as Safe Life, therefore no scheduled inspection outcome is required 
from the FD rating, these SSI's are limited to evaluation for ED and AD. 
78 
For composite material the damage tolerance analytical approach closely parallels that for metallic 
SSI's requiring an ED rating and an AD rating. However because composite structure are designed 
to stop damage growth a damage tolerance calculation is not required. 
With the understanding that each operator the has the ability (in fact later we will look at the real 
requirement for this activity to be carried out) to adjust the Structural Maintenance Programme 
once produced, in the areas of AD and ED tasks provided there is sufficient evidence that the tasks 
is redundant or superseded by company procedure. Later in the we will look at the in operational 
development of an operators maintenance programme where many RCM tasks are up for scrutiny 
as to their in operational applicability and effectively once operation experience and maintenance 
engineering statistics through reliability studies have been gathered. Just as with all RCM produced 
tasks, validation of the tasks in the particular operators environment and procedural context must 
take place where task interval adjustment, task deletion, or even new task addition. Until no in 
operation data is available the RCM analysis produced maintenance schedule is the only relevant 
schedule to be followed. 
The rating scheme attempts to rate each SSI in terms of its susceptibility to damage and 
detectability once damaged. The structural maintenance tasks and intervals are developed to 
enable timely detection of Accidental Damage (AD), Environmental Deterioration (ED C and S), 
and Fatigue Damage (FD). The rating allocated to an SSI should be with consideration to other 
ratings allocated to SSI*s in the similar inspection area, leading to greater emphasis to the most 
critical SSI*s. Once the SSI has been rated for EDR(C), EDR(S), ADR and FDR, the lowest rating 
dictates the final rating for that SSI, thus dictates the frequency of the interval. 
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The Structural RCM Decision Logic Diagrams. 
The decision logic described can be shown as a RCM Structural Logic Flow Diagrams. These 
diagrams detail the procedures and decisions need to be followed and taken to successfully 
produce a structural maintenance programme. This with use of the Rating Scheme SSI's will 
translate into inspection tasks with an accomplishment scheduled time. 
Fig 2 27. Structural Logic Diagram. (Air Transport Association MSG3 200 1) 
Aircraft Structure 
PI I Define Aircraft zones or Areas 
P2 I Define Aircraft Structural Items (SI) 
No 
DI Is the Sl a Significant Structural Item (SSI)? 
Yes 
P3 Categorize& list all SSI'sj 
03 1 Is SSI Damage Tolerant? 
No Yes 
Safe Life Limit FD Analysis 
Analysis 
I 
P14 
I AIRWORTHINESS LIMITATIONS I 
ED/AD/CPCP Analysis of other 
Analysis Structure 
P15 
I CONSOLIDATED STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE PROGRAMME I 
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Note: in fig 2.27, above, the letter P denotes a series of process steps are to take place to enable 
text in the box to be accomplished, while D denotes a series of decision steps are to take place. 
P4 
No 
From DI 
Categorize & List as 
other structure 
Is other structure similar 
to existino aircraft 
P5 Manufacturer 
recommends yes 
Maintenance 
II 
RCM Work Group 
Recommends or selects 
maintenance 
To P15 
Above Fig 2 28 "Is item a significant structural item? " 
Below Fig 229 "Categotise and List as SSI. " 
D2 
From P3 
I 
P7 Determine insp 
for AD /ED 
PS [-Determine CPCP Requirements 
Yes 
Is e ED inspection task from P7 adequate D9 
No additional 
to cover the CPCP requirements from P8? 
requirements No 
necessary. 
IF 
Reassess ED analysis from P7 & or define P9 
-additional 
requirements. ToP15 
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Below Fig 230 "Is the Sl Damage Tolerant" Safe Life Analysis Logic Diagram. 
From D3 
Categorize & list as Safe Life: Manufacturer 
determines Safe Life & includes with SSI 
description in Airworffiiness Limitations. 
To P14 
82 
Below Fig 231 "is the Sl Damage Tolerant". Fatigue Damage Analyses Logic Diagram. 
From D3 
Categorize & list as Damage 
Tolerant perform Damage 
Tolerant assessment 
No fatigue related task Is a scheduled fatigue 
related inspection required? N. 
Yes + 
Can FD be detected by visual 0 Can FD be detected by NDI inspection at practical intervals? methods at practical intervals? 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Are fatigue inspections Can inspection Improve access &/ or 
requirement feasible ? method be 0 redesign or classify 
improved ? as Safe Life. 
Yes 
t 
Yes 
To D3 
Select SSI for inclusion To P15 (all items) in the ALI document. 
To P14 
Corrosion Prevention and Control Programme (CPCP). 
Fig 2.27 & 2.29 refer to CPCP. A Corrosion Prevention and Control Programme (CPCP), should be 
established to maintain the aircrafts resistance to corrosion as a result of systematic deterioration 
through chemical and / or environmental interaction. 
The programme is expected to allow control of the corrosion of the aircraft to Corrosion Level 1 or 
better. The CPCP should be based on the ED analysis, assuming an aircraft operated in a typical 
environment. If corrosion is found to exceed Level I at any inspection time, the corrosion control 
programme for the affected area must be reviewed by the operator with the objective to ensure 
Corrosion Level I or befter. 
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[Corrosion Level 1: Corrosion damage that does not require structural reinforcement or 
replacement. Or Corrosion occuning between successive inspections exceeds allowable limit but is 
local and can be attributed to an event not typical of operator usage, e. g. mercuty spillage. ATA 
MSG3 2001] 
Summansing the Flow Chart Process to Produce a Structural Maintenance Schedule. 
Structural Logic Flow Charts 2.27 to 2.31 explain the method of developing the Structural 
Maintenance Programme of tasks. Along with this process and the rating process to identify 
intervals, the out come is a Structural Maintenance Schedule. 
Fig 2.27 details the process for producing the initial structural maintenance programme and details 
a series of processes (P 1, P2, P3 etc) and decision steps (D 1, D2, D3 etc) 
.... 
P1 Process 1 splits the aircraft into manageable zones / areas to be assessed. 
P2 Process 2 defines the structural items to be assessed in each zone. 
D1 Decision I is to be made for each structural item defined in P2 and ask of each item if it is 
significant. If so it is classed as a Structural Significant Item (SSI) subject to further analysis. 
See page 50 for definitions of what is significant. 
P3 Process 3 is applied to those items in D3 that are classified as a SSI. This Process is further 
detailed in decision flow chart fig 2.29 where the Accidental Damage AD and the 
Environmental Deterioration including CPCP, considerations are analysed and addressed. 
Process 4 is applied to those items in DI that are not classified as significant (SSI). 
This process is applied to all structural items in all zones / areas until all structural items have been 
categorised. 
P7 and P8, Process 7 and Process 8 leading from P3 are to analyse the SSI forAD, ED and 
CPCP implications and requirements. Leading to D9 Decision 9 asking the question to address 
CPCP implications. If the ED tasks meets the CPCP requirements then no additional CPCP 
task is required. P7, P8, P9 and D9 are repeated until all SSI's are analysed. 
Those items from DI that are not classified as a SSI undergo D2 and P4, P5 and P6, where 
the flow chart fig 2.28 is followed for each item, where the structure is compared to already 
known similar structure. 
PI 0 Process 10 is applied to those SSI's that are not "Damage Tolerant7. This process is very 
important as it addresses those SSI's that require a life limitation applied to them. This process 
can have significant cost implications as well as serious safety implications. SSI*s with a "Safe 
Life! ' imposed are not subjected to further fatigue related scheduled inspections. 
Al remaining SSI's are therefore damage tolerant. These SSI's are analysed in accordance 
with flow chart fig 2.31 to determine the fatigue related inspection requirements. Here D4 to D8 
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and P1 I to P14 are processed to establish airworthiness limitations and scheduled structural 
maintenance inspections. Here Non Destructive Inspection /Testing methods (NDI / NDT) may 
be employed where visual inspections are not appropriate or applicable. 
85 
Practical Example of Developing a Structures Maintenance Task 
Step 1. (Process 1) Define Aircraft Zones. 
MAJOR ZONE 100 LOWER HALF OF FUSELAGE 
MAJORZONE200 UPPER HALF OF FUSELAGE 
MAJOR ZONE 300 EMPENNAGE AND BODY SECTION 48 
MAJOR ZONE 4DO POWER PLANTS AND NACELLE STRUTS 
MAJORZONE600 LEFT*N0 
MAJOR ZONE 500 
-RIGHT WHO 
MAJOR ZONE 700 LANDING GEAR AND LANDING GEAR DOORS 
MAJOR ZONE 800 
- 
PASSENGER AND CARGO COMPARTMENT DOORS 
Fig 2.32 Above, Aircraft Major Zonal Diagram. (Boeing 737-6171800 Maintenance Manual. ) 
The aircraft is divided up into eight major structural zones. Form 100 being lower half of fuselage to 
800 passenger and cargo compartment doors. These zone are further divided up into sub zones. 
For example Major Zone 400 is powerplant and nacelles, Sub Zone 410 is left hand powerplant 
and nacelles. 
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433 
443 
1114 
444 
432 
43 
411 414 
412 41 423 
422 424 
4ýI 
4. 
425 
420 
SUM HE410. LEFTPCWERFL^NT 
SU0Z0HE420-RIGHTPOWERFILANT 
SýBZONE430-LEFTNACELLESTRUT 
SUE2ONE440 RIGHTNACELLESTRUT 
M. j., Z.. 400 CMF 56 7S. i., Eýgi- 
Fig 2.33 Detailed Zonal diagram of the Powerplant and Nacelle. (Boeing 737-617181900 
Maintenance manual). 
Step 2. (Process 2 and Decision 2). Define Aircraft Structural Items. 
This step identifies all structural items in the zone undergoing analysis. It then will go on to analyse 
if each structural item is a Structural Significant Item (SSI) or not. 
The following is a list of structural items for Zone 400, ATA 54. 
1 411 Left Engine 
- 
Nose Inlet Cowl 
2 412 Left Engine 
- 
Fan Cowl, Left 
3 413 Left Engine 
- 
Fan Cowl, Right 
4 414 Left Engine 
- 
Thrust Reverser, Left 
5 415 Left Engine 
- 
Thrust Reverser, Right 
6 416 Left Engine 
- 
Primary Exhaust Nozzle and Plug 
7 431 Left Engine 
- 
Forward Strut Fairing 
8 432 Left Engine 
- 
Fan Cowl Support Beam 
9 433 Left Engine 
- 
Strut Torque Box 
10 433 Left Engine 
- 
Forward Engine Mount 
11 433 Left Engine 
- 
Aft Engine Mount 
12 433 Left Engine 
- 
Strut to Wing Attachment 
13 434 Left Engine 
- 
Aft Strut Fairing 
With the example above we can now analyse each structural item to see if it can be classified as an 
SSI. 
87 
In order to help in selecting structural significant items from the established list of structural items, a 
list of questions (identification aids) supporting the definitions are: 
" 
Is the failure a threat to safety? 
" 
Does its failure directly affect operational capability? 
" 
Could scheduled maintenance cost effectively prevent or delay on aircraft failure? 
" 
Is the structural item a critical monolithic (single load path) item? 
" 
Is the structural item subject to a relitively high consentration of tensile stress? 
" 
Is the structural item subject to tensile stress at a high frequency? 
" 
Is the structural item a major structural attachment or opening? 
" 
Is the structural item (or does it contain) a load path discontinuity? 
" 
Is the structrual item primary structure? 
Note: If the answers to all of the above questions are NO then the item is not an SSI. 
Fig 234 Detailed close view of Strut Assembly. (Boeing 737-617181900 Maintenance manual). 
I Structural Significant Item 
1 411 1 Left Engine 
- 
Nose Inlet Cowl No 
2 412 Left Engine 
- 
Fan Cowl, Left No 
3 413 Left Engine 
- 
Fan CoW, Right No 
4 414 Left Engine 
- 
Thrust Reverser, Left No 
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5 415 Left Engine 
- 
Thrust Reverser, Right No 
6 416 Left Engine 
- 
Primary Exhaust Nozzle and Plug No 
7 431 Left Engine 
- 
Forward Strut Fairing No 
8 432 Left Engine 
- 
Fan Cowl Support Beam No 
9 433 Left Engine 
- 
Strut to Wing Affachments 54-50-101 
10 433 Left Engine 
- 
Strut Torque Box Side Skins 54-50-102 
11 433 Left Engine 
- 
Strut Upper Spar 54-50-103 
12 433 Left Engine 
- 
Strut Lower Spar 54-50-104 
13 433 Left Engine 
- 
Forward Engine Mount 54-50-105 
14 433 Left Engine 
- 
Aft Engine Mount 54-50-106 
15 433 Left Engine 
- 
Forward Engine Mount Bulkhead 54-50-107 
16 433 Left Engine 
- 
Aft Engine Mount Bulkhead 54-50-108 
Left Engine 
- 
Aft Strut Fairing No 
Note: 54-51 is the ATA-Sub ATA chapter for the strut area. 
It is worth mentioning here that no area will go un inspected, even if it is deemed as not an SSI. The 
Zonal Programme to be discussed next will detail how those items in the systems and in the 
structural programme that have not been identified as a SI's for systems or SSI's for structures. It is 
difficult at times not to categorise every item as an SSI, but engineering logic must be used and 
consideration as to the nature of failure of the item, as to whether it merits a dedicated structural 
inspection. 
Stop 3. Understand the SSI's Material, Design and Function. 
Before any further valid analysis can take place, the analysers must be familiar with the structure 
design, installation, function and also familiar with the material used and the protective treatment 
applied. With these features and functions in mind an accurate analysis in context can be made. 
Strut to Winq Affachment. (Zone 430 and 440). 
The strut to wing attachment fiffings, links and pins combine to form a single multi-element load 
path between the nacelle strut and the wing structure. The attachment, SSI 54-51 
-101, consists of 
the upper link, side links, diagonal brace, and their associated shear pins and wing and strut 
attachment fitting lugs. The upper link, shear pins and attaching lugs are accessible within the 
leading edge ATA Zone 533 for left hand side and 633 for the right hand side. The remainder of the 
structure is accessible within the strut aft fairing ATA Zone 434 for the left hand side and 444 for the 
right hand side. 
The upper link attaches the forward upper spar to the wing front spar, and is made of forged 6AL- 
4V titanium. The strut forward upper spar fifting lug is forged 15-5 PH CRES. The wing attachment 
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fiffing lug is 7050-T74 aluminium. The shear pin for both ends of the link are made of 15-5 PH 
CRES. 
The primary strut attachment lugs are integral parts of the strut aft upper spar fittings. These two 
forged Ti-6AL-4V fiffings attach the strut aft upper comers to the Tl-6AL-4V front spar fitting to the 
wing. The shear pins for this attachment are made of 15-5 PH CRES. 
The side links connect the strut aft bulkhead to the wing lower surface. They are made from 6AL- 
4V titanium as are the strut attachment lugs which are integral to the strut aft upper spar fittings. 
The wing attachment fittings are made of 7050-T74 aluminium. The shear pins for both ends of the 
link are made of passive A286 CRES. 
The diagonal brace attaches the strut lower spar at the aft bulkhead to the wing lower surface. It is 
made of 7075-T73 aluminium with integral machined lugs on both ends. The strut diagonal brace.. 
fitting lugs are forged 15-5 PH CRES. The wing attachment fitting lugs are 7073-T74 aluminium. 
The shear pins for both ends of the diagonal brace are made of 15-5 PH CRES. 
Strut To[gue Box (ATA Zones 432 and 442.433 and 443). 
The strut is a closed end, stressed skin structural torque box. The strut design employs skin spar 
bulkhead / frame type construction with two spars and five bulkheads. 
The Upper Spar SSI consists of chords of 6AL-4V beta annealed titanium and a web of 6AL-4V mill 
annealed titanium, with the 15-5 PH CRIES forward upper spar fitting forming a tee shaped stiffener 
along BL 0.0. The upper spar is made of a web of 2024-T851 aluminiurn with chords of 6AL-4V 
titanium and 2024-T851 aluminiurn stiffeners. 
The upper spar chords are spliced by the upper flange of the 6AL-4V titanium aft engine mount 
bulkhead and a spliced strip of 6AL-4V titanium. 
The Side Skins SSI are made of 2024-T851 aluminiurn with hot bonded and riveted doublers of 
2024-T851 aluminium. The triplers are riveted and fey surface sealed 2024-T851, while the bear 
strap / tripler is 6AL-4V titanium, attached by the same method as the forward triplers. The fore-aft 
stiffeners are 2024-T851 aluminium. The remaining stiffeners are 6AL-4V titanium. 
The Lower Spar SSI is made of one piece chords of 15-5 PH CRIES and two 15-5 PH CRIES webs 
spliced. The chord lower flanges are doubled by straps of 15-5 PH CRIES extending from the 
forward engine mount bulkhead aft. 
The forward engine mount bulkhead SSI is made from forged 6AL-4V mill annealed titanium with 
press fit 15-5 PH CRIES bushings in the shear pin and ground support equipment pin holes. 
Corrosion Protection. 
Forward and Aft Engine Mount Assemblies. 
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AJI primary components of the forward engine mount assembly are manufactured from 15-5 PH 
CRES. The attachment bolts are nickel alloy 718. The primary components as well as the 
attachment bolts of the aft engine mount assembly are manufactured from nickel alloy 718. These 
materials are inherently corrosion resistant and for the environment in which they operate, require 
no further corrosion protection. 
Strut Torque Box. 
The engine strut structure consists of the following components. 
Forged aluminium and titanium bulkheads 
Extruded and forged aluminium frame elements. 
Titanium, aluminium and corrosion resistant steel spar webs. 
Extruded and forged titanium and corrosion resistant steel chords. 
Aluminium side skin vVith hot bonded doublers, mechanically fastened to frames, bulkheads 
and chords. 
Corrosion resistant steel honey comb heat shield with titanium sheet fire wall. 
Forged corrosion resistant steel, aluminiurn and titanium fittings. 
Nickel alloy 625 ducting and race ways. 
* Adhesive bonded aluminium honeycomb pressure relief doors and aluminium sheet metal 
access doors. 
Aluminium details (except honeycomb core) which are also to be adhesive bonded are phosphoric 
anodized and primed with BSM 5-137 Type 1 corrosion inhibiting primer prior to bonding with BMS 
5-137, Type 11. Bonded skins and doors are given a coat of BMS 
- 
1079 type III primer and a coat 
of BIVIS 10-60, type 11 enamel where exposed. Aluminium details that are not bonded or do not 
contact steel or titanium are either boric sulphuric acid anodized (if bare) or Alodines (if clad) and 
given one coat of BMS 10-11, type I primer. If aluminium contacts steel or titanium, two coats of 
primer are used. AJI corrosion resistant steels details are passivated except where aluminium rivets 
are installed, or another aluminiurn part contacts. In these areas they are given two coats of BMS 
10-11, type I primer. Faying surfaces are sealed with BMS 5-95, BMS 5-26 or BMS 5-63. Sealant 
depending upon surface temperature of the area. Drainage systems in low or sump areas have 
been provided to prevent fluid collection. Sump area where drain holes could not be provided 
because of structural reasons are filled with moisture resistant potting compound to a level to 
promote drainage. 
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Step 4. Conduct an Environmental Deterioration and an Accidental Damage Analysis of the 
SSI*s and decide upon an inspection interval and Inspection method. 
Referring to fig 2.29, at this stage we should asses each item identified in step 2 as a SSI and 
described further in step 3, with regards to ED and AD. This is done by using the ED and AD 
evaluation tables on page 53 and 54, asking the questions of each SSI one at a time. 
Continuing to use the example of the Pylon Nacelle Strut and focusing this ED / AD assessment on 
the SSI 54-50-103 The Strut Upper Spar, we can analyse each of the EDR(C), EDR(S) and ADR 
implication for the SSI. 
SSI Number Description EDR(C) EDR(S) ADR 
Q 0 W W 
ý, T 
Strut Upper Spar 
- 54-50-103 
Lower Surface 
Strut Upper Spar 
- 54-50-103 
Upper Surface 
Recommended inspection method and interval: 
Fig 2.35 Rating Table 
Above is the EDR and ADR for the SSI 54-50-103 displayed in tabulator form without the ratings. 
We must now work through each analyses one at a time to come up with a rating which will in the 
end be totalled to give an over all rating for this SSI, thus determining the interval that the SSI 
should be inspected. Note that the SSI has been split into two Lower Surface and Upper Surface. 
This is due to that fact that the upper surface and the lower surface will have different access 
requirements for visibility so are considered independently of each other. 
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Environmental Deterioration Ratina. Corrosion. EDR(C). 
Visibility: The visibility for inspection after access is to be considered. How much is the SSI hidden 
For the Upper Spar Lower Surface the rating is 1, meaning the visibility is adequate, 
(reference to EDR tables). 
Sensitivity to Damage Size: This rating reflects the properties of the material used to construct the 
SSI. 6AL-4V titanium is rated as a 2, meaning very low In sensitivity to damage size. (Note 
that sensitivity to damage could be a different rating for pure corrosion and stress corrosion). 
Environmental Protection: This considers the type of applied protection at manufacture and 
compares previous type of protection applied to earlier designs. This SSI has a proven and 
Improved protection system, hence rated 1, the details of the corrosion system is on previous 
pages. 
Exposure to Adverse Environment: The probability of exposure is considered. A relative 
judgement based on collective operator experience. There is little possibility of moisture gathering 
which is another consideration. This SSI is considered unlikely to be exposed, hence rated 2. 
Environmental Deterioration Ratina. Stress Corrosion. EDR(S). 
Visibility: The visibility for inspection after access is to be considered. How much is the SSI hidden 
For the Upper Spar Lower Surface the rating Is 1, meaning the visibility is adequate, 
(reference to EDR tables). 
Sensitivity to Damage Size: This rating reflects the properties of the material used to construct the 
SSI. 6AL-4V titanium Is rated as a 1, meaning medium In sensitivity to damage size. The 
rating has dropped due to the fact that the Lower Surface of the Upper Spar is under continuous 
tensile loading hence more sensitive to the damage size from the perspective of stress corrosion 
than from pure corrosion. 
Environmental Protection: This considers the type of applied protection at manufacture and 
compares previous type of protection applied to earlier designs. No change for stress corrosions 
again this SSI has a proven and Improved protection system, hence rated 1, the details of the 
corrosion system is on previous pages. 
Exposure to Adverse Environment: The probability of exposure is considered. A relative 
judgement based on collective operator experience. Again no change to the pure corrosion rating. 
This SSI is considered unlikely to be exposed, hence rated 2. 
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Accidental Damane Ratina. (ADR). 
Visibility: The visibility for inspection after access is to be considered. How much is the SSI hidden 
For the Upper Spar Lower Surface the rating Is 1, meaning the visibility is adequate, no 
different than for the previous EDR's (reference to ADIR tables). 
Sensitivity to Damage Growth: This rating reflects the properties of the material used to construct 
the SSI. 6AL-4V titanium Is rated as a 1, meaning medium In sensitivity to damage growth 
rate. 
Residual Strength: Likely size of damage relative to the critical size of damage. For example the 
cargo door scuff plate has a high possibility of getting a dent of 1 foot by 0.3 foot same as the 
loader leading edge. This SSI has a high residual strength, as it Is unlikely to get damaged, 
hence rated 2. The material properties also here are considered. 
Likelihood of Accidental Damage: Foreign Object Damage and damage due to traffic increase 
the rating here. With this SSI it is unlikely to be suffer accidental damage as it in an area 
remote and protected, hence rated 2. 
The final columns of the table are the sum of each individual rating for ERID(C), ERD(S) and ADR. 
This now completes the rating assessment, the highest rating of the three for each SSI is the driver 
for the interval that must be decide next along with the inspection method. 
SSI Number Description EDR(C) EDR(S) ADR 
W 
a 
Ix 
0 
Ex 
a 
W III 
Strut Upper Spar 
- 54-50-103 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 6 5 6 
Lower Surface 
Strut Upper Spar 
- 54-50-103 0 2 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 1 2 2 4 4 5 
Upper Surface 
Recommended inspection method and interval: 
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Fig 2.36, above, The rating table completed for the SSI 54-50-103. 
Inspection Intervals and Inspection Methods. 
At the start of the RCM analysis the working group conducting the analysis decide upon an 
inspection time table. This time table is based on their experience of previous equipment 
inspection. 
e. g. 
EDR / ADR Interval Internal Inspection Interval External Inspection 
1 15 months or 2500 Mrs 15 months or 2500 fhrs 
2 24 months or 4000 fhrs 
3 48 months or 8000 fhrs 24 months or 4000 fhrs 
4 or greater 72 months or 12000 fhrs 
Fig 2.37 Inspection time table 
The maintenance intervals for this aircraft were selected as 3 month or 500 flight hours repeating 
for minor checks. It was felt with the case of the structural tasks the appropriate time to start the 
structural programme on most SSI's was at the fifth minor input I. e. 15 months or 2500 flight hours. 
The lowest rating from the analysis is selected as the rating for the SSI in question. So for 54-50- 
103 Upper Spar Lower Surface 5 is the rating. A rating of 5 means the internal inspection should be 
carried out every 72 months or 12000 flight hours which ever is sooner while the external inspection 
is to be carried out every 24 months or 4000 flight hours which ever is sooner. This is because the 
Strut Upper Spar Lower Surface is in fact as the analysis shows a well protected pieces of structure 
that has had similar designs already in operation with little or no short term damage, hence it would 
be inappropriate to continually access the area for the purpose of inspection, thus increasing traffic 
to inspect at short intervals. (Latter in the thesis we will look at the dangers of selecting intervals for 
task that are too short and can in fact lead to damage by the invasive action of the inspection). 
The inspection methods available to conduct the SSI task are as follows 
e General Visual Inspection Extemal or Intemal. 
A visual examination of an internal or extemal area, installation or assembly to detect obvious 
damage, damage, failure or irregularifty, This level of inspection is made from within touching 
distance, unless otherwise specirted. A mirror may be necessary to ensure visual access to a# 
surfaces in the inspection area. This inspection is made under normally available lightning 
condilions such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight or drop light and may require removal or 
opening of access panels or doors. Stands, ladders orplafforms may be required to gain 
proximity to the area being checked. 
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o Detailed Inspection 
An intensive examination of a specific item, installation or assembly to detect damage, failure 
or irregularfly. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting 
at an intensity deemed appropriate. Inspection aids such as mirrors, magnifying lenses etc may 
be necessary. Surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures may be required. 
9 SDecialDetailedinspection(includinqNDTIn 
An intensive examination of a specific Item, installation or assembly to detect damage, failure 
or irregularfly. The examination is likely to make extensive use of speciallsed inspection 
techniques and or equipment Intricate cleaning and substantial access or disassembly may be 
required. 
(Air Transport Association MSG3 200 1.1 inspection definitions. )
The General Visual Inspection (GVI) is the usual level of inspection selected, but in some cases a 
Detailed or Special Detailed Inspection (NDT) method may be preferred if the GVI is considered 
inadequate to find a defect. When a Detailed inspection method is selected the inspection 
frequency can usually be increased. 
With SSI 54-50-103 the nacelle strut upper spar we have identified both an internal aspect and an 
eternal aspect of the SSI requiring inspection. With the access required detailed, it is felt that a GVI 
will detect any structural defects, therefore other than detailing the level of access by specifically 
saying "upper" and "lower" with the associated access panels removed to facilitate an adequate 
inspection, there is no need for a Detailed or Special inspection. So in summary the following 
inspections are as a result of RCM Structural analysis for the Nacelle Strut Upper Spar 
.... 
SSI 54-50-103: Strut Upper Spar Lower Surface. 
A. Extemal. 
Inspection Interval: every 24 months or 4,000 flight hours which ever is sooner. 
Inspection Method: General Visual Inspection. 
Access: Nacelle / Pyion fairings. 
B. Intemal. 
Inspection Interval: every 72 months or 12,000 flight hours which ever is sooner. 
Inspection Method: General Visual Inspection. 
Access: Nacelle / Pylon Fairings and all insulation blankets. 
2. SSI 54-50-103: Strut Upper Spar Upper Surface. 
Extemal. 
Inspection Interval: every 24 months or 4,000 flight hours which ever is sooner. 
Inspection Method: General Visual Inspection. 
Access: Nacelle / Pylon fairings. 
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D. Internal. 
Inspection Interval: every 72 months or 12,000 flight hours which ever is sooner. 
Inspection Method: General Visual Inspection. 
Access: Nacelle / Pylon fairings and all insulation blankets. 
Note: Though the upper surface score was one point less than the lower surface, both fell into 
the same bracket of inspection intervals. Aso note that the distinction between the external and 
internal inspection is not only the fact that one looks at the external side of the strut but also the 
level of access. It can be then said that the detailed level of access can in fact define the scope 
of inspection. 
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2.3.3 The Zonal Inspection Programme. 
The RCM analysis process has so far concentrated on the scheduled maintenance tasks 
generated by explicit consideration to failure consequences and the Inherent reliability 
characteristics of each item. By this method alone many items both structural and system wise, 
would go un inspected by the strength that they are not classified as Structural Significant Items or 
Maintenance Significant Items. To complete the RCM process described so far there should be a 
supplemental programme including inspection tasks that consider the "left out"areas not addressed 
with the effects of failure RCM process that considers the effects of failure. Because the remaining 
"left out"areas are not classified as "Significant"their inspection should be cost effective and un 
complicated general area inspections. Non significant area inspections, known as Zonal 
Inspections, complete the RCM Scheduled Maintenance programme in ensuring all systems, 
structures and all areas of the aircraft do not go un inspected for their in service life. 
GENERAL VISUAL INSPECTION (GVf) 
A visual examination of an interior or exterior area, installation or assembly to 
detect obvious damage, failure or irregularity. This level of inspection is made 
from within touching distance, unless otherwise specified. A mirror may be 
necessary to enhanced visual access to all exposed surfaces in the inspection 
area. This level of inspection is made under normally available lighting conditions 
such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight or drop-light and may require removal 
or opening of access panels or doors. Stands, ladders or platforms may be 
required to gain proximity to the area being checked. 
Air Transport Association Maintenance Steering Group 3 2001.1 
The Zonal Inspection Programme is based on a series of General Visual Inspections (GVI's as 
defined by the ATA MSG3). The Zonal inspections are based on a three dimensional identification 
system used by the manufacturer to identify physical locations on the aircraft. The zones are 
usually defined and bounded by bulkheads, significant areas, stringers, floor beams, skins etc. The 
complete aircraft is split into zones and every part of the aircraft is located within a defined zone, as 
shown previously in fig 2.32. 
The Zonal GVI inspection is looking for deterioration of the original installation. This includes.. 
0 Corrosion 
* 
Cracks 
Chafing 
Evidence of leakage 
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* Evidence of overheat 
Security and condition of the components contained within the zone under inspection 
The Zonal inspection may require the use of access stands to attain arms length. The Zonal task 
does not require any special lighting or special tools. Access to conduct the inspection should be 
limited to the specified panels and door stated for the particular Zonal inspection task. 
Item 
No. 
Zone Access Interval Zonal Title an Task Description 
32-800 710 40 day External Zonal (General Visual): Nose Landing Gear & Eanding G-ea-r-ý'- 
or 300 doors from ground. Perform an external Zonal inspection (GV) of the 
CYC nose landing gear & landing gear doors. Inspection is accomplished 
from the ground, without the use of stands or ladders. 
52-824 834 834AW 18 Internal Zonal (General Visual): Aft passenger Door. Perform an 
834AX months internal Zonal inspection (GV) of the aft passenger door section 47, sta 
834AZ or 400 980. 
834BX cyc 
834BZ 
834CZ 
Fig 2 38. two tasks from the RCM / MSG3 analysis of the Boeing 73 7NG Zonal Programme. 
Note that in figure 1.3-3.1 the first example of the Zonal inspection requires no access panels to be 
opened. This defines the extent of the area to be inspected i. e. zone 710 Landing Gear & Gear 
Doors. But note that 52-824 does detail access panels to be opened. Therefore the extent of the 
area of inspection within the defined zone is clarified by the detailing of the of the panels requiring 
opening to accomplish the intended task. 
The primary objective of the Zonal inspection is to inspect the area defined in that zone, with 
respect to the structure and the installations within that zone. These inspections are non specific 
general visual inspections to detect the presence of the six irregular conditions mentioned earlier.. 
Corrosion: The General Visual at arms length will detect the presence of surface corrosion or 
discolouration. The earlier analysis (FD, AD and ED) conducted for the structural programme 
will identify those items that require more than the GV inspection of the Zonal inspection. 
Cracks: Similar to corrosion, the structural programme will define those items critical for crack 
detection, the Zonal GV will supplement in this case. 
Chafing: Electrical wires, control cables and piping may be subject to chaffing. The GV of the 
Zonal is to detect these conditions for all the items contained in the zone under examination. 
0 Evidence of leakage: Hydraulic fluid, oil, fuel, air, water and waste may leak through piping or 
from fittings. The GV of the Zonal is to identify such conditions. 
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0 Evidence of overheat:: Electrical connections, heating elements and mats, hot air ducting. 
0 Security and condition of the components contained within the zone under Inspection: 
Attachments, fixtures, fastenings, mounts and panels. 
The Zonal inspection are not on condition tasks designed at detecting a particular failure mode, but 
are efficient inexpensive opportunities to detect irregular conditions before they develop into 
expensive repairs of evident failures. 
The intervals assigned to the Zonal tasks are largely judgmental based on susceptibility, meaning 
the overall vulnerability of the installation Within a zone to damage, loss of security and leaks. The 
interval rating system takes into consideration three characteristics 
.. 
Density 
* 
Environment 
o Activity (relevant for Accidental Damage, AD) 
The Zonal Analysis Process. 
Step 1. Divide the Alrcraft into Zones. 
See fig 2.21. Here the same ATA Zonal system is used to define areas of the aircraft as was done 
with the structural programme. 
Stop 2. Detail Required General Information for the Zone. 
Zone Location 
Access Panels 
Approximate size of zone 
Type of systems and components installed in zone 
Typical power levels in any wire bundles in zone 
Type on environment within the zone 
Existing RCM SSI's and MSI's for items within the zone 
Step 3. Develop Rating Table. 
The rating table will assist in identifying the repeating interval to conduct the Zonal inspection of the 
zone under analysis. Rating tables will permit the likelihood of accidental damage (especially due to 
traffic), environmental deterioration, and the density of equipment in the zone to be taken into 
consideration. Two rating tables should be used to take into consideration both the environmental 
as well as the accidental damage considerations. 
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Environmental 
Factor Rating 
Temperature 
Vibration 
Chemicals 
Humidity 
Contamination 
Highest Value 
Rating: I- Passive. 2- Moderate. 3- Severe 
Accidental Damage 
Factor Rating 
Ground Handling 
Equipment 
Foreign Object 
Damage 
Weather Effects 
(hail etc) 
Frequency of 
Maintenance 
Activities 
Fluid Spillage 
Passenger Traffic 
Other 
Highest Value 
Rating: I- Low Probability. 2- Medium. 3- High 
(Both tables are taken from A TA MSG3 Rev 2). 
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As with the structural and the systems part of the programme, the Zonal working group will define 
intervals that correspond with the ratings prior to starting the analysis. For example... 
Interval Determination 
Probability Accidental Damage 
2 3 
Ca 1 72 months or 48 months or 24 months or E 46 Cu 
a 12000 fhrs 8000 Mrs 4000 fhrs ZN 
C: 2 48 months or 24 months or 15 months or CU a) ý0 2E 8000 fhrs 4000 fhrs 2500 Mrs C: 2 
.9 3 24 months or 15 months Or 3 months or 500 
w 4000 fhrs 2500 fhrs thrs 
102 
Stop 4. A- Perform the Standard Zonal Analysis. 
This is done using the RCM Zonal Standard Analysis Logic Flow Chart. Fig 2.39. 
Prepare A/C Zoning, 
including boundaries 
List details of Zone, e. g.: 
- 
Access 
- 
Installed Equipment 
features 
materials In zone 
- 
etc. 
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_I- 
STANDARD ZONAL ANALY IS--, 
fig 239 A TA MSG3 Standard Zonal Analysis Flow Chart 
Step 4. B. Perform the Enhanced Zonal Analysis. 
After some consideration as to the scope of use of the Zonal programme by the Air transport 
Association of America Maintenance Steering Group (ATA MSG) it was proposed that the Zonal 
programme be extended to address some topical issues that were arising at that time in the 
operation of aircraft. The first was the integrity of electrical wires over time and the build up of 
combustible materials over the operating life of the aircraft. The enhanced Zonal analysis adds two 
new aspects for the analysis and takes into consideration wiring as a "system" of its own requiring 
at times detailed visual inspections to ensure wire integrity. This does not effect the fact that wire in 
a zone is still subject to the GVI Zonal inspection, it will identify where wiring merits consideration as 
a detailed inspection in the system programme. This aspect of wire is not considered in the RCM 
system analysis and was added to the RCM flow chart after the initial analysis were conducted. 
AJso the enhanced analysis includes consideration to the collection of combustible materials. Over 
the life of an aircraft material that is not native gather in the comers of many parts of the aircraft, 
such as lint, hair, dead skin, carpet fibres, even fuel vapours etc. These materials can be classified 
as combustible and many aircraft fires can be said to have been assisted by the presence of these 
materials. The Zonal analysis programme takes this aspect into consideration and includes 
consideration to the gathering of such materials. 
So the enhanced dimensions to the Zonal tries to address both of these new aspects of wire as a 
system in its own deserving the attentions at times of a detailed inspection in the system 
programme as well as always considered in the GVI Zonal programme, also consideration to the 
build up of combustible material that if left un removed can be classified as a fire hazard. Fig 2.40 
and 2.41 show the recognised analysis flow charts in use today. 
The two new aspects of the enhanced Zonal analysis complete the objective of the Zonal 
programme to detect an abnormal situation existing in a zone in its early period, and giving an 
opportunity to rectify the situation and restore the zone to its normal situation. 
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Prepare A/C Zoning, 
including boundaries 
List details of Zone, e. g.: 
- 
Access 
- 
Installed Equipment 
features 
- 
Wire bundle Installation 
- 
Possible combustible 
materials in zone 
- 
etc. 
STANDARD ZONAL ANALY IS-1 
e contains onljýM 
Structure? 
ENHANCED ZONAL ANALY IS., 
Zonal Analysi3>ý No 
necessary? 
'0"' 
YYES 
Perform Zonal Analysis; e. g 
IE<Zon(e co ins NO Rating Table: 
Vý - AD Wiring? 
- 
Environment 
- 
Density 
/" Combustible NO Kba-vAdng portion 
materials In zone See Figure X)= Define Interval and a 
requirements 
YES Wiring Insoection task determinati n 
s si 
Inspection level definition. 
Inspection level verification. 
Interval determination. Consider candida 
Is there 
1 
an from System & 
10 
active ta k to gnificant NO Powerplant, UHIF 
reduce ýft likelihood of DET ý and/ GVI and Structure 
cnulation of combustibl or Analysis Procedui 
I materials? 
fI 
Task Consolidation? 
Define Task and 
and/ 
Cono" snoisis or 
MRB Report 
System Section 
MRB Report 
Zonal Section 
fig 240 A TA MSG3 Enhanced Zonal Analysis Flow Chart. Rg)= ref Fig 241 
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fic 241 A TA MSG3 Enhanced Detailed Zonal Analysis Flow Chart 
Inspection Level Definition 
Rating Table: 
- 
Potential effects (criticality) 
- 
Inspection area size (%olume) 
- 
Density 
------------- Inspection Level Verification 
YES 
, "'is a GVI alone effective 
for the entire zone? 
NO 
Define DIRT fbr 
specific areas of 
zone, and GVI for 
entire zone. 
Interval determination 
Rating table: 
- 
Accidental Damage (AD) 
- 
En%4ronmental Factors 
The wire inspection task determination and the task interval determination is made using an 
established ATA MSG3 table, that is similar in function previously. The table looks at the zone size 
& density where the wires under analysis exist. The second table then considers the size / density 
factor against the potential effects (criticality) of failure. From these two comparison tables a task 
level is defined. 
Wire Inspection Task Determination rating Table 
- 
Inspection Level Definition. 
Zone Size (Volume) 
Small Medium Large 
Low 1 2 2 
Density Medium 2 2 3 
High 2 3 3 
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Density / Size Factor 
2 3 
LOW GVI for entire 
zone 
GVI for entire 
zone 
DVI for wiring 
GVI for zone 
Potential Effects 
(Criticality) 
Medium GVI for entire 
zone 
DVI for wiring 
GVI for zone 
DVI for wiring 
GVI for zone 
High DVI for wiring 
GVI for zone 
DVI for wiring 
GVI for zone 
DVI for wiring 
GVI for zone 
e. g. If the wires exist in say the Wheel Well, the Zonal area can be considered as a large area with 
a high amount of components and wires present therefore a high density. So those wires in the 
Wheel Well are factor 3 in table 1. We then take factor 3 and consider the corresponding potential 
effects of failure of the wire (s) under analysis. For example main power cables running through the 
ceiling of the Wheel Well will have a high criticality as they are high energy cables that supply the 
power to many systems. So the outcome would be 3 High, DVI for Wiring and GVI for Zone. The 
DVI would be moved the correct ATA chapter in the Systems Programme, while the GVI Zonal 
would remain in the Zonal Programme. As far as an interval for the tasks, again much like previous 
an interval table would be used. 
Wire Inspection Task Determination rating Table 
- 
Interval Determination. 
Probability of Accidental Damage 
Low Medium High 
LOW 25000 hrs 5 yrs 5000 hrs / 12 5000 hrs / 12 
months months 
Probability of Medium 5000 hrs 12 5000 hrs / 12 Less than 5000 
Environmental 
months months hrs 112 months damage 
High 5000 hrs / 12 Less than 5000 Less than 500 
months hrs / 12 months hours /2 months 
Taking the example of the Main Power Feeder Wires in the Wheel Well, the DVI interval would 
depend upon comparing the wires to the table above. Probability of environmental damage is 
Medium as it is exposed to the environment of the wheel well that can be harsh, but then again the 
wires are heavy duty and well protected none the less Medium is the appropriate identifier. The 
Probability of Accidental Damage is also Medium as technicians and mechanics are often in the 
wheel well and could reach up to grab the wires to use them as a support, but is not High because 
it is in the ceiling of the wheel well. So Medium, Medium is the rating. This corresponds to 5000 hrs 
/ 12 months. 
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So the Wire Inspection Task is 
DVI the Main Power Feeder Cables Passing Through the Ceiling of the Left and Right Wheel Well 
every 5000 flight hours or 12 months which ever is sooner. 
This means the Zonal programme analysis has been completed. Consideration to those areas that 
may not have been inspected using the systems and structures analysis have now been examined. 
The new aspects of Wires being considered as systems in their own and given a detailed analysis 
in the Zonal programme addresses the possibility of early detection of faulty wiring thus maintaining 
the serviceability and airworthiness of the original wire installation. As well as the consideration to 
the build up of combustible materials in the Zonal programme analysis therefore the threat of 
foreign material contributing to the fire threat may be minimised. 
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Practical Example of Developing a Zonal Maintenance Task 
Step 1. Define Aircraft Zones. (For this example we are using a B737-NG, Next Generation). 
MAJOR ZONE 100 LOWER K04LF OF FUSELAGE 
MAJOR ZONE 200 UPPER HALF OF FUSELAGE 
MAJOR ZONE 300 EMPENNAGE AND BODY SECTION 48 
MAJOR ZONE 400 POWER PLANTS AND NACELLE STRUTS 
MAJORZONE500 LEFTWINO 
MAJOR ZONE 000 RIGHT WINO 
MAJOR ZONE 700 LANDING GEAR AND LANDING GEAR DOORS 
MAJOR ZONE BOO PASSENGER AND CARGO COMPARTMENT DOORS 
Fig 232 Above, Aircraft Major Zonal Diagram. (Boeing 737-6171800 Maintenance Manua/. ) 
Just as done previously for the structural analysis the aircraft is divided up into eight major structural 
zones. From 100 being lower half of fuselage to 800 passenger and cargo compartment doors. 
These zone are further divided up into sub zones. For example Major Zone 100 Lower half of 
fuselage. For this example we will use the major zone 700 Main Landing Gear and Landing 
Gear Doors. The sub zones are as follows... 
710 Nose Landing Gear and Landing Gear Doors 
711 Nose Landing Gear 
- 
Left 
712 Nose Landing Gear 
- 
Right 
713 Nose Landing Gear 
730 Left Main Landing Gear and Landing Gear Doors 
731 Left Main Landing Gear 
- 
Outer Door 
732 Left Main Landing Gear 
- 
Middle Door 
733 Left Main Landing Gear 
- 
Inner Door 
734 Left Main Landing Gear 
740 Right Main Landing Gear and Landing Gear Doors 
741 Right Main Landing Gear 
- 
Outer Door 
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742 Right Main Landing Gear 
- 
Middle Door 
743 Right Main Landing Gear 
- 
Inner Door 
744 Right Main Landing Gear 
For this exercise we will conduct an analysis of zone 710 Nose Landing Gear and Landing Gear 
Doors. 
Step 2. Detail Required General Information for the Zone. 
ft-ID> OAS CHARGING VALVE 
ONND 
c:: ) FM 
NOT S140 N NOSE LANDING GEAR NOSE LANDING GEAR AND DOORS 
(ON TOP OF STRUT) 
NOSE LA WING GEAR A ND DO 0 RS 
- 
INTRO DUCTI ON 
IWO 
0 
Zone Location: 710 Nose Landing Gear and Landing Gear Doors including 711,712 and 713. 
Access Panels: External Doors, 71 1AL and 712AR Nose Landing Gear Doors. 
Approximate size of zone: 2 meters by 1 meter. 
Type of syýtems and components installed in zone: Nose landing gear components.. 
Shock strut 
Integral axle 
Drag strut 
Lock link 
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" Torsion links. 
" Tyres. 
" Hydraulic hoses & pipes. 
" Retraction Jack. 
" Steering mechanism. 
" Steering actuators. 
" Nose landing gear actuator 
" Lock actuator 
" Lock mechanism 
" Bungee spring 
" Valve manifold 
" Transfer cylinder 
" Fuse (2). 
" Control cables. 
A tow fiffing is between the nose landing gear tyres. 
A jack pad is on the bottom of the shock strut. The jack pad lets the inner Cylinder move up for 
wheel and tyre replacement. 
Two doors aerodynamically seal the nose landing gear wheel well to decrease drag. The doors 
attach to the outboard edges of the nose landing gear wheel well. The doors connect to the shock 
strut and move mechanically when the nose landing gear extends or retracts. 
Wire Bundles and nVical gower levels in any mfire bundles in zone: 
Combustible Material Build unLPossible hydraulic fluid vapour. Possible grease build up. Possible 
run way or tyre debris build up. 
IWe on environment within the zone: The Nose Landing Gear and Gear Doors are subject to 
harsh external conditions. The nose wheel well area is un pressurised so the gear is subject to 
extremely cold temperatures, as low as 
-50 C. Also the environment has a high moisture content. 
The Nose Gear and Gear Doors are also subject to the harsh landing conditions and may well 
often be victims to FOD (Foreign Object Damage) depending on the condition of the runway. 
Existing RCM MSI's and SSI's for items within the zone: 
MSI's 
32-060 Clean Exposed Portion of the Nose Landing Gear Strut. Every 50 cycles 
32-070 Service Nose Landing Gear Strut. Every 3000 cycles. 
III 
32-080 Lubricate Nose Landing Gear Assembly. Every 60 days or 400 cycles which ever is 
sooner. 
32-090 Restore the Nose Landing Gear Assembly. Every 10 years or 18000 cycles which ever is 
sooner. 
32-100 Discard Nose Landing Gear Life Limited Parts. Every 75000 cycles. 
32-120 Perform a Detailed Visual Inspection of the Nose Landing Gear Retract Actuator. Every 
3000 cycles. 
32-130 Perform a Detailed Visual Inspection of the Nose Landing Gear Lock Actuator. Every 3000 
cycles. 
32-140 Perform a Detailed Visual Inspection of the Nose Landing Gear Lock Mechanism. Every 
3000 cycles. 
32-370 Inspect Nose Gear Wheel Assemblies for Condition & Wear. Every 24 hours. 
32-080 Restore the Nose Landing Gear Wheel Assemblies. Every Tyre change. 
32-390 Perform a Detailed Visual Inspection of the Nose Wheel Steering Mechanism. Every 3000 
cycles. 
SSI*s 
32-750 Internal General Visual : Nose Landing Gear Assembly. Complete Disassembly & 
Inspection of the Outer & Inner Cyfinder & all Gear components. Every 10 years. 
Step 3. Develop Rating Table. 
Environmental 
Factor Rating 
Temperature 3 
Vibration 2 
Chemicals 3 
Humidity 2 
Contamination 3 
Highest Value 3 
Rating: I- Passive. 2- Moderate. 3- Severe 
Temerature conditions where the nose landing gear exists range from ambient at ground level of 
say 35 C when sifting on an exposed tarmac; apron to - 55 C at 33,000 feet. This cold temperature 
could will promote freezing. This factor scores 3. 
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Vibration experienced by the gear is at take off as it bumps down the run way and at landing when 
it hits hard at touch down. The gear is designed exactly to with stand these types of loads. Other 
than that the vibration loads are not extreme. This factor could be said to be moderate with a factor 
score of 2. 
Chemicals around the nose gear are BMS 3-32 fluid which is a mixture of MIL-H-5606 hydraulic 
fluid and additives (UK DTD 585). This is the servicing fluid for the shock strut internals. 
The hydraulic retraction system is serviced with BMS 3-11 TYPE IV erosion arresting, fire resistant 
hydraulic fluid (Skydrol). 
Runways throughout the world use a de-icing fluid on the run way that is highly corrosive. This fluid 
will splash up onto the gear and doors during landing and take off. 
These three chemical types will normally be present on and around the nose landing gear and 
doors. Therefore a score of 3 would be expected. 
Humidi is not a factor as the temperature gets extremely cold and moisture would be frozen but 
for a period of time the moisture would be in liquid form. While the aircraft is on the ground the gear 
is extended so subjected to the ambient conditions. This factors scores 2. 
Contamination from dirt on the runway, foreign objects, chemicals, animals and insects is quite 
likely. This factor scores 3. 
Accidental Damage 
Factor Rating 
Ground Handling 
Equipment 
2 
Foreign Object 
Damage 
2 
Weather Effects 
(hail etc) 
1 
Frequency of 
Maintenance 
Activities 
2 
Fluid Spillage 1 
Passenger Traffic 1 
Other 2 
Highest Value 2 
Rating., 1- Low Probabifity. 2- Medium. 3- High 
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Ground handling Eguipmen attach to the nose gear for the purpose of towing the aircraft while on 
ground. Those these people conducting this activity are trained there is still a likelihood that they 
damage the nose gear by incorrect attachment of the tow bar or over turning when towing. This 
factor will be rated as a 2. 
Foreign Obiect Damage (FOD) due to debris on the runway is quite likely, but most runways are 
checked regularly for FOD and cleared by airport staff. A rating of 2 is awarded to this factor. 
Weather Effects will not likely have a major detrimental effect on the nose gear as its upper parts 
are sheltered mostly by the gear doors that are closed most of the time. This factor score 1. 
Freguengy of Maintenance Activities could mean a higher probability of invasive errors introduced 
by the presence of mechanics or technicians. Due to the components present in and around the 
nose gear and the accessibility of the nose gear there may well be some maintenance staff 
frequently around the nose gear. So the rating for this is medium at 2. 
Fluid Spillage is a concern as it can promote corrosion. Areas such as the galley or lavatories are 
highly susceptible to spillage but the nose gear area is not as the only fluid that could spill is strut 
hydraulic fluid when strut servicing is taking place which is very in frequent. So a score of 1 is 
allocated. 
Passenger Traffi can cause wear or accidental damage. With the nose gear there is no passenger 
traffic in the area so the probability is low at 1. 
pther considerations in this case might be for example the mechanical movement with the nose 
gear and doors. The possibility of chaffing or fouling is present. A rating of 2. 
Step 4. Perform the Zonal Analysis. 
This step uses the Zonal analysis flow chart fig 2.40 and goes through each question and carries 
out each action required of the flow chart. 
Q. Zone contains only structure? 
A. No. 
Q. Zone contains wiring? 
A. Yes. 
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Enhanced Zonal Analysis. 
Q. Combustible material in zone? 
A. Possible hydraulic fluid vapour. Possible grease build up. Possible run way or tyre debris build 
up. 
Q. Is there an effective task to significantly reduce the likelihood of accumulation of combustible 
materials? 
A. Yes. 
Action: Define task and Interval: By visual inspection, and by subsequent cleaning and removing of 
any combustible material present. 
Wiring Inspection task determination. 
Reference fig 2.41. 
Action: Conduct an inspection level definition for the wire inspection task. 
Wire Inspection Task Determination rating Table 
- 
Inspection Level Definition. 
Zone Size (Volume) 
Small Medium Large 
Low 1 2 2 
Density Medium 2 2 3 
High 2 3 3 
Q. Zone Size. 
A. The nose landing gear and doors is a relatively small zone. 
Q. Zone Density. 
A. The nose landing gear has a few components, Wres, harnesses, pipes and hoses. So can be 
considered as a medium dense zone. 
Small / Medium gives Density / Size factor rating of 2. 
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Density/ Size Factor 
1 2 3 
Low GVI for entire 
zone 
GVI for entire 
zone 
DVI for wiring 
GVI for zone 
Potential Effects 
(Criticality) 
Medium GVI for entire 
zone 
DVI for wiring 
GVI for zone 
DVI for wiring 
GVI for zone 
High DVI for wiring 
GVI for zone 
DVI for wiring 
GVI for zone 
DVI for wiring 
GVI for zone 
The Potential Effects or Criticality of a possible event due to the deterioration of wires or a harness 
on the nose gear can be considered as medium. The deterioration or failure could result in poor 
ground air sensing since the depression of the nose gear strut signals inputs to the air ground 
detection system, or the failure of the nose gear and nose gear door position indication could result 
in an emergency landing or return to base. For these reasons the potential effects can be classed 
as Medium. 
Medium Potential Effects /2 Density / Size Factor gives the following task determination.. 
Detailed Visual Inspection (DVI) for the wiring and a General Visual Inspection (GVQ for the 
Zone. 
The question of does there exist a satisfactory Systems Programme task that will address the wire 
inspection concerns, needs to be researched. This is done by referring to the systems programme 
that has been defined in systems ATA chapter 32 landing gear, 31 indicating and Sensing and 
possibly also 20 Standard practices. If not the tasks stands in its own right. In this case the Systems 
Programme did not identify a scheduled maintenance task to address the concerns highlighted by 
the Zonal analysis. 
-2 
The standard Zonal analysis to follow will take care of allocating the interval to the GVI Zonal 
inspection, but the interval for the Wire DVI needs now to be determined, using the wire inspection 
determination rating table. 
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Wire Inspection Task Determination rating Table 
- 
Interval Determination. 
Probability of Accidental Damage 
LOW Medium High 
Low 25000 hrs 5 yrs 5000 hrs / 12 5000 hrs / 12 
months months Probability of Medium 5000 hrs 12 5000 hrs / 12 Less than 5000 
Environmental 
months months hrs / 12 months damage 
High 5000 hrs / 12 Less than 5000 Less than 500 
months hrs / 12 months hours /2 months 
The probability of accidental damage is medium as mechanic traffic for maintenance grabbing a 
wire loom for support, ground handling when towing all can contribute to the possibility. 
The probability of environmental damage is also medium. Even though the environment is severe 
the nose gear and doors are design for this, but non the less freezing temperatures could cause 
wire damage by enbrittlement or moisture ingression. 
So Medium / Medium corresponds to 5000 flight hours or 12 months which ever is first. 
We have now identified two Wire Inspection task in the zone 710 with an interval. This scheduled 
maintenance task since it is a wire DVI should be moved into the systems programme under ATA 
chapter 20 standard practices, wire inspections. The task will take the next available sequence 
number and be placed in the systems programme. 
20-032 Detailed Visual Inspection of air ground electrical wires, looms, harnesses and 
connectors as well as system micro switches and sensors for deterioration, security and 
condition In the Nose Landing Gear and Landing Gear Doors area. Every 5000 flight hours 
or 12 months which ever Is first. 
20-033 Detailed Visual Inspection of door sensing electrical wires, looms, harnesses and 
connectors as well as system micro switches and sensors for deterioration, security and 
condition In the Nose Landing Gear and Landing Gear Doors area. Every 5000 flight hours 
or 12 months which ever is first. 
Now the task of continuing with the standard Zonal analysis remains. 
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Standard Zonal Analyýis. 
We have already recognised that a Zonal task is necessary, so we move on to the next question or 
action. 
Action: Perform Zonal analysis. E. g. rating table, AD / Environmental / Density. 
This action was done at step 3, so we refer to the two tables. The first showing the highest value for 
Environmental as 3 and Accidental as 2. As a GVI Zonal is inexpensive to conduct and in this case 
the access is almost nothing. The GVI for the zone 710, Nose Landing Gear and Doors should be 
less than 5000 flight hours / 12 months. Using airline experience and engineering judgement the 
following Zonal inspection could be adopted.. 
Z710-001 During Walk Round Inspection check the Nose Landing Gear and Doors for 
damage and condition. Before Every Flight. 
Z710-002 Nose Landing Gear and Doors Zonal GV1 Inspection. Every 6 months. 
Note that the first inspection Z71 0-001 is not strictly a Zonal GVI but a walk round inspection before 
flight. This type of inspection though not adhering strictly to the definition of the Zonal or the GVI, 
within touching distance, non the less the walk round pre flight inspection is an effective way of on a 
very regular basis establishing a general airworthiness condition before flight. 
Note that the numbering convention used above is Z for Zonal, to identify the task as part of the 
Zonal programme. 710 for the zone under inspection and 001 for the sequence of the task within 
that zone. Another convention can be used such as... 
32 for Zonal ATA chapter and 800 for a sequence number that will not coincide with the systems 
programme or the structures programme for that ATA chapter. 
For example, the same inspection as above numbered as follows 
32-801 During Walk Round Inspection check the Nose Landing Gear and Doors for damage 
and condition. Before Every Flight. 
32-802 Nose Landing Gear and Doors Zonal GVI Inspection. Every 6 months. 
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The Walk round Inspection. 
Walk round inspection are general visual inspections from ground to detect any obvious external 
damage or defect such as a large dent from a bird strike, fluid leakage from control screw jacks or 
power control units, gear damage sustained from the last landing etc. The Walk round is an 
effective check to be carried out usually post flight and pre flight. The level of skill to carry out the 
walk round inspection is of some debate. Often the flight crew conduct their walk round prior to 
accepting an aircraft for flight. Often the releasing technician will conduct a walk round as part of his 
departure checks. Though the walk round inspection is not strictly a Zonal GVI as the subject of 
inspection, e. g. underside of wing of a B747, is not within touching distance. This should be 
considered when allocating a walk round inspection to address an item in the RCM analysis. 
Event Orientated Inspections. 
Special events that are not at all normal, such as lightning strikes or heavy landings. Merit special 
inspections that are not determined by RCM analysis. These inspection are as a result of a 
significant event. These significant events should be anticipated, considered and the effective 
inspection tasks to ensure the continued airworthiness should be determined. Examples of Event 
Orientated Inspections also known as Unscheduled Maintenance Checks are found in ATA 
Chapter 5 of the maintenance manual. The following are defined unscheduled maintenance cheks 
with their respective ata chapter... 
ql-. 
05-51-01 HARD LANDING OR HIGH DRAGISIDE LOAD LANDING 
05-51-04 SEVERE OR UNUSUAL TURBULENCE, STALL, BUFFET OR SPEEDS 
MORE THAN DESIGN LIMITS 
05-51-08 FLAP/SLAT DOWN OVERSPEED CONDITION 
05-51-10 DRAGGED ENGINE NACELLEIENGINE SEIZUREITHRUST REVERSER 
AND ATTACH POINTS DAMAGE 
05-51-14 MERCURY SPILLAGE CONDITION 
05-51-15 BRAKE SEIZURE CONDITION 
05-51-16 FLAT SPOTTED TIRES 
05-51-17 WHEEL BEARING FAILURE/DAMAGE CONDITION 
05-51-18 BIRD/HAIL STRIKE CONDITION 
05-51-19 LIGHTNING STRIKE CONDITION 
05-51-22 HYDRAULIC FLUID REACTION WITH TITANIUM 
05-51-24 CABIN OVERPRESSURE CONDITION 
05-51-27 EXTREME DUST CONDITION 
05-51-28 ICE OR SNOW CONDITION 
05-51-31 VOLCANIC ASH CONDITION 
05-51-32 TAIL STRIKE/SKID CONDITION 
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1? z 05-51-34 HOT AIR DUCT RUPTURE CONDITION 
05-51-35 OVERWEIGHT LANDING 
05-51-42 DAMAGE DUE TO ENGINE BLADE OUT 
05-51-44 NACELLE/STRUT PRESSURE RELIEF DOORS OPEN CONDITION 
05-51-47 LANDING-GEAR-DOWN OVERSPEED CONDITION 
05-51-54 TIRE TREAD LOSS OR TIRE BURST 
05-51-57 ACID SPILLAGE CONDITION 
05-51-67 AIRFRAME VIBRATION CONDITION 
05-51-80 CONDITIONED AIR PACK OUTLET DUCT SYSTEM FAILURE 
05-51-81 CABIN DEPRESSURIZATION CONDITION 
05-51-91 EXCESSIVE CABIN PRESSURE LEAKAGE 
05-55 HIRF/LIGHTNING PROCEDURES 
Though the unscheduled maintenance checks are not derived from RCM / MSG3 analysis they are 
event orientated in as much as they are only carried out as a result of an unusual event occurring. 
Summarisina RCM. 
The use of RCM analysis is to attempt to define a scheduled maintenance programme of tasks that 
maintain the inherent design reliability of a system or component through scheduled maintenance 
tasks. A systems, structural and a Zonal maintenance programme can be developed using RCM. 
By considering the consequences or effects of failure before defining the scheduled maintenance 
task, this means the focus is on applicable and effective maintenance tasks rather than carrying out 
a task for the sake of it. RCM maintenance programmes remove the irrelevant maintenance task 
and recognises that Maintenance tasks are invasive and can by their own action introduce further 
or different problems. The decision to carry out a maintenance task should not be without close 
analysis of the merit of that inspection. 
RCM analysis allows in operational failures to occur at times but also goes looking for non evident 
failures at intervals defined by engineering logic and historical failure data. 
RCM analysis attempts to bring to maintenance task allocation a decision logic that minimises 
scheduled maintenance tasks to a core few. It has standardised the maintenance task to 5 specific 
maintenance actions, 
General visual Inspection 
Detailed Inspection 
operational Check 
Functional Check 
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Restoration 
Over and above the RCM maintenance schedule it is recognised that special events require special 
inspections. Those events have been pre defined and so have the maintenance actions. RCM 
decision tree analyses is the basis for MSG3 analyses which will be further discussed in the next 
section. 
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3. The Maintenance Steerinq Group. 
3.1 MSG: An Industry Acceptance of RCM Analysis to Create an Aircraft Maintenance 
Programme. 
3.1.1 MSG: Addressing the Issue of Aircraft Scheduled Maintenance. 
The FAA became increasingly concerned by experience showing that it was not possible to control 
the failure rate of certain types of engines by any feasible changes in either the content or 
frequency of scheduled overhauls. As a result, in 1960 a task force was formed, consisting of 
representatives from both the FAA and the airlines, to investigate the capabilities of preventative 
maintenance. 
The work group led to the establishment of the FAA Industry Reliability Pr ogramme. Two major 
discoveries resulted from the programme: 
Scheduled overhauls have little effect on the overall reliability of a complex item unless the item has 
a dominant failure mode. 
Arline and manufacturer experience in developing scheduled maintenance programmes for new 
aircraft has shown that more effective programmes can be developed through the use of a logic 
decision process. This working together of the Regulators and the Operators'was the attempts of a 
Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) endeavouring to find a maintenance solution to ensure the 
continued airworthiness of aircraft in an efficient logical manner. 
3.1.2 MSG 1 an Initial theory to create an Aircraft Maintenance Programme. 
During the advent of the introduction of the B747, representatives were invited by Boeing to attend 
a series of meeting with the view to develop an effective and efficient maintenance programme. In 
july 1968 this Maintenance Steering Group produced a handbook called "MSG-1 Maintenance 
Evaluation and Programme Development' which included decision logic and inter airline 
manufacturer procedures for developing a maintenance programme for the new B747. It was felt 
that these guidelines in the MSG-1 Handbook would ensure maximum safety and reliability at the 
lowest cost possible. 
The MSG-1 philosophy utilised Overhaul and On Condition concepts. The objective of the MSG-1 
Handbook was to permit the evaluation of a new aircraft design for maintainability and subsequent 
to the evaluation develop a maintenance programme which will be acceptable to the Regulatory 
Authorities, the Operators and the Manufacturer. 
MSG-1 for the first time called on the designers to consider maintenance and reliability. Three of 
the main objectives of the Handbook were... 
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1. To outline the otganisation and methods for providing akline in puts to the aircraft designer to 
assure proper consideration for maintainability features during the design phase of new aircraft. 
2 To outline the organisation, decision process and detailed procedures for determining the 
scheduled maintenance requirements for new aircrA 
a To outline the methods by which the airlines and Regulatory AuthotWes can operate together 
during the period of development of the airlines maintenance programmes for new aftraft. 
(MSG-1 Boeing 1968) 
It was this idea that all those with a vested interest in developing an effective maintenance 
programme got together to decide on policy, direct the activities of the Working Group as well as to 
be part of it. The Working Group made up of the Operators, Regulators and Manufacturers was 
named the Maintenance Review Board. They would together build the maintenance programme 
using the guidelines of the MSG-1 Handbook. 
At this stage of MSG development it was already understood that the best reliability that could be 
achieved by a system, component or structure belonging to an aircraft was the reliability of the 
original design. No amount of maintenance could improve that level on inherent reliability. It was 
also recognised that in operation experience played a large part in maintenance programme 
development after the initial programme was developed. MSG also recognised the requirement for 
trained personnel and for standards and levels of inspection. The first standard inspection levels 
defined by MSG-1 were as follows... 
1. Servicing 
2. Inspection 
3. Repair 
4. Testing 
5. Calibration 
6. Replacement 
It was defined that only tasks that have a direct effect on meeting the stated objectives of the 
maintenance programme are valid task for inclusion into the programme. Task that increase 
maintenance costs without a corresponding increase in reliability protection are not advised in 
IVISG-11. 
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The MSG-1 Handbook advised the development of the Scheduled Maintenance Programme using 
decision logic for the first time in the aircraft maintenance discipline. The decision logic started by 
considering the consequence of failure and the potential effectiveness of scheduled maintenance 
tasks. In those cases when the failure consequences were purely economic, the guide lines lead to 
consideration to the cost of the scheduled maintenance task and the value of the benefits resulting 
from accomplishing the task. 
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Figure 3.1 shows the first MSG decision logic diagram. 
Decision Diagram To Define Maintenance Tasks Having POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS. 
Question Task 
Is Reduction In Failure Yes In Flight Monitoring, 
Resistance Detectable Periodic Une Inspections, 
Away From Overhaul Tests, Servicing etc.. 
Base? 
I 
No 
Is Reduction in Failure Yes Resistance Detectable Periodic Overhaul Base 1 At Overhaul Base? 0 Inspections, Tests, 
Servicing etc.. 
No 
Doe Failure Mode 
Have a Direct Effect on 
Airworthiness? 
I 
No 
Yes 
Urnitation an Total Thm, 
Time Since Overhaul, 
Total Cycles etc. 
Yes 
Does Component Have a 
Hidden Function From 10 View Point of Flight 
Crew? 
I 
No 
I Is There an Adverse 
Relabonship BetNeen 
Age & Operafing 
ReliabilitV? 
I Yes 
No 
Periodic Test on Aircraft 
or Removal For Shop 
visit 
Rerrx)ve Periodically fbr 
Overhaul If Ecmwically 
Juslified. 
Remove after 
Operational Malfunction 
for Repair or Overhaul. 
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The first introduction of decision logic diagrams through MSG-1 analysis, seen above started to 
examine the reduction of failure resistance and started to ask the question of the consequences of 
the failures through analysis. Here we see for the first time the concepts of overhaul and on- 
condition tasks being considered to attempt to maintain the inherent reliability of the original design. 
What the B747 MSG-1 Handbook tries to attempt to give guidelines to accomplish the production of 
a relevant and cost effective maintenance programme by bringing together the manufacturer and 
the operator who through a process an analysis develop a maintenance programme for a new 
aircraft prior to introduction to service, acceptable to the FAA. 
3.1.3 MSG 2 improving the Initial theory and a step closer to RCM. 
Recognising the success of Boeing's MSG-1 "Maintenance Evaluation and Programme 
Development' Handbook produced in 1968 for the new B747, in 1970 the Air transport Association 
of America (ATA) recognising the benefits of such a process to its members and to aviation safety 
in general, decided to attempt to create a universal document that could be used not only for the 
development of the B747 maintenance programme, but for the development of all new aircraft 
maintenance programmes. 
The ATA Reliability and Maintenance Subcommittee, taking the experience of the group that 
developed MSG-1 guide lines produced a document called "Airline / Manufacturer Maintenance 
Programme Planning Document MSG-2". This documents objectives were... 
to present a means for developing a maintenance programme which will be acceptable to 
Regulatory Authorities, the Operators and the Manufacturers. The maintenance programme data' 
will be developed by co-ordination wfth specialists from the operators, the manufacturers and when 
feasible the regulatoty authorkies of the country of manufacture" 
(A TA MSG-2 March 25th 19 70. )
MSG-2 recognised three general primary maintenance processes. These were.. 
1. Hard Time: A maximum interval for performing maintenance tasks. These intervals usually 
applied to overhaul, but also apply to total life of parts or units. 
2. On Condition: Repetitive inspections, or tests to determine the condition of units or systems or 
portions of structure. 
3. Condition Monitoring: For items that have neither hard time limits nor on condition maintenance 
as their primary process. Condition Monitoring is accomplished by appropriate means available 
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to an operator for finding and resolving problem areas. These means range from notices of 
unusual problems to specific analysis of unit performance. 
MSG-2 continued to develop the three process further into five detailed scheduled maintenance 
processes.. 
I- Servicing. 
2. Inspection. 
3. Testing. 
4. Calibration. 
5. Replacement. 
It also continued to recognise the decision tree logic established in MSG-1 recognising that 
Systems (including powerplant) and Structure required analysis in this way. It also partially 
introduced a new aspect to the process that was missing from MSG-1 and that was the definition of 
the interval that a scheduled maintenance task should be, but falls short of defining how the 
intervals should be determined. MSG-2 also brought in to the analysis the new technologies of 
Aircraft Integrated Data Systems (AIDS) and Built in Test Equipment (BITE). Both these systems 
give valuable performance data that can reflect the failure resistance reduction of systems and 
components. 
Aircraft that underwent MSG-2 analysis to develop their initial maintenance programme are 
Lockheed Ll 011 Tristar, 
McDonnell Douglas DC-10. 
B737-200 (parts) 
BAC Concord. * 
A300. * 
*The Association of European Airlines took MSG-2 and produced a document called the 
European Maintenance Steering Group Guidelines (EMSG) in 1972. This document was 
essentially MSG-2 with a few clarification. 
3.1.4 MSG 3 application of RCM. 
In early 1978 the US Department of Defence commissioned the services of two well known figures 
in the commercial aviation sector who had been instrumental in the establishing scheduled 
maintenance programme development present day thinking. Both these experts were employed 
by United Airlines who at that time were using the MSG-2 philosophy with further developed 
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philosophies and ideas. F. Stanley Nowlan was at that time the Director, Maintenance Analysis for 
United and Howard F. Heap Manager, Maintenance Programme Planning, both working for United 
Airlines in San Francisco. Their commission was 
Io explain and research the basic concepts, principles, definitions and applications of a logical 
discipline for development of efficient scheduled (preventative) maintenance programmes for 
complex equipment, and on going management of such programmes. Such programmes were 
referred to as reflability-centred maintenance (RCM) programmes because they centred on 
achieving the inherent safety and reliability capabilities of equipment at a minimum cost. 
(Nowlan and Heap RCM 1978). 
The US Department of Defence intended the commissioned report to serve as a guide for the 
maintenance of a verity of military equipment. 
The final report issued in December 1978 further developed the existing MSG-2 philosophy. Where 
MSG-2 was concerned primarily with the development of maintenance programmes prior to service 
for aircraft, RCM taking the basic philosophy built on it to a definite way of establishing not only 
initial intervals but also repeat intervals and also developed the methodology of packaging 
scheduled maintenance tasks. An emphasis on the importance of in service data was identified in 
RCM as central to the further development of the initial base-line maintenance programme. This 
was established through in service failure and finding investigation resulting in the developing of the 
initially established maintenance programme. MSG-2 mentioned nothing about the development 
and appropriateness of the initially developed programme. RCM introduced more relevant analysis 
of the structural tasks and introduced the concept of the Zonal programme. Both of these issues 
were either very sketchily dealt with or not at all in MSG-2. 
The RCM decision logic diagram itself differed from that used in MSG-2 in that it began with the 
consequences of failure and then the analysis of the failure modes rather than the evaluation of 
proposed maintenance tasks. RCM also recognised the existence of the four basic maintenance 
tasks instead of the three primary maintenance processes recognised in MSG-2. 
1. On Condition Tasks : (Predictive or Condition Monitoring). Used where a clearly defined 
potential failure period (P-F period) exists for the failure mode under consideration. For 
example a tyre inspection every day, the tyre stays installed if the wear is not to a certain limit, 
and is removed if the wear is at or beyond a certain limit. The survival of the tyre is based on 
the condition it passes the inspection. 
2. Scheduled Discard Task : Used where a clearly defined age of increased conditional 
probability of failure exists for the failure mode under consideration. For example the 
passenger life jackets part number P01 24W have a discard life of 10 years. The manufacturer 
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has through studies shown that the useful life of the jackets, i. e. the period of time prior to when 
the wear out stage starts, is 10 years. After that the jackets have a high probability of failure 
due to the perishing rubber components. The cost of removal, replacing & restoring the jackets 
will cost more than purchasing a new jacket so the old jacket is discarded. 
3. Scheduled Restoration Task : Used where a clearly defined age of increased conditional 
probability of failure exists for the failure mode under consideration and the restoration task 
restores the components resistance to failure to a level that is tolerable. For example the main 
landing gear of a B737 built by Manesco, has a restoration life of 12 years or 15,000 cycles 
which ever is sooner. Manesco have through studies shown that the gears useful life is at 12 
years due to environmental effects or 15,000 cycles due to operating stress and the probability 
of failure rises considerable at this point which is the start of the wear out stage. But by 
restoration of the gear & its components the inherent reliability of the gear can be restored. 
4. Failure Finding Task : Used where the task can confirm that all components covered by the 
failure mode under consideration, are functional. (Not used for evident failure modes. ) For 
example a standby hydraulic pump that is not normally in use, is intentionally brought on line by 
perhaps simulating a failure of the main pumps, (pulling their circuit breakers) the performance 
of the standby pump is then monitored for correct function. 
After the issue of the RCM Report in 1978, the ATA decided take on board the developed RCM 
process improvements made to MSG-2 and issued the in 1980 the document titled "ATA MSG-3 
Operator / manufacturer Scheduled Maintenance Programme Development7 
. 
MSG-3 was not a 
departure from the MSG-2 philosophy but built on ten years of validated reliable aircraft operation. 
Major Improvements of MSG-3 to MSG-2. 
MSG-3 is a "top down" approach or consequence of failure approach. The consequence of 
failure was assigned one of two basic categories 
1. Safety 
ii. Economic 
further sub classification were.. 
Category 5 Evident Safety Effects 
Category 6 Evident Operational Effects 
Category 7 Evident Economic Effects 
Category 8 Hidden Function Safety Effects 
129 
Category 9 Hidden Function Non-Safety Effects 
2. The structural deterioration process included the consideration to fatigue, accidental damage, 
age exploration, and others. 
3. The new damage tolerance rules for design mandated by FAR 25.571 were introduced to the 
process. 
4. MSG-3 was task oriented not maintenance process oriented as with MSG-2. 
5. The MSG-3 process separated tasks applicable to hidden or evident failures. Hidden failures 
were treated more thoroughly. 
6. The effects of multiple failures were taken in to consideration. 
7. MSG-3 made a clear separation between those tasks required for economic reasons from 
those required for safe operation. 
Aircraft that underwent MSG-3 analysis to develop their initial maintenance programme are 
Boeing 757 
Boeing 767 
Airbus 310 
A: irbus 320. 
The ATA Maintenance Steering Group made up of manufacturers, operators and regulators, 
continued to monitor the success of MSG-3 developed maintenance programmes for in service 
aircraft and further improved the MSG process building on data received from the operators. 
In 1988 the ATA issued MSG-3 Revision 1. Many administrative clarifications were made. The 
main revision was the deletion of Crew Monitoring tasks. Those tasks in crew manuals that were 
required to be carried out were deleted from the maintenance programme as the failures should be 
identified by the crew in their daily operation of the aircraft. This point is very important as it is 
effectively involving the flight crew in the detection of failures through crew procedures. It is for this 
case important that flight crew understand their roles the continued airworthiness of the aircraft 
through reporting failures and defects, this is not always realised by flight crew. 
Aircraft that underwent MSG-3 Revisioni analysis to develop their initial maintenance programme 
are 
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Boeing 777 
McDonnell Douglas MD 11 
Airbus 340 
In 1993 resulting from the FAA AD 1990-25-05 guidelines on the Corrosion Prevention and Control 
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programme were added to the analysis logic. This resulted in the ATA issuing MSG-3 Revision 2 in 
late 1993. Aircraft whose scheduled maintenance programme was developed to the MSG-3 
Revision 2 guidelines were considered as compliant with FAA AD 1990-25-05 by the nature of the 
CPCP tasks being considered into the structural programme. 
Aircraft that underwent MSG-3 Revision2 analysis to develop their initial maintenance programme 
are... 
Boeing 737 New Generation 
Boeing 717 
Airbus 330 
Gulfstream GV 
Bombardier Regional Jet (RJ) 
Note. MSG-3 philosophy had now been adopted as the standard for not only leading aldiners but 
was now also crossing over to the regidnaIjet and corporate jet world. 
In 2001 MSGý3 Revision 2001.1 was issued by the ATA. This revision incorporated the enhanced 
Zonal analysis. (as detailed in chapter 2.3-3) where the gathering of combustible material was 
considered and the importance of the serviceability of wire runs also was given special 
consideration. Also detailing that a GVI was to be conducted at arms length using introducing a 
tactile dimension to the inspection and the use of a mirror when required. 
Finally in existence today, MSG-3 Revision 2002.1 was issued. This revision introduced a 
dimension to examine non-metallic structure and emphasised the Importance of recording 
assumptions and considering vendor recommendations. 
In summary IVISG-3 enabled the development of scheduled maintenance programmes for aircraft 
that were effective, applicable and economically efficient. IVISG-3 moved on from the philosophy of 
removing parts at scheduled intervals regardless of their condition to ensured safety and reliability 
to a philosophy of operational and visually check parts at scheduled intervals and allowing them to 
continue in service if they meet airworthiness criteria. It is suggested by Boeing and the ATA that 
maintenance costs as a result of MSG-3 have reduced by at least 30% over the last 20 years by 
the industry adopting MSG-3 as a standard philosophy. By IVISG-3 calling for in service monitoring 
of reliability (touched on so far but this subject will be developed in chapter 4), has allowed for a 
more detailed understanding of the nature of failure of aircraft components and systems. The 
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disciplined process of the MSG-3 analysis has not only given the operators an effective 
maintenance programme but feedback to the manufacturer where improvements can be identified 
in the basic design of the aircraft and of the systems. Finally the process of MSG-3 brings together 
all the main players of the industry at one time, the manufacturer, the operator, the regulator and 
even the vendors, this process improves not only communication but the sharing of technical 
information from different perspectives. 
3.1.5 Further Development of the RCM / MSG-3 theory and JAI 011 RCM Standard. 
Through out the late 1980's it was soon realised the benefits of the RCM / MSG-3 process in 
producing scheduled maintenance programmes and as with many new technologies first started in 
aviation other maintenance and engineering disciplines started to look closer at adopting the 
methods of RCM / MSG-3- In 1991 John Moubray a non aviation maintenance engineering 
specialist recognised the potential of RCM / MSG-3 and published the book "RCM Reliability 
Centred Maintenance" Industdal Press Inc. ISBN 0-8331-3078-4. This book explained and adapted 
the methodology now used as standard in the aviation world to apply it universally to the 
development of all maintenance scheduled for Plants, machinery, structures and systems. This 
book took the principles established by Nowlan and Heap in 1978 and defined them in terms that 
could be followed by any maintenance engineers for the use of developing a maintenance 
programme. Soon after, the Society of Automotive Engineers of the America, SAE, accepted RCM 
as the standard for developing maintenance programmes in all engineering context, issued SAE 
Standard JA1 011 in 1999. This standard document established the recognised application of RCM 
describing the minimum criteria that any process must comply with to be called RCM. The 
document defined in the standard many of the terms and conditions for RCM analysis. It also 
followed the line of aviation in establishing a policy that the programme developed through RCM 
analysis must be subject to continuous review as to the applicability and effectiveness of the initially 
established programme through in service data analysis. This standard has been used for 
establishing the initial maintenance programmes for Nuclear Reactors, Oil Rigs, Container Ships, 
Manufacturing Factories and even Pipe Lines and continues to be the maintenance and 
engineering standard for the development of scheduled maintenance programmes so much so that 
any maintenance programme developed through non RCM methods is questioned as to ifs 
effectiveness. 
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3.2 MSG 3 Analysis: Creation of A New Aircraft Maintenance 
Programme. 
3.2.1 The Regulative Requirements for AIrcraft Maintenance Programmes. 
In order to get an Air Operators Certificate from a JAA state under JAR OPS 1 must be complied 
with. JAR OPS I requires a nominated person acceptable to the Authorities to be responsible for 
the Maintenance function. The nominated maintenance post holder will be responsible for 
establishing the Maintenance Programme. JAR OPS 1, sub part M, 1.910 with regards to the 
Operators Aeroplane Maintenance Programme states the following... 
JAR OPS 1, subpart M, 1.910. 
a) An operator must ensure that the aeroplane is maintained in accordance with the operators 
aeroplane maintenance programme. The programme must contain details including frequency, 
of all maintenance required to be carried out. The programme will be required to include a 
reliability programme when the Authorfty determines that such a refiabilfty programme s 
necessary. (See AMC OPS 1.910(a)) 
b) An operators aeroplane maintenance programme and any subsequent amendment must be 
approved by the authority. (See AMC OPS 1.91 O(b).  
Acceptable Means of Compliance AMC OPS 1.910(a). 
1. The aeroplane maintenance programme should be managed and presented by the operator to 
the Authority. 
2 Where implementation of the content of an approved operator's aeroplane maintenance 
programme is accomplishes by an appropriately approved JAR 145 Approved Maintenance 
Organisation, it therefore follows that the JAR 145 Approved Organisation should have access 
to the relevant parts to the approved operators aeroplane maintenance programme when the 
organisation is not the author. Implementation means preparation and planning of the 
maintenance tasks in accordance wfth the approved maintenance programme. 
3. The aeroplane should only be maintained to one approved operators maintenance 
programme at a given point in time. Where an operator wishes to change from one programme 
to another approved programme, a transfer check / inspection may be needed to be 
performed, as agreed with the Authorfly, in order to implement the change. 
4. The operator's approved maintenance programme should contain a preface which will define 
the maintenance programme contents, the inspection standards to be applied, permitted 
variations to task frequencies and where applicable, any procedure to escalate check / 
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inspection intervals. Appendix 1 to AMC OPS 1.9 10 (a) & (b) provides detailed guidance on the 
content of an approved operator's aeroplane maintenance programme. 
5. Where an operator wishes to use an aeroplane with the initial operators maintenance 
programme based upon the Maintenance Review Boards Report (MRBR) process, any 
associated programme for the continuous surveillance of the reliability or heafth monftoring of 
the aeroplane should be considered as part of the aeroplane maintenance programme. 
6. Where an aeroplane type has been subjected to the MRBR process, an operator should 
normally develop the inflial aeroplane maintenance programme based upon the MRBR. 
Z T77o documentation supporting the development of the operators maintenance programme s 
for aeroplane types subjected to the MRBR process should contain identification cross 
reference to the MRBR tasks such that it is always possible to related such tasks to the current 
approved operators maintenance programme. This does not prevent the approved operators 
maintenance programme from being developed in the light of service experience to beyond the 
MRBR recommendations but will show the relationship to such recommendations. 
8. Some approved operators aeroplane maintenance programmes, not developed from the MRB 
Process, utifise reliability programmes. Such reliability programmes should be considered as 
part of the approved maintenance programme. 
9. Reliability Programmes should be developed for aeruplane maintenance programmes based 
. 
upon the MSG logic or those that include condition monitored components or that do not 
contain overhaul periods for all significant system components. 
10. Reliability programmes need not be developed for aeroplane maintenance programmes of 
aeroplanes of 5700 kg and below or that do not contain overhaul time periods for all significant 
system components. 
1. The putpose of the reliability programme i's to ensure that aeroplane maintenance programme 
tasks are effective and their perlodicfty is adequate. ft therefore follows that the actions 
resuffing from the reliability programme may be not only to escalate or delete maintenance 
tasks, but also to do escalate or add maintenance tasks, as necessaty. 
12 A reliability programme provides as appropriate means Of monftoring the effectiveness of the 
maintenance programme. 
it can be seen through the JAA regulations that the maintenance programme is regarded as the 
prime vehicle for ensuring the continued airworthiness of the aircraft and so entrusts the 
responsibility of the maintenance programme with the operator on ever occasion even when the 
maintenance tasks are contracted out to maintenance service providers. It is my opinion that the 
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definition of the maintenance programme and its application to attain specific objectives is not clear. 
The AMC's do not go far enough to elaborate on what is an acceptable maintenance programme, 
while in the US the FARs define levels of maintenance programmes through the different levels of 
AOC, FAR 121,135 or 91 for private categories. The FAA Advisory Circular AC 120-16D goes on 
further to define what a maintenance programme is (this is a valiant effort by the FAA to define the 
complete activities of the maintenance programme, but by removing the responsibility of the private 
operator, FAR 91, to meet the definitions in the AC I believe is s short fall of the intention of the 
regulation. JAR OPS 2 (JAA equivalent to FAR 91, private category) is pending with the JAA. It is 
my hope that the JAA go one step further than the FAA and mandate the maintenance programme 
requirements (maintenance schedule and reliability programme) for private operators. The depth of 
the maintenance programme will of course not be as far reaching as the airliner JAR OPS I 
AOC's. There fore what the FAA have done in my opinion needs to be also done by the JAA and a 
clear definition of the objectives of the maintenance programmes over and above the Maintenance 
Schedule needs to be elaborated upon. Further more it is also my opinion that the FAR*s fall short 
(the JAR' s do not even start to address the issue) in negating the requirement for a maintenance 
programme as opposed to an inspection programme (with out a reliability programme) to be in 
place for private operators. It is the private operators that use the aircraft in a unique way that need 
the substantiating data from conducting a reliability programme to support the effectiveness of their 
maintenance schedule as much if not more than a standard airline type operator. Section 3.2.4 
starts to define what I believe is an accurate interpretation of what a maintenance programme is, 
and what I believe is required to be in place if RCM / MSG3 
By the maintenance programme being mandated in the JAR OPS subpart M rather than in the JAR 
145 (JAR 145 is the regulations governing maintenance performed on aircraft, that with out JAR 
145 approval an operator or maintenance service provider can not conduct maintenance activities 
on a JAA state registered aircraft), the responsibility lies with the operator. The regulation also 
embrace the RCIVI / MSG 3 maintenance philosophy by making reference on many occasions to 
the MRBR process. It also recognises the need for continued monitoring of the maintenance 
programme for effectiveness by also referring to the supporting reliability programme. The one 
conflicting regulatory issue is AMC OPS 1.910(a) paragraph 10, where it removes the responsibility 
of utilising a reliability programme W overhaul time periods for all significant system do not exist. It is 
in my opinion required for all maintenance programmes that the reliability programme be in place 
for all maintenance programmes, perhaps by employing a very small method of periodic defect 
analysis. I believe this might be an error in the regulations as it contradicts earlier paragraphs such 
as paragraph 9 that recommends the use of reliability programmes for maintenance programmes 
developed through the MSG process. I think here the JAA are confusing MSG2 and MSG3 
philosophies. 
The development of reliability programmes in support of the maintenance programme will be a 
point of development later in the thesis. 
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3.2.2 Air Transport Association Guidelines For Producing a Maintenance Programme. 
ATA MSG3 Operator / Manufacturer Scheduled Maintenance Development document issued and 
revised by the Air Transport Association (ATA) is produced with the purpose to develop a proposal 
to assist Regulatory Agencies in establishing initial scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals for 
new types of aircraft and or power plants. Though the JAA regulations do not directly refer to the 
document they do in JAR OPS subpart M make many references to the procedures detailed within 
the ATA documents that are better known as MSG3 or the MRBR process. This document is a 
detailed step by step recommendation on the procedures to be taken to produce an MSG3 
maintenance programme. 
3.2.3 Application of MSG 3 to Produce A Maintenance Programme for A New Aircraft 
Utilizing the MRB & the ISC. 
FAA FAR 21, and JAA JAR 21 requires that one of the condition for a new Type Certificate being 
issued to a manufacturer for a new aircraft type is that a report detailing the requirements for 
continued airworthiness is issued. On modem aircraft this regulation is satisfied by the production of 
the MRBR utilising the MSG3 process through the MRB. FAR 121,135 and JAR OPS 1 requires 
that for an applicant to be granted an Air Operating Certificate (AOC), that a maintenance 
programme must be in place and acceptable to the authorities. 
Before the new aircraft manufacturer is ready to apply for the new type certificate invitations are 
sent out to those operators that have already placed orders for the new type or those operators that 
are considering to place an order. At the same time the manufacturing country regulatory 
authorities are invited as are any other authorities of potential operating countries. Representatives 
of those operators and authorities and also of the manufacturer and some component vendors will 
meet and form the Maintenance Review Board. The MRB will then through many meetings apply 
the MSG3 philosophy to the new aircraft type using the exact process described in chapter 2.3 
previously. The result from the MRB will be the MRBR the Maintenance Review Board Report. This 
FAA / JAA / TC / other authorities approved report will be one of the required documents and 
process for the issuance of a new type certificate under FAR 21 and JAR 21. 
The MSG3 process recognising the need for on going monitoring of the effectiveness of the 
maintenance programme, so the MRBR responsibilities for on going revision and monitoring is 
taken on board by the ISC, the Industry Steering Committee. The ISC is very similar in construction 
to the MRBR in that it is usually held by the manufacturer, with members from the authorities, the 
operators, the manufacturer and vendors. The appointed chairperson is normally from one of the 
lead operators who take on the role of co-ordinating and chairing the meetings. The ISC main role 
is to ensure the development of the MRBR utilising in service data gathered by the operators and 
the manufacturer. This task may involve the recognition of new scheduled maintenance task 
requirements as a result on multiple in service failures or findings fed back to the manufacturer and 
the ISC by the operators. It may also involve the escalation of scheduled maintenance tasks based 
on no in operational findings or even de escalation. The whole point of the ISC is to continue the 
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RCM / MSG3 philosophy that the applicability and effectively of the scheduled maintenance 
programme must be continually monitored to assure the on going airworthiness of the aircraft type. 
The ISC may meet twice yearly at the manufacturers head quarters. It is the responsibility of the 
manufacturer along with the ISC chairperson to present the revised MRBR to the authorities for 
approval before the new revised MIRBR is issued to operators. A revision to the MIRBIR will result in 
the Manufacturers Planning Document being revised also. 
3.2.4 The Operators Approved Maintenance Programme. 
As JAR OPS subpart M 1.910 states that the Operator must ensure that the aircraft utilised under 
the operators JAR OPS approval and AOC must be maintained to an approved maintenance 
programme. This requires the operator to produce a scheduled maintenance programme 
applicable to the aircraft type they are operating and acceptable to the authorities issuing the AOC 
and JAR OPS M approval. 
The term "aircraft maintenance programme" is one of some of the most miss-understood words in 
the maintenance of aircraft. The JAR's compound this misunderstanding by not clearly stating what 
a maintenance programme should consist of, while the FAR's do go a little further to clarify the ' 
differences between a maintenance programme and an inspection programme through the issue of 
different levels of AOC's from FAR 121,135 and 91. For 121 and 135 a maintenance programme 
should be applied by the operator but for 91, private category only an inspection programme needs 
to be applied. The term maintenance programme in my opinion means the complete system of 
identifying the scheduled maintenance tasks required to be carried out at certain intervals, a 
method of documentation to carry out those tasks and a complete system of monitoring and feed 
back to ensure the continued effectiveness and applicability of the scheduled maintenance tasks. 
The document itself that details the scheduled maintenance tasks and the intervals to be followed 
to accomplish those tasks is called the "Maintenance Scheduler (MS). The MS front introduction 
pages details the rules and methods of complying with the Maintenance Programme. Once the MS 
is accepted by the authorities and issued an approval by the authorities Is now refereed to as an 
AMS, approved maintenance schedule. Once approved the AMS is then subjected to approval at 
every revision. The AMS forms the basis of the maintenance programme and of the operators JAR 
OPS subpart M approval. 
TvDical Components of a Maintenance Programme. 
1. An Approved Maintenance Schedule, (AMS). 
2. A Task Card set to carry out the AMS. 
3. A system to control the AMS and issue the Task Card set. 
4. A system to monitor the effectiveness of the AMS through defect monitoring, both pilot reports 
and maintenance reports. (Reliability Programme). 
5. A system to monitor the condition of components removed in service. (Reliability Programme). 
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6. A system to be able to revise the AMS due the Reliability Programme or manufacturers 
recommendations. 
Often operators stop at item I when identifying a Maintenance Programme, but as the JAA 
regulations say in JAR OPS subpart M, perhaps contradicting them selves a little in different 
paragraphs, but reference to AMC OPS 1.91 0(a) paragraph 9 states.. 
"Reflabilfty Programmes should be developed for aeroplane maintenance programmes based 
upon MSG logic. 
_" 
The MRB process is certainly an MSG logic programme, and the requirement of the RCM / MSG3 
logic process to continuously monitor the in operational and maintenance findings is required to 
support the tasks and intervals in the maintenan6e programme for applicability and effectiveness. 
For this reason the Reliability Programme is an integral part of the complete Maintenance 
Programme. Later in the thesis we will review the different methods of conducting a Reliability 
Programme, for now lets continue to look closer at the production of the AMS. 
The AMS should normally be based upon the MRBR. In order to assist the operator with a better 
technical clarification of the MRBR the manufacturer often issues the Maintenance Planning Data 
(MPD). The MPD contains the MRBR but elaborates with reference to panels to be opened, 
manhours estimated to carry out the MRBR tasks, maintenance manuals or task card references 
the detail the MSI or SSI task work steps details, work zones or area that the task falls in, further 
information in support of the scheduled maintenance tasks. The MPD is contains the complete 
MRBR and is revised when ever the MRBR is revised but the MPD is also revised on its own. The 
ISC often improve decide on the MPD revisions to improve clarifications Or scheduled maintenance 
task details. Often the MPD is the source base line document for the operators AMS. 
While the MPD is adequate as a base line document, that details the complete RCM / MSG 3 
manufacturers recommended scheduled maintenance tasks, it would be a Mistake to use it alone. 
In addition to the MPD there may be other scheduled tasks required for inclusion in the 
Maintenance Programme that are not RCM / MSG 3 derived, such as... 
Regulatory Tasks: Airworthiness Directives, Aircraft frequent weighing, Pressurised bottle 
hydrostatic testing etc. 
2. Company Special Tasks: Cabin Interior Inspections, In Flight Entertainment Inspections etc. 
3. Non MRBR Manufactures Task: Service Bulletins, Service Letters or ETOPs tasks etc. 
4. Reliability Derived Tasks: Tasks developed on other operator aircraft With similar equipment 
etc. 
5. Vendor Requirements: Special Vendor equipment installed maintenance tasks etc. 
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6. Environmental Considerations: Task to address the climate that the AOC holder will operate 
his aircraft in such as hot and humid, wet non paved run way landings, salt water air, freezing 
conditions,, etc. 
The AMS is in fact a living document that should be continuously developed to address issues 
derived from the on going Reliability Programme. 
The section that follow is an example of a typical introduction to an Operators Maintenance 
Schedule. It describes not only the construction of the AMS but also the Maintenance Programme 
process. The introduction of n AMS is essential to define and detail the purpose and methods of the 
complete maintenance programme.... 
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PART 1 
DESCRIPTION OF 
MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE 
INTRODUCTION 
The Maintenance Schedule described in this document applies to Operator X aircraft. This 
schedule covers all scheduled maintenance tasks for the airplane and systems including 
powerplant, required by the manufacturer and relevant authorities. Opertor X Engineering 
Planning and Development are responsible for managing and coordinating the accomplishment 
of the requirements in this schedule and for the necessary revision service to the Maintenance 
Schedule. 
MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE PROCESS 
2. All scheduled maintenance tasks are controlled by a time interval. This interval can be in the 
form of flight hours, flight cycles, landings, engine operating hours or cycles, APU operating 
hours, or calendar times. Tasks will be allocated to packages (Monthly, A-check series, C-check 
series), specified flights (Daily, Transit Night Stop ) or in conjunction with another scheduled 
maintenance action, e. g., engine change. The interval is the requirement when the task must be 
complied with. Allocating a task to a work package is for planning convenience only. 
3. Component and engine restorations are controlled by a "life limited" and/or "on conditiolf' 
process. 
a. The life limited process is applied when components or engines are scheduled for 
restoration or discard at a specified time or interval. Ilis includes replacement of life 
limited parts at specified intervals. 
b. The "on condition! ' process is applied when components or engines are monitored for 
"conditiore'by periodically scheduled inspections or checks and/or by regular data 
collection (such as the engine trend monitoring schedule). Component or engine 
maintenance is required when the inspected item exceeds the "limits" specified in the 
AMTvVCMM, or information based on Operator X reliability data. 
Condition monitoring is a primary maintenance process to verify the fleet for 
airworthiness and the effectiveness of the Maintenance Schedule. Condition 
monitoring is a program of data collection and analysis in order to obtain 
information for the whole fleeL The results are used to control the Maintenance 
Schedule, evaluate the continuity of airworthiness of the fleet and monitor the 
performance of individual parts and systems. 
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF SCHEDULE 
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4. The Operator X Boeing 737-700IGW Maintenance Schedule is applicable for aircraft 
operating In the range of 150 to 1,500 flight hours per year. Any aircraft operating outside 
these limitations can not follow this Schedule without prior approval from the Opertor X 
Authorities & Boeing. 
5. This schedule is applicable only to the operators Boeing 737-NG, with CFM56-7B engines 
installed. Registration numbers are XX-XX, XX-XX, XX-XX. 
6.1 While the basis for the schedule is the manufacturer's Maintenance Planning Data document ý 
(MPD), all maintenance work performed on Operator X aircraft will be in compliance with and 
in reference to the following documents: 
a. Aircraft Maintenance Manual 
b. Engine Maintenance Manual 
C. Structural Repair Manual 
d. Component Maintenance Manual 
e. Illustrated Parts Catalogue 
f. Wiring Diagram Manual 
g. Service Bulletins 
h. Service Letters 
i. Airworthincss Directivcs 
Amendments 
7. The basis for this schedule is the Boeing 737-NG MPD D626AOO I Revision 13 Dated Oct 02, 
CFM56-7B Engine Shop Manual Revision 21 15Aug 02, all revisions to these documents 
will be appraised & if applicable reflected in this schedule. Any possible amendment to the 
Maintenance Schedule shall be discussed by the Operator X Schedule Review Board (MSRB). 
The MSRB will sit three times a year to deliberate on possible Maintenance Schedule 
amendments. 
8. Amending the Maintenance Schedule is the responsibility of the Maintenance Engineering 
Planning section. 
9. Amendments to the Maintenance Schedule shall take place as a result of the following: 
a. Issue or revision to any OEM's documentation. 
b. Issue or revision to any appropriate FAA, CAA, DGAC, TC, GCAA or odier relevant 
regulatory documentation. 
C. Revisions or additions to Operator X company requirements. 
d. The experience of Operator X. 
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10. Every revision and amendment must be presented to QAM or his deputy for acceptance; QAM 
will then seek approval of the Operator X Authorties. Only then will Engineering Planning and 
Development make effective the changes and revise all issued Maintenance Schedules and 
annotate each revision sheet. This process will take place at the MSRB. No revision shall take 
effect until Operator X have granted approval. 
Responsibilities 
Opertor X Maintenance Engineering Planning (MEP) are the responsible section to ensure the 
Maintenance Schedule is in effect at all times. MEP will monitor the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of the schedule and will instigate the development of the schedule where felt 
technically necessary. Any deviations from this Maintenance Schedule or accompanying 
documents are not allowed without prior approval from MEP. MEP will not agree to deviations 
from this Schedule without prior approval from the QAM. MEP are also responsible for creating 
and issuing the work documents in advance to aircraft maintenance (AM), which are required to 
ensure the Maintenance Schedule tasks are called for compliance prior to exceedance of their 
Maintenance Schedule interval. 
12. All significant structural discrepancies found shall be reported to Boeing Commercial Airplanes 
(BCA) on a Discrepant Structural Report form (see BBJ MPD D626AOO I, page B. 0-1 for form 
copy). It is the responsibility of Operator X Maintenance Engineering Planning to ensure the 
forms are submitted when required. Definition of corrosion levels 1 to 3, and guidelines to be 
followed are referenced in D626A001. 
Extension of Task Intervals 
13. Short-term extension: In exceptional circumstances the Maintenance Schedule allows for 
short-term extension of maintenance tasks. The maximum allowable extension of the tasks are 
as follows: 
a. Hours: 10% but not to exceed 50 hours 
b. Landings: 10% but not to exceed 25 landings 
C. Calendar: For intervals less than I year 10% but not to exceed I months 
For intervals less than 2 years 10% but not to exceed 2 months 
For intervals less than 3 years 10% but not to exceed 3 months. 
Notes 
Extensions are not permitted to component mandatory life limitations, safety equipment or 
Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs as indicated in the task description). 
CMR's Definition: As defined by FAA AC 25-19 a CMR is a required periodic task, 
established during the design certification of the airplane as an operating limitation on the type 
certificate. CMR tasks are identified also with an asterisk after the task number. 
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iii. Extension will not be cumulative. 
iv. Extensions will only take affect after formal application to Operator X QA is accepted in 
accordance with the Opertor X procedures. The Operator X Authorities have delegated to the 
Operator X QAM the ability to grant Short Term Extensions. 
STRUCTURE OF MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE 
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14. Extended-Range Twin Operations Procedure (ETOPs): The Maintenance Schedule 
development and construction takes into consideration ETOPs, as far as tasks are identified as 
an ETOPs significant task, where applicable. The ETOPs-significant tasks will not normally be 
scheduled for compliance at the same time on both engines or systems during line maintenance. 
If through some occasional or nonroutine case, multiple actions on ETOPs-significant items do 
occur, different technicians will perform the maintenance on the similar systems, and the work 
will be inspected by different approved inspectors, or a verification of the system will be 
accomplished. During minor and major maintenance, ETOPs-significant tasks will have 
adequate certifiers and final function checks to satisfy the ETOPs requirements for system 
integrity and therefore can be scheduled concurrently. The Amiri Flight ETOPS Manual 
explains how Operator X meets the GCAA requirements. Note: ETOPS significant tasks are 
identified as "ETOPs Similar System Maintenance TasVin the MS & Task Cards, while 
ETOPs CMP additional tasks for ETOPs flights are identified as "CMP Task" in the MS & Task 
Cards. 
15. Definition of Line Maintenance: A package of scheduled maintenance tasks that do not require 
extensive access or downtime. Daily, Transit, Night Stop, Daily Non Flying, & Day Non Flying 
and the Monthly series are considered line maintenance. 
16. Definition of Minor Maintenance: A package of scheduled maintenance tasks that may require 
some extensive access or downtime. The A-check series is considered minor maintenance. 
17. Definition of Major Maintenance: A package of scheduled maintenance tasks that do require 
extensive access or downtime. The C-check series is considered major maintenance. 
18. Work Packages: Operator X Engineering Planning and Development have allocated certain 
points in time to accomplish groups of tasks at one input. Those inputs are referred to as work 
packages. The work packages are assuming an annual utilization of 1500 flight hours & 400 
flight cycles. If the utilization differs over time from the assumption the work packages will be 
reallocated accordingly without excedance of the task interval. The work packages are as 
follows: 
a. , Daily: Prior to the first flight of the day in accordance with Task Card 050001. 
Transit: During every Transit in accordance with Task Card 05000 1. 
C. Night Stop : When the crew have left the a/c secured & unattended for a stop of 6 hours 
or more in accordance with Task Card 050001. 
d. Non Flying Tasks : These tasks have to be accomplished when the a/c is parked in a 
flight ready condition but has not flown for a certain period of time. Non Flying Daily 
has to be done not to exceed 48 hrs elapsed of non flying & the 7 Day Non Flying has to 
be done not to exceed 7 days elapsed of non flying. Both tasks are iaw Task Card 
050001. 
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e. Monthly 1: Not to exceed every 2 calendar month or 300 flight hours in accordance with 
Task Card 0500M I
Monthly 2: Not to exceed every 2 calendar month or 300 flight hours in accordance with 
Task Card 050OM2. 
E A-check: Not exceed every 6 calendar months or 750 flight hours, whichever is sooner, 
in accordance with Boeing Task Cards. 
g. C-chcck: Not to exceed every 36 calendar months or 4,500 flight hours, whichever is 
sooner, in accordance with Boeing Task Cards. 
19. Though allocated to a work package the requirement for each individual task is dictated by the 
Maintenance Schedule task interval. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE CHAPTERS AND CODES 
20. Systems. This chapter describes in order of ATA, the MSG 3 scheduled maintenance 
requirements for the complete aircraft systems, to ensure system serviceability and integrity. 
The tasks in this chapter ensure aircraft systems integrity by lubrication, functional checking, 
operational check, inspection, checking and removal of components for restoration or for 
discard. 
21. Zonal. This chapter describes the Zonal programme of general visual (GV) inspection tasks and 
if required, physical check of the general condition and security of attachment of the accessible 
systems and structural items in defined zones with the access defined for each task. This 
includes checks for degradation such as chafing of tubing, loose duct supports, wiring damage, 
cable and pulley wear, fluid leaks, electrical bonding, general condition of fasteners, inadequate 
drainage, and general corrosion, not covered in the MSG 3 analysis. The Zonal inspection is not 
intended as a quality assurance check after maintenance check for determining proper 
reassembly of components, structures or powerplants. 
22. Structures. This chapter describes the scheduled maintenance tasks for the structural 
maintenance programme. This programme is designed to provide timely detection and repair of 
structural damage which may occur in the fleet during normal operation. Detection of corrosion, 
stress corrosion, minor accidental damage and fatigue cracking by visual and NDT procedures- is
considered. The corrosion prevention and control programme (CPCP) is an integral part of the 
structural progranune. All tasks in the structural programme require the application of the CPCP 
basic task at the specific intervals (see MPD D626AOO I pages 8.0-8 and 9 for details of the 
CPCP basic task). The objective of the CPCP programme is to control corrosion found on all 
structures listed in the structural programme to Level I or better. 
23. Reporting Results of the Structural Inspection: All significant structural discrepancies found 
shall be reported to Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA) on a Discrepant Structural Report 
form (see MPD D626AOO I page B. 0- 1 for form copy). It is the responsibility of Operator X 
Maintenance Engineering Planning to ensure the forms are submitted when required. Definition 
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of corrosion levels I to 3 and guidelines to be followed are referenced in D626AOO I.
Maintenance Engineering Planning are also required to copy any reports raised to QA. 
24. Definitions of inspection types. 
a. The terms "check" and "inspect" are not intended to imply a level of skill required to 
accomplish a task. 
b. The phrase "... mechanical control path... " is used in describing certain scheduled 
maintenance tasks. This is not intended to include cables, but only 
components/assemblies required to initiate and terminate action. 
C. "Intcmar' and "external" as used in the Zonal inspection tasks refer to the point from 
which the inspection is accomplished in relation to the zone. "External" is also used for 
inspections under panels with quick release fasteners. The Zonal tasks include visual 
checks of electrical wiring, hydraulic tubing, water/wastc plumbing, pneumatic ducting, 
components and fittings, brackets, and so on, associated with systems, as well as all 
visible structures which are contained within the zone boundaries. The extent of the 
intended area is defined by the access listed. Whenever possible, the Zonal inspection 
should be conducted within touching distance. 
d. General visual: A visual examination of an interior or exterior area conducted within 
arms legnth, installation or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure or irregularity. 
This level of inspection is made under normal available lighting conditions such as 
daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight or drop light and may require removal or opening of 
access panels or doors. Stands ladders or platforms may be required to gain proximity to 
the areas being checked. Normal inspection aids are to be used as required. 
Detailed inspection: An intensive visual examination of a specific structural area, system, 
installation or assembly to detect damage, failure or irregularity. Available lighting is 
normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at an intensity deemed to be 
appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids may be used. Surface cleaning and elaborate 
access procedures may be required. 
Special detailed inspection: An intensive examination of specific items, installations or 
assemblies to detect damage, failure or irregularity. The examination is likely to make 
extensive use of specialised inspection techniques and/or equipment. Intricate cleaning 
and substantial access or disassembly procedures may be required. 
25. Task No.: A unique identifying number for each task in the Maintenance Schedule. This 
number reflects directly the manufacturer's MPD Task No. where applicable. The first two 
digits are the ATA chapter (41 for left, -02 for right, and -00 for tasks without left or right 
positions). The last two digits allow for identifying multiple positions for a common task. 
Operator X added tasks are identified by 
-XX The substantiating data for the addition of these 
tasks will be held as part of the process. 
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26. AMTOSS (Aircraft Maintenance Task Oriented Support System): The first 6 digits denote 
chapter-section-subject of the corresponding maintenance manual procedure to accomplish this 
task. The seventh and eighth digits are function codes that identify the type of work required. 
For tasks without AMTOSS references the Task Card, if available, is entered here. 
27. Interval: Task intervals are specified in terms of frequency and usage parameters uch as flight 
hours, cycles and calendar time. "Note" refers to an explanation under the task description that 
will clarify the interval. 
CYC = aircraft flight cycles 
HRS 
= aircraft flight hours 
cycles. 
YRS 
= years 
LDG CNG = landing gear change 
SHP VST = shop visit 
Daily = Prior to the first flight of each day 
flight 
Arrival = After each aircraft arrival 
APU CNG = APU change 
AHR = APU hours ACY = APU 
MOS = months 
ENG CNG = engine change 
LIFLIM = life limited 
PD = Pre-dcparture 
- 
prior to every 
Note: When there are two or more intervals for a task, which is due sooner must be followed. 
28. Threshold: This refers to the interval that a task must first be carried out. A task with a 
threshold and a repeat interval is subject to inspection firstly at the threshold time and 
subsequently at the repeat interval. 
29. Zone: The zone identifies where the task is applicable on the aircraft. Zones are defined in 
Section 3 of the B737-NG MPD. 
30. Access: The access panels or door numbers required to be open to carry out the task. 
31. Manhours: The manhour estimates are based on the time for skilled personnel to accomplish 
the task. These amounts do not include time for access or defueling or moving stands to get to 
the task area. 
32. Task Description: Description of the task to be perfonned. Applicability and interval notes are 
listed here to provide additional explanation. Also, if the task is an ETOPS-related task it will be 
noted here. 
33. Applicability: The task applicability to the Opertor aircraft and engines will be shown here. 
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4. New Enhancements to the MSG3 Process including ETOPs. 
4.1 Extended Twin Engine Operation. ETOPs. 
4.1.1 ETOPs: An Introduction. 
Regulation in existence today from the US FAA and the European JAA limit two engine aircraft 
from flying further than 60 minutes, at one engine cruise speed, from an adequate alternate airport. 
This limitation resulted from failure data gathered over the years of mainly piston propeller and early 
jet engines. The intention of this regulation was to try to ensure an operating aircraft had adequate 
ability to land at an appropriate airport (not any airport but an adequate airport) in the event of an 
engine failure. This regulation contributed to the development of the three engined aircraft such as 
the Ll 011 Tristar, DC1 0, and the B727 that could legally transport passengers across the Atlantic, 
Pacific and Caribbean routes. (It should be noted that pre ETOPs times, as early as 1977 the FAA 
granted approval for operation of 75 minutes to some operators to meet routes in the Caribbean 
Sea). 
As the large gas turbine engine become more advanced and much more reliable, the 
manufacturers and operators petitioned the regulators to review the regulation. The result was in 
1985 the FAA issued Advisory Circular 120-45 (AC 120-45). AC120-45 was considered as a 
method for exemption to the 60 minutes rule and detailed the requirements that an operator must 
meet prior to application to their authority for exemption to the 60 minutes rule. In the first instances 
the authorities would give extension of the 60 minute rule for 75 minutes and 120 minutes. Soon 
after the issue of the FAA ACII 20-42 the UK CAA issued CAP 513, the French DGAC CTC 20 and 
Transport Canada TIP 6327, (later JAA Information Leaflet 20,11-20) all addressing the requirement 
to be met by an operator prior to application for extended twin engine operations further than 60 
minutes, single engine cruise speed, from an adequate alternate airport. In existence today the 
FAA recognise 75,120,180 and 207 minutes ETOPs approval, while the JAA recognise 90,120, 
180 and 207 minute ETOPs approval categories. 
AC 120-42 and the other regulatory authorities requirements, identified a two stage process for the 
approval to operate ETOPs. The two stages are... 
ErOPs Type Design Approval. 
2. ETOPs Operational Approval. 
The Operational Approval was split further into two distinct areas.. 
a. Operational conditions. 
b. Maintenance and Engineering conditions. 
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ETOPs Type Design Approval. 
During the type design approval process of a new aircraft the aircraft must meet Federal Aviation 
Regulation 21 for aircraft built in the US and Joint Aviation Regulation 21 for aircraft built in Europe. 
For ETOPs type design approval the manufacturer must show that the airframe and propulsion 
systems for a particular aircraft can achieve a sufficient high level of reliability. In some instances 
the manufacturer must receive ETOPs design approval from more than one regulatory agency. The 
"traditional method" of approval required aircraft to have conducted two years of in service 
operation and the engines to have flown between 50,000 to 250,000 flight hours. Type design 
approval of an aircraft / engine combination is also contingent upon a sufficiently low World fleet in 
flight shut down (IFSD) rate. Two specific IFSD rates are in existence today with the FAA and the 
JAA, they are 0.05 in flight shut downs per 1000 engine hours minutes (I IFSD per 20,000 hours) 
for 120 ETOPs design approval and 0.02 in flight shut downs per 1000 engine hours minutes (1 
IFSD per 50,000 hours) for 180 minutes ETOPs design approval. 
Under the "traditional method" of ETOPs type design approval, if a manufacturer wished to design 
a new two engine aircraft that was specifically for long range missions associated with ETOPs, 
there would have been a delay of up to one year of operation before the aircraft could be approved 
for ETOPs missions. This led Boeing to liaise with the FAA to seek an altemative method of getting 
ETOPs approval for the latest twin jet the B777. The method now referred to as Oeady" ErOPs type 
design approval, required the regulatory authority and the manufacturer to establish specific design 
reviews and flight test conditions, (e. g. FAA Special Conditions 25-ANM-84 and JAA Certification 
Review Item, CRI, G-1)., that have to be satisfied during the basic certification testing of the aircraft. 
Many rigorous ground and flight tests are performed which replicate one or more years of actual in 
service and maintenance cycles, thereby establishing a high degree of confidence that the desired 
reliability levels would be realised in actual operational service. Successful completion of this 
certification programme for the B777 has validated this approach as a viable alternative for future 
aircraft designs to the "traditional" one or two years waiting before ETOPs Type Design Approval. 
Some of the improvements to design of the modem jet liner required for ETOPs operation were for 
example a hydraulic motor generator (HMG) had to be added to the B757 and B767 to provide a 
source of back up power in the event of a loss of power from both integrated drive generators 
(IDG's), or the loss of one IDG and the auxiliary power unit (APU). The B737 and MD80 series 
aircraft do not have the HMG's, for these aircraft it would be necessary that the APU is running 
during the entire ETOPs portion of the flight. The B777 was designed with four sources of electrical 
power ( two from each engine) which satisfies the ETOPs requirement. Cargo fire extinguisher 
systems and equipment cooling systems were also subject systems required for ETOPs design 
approval. 
After the Type Design Approval for ETOPs operation has been granted a note is added to the 
Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) similar to the follomfing... 
For "traditional" ETOPs approval method 
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The type design reliability and performance of this aircraft/ engine combination has been evaluated 
in accordance with FAA Advisory Circular 120-42(X) and found to be suitable for extended range 
operations-when configured with Boeing Document D6)000(, 'Configuration Maintenance, and 
Procedure for Extended Range (ER) Operation" This finding does not constitute approval to 
conduct extended range operations. 
For "early' ETOPs approval method 
The type design reliability and performance of this aircraft / engine combination has been evaluated 
in accordance with 25-ANM-84-FAA Special Conditions: "Extended Range Operations of the 
Boeing )= series aircraft" dated XX XX 
, 
and found suitable for extended range ope t ons X)=. ra i 
This finding does not constitute approval to conduct extended range operations. 
ETOPs Operational Approval. 
The "traditionar method for ETOPs Operational Approval requires that the operator shows the 
regulatory agency.. 
a. The airline can operate the aircraft safely under conditions of ETOPs. 
b. The airline can maintain and engineer the aircraft in the approved configuration at a high level 
of reliability. 
At the initiation of the ETOPs concept in 1985 it was considered prudent to require an airline to 
operate the candidate engine / airframe combination for one year before being authorised to 
conduct 120 minutes ETOPs flights, because ETOPs was not at that time considered a proven 
concept. In 1988 when the maxim um diversion time was extended to 180 minutes, it was again 
considered appropriate for the operator to conduct not only 12 months of reliably flying but also 12 
months of 120 minutes ETOPs reliable flying. Prior to consideration for approval to operate at 180 
minutes ETOPs flights. Again the conservatism was based on the fact that the concept was still in 
its early stages. The Operator was expected to show the authority detailed information on the 
maintenance and reliability processes and programmes as well as the flight operations and training 
processes and programmes that the operator had been using for the past one years operation. 
Since the requirements for IETOPs are much more stringent in all these areas than for non ETOPs 
operations, it would be expected that the operator would be able to show that their performance 
was at least up to the standard required by ETOPs regulations. This approach would still be 
satisfactory if an operator has sufficient domestic non ErOPs operational experience. If this is not 
the case and it was required that the operator gains ETOPs approval as quickly as possible, then 
the Accelerated ErOPs Operational Approval Method can be applied. 
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The "accelerated" method for ETOPs Operational Approval was introduced as a new appendix to 
the AC 120-42 entitled "Reduction of Airlines In-service Experience Prior to the Granting of an 
ETOPs Operational Approval". It was designated as Appendix 7 of both A 120-42 and JAA IL 20. 
Appendix 7 identifies the requirements for an airline to begin service with up to 180 minutes 
ETOPs (or up to the type design approval limit for the engine / airframe combination) 
, 
when the 
airline has established that the necessary ErOPs processes are in place, and that the processes 
are proven to be reliable. The accelerated ETOPs approval method allows an airline the flexibility to 
use the aircraft on the most optimum routes from the start of initial operation with that aircraft. 
The accelerated ETOPs operational approval appendix is a reflection of the willingness of the 
aviation industry to examine data and retain only those requirements that add value to operational 
safety. An accelerated ETOPs operational approval requires a firm commitment by the operator to 
establish and maintain the necessary practices and procedures and to maintain them throughout 
the life of the programme. 
4.1.2 ETOPs: Maintenance and Engineering Implications. 
FAA AC 12042 and JAA IL 20 identifies twelve specific maintenance and engineering activities 
that must take place supplementing the normal existing maintenance and engineering practices 
followed by an airline, for those wishing to apply for ETOPs operational approval. These fourteen 
activities are design to ensure a more reliable technical operation is established and a monitoring 
programme to ensure the more reliable technical operation is maintained. 
1. ETOPS Maintenance Programme: A supplement to the existing approved programme. 
Presently approved maintenance programmes (MSG2 or 3) for the engine / aircraft combination 
must be supplemented by tasks identified in the AC 12042, IL 20 and the Configuration, 
Maintenance and Procedures (CMP) manual approved by the authorities for the aircraft type. 
These were task identified by non MSG methods that addressed concerns for ETOPs critical 
systems. For example with the B737NG Engine Hydraulic quick disconnect lines should be 
inspected every 500 flight hours, the engine fuel cross feed valve should be operationally checked 
every 6000 flight hours, the APU fuel feed shut off valve should be restored every 30,000 flight 
hours. These tasks should be added to the airlines maintenance programme and Identified in the 
programme as ETOPs tasks. 
2. ETOPs Training Programme: A supplement to the existing maintenance training programme 
for aircraft used in ETOPs operation. 
Additional training is required for ETOPs maintenance personnel. The objective of this initial training 
and subsequent refresher training is to ensure the seriousness of the ETOPs operation is 
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understood and that all the additional activities and considerations that must take place are known 
by the technical staff that Will be involved in the ETOPs operation. 
3. ETOPs Reliability Programme: A supplement to the existing Reliability Programme or a new 
stand-alone programme. 
An Event Oriented Reliability Programme is preferred for ETOPs operations, where ETOPs 
problems are identified as they appear and prevented from occurring or developing further into 
serious issues. Traditionally Reliability monitoring has been undertaken through statistical analysis 
of defects or reports. The ETOPs requirement is an attempt to move those operating ETOPs away 
from those retrospective reactive reliability monitoring systems to a more proactive anticipatory 
monitoring system. This subject will be discussed further later in the thesis (section 6) and 
investigated in more detail as the more credible system for use with not only ETOPs operations but 
for use with all MSG-3 developed Maintenance Programmes. 
4. ETOPs Manual. 
A chapter in the AAines Maintenance Organisation Exposition (MOE) or a stand-alone manual 
describing the procedures and policies to be followed with in the Maintenance and Engineering 
Division to meet the ETOPs requirements. 
5. ETOPS Pre Departure Service Check: Performed prior to all ETOPs flights. Consists of 
standard Maintenance Programme Transit check tasks with the addition of some specific 
ETOPs tasks deemed necessary for that type of aircraft by the manufacturer or by the 
authorities. 
Some examples of additional pre departure tasks are the inspection of the cargo fire containment 
tape seals between side walls, inspection of the cargo door seal, both these tasks target the fire 
containment capability in the event of a cargo bay fire. The inspection of the oil level from the sight 
gauge and servicing to full prior to every ETOPs flight. 
6. Oil Consumption Monitoring Programme: It is required that oil consumption rates of all engines, 
APU's included, are monitored not only for ETOPs flight but all flights. 
The oil consumption should be observed and calculated for both the short term and long term to 
recognise immediate excessive consumption and consumption trends. This involves checking the 
oil levels prior to every flight and recording uplifts. 
7. Engine Condition Monitoring Programme: ECM is to detect the detedoration of engines at an 
eady stage. 
ECM is to ensure that trends or exceedances are monitored and acted upon before they become 
airworthiness issues resulting in failures or costly repairs. 
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8. Propulsion System Monitoring Programme: ETOPs operators are required to monitor the 
World In Flight Shut Down (IFSD) rates as well as the company IFSD rates. 
Using a 12 months rolling average for monitoring the World and company the IFSD rate. Co- 
ordination with the authorities, the manufacturer and other airlines is required to ensure the early 
addressing of any possible conditions that could bring the engine type reliability statistics into 
question for ETOPs operation. Clear definition of what constitutes an IFSD is required. For example 
An IFSD shall be considered to have taken place when the aircraft is airborne and the engine was 
shut down as a result of the following 
...... 
a. Human intervention follovVing an abnormal situation. 
b. An automatic shut down function. 
c. Any other involuntary reason. 
It can be seen by the definitions of an IFSD that the addition of the human factor (c. ) is also 
considered as an IFSD. This is to not only address the mechanical possibilities of loss of an engine 
but also the possibility of a human error. The human error could result from bad design, where it 
was possible through ergonomics that an engine was accidentally shut down or through in 
adequate crew training or procedures that an engine was unintentionally shut down 
9. Resolution of Aircraft Discrepancies: Significant Systems to ErOPs should be monitored for 
reliability and defects. Any reports / defects on these significant systems should be thoroughly 
resolved and documented. Corrective action should include the precise verification that the system 
is returned to its proper airworthy condition. 
While all defects and reports should be investigated and with proper trouble shooting certain ata 
chapters and systems have been identified as Significant Systems to the ETOPs operation. These 
systems / ata*s should be considered in more detail with respect to discrepancy monitoring. 
10. Maintenance on Multiple Systems: Avoiding maintenance on dual systems at the same time by 
the same maintenance crew (such as engine I& engine 2). 
This practice can eliminate the human factors that can contribute to duplicated errors. It should be 
common practice for the planning and scheduling section not to issue multiple / similar system 
tasks at the same time to the same crew by separating the accomplishment of the similar tasks to 
different maintenance down times or by issuing the tasks to be accomplished by two totally 
independent crews with independent inspectors or certifiers. This action can avoid the same error 
being duplicated to multiple systems. For example asking for oil filters on engine I&2 to be 
replaced at the same time by the same crew. 
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11. ErOPs; Part Control: A programme should be in place to ensure that non ETOPs parts are not 
issued to ETOPs aircraft, or clearly identified as non ETOPs parts. 
The manufacturer and regulatory authority issue the Configuration, Maintenance and Procedures 
document that details the part status for ETOPs operation. These parts will be in the IPC but so will 
other non ErOPs; parts. It is required that the operator ensures that a programme is in place to 
ensure that non ETOPs parts will not be installed on an aircraft operating ETOPs flights. 
12. APU High Atitude Start Reliability Programme: In flight start and run capability of the APU, at 
altitude, must be tested and a 95% reliability rate maintained. 
The APU is critical for ETOPs operation so it is important that the APU is able to start at high 
altitude under cold soak conditions and can be relied upon to supply electrical power in the event of 
an engine failure. This can be conducted by the operator conducting in flight starts on flights and 
recording the success. This success statistics should show a minimum of 95% starts, any more 
than 5% failures could result in the revoking of the ETOPs approval. All failed starts should be 
subjected to investigation and rectification action. Note that for different twin enqine tvr)es the APU 
start p gramme differs. The CMP will define the reguirements. 
These twelve Maintenance and Engineering activities should be incorporated into the procedures 
of any operator wishing to fly ETOPs. The basic philosophy of these activities is to increase the 
reliability of the aircraft and system mechanics and to increase the capability of the maintenance 
and engineering function while eliminating as far as possible the human factor that can cause 
errors that would be detrimental to airworthiness of an ETOPs operation. It needs to be 
emphasised that ETOPs is not only about increasing the reliability of the systems but also about 
personnel training, procedures and human factors that contribute to a more reliable human 
operation. 
4.1.3 ETOPs Maintenance Philosophy, a New Standard for All Aircraft Maintenance 
Programmes. 
Though only mandated for ETOPs Operations, it is my belief that the additional twelve activities 
should not be only for ETOPs operation but for all normal operators maintenance and engineering 
functions and activities. This section follows on with this concept and explains why and how these 
additional ETOPs activities can become routine in the normal aircraft maintenance programme. 
The philosophy that is behind the ETOPs improvements is to try to ensure a more reliable machine 
and a more reliable human. The general idea is to identify the areas and procedures that can be 
improved by asking the question of possible failure events... 
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"Can an event like this affect the airworthiness wfth respect to engines or other chlical SYSterns thus 
compromise the twin engine operation" 
This is a similar question that is asked during the initial stages of the MSG-3 process, the effects of 
failure, the design reliability including the redundancy. With the objective of maintaining the original 
design reliability, that has perhaps been increased through the CMP / ETOPs modifications. So the 
question for ETOPs operation has a very relevant place even in the non ETOPs operation not only 
for twin jets but also multi jets. The introduction of the ETOPs question into the MSG-3 process will 
be considered later in this section. 
While there is I believe a place in the MSG-3 process for the ETOPs question to be inserted as a 
standard, further more out of the twelve additional maintenance and Engineering tasks required for 
the ETOPs operation many of them also should be standard for all operations, not only ETOPs. 
Standardising ETOPs Activities for Non ETOPs Operation. 
ETOPS Maintenance Programme: A supplement to the existing approved programme. 
The supplement to the standard maintenance programme (produced through MSG2 or 3 
philosophy) is intended to identify earlier than normal, potential failures to ETOPs systems by 
introducing additional maintenance tasks addressing critical ETOPs systems. These tasks are 
produced by non MSG-3 techniques, but if we can introduce the ETOPs question into the MSG-3 
process as standard we will be able to define those systems potentially detrimental to ETOPs 
operation and identify the scheduled maintenance tasks that can allow early detection of potential 
failures that would in normal operation be treated as reported events by the operating crew. 
Level I questions of the MSG-3 process detailed in fig 2.15 
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RCM Level 1. Functional Failure Evaluation. 
Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the 
operating crew during the performance of normal duties? 
Yes 
Does the functional failure or 
secondary damage resulting from the 
functional failure have a direct adverse 
effect on oDeratina safetv? 
Yes I No 
No 
Does the functional failure have a direct 
adverse effect on operating capability? 
Yes 
Safety Effect: Cat 5. Task 
required to assure safe operation 
Operational Effect: 
Cat 6. Task desirable KI 
reduces risk tD an 
acceptable level. 
Impact Immediate 
Fig 2 15 
No 
Non Operational 
Economic Effect: 
Cat 7. Task desirable N ft 
wsts less than repair. 
Impact Delayed 
Crew Evident Effects following analysis can result in category 6 effects.. 
Does the combination of a hidden 
functional failure and one additional 
failure of a system related or back 
up function have an adverse effect 
on operating safety? 
Yes 
No 
Hidden Safety Hidden Non Safety 
Effect: cat 8. Task Economic Effect: cat 9. Tas 
required to assure ft desirable to assure ft availability 
availability necessary necessary to avoid economic effectE 
tD avoid effects of , of multiple failures. 
multiple failure. 
"Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on the operating capability"? 
Aoes not normally imply ETOPs operational capability, because operators of the non ETOPs 
aircraft should not be penalised for ETOPs operational events if they are not operating ETOPs. It is 
my opinion that for all twin jets, the ETOPs question should be brought into the IVISG-3 process. 
This way the ETOPs issues are correctly addressed. 
"Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on the operating capability including 
ETOPs operation"? 
Above is the complete question that would address the ETOPs issue at this stage with respect to 
evident failures. Those failures that are exclusively ETOPs operational effects should be identified 
156 
as Cat 6ER, to distinguish them from the non ETOPs Cat 6 effects. (ER stands for Extended 
Range and is the letter coding used in the MMEL for the identification of ETOPS restrictions, thus it 
would be a follow on to use that already established standard). 
Those tasks would then be subjected to the same Level 2 analysis to find a scheduled 
maintenance task as any other effect except that as with Category 5 Safety Effects the analysis, the 
Cat 6 ER effects analysis would not stop once an effective and applicable tasks is found but would 
continue through every question of the analysis thus possibly resulting in multiple scheduled 
maintenance tasks. The reasoning I believe this is totally relevant for the Cat 6 ER effects is that 
with other Cat 6 effects, the failure does not compromise the safety of the aircraft in its operation 
while the existence of a failure effect of an ETOPs (ER) nature though does not directly affect the 
safety of the operation it does put the aircraft, while flying ETOPs routes (more than 60 minutes 
single engine cruise, from an adequate airport) in a much more critical situation. It could therefore 
be argued that Cat 6 ER effects should be identified as Cat 5 ER events as they are by nature 
safety related, but it is in my opinion better that the Cat 5 as important as they are as identified as 
safety items that ETOPs evident operational effects remain as Cat 6 so as not to dilute the 
seriousness of Cat 5 effects. Just as with Cat 5, Cat 6ER should instigate a redesign if no 
maintenance tasks is found to be effective. 
Does the functional failure have a 
direct adverse effect on operating 
capability including ErOPs 
Operation? 
Yes 
Is the Ulure exclusively 
ETOPs significant? 
Yes I No 
Operational ETOPs 
Effect: Cat 6ER Task desirable to 
assure the availability necessary to 
avoid IFTOPs significant effects of 
multiple failures. 
Operational Effect: cat e. Task desirable if it reduces dsk to an 
acceptable level. 
Ficy 4.1. MSG-3 analysis introducing ETOP: s effects for Cat 6 failures. 
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Crew Non Evident Effects following analysis can result 
- 
in category 8 or 9 effects. For similar 
reasons to Cat 5 and 6 evident effects, the Cat 8 hidden safety effects should remain un changed, 
but Cat 9 hidden non safety effects should include an ETOPs effect analysis just as introduced to 
Cat 6. This new category of effects should be referred to as Cat 9 ER. 
"Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related 
or back up function have an adverse effect on operating safety? " 
...... 
is the question asked of non crew evident effects. If the answer to the analysis result in Yes 
then the effect is Cat 8, if no the effect is Cat 9. The "no" results should be subjected to a further 
ETOPs question to address those effects that are Cat 9 but have ETOPs implications. 
A point to remember here (and is also very much pertinent to the evident failure effects) is that in 
accordance with ETOPs rules, once an aircraft is despatched ETOPs capable from the stand the 
pilot can continue ETOPs even with a failure warning in the flight deck. He make the judgement 
during such events whether to continue the ETOPs route, whether to divert to an alternative route 
or whether to divert to land. His judgement will take into consideration many things, but he is quite 
allowed to continue if he deems so appropriate. 
Does the combination of a hidden 
functional failure and one additional 
failure of a system related or back 
up funciion have an adverse effect 
on operating safety? 
Does the failure have ETOPs 
significance? 
No 
Yes 
Hidden Non Safety Hidden Non Safety 
ErOPS Effect: Cat 9EF; L Task Economic Effect: cat 9. Task desirable to assure ft availability desirable to assure ft availability , 
necessary to avoid ErOPs significant necessary to avoid econwic effects 
effects of multiple failures. of multiple failures. 
Fig 4.2 MSG-3 analysis introducing ETOPs Effects Cat 9 failures. 
Similarly to the Cat 6ER Effects the Cat 9ER should then be subjected to analysis similar to that of 
Cat 8, where the task allocation analysis continues through all the questions regardless of a Yes 
answer to an effective and applicable task. Thus possibly resulting in multiple tasks. 
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With the addition and identification of ETOPs Effects Cat 6ER and Cat 9ER failures, thus the 
development of scheduled maintenance tasks applicable to ETOPs operation resulting from the 
MSG-3 process, the introduction of these tasks can be considered as more relevant and consistent 
than other methods of task selection for ETOPs operation. Operators using the aircraft for non 
ErOPs operation of course need not include the ER tasks in their maintenance programme as they 
are not subject to the higher criticality of the ETOPs systems inherent reliability, the standard MSG- 
3 analysis (non ER task development) Will result in adequate task selection. 
ETOPs Traininq Pro-qramme: Activity 2 in the ETOPs additional activities.. 
A supplement to the existing maintenance training programme for aircraft used in ErOPs 
operation. 
The emphasis here is to highlight to those in daily contact with the aircraft, who have airworthiness 
responsibilities from a maintenance and engineering stand point the ETOPs maintenance and 
engineering philosophy and the importance of the concept. It is my opinion that to start and stop 
only with ETOPs implications is incomplete. The standard maintenance and engineering 
programme, (maintenance programme refers to the complete set of activities from routine 
scheduled maintenance tasks to management and rectification of findings and modifications), 
should be explained and imparted to all those directly involved with the aircraft airworthiness and 
operational life cycle. It is not my experience today that the maintenance programme concept is 
understood fully by maintenance staff and operational staff. The IETOPs training programme Vies to 
heighten the level of awareness of the ETOPs maintenance programme, we should endeavour not 
only to do this but also to ensure that the standard (non ETOPs) maintenance programme and 
intentions are understood universally. 
For example.... 
The maintenance technician or engineer, does he / she understand why we conduct scheduled 
maintenance and why we do the tasks we do, and why we do the tasks we do when we do them? 
Do they understand the definitions of the scheduled tasks that we ask them to do or the implication 
of the defect rectification that they do? The maintenance technician / engineer is the front line in 
maintaining aircraft airworthiness. His actions directly affect the airworthiness of the aircraft in the 
shortest period of time. His actions and recording of his action is critical to the maintenance and 
engineering programme. We are only aware of the effectiveness of the maintenance programme 
through his feedback using the documentation that is included in the maintenance and engineering 
programme. For example.. 
a. The correct carrying out of scheduled routine maintenance tasks that have been defined by the 
MSG-3 process. 
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b. The correct rectification of findings resulting from the scheduled maintenance tasks and from 
routine operation of the aircraft. 
c. The correct interpretation of the pilot reports during the operation. 
d. The correct reference to the manuals and documents that make up the maintenance 
programme, such as the maintenance manual, fault isolation manual, the minimum equipment 
list. 
e. The correct feedback and recording of findings and subsequent rectification action. The 
maintenance technician / engineer goes through years of technical training, but does he also 
get correct instruction on technical writing? The maintenance programme relies on the 
maintenance technician / engineer for clear accurate recording of a finding or conditions and 
his subsequent actions in the non routine finding card, in the technical log and in any 
occurrence reports. The whole system relies on this feedback and his conformation (or 
otherwise) that the inherent reliability of the design is reintroduced after an event, allowing the 
monitoring of the applicability and effectiveness of the maintenance programme. 
it is my experience that the training programme in place for ErOPs explains the importance of the 
role of the maintenance technician / engineer with respect to the complete maintenance and 
engineering programme, but those that are not subject to this, I. e. non ErOPs operations perhaps 
are not aware, thus creating quite a considerable hole in the maintenance and engineering 
programme effectiveness. (Later in the thesis the importance of the feedback from the maintenance 
technician / engineer will be examined further and shown exactly where and how it impacts on the 
maintenance and engineering programme). 
In addition to the maintenance technician / engineer, do the flight crew understand their part in the 
maintenance and engineering programme? How they are an integral part of the maintenance cycle. 
Remembering that MSG-3 level 1 asks the question "is the occurrence of a functional failure 
evident to the operating crew during normal duties", without their recognition, feedback or 
recording of failures or events, the MSG-3 concept is considerably handicapped. Recognising and 
reporting on evident failures, liaising with the maintenance staff, using new modified systems 
recently installed on their aircraft that are intended to increase the inherent reliability? 
Finally also do the operational dispatch staff understand the performance capabilities of the aircraft 
and when we might be asking the aircraft to operate in circumstances or environments that might 
be demanding or detrimental? 
While MSG-3 maintenance programme philosophy does feedback to, and is considered in part by, 
the design engineers and the manufacturer, if the maintenance end engineering staff, the flight 
crew and the operational staff are trained to understand the maintenance and engineering cycle of 
the aircraft and their part in that cycle, this will add only to the maintainability and inherent reliability 
of the aircraft. It is in my opinion essential that flight crew in particular undertake maintenance 
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engineering appreciation training to ensure their understanding of their role in the maintenance 
programme cycle. 
For example The MSG 3 analysis of the engine fire warning system resulted with no scheduled 
maintenance task since it was in the crews procedures to conduct a test of the circuitry prior to 
every engine start, confirming the correct warnings and lights come on. If the pilot does not report 
when a fault occurs or an in correct sequence when conducting the test, the maintenance 
programme will not get the pilots input reporting the occurrence. This will give the false information 
that there is no problem with the system. This shows how the maintenance programme depends 
upon Pilot Reports (PIREPs) to confirm the effectileness of the maintenance programme. Or when 
the maintenance crew carry out visual inspections of the wing to body area for evidence of fluid 
leaks, and they detect a fluid leak but do not report it in the defect report or the non routine card but 
just go ahead and clean the leak. Then the maintenance programme is getting the wrong feedback 
that the inspection is not detecting any faults and therefore needs no attention as far as fault 
research or interval reduction is concerned. 
Both these examples show the importance of correct reporting of findings and faults from the crew 
and maintenance staff and its effect on the maintenance programme. 
qa ETOPs Reliabili! y Programme: A sunglement to the existing Reliability Pro- ramme or a new st nd- 
alone Qroqramme. 
For ETOPs operation is it required that the operator conducts reliability monitoring. It is required 
that Event Based Reliability Monitoring is employed rather than the regularly used Statistical Based 
Monitoring Programme (JAA IL 20 & FAA AC120-42) 
. 
Later in the thesis this subject will be 
explored in more detail., but essentially what IL20 and AC 120-42 is trying to establish is the 
monitoring of the ETOPs Significant Events for recurrence. (ETOPs significant events are those 
that effect ETOPs sensitive ata chapters that can have a detrimental effect on the ETOPs critical 
systems). Recurrence means that a fault or defect occurs a second time after rectification action 
has taken place, thus identifying either an issue with the rectification action taken, the 
misunderstanding of the system, a faulty system or component or incorrect documentation 
identifying the fault. It is my opinion that the Event Based (recurrence) monitoring is applicable not 
only to the ETOPs operation but for all operations. The effectiveness of the statistical monitoring 
programme using standard deviations to establish alert levels, is in my opinion questionable in its 
retrospective ability, relying on a large data sample and focusing on the event alone regardless of 
how trivial or significant, rather than the event and subsequent corrective action for a particular 
report. Later in the thesis (section 6) we will investigate the benefits of the event based system 
(adapted to all ata chapters not iust ETOPs chapters) versus the statistical based system for firstly 
a small fleet of up to ten aircraft and then for a larger fleet of many more than ten aircraft. Aso we 
will look at the essentialness of conducting reliability monitoring from IVISG-3 based programme, as 
they rely totally on the feedback and reporting of findings. The table below details those ata 
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chapters identified as ETOPs sensitive again it is my opinion that the table of ata chapters for 
defect recurrence monitoring should be for all ata chapters not only the ETOPs sensitive ones. This 
will be further developed later in the thesis (section 6) in Developing Reliability programmes to 
identify the effectiveness of the complete Maintenance Programme. 
ATA CHAPTER ATA ETOPS SIGNIFICANT SYSTEM 
SECTION 
21 
-31 Cabin Pressure Control System 
Air Conditioning 
-51 Air Conditioning (AC) Packs 
-51 Air Temperature Control 
24 
-58 E/E Cooling 
Electrical Power 
-00 Electrical Power 
-20 AC Power Generation 
-21 Power & Regulation 
-23 Fault Sensing 
-34 DC Power Meters 
26 
-10 Detection 
Fire Protection 
-11 Engine Fire Detection 
-15 APU Fire Detection 
-16 Lower Cargo Smoke Detection 
-23 Cargo Compartment Fire Extinguishing 
28 
Fuel 
-22 
-25 
-41 
-43 
Engine Fuel Feed System 
APU Fuel Feed System 
Fuel Quantity Indicating System (FQIS) 
Fuel Temperature Indicating System 
30 
-11 Wing Thermal Anti-Icing 
Ice & Rain Protection 
-21 Engine Inlet Thermal Anti-Icing 
-31 Pitot Static Probe Anti-Icing 
-33 Total Air Temperature (TAT) Probe Heat 
-34 Engine Probe Heat 
-41 Flight Compartment Window Anti-Icing 
34 
-43 Weather Radar System 
Navigation 
36 
-11 Air Supply Distribution System 
Pneumatic 
Table 4.1. ETOPS ignificant Systems as taken from FAA AC 120-42 
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ATA CHAPTER ATA ETOPS SIGNIFICANT SYSTEM 
SECTION 
49 
-11 Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) 
Airborne 
-13 APU Mounts 
Auxiliary 
-14 APU Harness 
Power 
-15 APU Air Intake 
-16 APU Drains and Vents 
-21 APU Engine 
-27 APU and Generator Lubrication Systems 
-31 APU Fuel System 
-41 APU Ignition/Starting System 
-51 APU Cooling Air System 
-53 APU Surge Bleed System 
-61 APU Control System 
-71 APU Exhaust Gas Temperature Indicating 
System 
-81 APU Exhaust System 
All Engine Chapter-Section items are 
ETOPS significant EXCEPT those listed below: 
70-79 77-31 Airborne Vibration Monitoring (AVM) System 
Engines 78-31 Thrust Reverser System 
78-34 Thrust Reverser Control System 
Table 4.1. ETOPS Significant Systems (continued) 
Oil Consumption Monitoring Programm : It is required that oil consumption rates of all engines, 
APU's included, are monitored not only for ETOPs flight but all flights. 
AC 120-42 and IL 20 require the monitoring of all engine oil consumption on both a short term and 
long term basis. It is in my opinion that the consumption of oil is an indication of an engines internal 
condition and the practice should be not only for ETOPs operation but also for all operations. The 
anticipatory action of recognising a trend of increasing oil consumption can result in investigationary 
action that could prevent a significant failure. Short term oil consumption will detect immediate high 
rates of consumption, i. e. from flight to flight and the maintenance manual for that aircraft and 
engine will define what oil consumption is acceptable. 
For example the B737-NG maintenance manual 71-00-00-800-806 defines that 0.4 quarts per hour 
is a level of oil consumption for the CFM56-7B engine that is acceptable, while 0.8 quarts per hour 
requires investigation, and 0.85 quarts per hour requires aircraft grounding. 
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When monitoring the oil consumption rate you must be careful to take into consideration the 
accuracy of the recording of the oil uplift. e. g. the maintenance technician might not service the oil 
until the level is below the sight gauge thus requiring perhaps two quarts to get the level up to the 
full level line, thus the oil consumption might appear to have jumped to a high level all of a sudden, 
while another maintenance technician might service the oil when the sight gauge shows mid way 
between the refill line and the full line, thus not indicating such a dramatic consumption. This is why 
it is prudent to plot the uplift over a period of time to smooth out the peaks. Nso the uplift record 
may say I quart when in fact only 0.5 quarts were used. It is not always easy for the maintenance 
technician to detail the exact amount of oil used to service the engine as no exact measuring 
equipment is used in the servicing task. By separating the short term immediate consumption from 
the longer term plotted consumption you can allow for the inaccuracies of recording. 
Oil consumption monitoring is in my opinion an essential activity required to take place within the 
maintenance programme to identify non evident events that could lead to failures. This way 
maintenance actions can take place to avoid not only in flight engine failures but also resulting 
costly engine repairs. 
To follow is an example of a medium / long term consumption chart for the CFM56-7B engine. 
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. 
lg. Pos. / SIN May Jun 
lia7571 ll 1 
. 
50 50 16 
otal Fl. Hrs Eng. 1 833 
L 
53.59 
Zonsmnp. M. Hr. 0ý Oý 4 .2 0.30 
2W4722 11.50 19.00 
otal FI. Hrs Eng. 2 48.33 53.59 
-ortsurnp. fn. Hr. 0.24 0.35 
: onsump. M. Hr. (Rolling a 
APU/P-5327 0.00 0.50 
Total Hrs APU 43.00 
: onsumi). /OP. Hr. 0.00 0.01 
Oil uplift follow up Aircraft A6-AIIN 
Year: 2002 
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
15.50 32.50 17.50 24.30 13.50 12.00 
53.91 114.59 69.08 98.25 53.91 53.58 
0.29 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.22 
mae over 6 Months) 0.27 0.27 0.26 
17.50 31.50 19.50 24.20 14.50 13.00 
53.91 114.59 69.08 98.25 53.91 53.58 
0.32 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.24 
ge over 6 Months) 0.28 0.28 0.27 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
95.70 40.70 76.80 76.00 42.00 76.40 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AS-AIN Oil Consumption 
Year: 2003 
Jan. Feb Mar Apr 
21.20 17.50 10.00 11.50 Total Oil upIr 
91.67 78.33 46 54 
0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 
0.25 0.24 0.23 0.23 
21.70 17.50 11.00 12.50 Total Oil upIr 
91.67 78.33 46 54 
0.24 0.22 0.24 0.23 
0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24 
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 Total Oil uph: 
55.70 84.5 76.1 75.9 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
0.40 
0.30 E 
0.20 
0 0.10 
0 0.00 
Month s Eng. 1 
-a- Eng. 21 
May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan. Feb Mar Apr 
Note that the Y axes is consumption in quarts (US quarter of gallons). AJso note that the 6 month 
rolling average is used to smooth out the peaks of oil uplift. This method is also used not only for 
engines but also APU's. Note that care should be taken when comparing oil consumption. Ensure 
the same units of measure are being used. Different manufacturers can use different units of 
measure. 
Engine Condition Monitoring Proqramme: ECM is to detect the deterioration of engines at an earl 
ýiýe. 
ECIVI is to ensure that trends or exceedances are monitored and acted upon before they become 
airworthiness issues resulting in failures or costly repairs. It is in my opinion necessary to conduct 
ECM not only for ETOPs operation but for normal operations. Again it is an essential activity with in 
the maintenance programme that can identify events that would often go undetected early enough 
to allow investigation to take place that could correct a non standard condition before a significant 
failure occurs possibly resulting in engine failure or costly repairs. 
Significant engine parameters that should be monitored with in the ECM programme are.. 
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Exhaust Gas Temperature EGT. A rise in EGT may well be identified by the flight crew, but only 
usually if it is an exceedance, upward trend of increasing EGT can be identified by ECM and a 
possible problem can be investigated prior to a failure occurrence. Short term EGT increases can 
be attributed to faulty crew actions or procedures as well as defective systems or components, 
while medium or long-term trend increases can be the result of potential failures such as, engine 
fuel management faults, engine bleed air valve faults or just EGT probe faults. 
Engine Low Pressure Fan Speed N 1. A fluctuation in NI again as with EGT may well be identified 
by the crew if an exceedance takes place, but regular non exceedances; or upward trends will be 
detected by ECM of this parameter. NI fluctuation could result from engine fuel management faults 
or NI speed sensor faults. 
Other parameters to be monitored are Engine High Pressure fan Speed N2, 'Fuel Flow, Oil 
Temperature, Oil Pressure, Engine Vibration. By monitoring trends from these parameters an 
indication of the health of the engine internals can be determined and with investigation of noticed 
trend increases as opposed to one of fluctuations, maintenance actions can be planned ahead thus 
preventing in operation failures or even expensive failure repairs. 
ECM parameters can now a days be downloaded directly from the aircraft while in flight through 
ACARS (Aircraft Communication and Reporting System) and transmitted through SATCOM 
(Satellite Communication) to the ECM ground station, downloaded directly into a software 
programme that will plot the parameters immediately live and show data and trends while the 
aircraft flies. 
The activity of ECM in my opinion should be carried out on all operations even if it is not the 
ACARS method but a simple crew form filling in process while at cruise. (Automatic recording of 
engine parameters has a large advantage over manual methods as it may not be possible due to 
pilot work load and the criticality of the stage of flight to ask for take off and landing engine data to 
be monitored by form filling). This way the non evident potential failure modes of the engine 
internals can be monitored before a resulting failure occurs. 
Maintenance on Multiple Sygtems: Avoiding maintenance on dual systems at the same time by the 
same maintenance crew (such as engine 1& engine 2). This practice can avoid the same wrong 
process being accomplished on two essential ETOPs systems at the same time. 
IDENTICAL MAINTENANCE ON SIMILAR SYSTEMS 
Identical maintenance action to multiple similar elements in ETOPS significant systems 
should not be undertaken nor should it be practiced on non ETOPs systems. Identical 
maintenance action to multiple similar elements is defined as the same task (i. e., repair, 
replacement, or disassembly) being performed on more than one of similar systems during 
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the same maintenance visit, and on the same component. Engine-driven components are 
considered equivalent, consequently the replacement of such components in any combination 
on both engines qualifies as an identical maintenance action. Examples of the above would 
include: removal of both engine oil filters or both chip detectors, and replacement of both 
IDGs, EDPs, or replacement of the #1 IDG and the #2 EDP. 
NOTE. Servicing of fluids and gases is not considered multiple maintenance action. 
To aviod the situation occuring Scheduled Maintenance on multiple, similar systems should 
be scheduled by the Maintenance and Engineering Planning section so that tasks will be 
performed during different check packages or different phases of phased checks. 
Routine line checks should be staggered to prevent maintenance action from being performed 
on both systems at the same time. If, through some non-routine cause or on a time when 
multiple actions do occur, the following should apply: 
a. Different technicians / engineers will perform the maintenance on the similar 
systems. 
b. The work will be certified by an independent inspector; or 
C. A verification of the systems (as will be detailed in the following section 
Resolution of Aircrfat Discrepencies) will be accomplished to ensure system 
integrity. 
If the Maintenance and Engineering Planning section do schedule similar system 
maintenance tasks or identify that an issued task could result in similar system maintenance, 
that task card should be marked as "Similar System Maintenance". It is then the responsibility 
of the Maintenance Personnel to be aware that if he violates the similar system rule he must 
comply with the conditions to ensure system integrity after the task is carried out. This also 
leads to the importance of correct and clear technical authorship detailing that the system 
violated has undergone confirnation of system integrity through an appropraite and adiquate 
maintenance manual test. 
This issue of separating in time similar system maintenance tasks as a preference to same 
task at the same time but with different technicians and inspectors is an issue argued over many 
times. It is my opinion that whenever possible the separation of the tasks accomplishment to 
ensure the similar system violation takes place at separate points in time with several operating 
cycles and hours between the task accomplishment is a much preferred option than using separate 
maintenance staff only, for the following reasons (using the engine oil filter change as an 
example).... 
Engine I oil filter is changed by technician number 1 and certified by inspector number 1, 
while Engine 2 oil filter is changed by technician number 2 and inspected by inspector number 2. 
The different crew works both engines on at the exact same time. This reduces largely the risk of 
the same error by the same technician and inspector being followed over on to both engines, but 
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the risk can be reduced further by conducting the tasks at different scheduled points in time 
because, both technician number I and number 2 may consult each other on how to do the task 
thus swapping errors. Technician number 1 and number 2 will refer to the exact same maintenance 
manual procedure effective for that point in time, which may be wrong or unclear. Technician 
number I and number 2 will use the exact same tools on the exact same day, which may be faulty 
or if requiring calibration inaccurate. Technician number 1 and number 2 will use the material kits 
preloaded on the same day probably from the same batch of receipts, which may contain the same 
defective material. 
So by scheduling similar system maintenance tasks at the same point in time but by using 
different maintenance staff you are only removing the human factor contributing to the risk, but by 
scheduling the tasks at different points in time and if any of the errors mentioned do occur you have 
created a stagger in time where it is less probable that a failure induced by the errors mentioned do 
occur at the exact same flight or point in time in the future, thus giving time to react to correct any 
maintenance, tool or material error and reducing the risk of multiple failures at the same time on 
similar systems. 
It is my opinion that this ETOPs standard practice is the most relevant for use in all 
standard aircraft maintenance practices when carrying out Line maintenance, whether ETOPs, 
propeller, twin or four engine aircraft. The first step of making the maintenance staff aware of the 
similar system maintenance by marking the task card "Similar System Maintenance" is the first 
crucial step. To stop here would be an improvement by reducing the human factor risk element, but 
to physically separate the tasks is reducing the risk that bit more. Some examples of how to 
separate the similar system tasks is as follows... 
B737-700 / CFM56-7B Maintenance Schedule. 
Task 79-010-01 
-00 Change Engine No I Oil Supply Filter. 
Task 79-010-02-00 Change Engine No 2 Oil Supply Filter. 
Both tasks have an interval of 12 months are would neatly fit into the 2A Check maintenance input. 
It is easy for the Maintenance and Engineering Planning section to plan to accomplish both tasks 
and all other tasks at the 2A 12 month maintenance input. But equally since the B737 maintenance 
schedule also has a6 month IA Check maintenance input all the engine number I tasks could be 
separated from the engine number 2 tasks and accomplished on the 1A check input and 
subsequently repeated every 12 months on the 3A, 5A 7A etc, while the engine number 2 tasks 
accomplished on the 2A, 4A, 6A etc. AJI that is lost is 6 months from the life of engine number one's 
tasks that need to be accomplished early to establish the stagger. A more complex example of 
separating similar system tasks is... 
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Task 72- 010-01 
-00 Inspect the Magnetic Chip Detectors (MCD) for evidence of debris build up on 
engine No. 1. 
Task 72- 010-02-00 Inspect the Magnetic Chip Detectors for evidence of debris build up on engine 
No. 2. 
Both tasks have to be accomplished every 250 flight hours and are not aligned to any scheduled 
maintenance input but are controlled as "out of phasd' and complied with just prior to, but as close 
to as possible, their due time on an opportunity basis. The adoption of the similar system 
maintenance stagger in this case may result in the introduction of some additional co-ordination 
and even perhaps some additional downtime, as the tasks interval does not lend itself to the easy 
allocation of the task to a maintenance input, so they should be done on an opportunity basis, 
perhaps on a night stop or during a daily check when they are close to falling due. The MCD 
example is a very good task to look at. It is a simple task taking only 10 minutes to remove the 
MCD that is very accessible through an access flap in the bottom of the engine cowl, remove the 
MCD inspect it, and reinstall it. The appeared trivial nature of such a task lends its self to 
complacency. This task is a violation of a very significant engine system, the oil system, loss of oil 
through the incorrect installation would result in engine shut down and may not become apparent 
until the aircraft is in flight. 
There are at least three famous occasions when this simple task was incorrectly carried out on all 
the engines of an aircraft resulting in oil loss to both engines and in one occasion to the four 
engines of a four engined aircraft. On a four engined aircraft it would be good practice to exercise 
separation of the tasks in pairs of engines rather than for all engines. For example engine 1 and 3 
could be accomplished together and engine 2 and 4. Thus at no time are both engines on the same 
wing violated. The reason I propose going that step further than just identifying and using separate 
technicians is based largely on what has happened in the past with the MCD task. On one 
occasion the MCD's were removed, sent to a laboratory for inspection, and new MCD's installed. 
The MCD's have a single 0 ring seal on their shaft, it was the practice for many years that the 
newly supplied MCD's were prepared by stores for the technician to immediately install, i. e. the o 
rings were already fitted to the new MCD. On one occasion this process changed and the new 
supplied MCD's did not have the o ring pre installed on the MCD shaft. The technician was not 
aware of this new practice and did as he always did, remove four MCD's, take them to the stores 
for shipment to the lab, and get four back and immediately install them. Not having the o ring 
installed was not sufficient to show an oil leak during the engine motoring run, but on take off role 
and after take off the oil loss was sufficient enough to give the flight crew four engine oil pressure 
warnings which were substantial enough to cause four in-flight shut downs. My opinion here is that 
even by having two inspectors or technicians carrying out the tasks on the different engines, this 
error could have still occurred. But by separating the task in engine pairs, the pilot would have been 
faced with only two engine IFSD's on this occasion. My point is that the human error aspect 
contributing to the failures is only one of a few possibilities, by separating the tasks the other 
contributing possibilities can have reduced risk. 
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For those who do not wish to incur the additional co-ordination and perhaps in some way the 
additional cost of separating similar system tasks where either they are not following ETOPs 
practices or are using the different technician and inspector procedure, I would encourage that they 
re consider and perhaps compromise with the splitting of what I see as the four vital similar system 
tasks.... 
1. Fuel System violations: for example filter changes or fuel nozzle inspections. 
2. Oil System violations: for example filter changes or MCD inspections. 
3. Ignition System violations: for example plug changes or harness changes 
4. Boroscope Inspections: This will involve internal inspection of the engine via some access hole 
or through ignition plugs or fuel nozzles. 
By at least avoiding similar system violation with regards to these four areas on line maintenance 
activities I believe the risk of similar system concurrent failure will be largely reduced. On major 
maintenance inputs it is difficult to avoid similar system violations, but in such cases adequate final 
function tests should be carried out to ensure the revalidation of violated systems. This may in 
some cases require full power engine runs or even a flight test. 
Resolution of Aircraft Discregancies: Significant Systems to ETOPs should be monitored for 
reliability and defects. Any reports / defects on these significant systems should be thoroughly 
resolved and documented. Corrective action should include the precise verification that the system 
is returned to its proper airworthy condition or at least a precise detail of the maintenance tasks 
carried out during the investigation of the report. This approach should not be conducted only for 
ETOPs system events but for all systems. 
The addressing of pilot reports or defects by maintenance staff involves a methodical investigation 
process. Manufacturers produce a variety of troubleshooting aids on modem jet aircraft such as the 
following... 
Fault Codes identified in the aircraft management computer maintenance page. These fault codes 
can be entered directly into the Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) where troubleshooting procedures will 
be detailed and if followed will result in the root cause of the symptom being discovered. Though 
the FIM gives details of troubleshooting the maintenance procedures remain to be detailed in the 
maintenance manual, MM. The MM is always the authoritative manual to detail non, routine 
maintenance tasks. 
On going system and component self test using Built in Test Equipment (BITE) for critical systems. 
These test often activated on the controlling system computer, can identify if the system or 
computer is in a serviceable mode. 
It is essential that the exact work steps taken are detailed in the maintenance documentation, either 
the Technical Log or the Non Routine Card. This will allow the complete defect history and action 
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taken to be saved to history for future reference or to assist in the study of ongoing problems. This 
aspect of maintenance, i. e. correct and detailed action recording has been examined in "ETOPs 
Training Programmd" paragraph e mentioned previously. The technical writing skills of the 
investigating technician / engineer is essential to effective root cause analysis of faults and defects. 
An example of a Technical Log entry with rectification / resolution details is as follows 
PREP 1. A defect resulting in repair / resolution confirmation. 
Pilot Rei)ort:: Defect / SyrnDtom. 
Automatic Direction Finding ADF 1 audio intermittent. 
Rectification action 1: 
CB on P1 8-1 cycled. Reports will be monitored further. 
Rectification action 2: 
ADF system audio test FIM TASK 34-57-00-810-806 referred to. AMM TASK 34-57- 
00-730-801 p501 carried out audio test. Audio test found not satisfactory. FIM step F 
captains flight inter phone speaker test carried out refer to AM 23-51 task 805. Capt 
flight inter phone failed test, subsequent replacement of same inter phone carried out 
iaw AMM TASK 34-57-00-730-801 p5011 removal & AMM TASK 34-57-00-730-801 
p5011 installation. Repair confirmation FIM 23-51 task 805 step G carried out 
successfully. Defect rectified. 
Rectification action 1 does not involve detailed trouble shooting and does not involve evidence of a 
methodological approach. While Rectification action 2 not only clearly follows the FIM process 
detailing the exact methodological process carried out by the maintenance technician / engineer, it 
also gives conformation of rectification and defect resolution at the end of the action details. This is 
a good example of a well trouble shot and written defect action rectification. 
PREP 2. A defect resulting in no confirming repair action. 
Pilot Report: Defect / Soptom. 
While on taxi after landing, rudder pedals does not move freely, requires more than 
normal force to obtain same output. 
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Rectification action 1: 
Rudder pedals inspected for obstacles, none found and rudder hinge lubricated. 
Rectification action 2: 
Rudder Does Not Move Freely 
- 
Fault Isolation task 27-21-00-810-807 referred to and 
step 7 c, Ia through to h rudder travel check carried out. All found normal, fault 
identified as intermittent. Defect cleared, will monitor for further occurrence. 
Rectification action 1 does not tell you the troubleshooting process carried out and can not be used 
in future re arising of the symptom as assistance in the trouble shooting process. While 
Rectification action 2 details the exact FIM reference and the subsequent steps carried out. Even 
though the action does not result in exact resolution, this can be used in future to build upon if the 
event re occurs. The second action is clear and uses a methodological process detailed well on the 
maintenance documentation. 
Pilot reports of discrepancies is one aspect of defect rectification, another aspect are defects found 
during scheduled maintenance, i. e. the carrying out of the fault finding maintenance programme 
task. Remember that the point of carrying out the maintenance programme tasks is to detect 
potential failures. 
Maintenance Schedule Task 1. 
Routine Task 53-110-00-00 General Visual Inspection of the Galley to Floor Attachment. 
Resulting in the following.. 
Non Routine Card 1. 
Corrosion found. Attachments placed in accordance with maintenance manual chapter 53. 
Non Routine Card 2. 
Corrosion found when carrying out Task Card 53-11 O-Oo-oo on Galley 4 attachment forward 
inboard & forward outboard. FWd I/B attachment corrosion removed & found to be surface 
corrosion, damage within limits reference SRM 53-25-00, no further action required. 
Fwd O/B attachment corrosion gone beyond limits in SRM 53-25-00. Attachment replaced law 
AMM 53-25-20-200-800. 
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In an MSG-3 maintenance programme it is imperative that non routine findings are noted and 
considered in detail. The Non Routine Card is the vehicle for detailing what is found when 
conducting the routine task. Without clear and precise technical authorship it is not known if the 
findings should result in the reduction or increase of a maintenance tasks depth of inspection or 
interval of inspection. NRC 1 is a very bad example of little detail from what is a corrosion finding. 
From this it is not known the depth or significance of corrosion or even where the corrosion has 
occurred. But from NRC 2a clear and exact detail of what was found and the subsequent 
investigation is detailed well. It gives us a good indication of what was found and where exactly it 
was found. From NRC 2 we know that this task is doing its job and resulting in findings. 
Maintenance Schedule Task 2. 
Routine Task 24-100-00-00 Check Engine #1 Integrated Drive Generator Oil level & Service as 
Required. 
Resulting in the following.. 
Non Routine Card 1. 
I DG serviced to full mark law 24-13-21-21-600-801. 
Non Routine Card 2. 
Engine #1 IDG oil level checked law task 24-100-00-00 & found below"service line"on sight 
gauge. 1.25 quarts of oil added law AMM 12-13-21-600-801. 
NRC I tells us by implication that the task found the IDG low on oil so required servicing. It even 
confirms that the technician used the correct procedure. But NRC 2 tells us much more and gives 
us the oil required to service the IDG to full, 1.25 qts. This allows us to know that the oil 
consumption of the IDG was not so much that it went below the minimum line, but only to the 
service line. Also by knowing the oil uplift at this time, we can monitor next scheduled inspection 
results to see if the next uplift is the same amount or less and then be able to calculate the 
consumption over the hours flown sine the last check. 
Both these examples of PIREPs and NRC*s show the importance of good technical authorship 
when a technician or engineer is writing up a report or finding and their rectification action. It is not 
only imperative for an IVISG-3 based maintenance programme to get good clear detailed feedback, 
but it is also imperative for any maintenance process that maintenance actions and defect 
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rectification are carried out to approved procedures and detailed clearly and that findings are 
confirmed found and confirmed rectified. Getting to the Root Cause of a defect is imperative to 
finding the correct and appropriate resolution and good maintenance records can lead to the 
Maintenance Programme becoming more effective and applicable. This is not only applicable to an 
ETOPs operations but to every aspect of maintenance engineering. Of course the eloquent writing 
of a technician does not guarantee that the root cause of the defect has been found and the correct 
rectification action has been carried out, but what it does do is documents the action taken by the 
technician and allows for a clear record to be referred to later if the defect reoccurs. What will result 
in the root cause rectification of the defect is correct and adequate training of the technician on the 
type or aircraft and its systems and also in the use of documents available to him to assist him in 
his research and trouble shooting. 
To resolve that a defect has been cleared it may be necessary to carry out a full function check of 
the system to ensure that the action taken by the technician has resulted in complete resolution of 
the defect. This will be detailed in the appropriate maintenance manual, but the technician may 
wish to conduct full function tests of the system in the same environment that the defect occurred. 
This may not be possible on the ground. Most of the time any defect resolution can be confirmed by 
full function checks on the ground, such as powered engine runs, hydraulic pressurisation tests and 
so one, but for defects such as hydraulic pressurisation module freezing when the aircraft is at cold 
soak, can not be confirmed rectified or reproduced on the ground. This type of defect rectification 
requires resolution action confirmation by getting the same environment reproduced to see if the 
fault is solved or reoccurs. Hence a verification flight would be required. 
Many aspects are involved in the confinned resolution of defects rectification 
1. Adequate technical training of the technician to enable understanding of the aircraft and 
systems. 
2. Adequate training for the technician in the use of the manuals available to assist him in his 
trouble shooting. 
3. Adequate training of the technician in how to conduct technical writing. Ensuring clear and 
accurate referencing of maintenance activities and tasks. 
4. Correct understanding of the technician on how to confirm that the maintenance action he has 
conducted will result in confirmed resolution of the defect. His ability to understand when further 
verification is required. 
5. An adequate reliability and defect monitoring system paying attention to all PIREPs and NRC*s 
assisting the technician in his trouble shooting and monitoring for further reporting on 
subsequent operations. 
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Interchanqeabilitv of Components 
Swapping components between ETOPS airplanes similar primary systems for troubleshooting 
purposes (e. g., installing #1 Enigne Electronic Control Unit (EECU) in the #2 EECU location 
to ascertain if a problem is with the #2 EECU or further up the system) is not recommended. 
In those cases where similar components are swapped, positive verification of system as 
described in the previouse section, is required for both systems. 
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4.2 Low Utilisation Implications for an Aircraft Maintenance Programme. 
4.2.1 Low Utilisation: An Introduction. 
When an aircraft manufacture decides to build a new aircraft type it is only after a lot of industry 
research which will involve talking to operators on what size of aircraft they need, with what range, 
how many seats, and with what anticipated utilisation, where are the likely geographical locations, 
what will the runways be like. Al these parameters combine to identify the role of the new aircraft. 
The anticipated role will influence all aspects of the design and certification process. 
When an operator wishing to use the new aircraft for a role that is not consistent with the initial 
conceptual role such as... 
A Japanese airline used B747's for short range high passenger density flights, when the B747 was 
conceptually designed for long haul flights. 
An Indian airline took a A320 and operated it to remote landing strips that were not constructed with 
the same material as national airports. 
A B737 was fitted with auxiliary fuel tanks to give it a range twice of its design range to conduct long 
range flights while this aircraft was designed for short haul hops. 
The scenario we will explore in this thesis is the use of airliners to conduct occasional in frequent 
flights to almost any location in the world. The term Low Utilisation is used to describe such 
operations, where it is a B747-400 flying once every 30 days or a B737-700 flying 800 flight hours 
per year. This scenario is often seen in the Charter World where aircraft are utilised only in the 
holiday season or in the Government or VIP world where the objective for the aircraft is to be ready 
on call for occasional personal transportation of a person or family at short notice. 
4.2.2 Low Utilisation: Maintenance Implications. 
As touched on in section 2.2.1, the definitions of responsibility for the Private Category Operator 
has not been defined in the JAKs. Pending JAR OPS 2 is suppose to be the regulatory vehicle 
that will define the requirements and will be available with in the next year, while the FAA FAR 91 
defines for US registered aircraft the responsibilities for the private category operator. Very often 
the Low Utilisation operation is also private category. At the start of the IVIRB process some 
assumptions are made by the board. These assumptions are normally predominantly operational 
assumptions such as the following... 
1. Operators average annual flight hour utilisation. 
2. Operators average annual cycle utilisation. 
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3. Operators average hours per sector. 
Form these operator inputs a range of usage parameters can be established. Of course the 
marketing and operations departments of the airlines who have or are intending to purchase the 
new aircraft type have done their home work and identified routes and usage parameters prior to 
the start of the IVIRB process. These parameters may be quite different from one operator to 
another and largely depend upon the aircraft range and capacity. For example..... 
For a narrow body 200 passenger seater aircraft one airline may intend to use it as a Glasgow to 
London shuttle. Going up and down the UK all day as often as possible. While another operator 
may use the aircraft as a charter aircraft to fly from Glasgow to Malaga and back once only every 
day except Sundays and the occasional holiday. 
This means the operators described above will have the following parameters.. 
Operator 1: 8 flights per day, 1 hours flights, 365 days per year. 
Operator 2: 4 flights per day, 2 hour flights 300 days per year. 
Normal Operators Possible Utilisation Parameters for a Narrow Body Short Haul Aircraft. 
Operator 1. Operator 2. 
Operators average annual 2920 flight hours 2400 flight hours 
flight hour utilisation 
Operators average annual 2920 flight cycles 1200 flight cycles 
cycle utilisation 
Operators average hours per I flight hour/ cycle 2 flight hours / cycle 
sector 
These assumed operating parameters along with others such as continuous landing on hard paved 
runways in national and international airports, using recognised ground handling agents and 
fuelling companies all will play a part in the IVIRB process when selecting maintenance tasks and 
intervals. 
Differing largely from these assumptions may mean the MRBR is not completely an applicable 
maintenance schedule for the aircraft. For example the system maintenance significant items (MSI) 
assume constant usage and so does the structural significant items (SSI). The consideration to 
infrequent usage and its effects on the systems and components have net been applied to the 
MRBR in most cases. Also for the SSI*s the consideration are to operating in a constant 
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environment under constant use, where possible passing personnel traffic could result in accidental 
damage, with an other type of used these implications may not be relevant. 
Low Utilisation Operators Possible Utilisation Parameters for a Narrow Body Short Haul 
Aircraft. 
, 
Operator 1. An aircraft used to transport the executive board members of a major company to the 
firms International facilities. 
Operator 2. A presidential aircraft used to transport a VIP occasionally to international meetings. 
Operator 1. Operator 2. 
Operators average annual 700 flight hours 300 flight hours 
flight hour utilisation 
Operators average annual 250 flight cycles 100 flight cycles 
cycle utilisation 
Operators average hours per 2.8 flight hour / cycle 3 flight hours / cycle 
sector 
The direct maintenance implications for Low Utilisation Operator 1 and 2 could be 
1. Is the aircraft always fully fuelled ready to dispatch? 
This may mean consideration to the water build up in the tasks and would mean addition 
maintenance tasks. Aso frequent Biocidal treatment to prevent the build up of fungus or bacteria in 
the fuel tanks causing corrosion. Aso the stress on fully loaded tanks parked does that require 
consideration contributing to fuel leaks and other aspects. If it isn't always full can the sealant in the 
tanks with stand the environment or will they perish? 
2. Is the water system always full? 
This could mean fungal or bacterial build up. If not it could mean dry tanks & seals that could 
perish. 
3. Is the aircraft stored in a hanger when not operating? ' 
This could mean a less harsh environment that was considered when the corrosion and structural 
programme was devised. If the aircraft is hangared constantly then the environmental effects will be 
very different from those of an airliner? 
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4. Is the aircraft handled on the ground by specialist handlers or the same as those that airlines 
use? 
This will largely affect the accidental damage ratings that are influenced by the banging and large 
personnel traffic of international airline ground handling companies. Perhaps the handling agents of 
such low utilisation companies are more careful and the personnel traffic is much less. 
5. Many lubricating system require the system to be in operation to be able to lubricate? 
By low utilisation the systems that are normally lubricated frequently are now not. The sumps will 
contain the oil while the bearings and seals will be open to the atmosphere of the system. Perhaps 
some systems require more frequent lubricating or operational testing to get the oils flowing? 
6. Is a MRBR task is to be done at 3000 flight hours? This may be 30 years for a low utilisation 
aircraft, is this acceptable? 
The MRB process will be looked at closer in the next section taking into' consideration the 
adjustments of intervals if required, if a factor of calendar usage is a valid consideration for the 
reduction or extension on task intervals. But what can be seen by considering the operating cycle 
of the Low Utilisation aircraft is that conditions and environment can be very different from the 
airliner, so to just adopt the airliner maintenance philosophy and maintenance schedule would not 
be correct, but to factor in the Low Utilisation implications of long periods of non usage, of specialist 
handling at special VIP terminals, of possible exposure of structure to a controlled environment, as 
well as others would be a necessary requirement in my opinion. It is my opinion that any aircraft 
operating out side the "normal" operating parameters of the intended design should be subjected to 
a proper Low Utilisation Maintenance Implication review and this should start with the review of the 
MRBR process and the MSG3 analysis. 
4.2.3 Low Utillsation Adjustments to The MSG3 Process. 
Boeing Document D626AOOI the Manufacturers Maintenance Planning Data, derived from the 
MRBR, for the B737NG details that any operation less than 100 flight hours per months or 1200 
flight hours per year should consider following a low utilisation maintenance programme. Other 
Boeing and Airbus maintenance planning documents also give the operating parameters that were 
assumed by the MRBR. It has been the practice in the past that when an operator wished to use an 
aircraft for missions that do not meeting the operating parameters detailed in the MRBR / MPD to 
adjust the maintenance schedule tasks from their usage based intervals to those of a calendar 
based interval. For example tasks with an interval of 5000 flight hours intervals, usage based, 
would have been converted to 3 years intervals. The concept being assume a utilisation of 1000 
flight hours per year it would be 5 years at the most for a 1000 flight hour per year low utilisation 
operation or even 10 years for a 500 flight hour low utilisation operation to meet the task interval 
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requirements. While normal operations were conducting the tasks at around 3 year or less 
intervals. 
This approach of simply converting scheduled maintenance task intervals from one usage 
parameter to a calendar parameter, say from flight hours to years or months, is completely wrong 
and completely contradicts the intention of the RCM / MSG3 process of deciding on effective and 
applicable intervals to conduct scheduled maintenance tasks. What applicability at all does doing a 
scheduled maintenance task that has come out of the RCM / MSG3 process to be accomplished 
every 5000 flights hours at 3 years? The RCM / MSG3 process has identified that that Maintenance 
Significant Item or Structural Significant Item (MSI or SSI), is a function of flight hour usage. 
imagine the low utilisation operator at 3 years has only flown 2000 flight hours and he is conducting 
maintenance tasks for 5000 flight hours? All he achieves by doing so is the disturbance of stable 
airworthy systems and components and introduces an activity that in itself can be destructive and 
invasive. it is my opinion that such Low Utilisation calculators that massively reduce the task 
intervals, that have been applied in the past, are not appropriate and can not be classified as 
applicable and effective maintenance tasks. 
What I will achieve and attempt to describe in this section of the thesis is the possibility of two 
methods, where the low utilisation implications of an operation can be taken into direct 
consideration I the RCM / MSG3 process by the following... 
Method 1. Where the airliner MRBR is taken as is and the low utilisation implications are applied to 
the MRBR MSI*s and SSI's and adjustments made where appropriate. 
- 
Method 2. Where the RCM / MSG3 process takes place all over again with the assumption 
parameters detailed in the MRB hand Book, established from the very beginning that take into 
consideration the low utilisation operation parameters. 
The selection of which method is to be used may be based on a cost implication, but it is my 
opinion when an aircraft is marketed for a low utilisation operation, method 2 should be applied, but 
when the product is adapted for a low utilisation method 1 may suffice. It should be also realised 
that the out come of the RCM / IVISG3 process, the MRBR is only one part of the value of 
conducting the IVIRB process, that other part is the think tank that is established where operators 
and manufacturers and authorities get together to decide on maintenance policies for the whole 
world, at what other times does this ever happen? 
Looking closer at Method 1. 
The B737-6001700/800 and CFM56-7B Maintenance Review Board Report was issued on 7th July 
1997 and approved by the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Canada (TC) and 
the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA). The report was produced using the Air Transport Association's 
Maintenance Programme Development Document MSG3 Revision 2, dated 12 Sept 1993. 
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Section 1 of the report is the introduction detailing the rules of the programme. Paragraph 10 of 
section I states... 
uThe intervals for tasks identified in this MRB Report are based on normal utilisation. Operators 
deviating substantially below a normal type utilisation (less than 100 flight hours per month per 
aircraft) should consider application and employment of a "Low Utillsation "programme based on 
calendar time. " 
Section 1-4 goes on to state 
" The MRB Report applies to the basic Boeing Model 737-60017001800 aircraft. The following 
average utilisation for 737-60017001800 operator is., 
8.0 flight hours per day 
1.4 flight hours per flight cycle. ff 
What Boeing (and since this is a Boeing produced FAA endorsed document, also the FAA) are 
suggesting here is the transferring of the MSI and SSI tasks, that have been subject to in-depth 
analysis and review, from their applicable task interval parameters to a possibly non applicable task 
interval and parameter. Further more how Boeing now stated the average utilisation of the 
B737600/700/800, at the stage of the MRBR being produced is surprising as it is not yet in 
operation at that time. In fact Boeing have used an anticipated utilisation that does not really bring 
any technical bearing to the task of defining maintenance tasks and their intervals. The pure RCM / 
MSG3 philosophy is to identify a task and interval that is effective and applicable based on actual 
in service data and engineering judgement. The introduction and use of these parameters as 
having anything to do with the RCM / MSG3 process is questionable. Further more the introduction 
of the two paragraphs above are almost distractions from what we are trying to achieve with the 
RCM / MSG3 process. But on the other hand the RCM / MSG3 process is progressive and looks to 
in service data and previous assumptions that can be supported by actual data, and to what Boeing 
are trying to do with these two paragraphs is to establish a "normal" operating environment that is 
know already in the industry. The MSG process has been developed from the 1980's by one step 
at a time, with making massive changes to a way of thinking. To deviate immediately from a known 
"normal" utilisation perhaps would be too adventurous. But I would still contest that true RCM / 
MSG3 analysis stands alone on its own merits with out the assumption of a normal utilisation, but it 
would be foolish to think that an aircraft can fly in an airworthy condition with out scheduled 
maintenance for years, and that would be the case for a 10,000 flight cycle task for a 200 flight 
cycle per year operation, 50 years in fact, when "normal" operations are conducting the inspection 
every 19 years. So to apply method 1 to define low utilisation scheduled maintenance task 
intervals to an already established MRBR for a normal operation is not just to say for example... 
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Wrong Method 1A 
The anticipate utilisation is 500 flight hours per year. This equates to around about one quarter of 
the normal utilisation, so all hour and cycle interval scheduled maintenance tasks shall be divided 
by four to obtain their low utilisation interval. 
Wrong Method 1B 
In normal operation the aircraft will fly about 3000 hours per year so if the first significant inspection 
tasks (C Check) are due at 6000 flight hours that equates to 2 years. So all flight hour tasks will be 
translated to calendar by the formulae 3000 flight hours = 12 months, 6000 flight hours = 24 
months etc. 
Both wrong method I's ruin the RCM I MSG3 process that had already taken place. Sadly this is 
the normal practice today in the world of low utilisation. Aircraft classified as low utilisation because 
they fly less than 100 hours per month are forced to apply what is in my opinion, incorrect 
adjustments. 
If Method I style of adapting an already produced MRBR for low utilisation is to be used to try to 
make the most of the RCM / MSG3 philosophy, realising the inherent reliability the following should 
be conducted.... 
Similar to the Maintenance Review Board a group of low utilisation operators should be formed and 
that group though are not the MRB could be called the Low Utilisation Maintenance Advisory 
Board, LUMAB. This group will bring low utilisation operational experience to the process. As 
before with the MRB the manufacturers and OEM should participate. The same lead engineer from 
the manufacturer that co-ordinated the MRB should co-ordinate the LUMAB. Before the process 
starts the LUMAB must undergo an introduction to MRB process and the MSG3 philosophy. They 
must be aware of the structure of the MRBR and the MPD and how it was derived. This is essential 
to ensure the re analysis of the MSI's and SSI's are done with consideration to their origins. The 
LUMAB will now review every task in the MRBR, every MSI and every SSI and apply low utilisation 
analysis of the tasks. Since the MSG3 analysis has taken place the MSI and SSI can be taken as it 
is and the following first level LU questions applied to each task... 
Is this MSI / SSI at ail a function of usage? 
2. Is this MSI / SSI at all a function of calendar time? 
3. Is this MSI / SSI at all a function of its predominant environment? 
4. Is this MSI / SSI at all a function of its style of operation? 
5. Is this MSI / SSI at all a function of its style of handling? 
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(Note a possible short fall of this to start with is that the process would be better placed to start with 
the failure modes rather than the MSI's and SSI*s. This aspect will be dealt with in the summary of 
the method and even further with LU Method 2). 
Fig 4.3 Analysing established MRBR tasks for low utilisation. 
msi Ssi 
Calendar Interval Multiple Interval Usage Interval 
Tas Task 
Q 1. Is Us task at all Q2. Is this task at all 
a fimction of usage? a fimction of 
calendar tinie? 
Action 1. Task 
10 Q3. Is this task at all a function of the Interval 
t 
medominant weratiniz enviromnent? Adjusfinent 
Consideration to yN 
take place. Q4. Is this task at all a fimction of the I 
oneratiniz stvle? , 
Q5. Is this task at all a fimction of the 
handline stvle? 
I 
LU Analysis completed. 
I. Task either has been unchanged or 
2. Task has adjusted interval or 
3. Task has been given multiple intervals or 
4. Task requirements have been developed with LU 
considerations. 
Fig 4.3 
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For aircraft that it is anticipated that the utilisation will not meet the minimum described in the 
MRBR, e. g. for the B737-6/7/800 less then 100 flight hours per month. The above decision flow 
chart must be applied... 
- 
Stop 1: 
Take the MRBR 
. 
Go through every MSI and SSI one at a time go through the decision tree flow 
chartabove. 
Step 2: 
Identify if the task interval for the MSI / SSI is a calendar interval i. e. days, months or years or a 
usage interval, flight hours, landings, engine cycles or a combination of both calendar and usage. 
Follow down the appropriate flow. For a task that has both interval types, calendar and usage this 
means the failure mode has been identified in the MSG3 analysis as a factor of both types of units 
of measure. 
Stop 3: 
Question I or 2 depending upon the branch. Q1 asks if the interval unit of measure is solely 
calendar based, meaning the task will be accomplished regardless of the operating times. Is there 
technical implications or factors that might affect the system or structure in question that should give 
consideration to low utilisation perhaps resulting in a reduction of the calendar interval or an 
inclusion of a usage parameter interval in addition to the calendar? For example MSI 32-200 a 
function check of the manual extension system is required at 18 months with no additional usage 
unit of measure parameter such as landings. So the answer to Q1 here is "Yee consideration 
should be made. During the Action Task Interval Adjustment Consideration all factors will be 
considered, but here we are just identifying that there may be reason for consideration, we are not 
saying it should be adjusted. AYes" answer means this MSI has to be subjected to Actioni. It 
should be noted that the MSG3 analysis that produced the MSI or SSI is thorough and usually will 
identify those failure modes that are dependent on multi unit of measure parameters so especially 
with the case of calendar items Q1, there should not be too many Yes's, Q2 is a different case. 
Q2 asks if the interval unit of measure is solely a factor of usage and should calendar time be 
considered? The original MRBR assumed a rate of utilisation, but still N the failure modes merited it 
multi usage parameters would be considered, but the MRBR did not consider the effects of low 
utilisation, this is why we are re analysing with a LU perspective. In many cases as long as the 
system if being functioned occasionally even rather than frequently, the required internal seal 
lubrication and system exercise will prevent non utilised symptoms from occurring. Exactly when 
can low utilisation become a factor that affects failure modes from occurring, is the difficult area that 
is un clear requiring best engineering judgement if data is unavailable. Here we are considering by 
not functioning the system is it possible that failure symptoms could occur, and would it therefore be 
necessary to introduce the MSI at a calendar interval as well as the usage interval? For example 
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MSI 32-250 calls for an inspection of the wheel brake control linkages every 3000 cycles, with no 
calendar interval. With a utilisation of 150 cycles per year that would mean 20 years before the 
inspection is done, so it would be fair in this case to say "Yes7 to Q2. At this stage it is fine to say 
yes, all this means it will be looked into closer at the next stage. So those MSI's or SSI's that 
resulted in a "Yes" reply for Q1 or Q2 are noted aside for Action I to be applied to them later. 
Note that multiple interval MSI's or SSI's do not need Q1 or Q2 to be asked as the MSG3 process 
has identified already that the failure mode is a factor of both usage and calendar unit of measure. 
These MSI's and SSI's go straight to Question 3 as do all the other MSI's and SSI's even after Q1 
and Q2 have been asked. 
Step 4: 
AM MSI*s or SSI*s regardless of Yes or No replies to Q1 and Q2 and also multiple interval MSI's 
and SSI's must now under go Questions 3,4 and 5. These questions origins are quite different 
from the MSG3 philosophy in that they are considering the operating environment and operating 
style in which the aircraft will be utilised. While Q1 and Q2 are generic to all low utilisation 
operations this part of the LU analysis may be applicable to a certain type of operation and needs 
to be considered differently giving different answers each time. It could be claimed that this aspect 
is the customisation of the programme and this analysis should take place for all operators as a 
maintenance programme is not complete until in operational considerations have taken place. For 
the purpose of this analysis example we will be considering a VIP Operator from a coastal desert 
environment. 
Q3. Is this task at all a function of the predominant operating environment? 
With this question we are recognising that the nature of the environment can have an effect on 
failure modes by shortening the time when the P-F range starts, thus reducing the In service life 
of particular components or systems. On the contrary to this the environment may In fact increase 
the life of the P-F range for example, if the aircraft Is parked in an air conditioned hanger, will this 
delay any possible corrosion? Since this question Is taking into consideration a particular operating 
environment it can not be considered as part of the generic maintenance programme development 
process, but a customisation dependent on the operators predominant operating environment. 
None the less lets proceed. B737NG MRBR MSI 21-010 Replacement of the Air Conditioning Re 
circulation HEPA Filters has been identified as required every 5000 flight hours. Since the aircraft 
in question will be in a high sand and dust environment this MSI is a good candidate for Task 
Interval Adjustment Consideration, so is marked and noted for further analysis later. The operating 
environment also incJudes consideration to runway quality. We will analyse this factor further later. 
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Q4. Is this task at all a function of the operating style? 
All MSI's and SSI*s even if they have already answered "Yee to a previous question must continue 
through the complete decision tree. Question 4 recognises that Low Utilisation operations, often 
operate their aircraft differently from airliners in as much as they have a dedicated small flight crew 
and ground crew that are highly experienced. This question tries to get us to consider if the style of 
operation merits the further analysis and possible adjustment of inspection intervals. This may 
imply with tasks such as B737 NG MRBR MSI 32-270 Visually Check the Brake Wear Indicator 
Pins, where the pilots land long and apply minimum braking. Or the operating policy / style would 
be to land short to exit the runway as fast as possible on all landings. On both scenarios the answer 
would be "Yes". Again at this stage we are only considering if it is a factor and we should analyse 
further. At the next stage we will closer analyse the implications of operating style. 
Q5. Is this task at all a function of the handling style? 
Continuing to apply the questions to all MSI's and SSI's this is the last one to be asked. Here we 
are asking K we should consider adjusting the intervals as a result of how a low utilisation VIP 
operator is handled on the ground. MSG3 analysis considers accidental damage as a resulting 
factor for identifying structural inspection intervals. This is because it is recognised that at terminal 
buildings there are a lot of traffic and baggage handlers manhandling off and on a large amount of 
cases. Is this the case with a low utilisation VIP operation? Perhaps not. So should the inspection 
be considered for adjustment as a result of the different style of ground handling? Again this will be 
further analysed with a variety of approaches and considerations. 
With the three questions in step 4 we are trying to identify those MSI's and SSI's that should be 
analysed further using three possible influences that due to the nature of low utilisation, could result 
In a required change in interval, up or down. This step identifies those MSI's and SSI*s for further 
detailed analysis which will be carried out in step 5. Even if an IVISI has answered Yes twice both 
yes answers should be considered for analysis in their own context. 
Stop 5: 
Step 5 Is Action 1, the consideration of adjusting the MRB allocated interval as a result of the LU 
questions 1,2,3,4 &5 resulting in a Yes answer. Each Yes answer has to be considered in its 
own right. 
Adjustment Consideration: Ql Action 1. 
Is this task at all a function of usage? This question implies that the MRBR calendar interval as it 
stands is not sufficient to ensure the inherent reliability remains in tact with respect to a LU aircraft. 
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A Yes reply means this task must be considered for interval adjustment or task enhancement to 
allow for low utilisation. So what has been decided so far for this calendar interval task as defined 
by the IVIRB should perhaps take into consideration usage. To expand further on this, take B737NG 
MRIBR IVISI 32-200 a function check of the manual extension system required at 18 months with no 
additional usage unit of measure parameter such as landings. So the answer to Q1 here was "Yes" 
consideration should be made for an interval other than the calendar one allocated as a result of 
LU. The reason this task was allocated a Yes reply was that for 18 months on a low utilisation 
aircraft only 270 flight may have occurred, while on the MRBR defined the interval for this MSI at 18 
months they envisaged at least 1000 flights to have occurred. So the question here is not so much 
as should an other unit of measure interval be introduced but should the interval be adjusted with 
the LU in mind, due to the fact that the landing gear had not been functioned as much as a normal 
operation or in deed the contrary was the interval of 18 months selected as a result of failure data 
and lower monthly usage should result in a longer interval? Before this decision is made the 
following questions and reviews should take place... 
QI 
-1. Is there similar system finding or failure data available? 
With this data it can be seen if findings on LU aircraft can support the reduction of the interval or 
indeed support it the other way to remain unchanged or to be increased to a more appropriate 
intervals. Note that the increase in the interval should not be undertaken at the start of the 
programme, but can be at a latter sage once in operational data has been gathered. This issue of 
interval extension will be dealt with in detail later in the thesis. 
So with QI resulting in a Yes answer leading to Q 1-1 where consideration to whether there is 
supporting data or good engineering judgement that will justify the change in interval from the 
original MRBR interval. The change could be either a reduction in the calendar interval to take into 
consideration the low utilisation of the aircraft, an introduction of a usage parameter. Remember 
that to introduce a new parameter than that given by the MRBR is a considerable task, as the 
MSG3 analysis has identified the failure modes as being a function of calendar. Taking the 
example of our Low Utilisation Operators I and 2, as defined at the start of the section, again see 
below, 18 months of flying for Operator 1 is 375 cycles, for Operator 2 150 cycles, while for the 
normal operator 1000 cycles or more. Engineering judgement with Operator 2, who may fly only 8 
times in one month, might be that the interval needs reducing since the system is not operating 
regularly. This would be best done with consultation with the manufacturer and designer of the 
system, who will be able to define the point where LU will start to infringe on the inherent reliability 
of the design. LU Operator 1 will fly around 20 flights per month just less than one every day. 
Engineering judgement may well decide that there is no need for interval adjustment as the LU 
factor in this case does not have a detrimental affect on the system. 
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Operator 1. Operator 2. 
Operators average annual 700 flight hours 300 flight hours 
flight hour utilisation 
Operators average annual 250 flight cycles 100 flight cycles 
cycle utilisation 
Operators average hours per 2.8 flight hour / cycle 3 flight hours / cycle 
sector 
If it is decided that the interval will not be adjusted or it will be adjusted then it is time to go on to the 
next Adjustment consideration resulting from Question 2. Before that happens the decision must be 
noted and recorded. Since some MSI's / SSI's may have resulted in a Yes answer a few times to 
Q1,2,3,4 or 5, the interval adjustment may again be adjusted for other considerations. 
Adjustment Consideration: Q2 Action 1. 
Is this task at all a function of calendar time? This question is the opposite to Q1. This question 
implies that the MRBR usage interval ( flight hours or cycles) as it stands is not sufficient to ensure 
the inherent reliability remains in tact with respect to a LU aircraft. A Yes reply means this task must 
be considered for interval adjustment or task enhancement to allow for low utilisation. So what has 
been decided so far for this usage interval task as defined by the MRB should perhaps take into 
consideration calendar time. To expand further on this, take for example B737NG MRBR MS1 32- 
250 that calls for an inspection of the wheel brake control linkages every 3000 cycles, with no 
calendar interval. With a utilisation of LU Operator 2 100 cycles per year that would mean 30 years 
before the inspection is done. The exact question to be considered here is 
Q2-1. Will reduced usage affect this MSI or SSI thus necessitating the introduction of a calendar 
control such as days or months? 
Using the example given above with exposure to the environment with out the normal usage, the 
linkages could be considered for environmental damage. The Zonal programme should be referred 
to see if this concern is taken care of. So if it can be confirmed that there is a Zonal inspection that 
addresses this concern, then there is no need for the sake of this question to introduce a calendar 
interval, in this case of MSI 32-250 the Zonal inspection is too far into the future, so to rely on that is 
not appropriate. 
This question needs to be looked at closer and followed by other considerations such as.. 
Q2-2 When would a reduction in utilisation from the normal become a concern for the component 
or system this task addresses? 
les 
Boeing define Low Utilisation as anything below 100 flight hours per month, which would be around 
just under 1 flight a day. Using engineering judgement would not in my opinion merit an interval 
adjustment but question 2-2 begs to be asked. This leads to Q2-3 which is in my opinion a more 
appropriate question... 
Q2-3 Would the anticipated utilisation include long periods of non usage, if so should this be 
considered for task interval adjustment? 
Non usage or long periods on non usage of an aircraft is an area that is important to define. If an 
aircraft and its systems are operating regularly, say every two days, but are operating less then 100 
flight hours per months are at less a risk than an aircraft that is operating only a few flights a month. 
There is Low Utilisation then there is Very Low Utilisation, the latter is an area that is of concern as 
the aircraft and systems are not being functioned and not being lubricated as intended. Aircraft 
Maintenance Manual chapterlO deals with prolonged periods of parking. Identifying, 7 days, 10 
days and 30 days as short periods of non operation times where preservation maintenance 
activities must take place. The 7 days and 30 days tasks are minimal, but in my opinion no where is 
the very low utilisation issue addressed adequately. Boeing classify less than 1200 flight hours per 
year (100 per month) as low utilisation and less than 150 flight hours per year as very low 
utilisation. They also limit the use of the Boeing Low Utilisation programme to aircraft operating no 
less than 150 hours per year. This is arguable as I believe that very low utilisation should be 
considered not by hours of flight per year but by cycles of flights per year with restrictions on times 
between flights. For example 1 flight every other day of one hours is an acceptable Low Utilisation 
operation, totalling about 180 flights per year but only perhaps 200 flight hours per year. Boeing 
gives a band of 150 to 1200 flight hours per year as a classification of low utilisation. It is my opinion 
that very low utilisation (periods of non operation) should be based on time between flights and 
flight per month rather than flight hours. For example, 1 flight of one hour every two days would 
equate to 182 flights per year and 182 flight hours per year. When the aircraft is not flying it is 
parked in a hanger, this is low utilisation but not very low utilisation. 
So in summary, Q2 Action I leads to three questions to be asked of the MSI / SSI 
Q2-11 Will reduced usage affect this MSI or SSI thus necessitating the introduction of a calendar 
control such as days or months? 
Q2-2 When would a reduction in utilisation from the normal become a concern for the component 
or system this task addresses? 
Q2-3 Would the anticipated utilisation include long periods of non usage, if so should this be 
considered for task interval adjustment? 
The out come of all these question will first determine if a change of interval is required then 
secondly identify a more appropriate interval for the LU operation with regards to this MSI or SSI. 
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Adjustment Consideration: 03 Action 1. 
We are now starting to examine the special implication of the operation other than actual low 
utilisation, that could have influence on the scheduled maintenance programme tasks. These 
implications could be argued as non generic, but rather particular to a certain operating 
environment, so should be subjected not to a generic LU Maintenance Schedule but customised to 
an operator depending upon the nature of the operation. Either way is acceptable but must be 
considered before a maintenance programme is completed for an operator, but perhaps the 
generic route would not be completely correct as it will allow those operators that do not apply the 
special circumstances to their daily operation to take advantage of the interval adjustments when it 
would not be appropriate for them to do so. 
A Yes answer resulting from; 
Is this task at all a function of the predominant operating environment? 
Should then be examined for interval adjustment. The closer look at why the reply was Yes should 
then follow. An MRBR interval will be based on a normal operating environment for an Airliner. 
Taking Operator 2 as our example here, a VIP Government Operator flying the Head of State, 
perhaps in a country where the environment is sandy and humid, but the aircraft is hangered most 
of the time it is not operating in an air conditioned hanger. This aircraft will be definitely subjected to 
a different operating environment that a northern European operator. What we are trying to 
determine here is there a need to adjust the interval as a result of the environment that the aircraft 
will operate? 
This leads to 
Q4-1 Is there similar system in operational data available for research? 
Examination of similar system data for other aircraft that have been operated in the environment 
will give good guidelines as to the appropriateness of the adjustment. Perhaps the harsh sandy 
environment would normally require the adjustment down of an interval for filter replacement for 
example, but equally this would be cancelled out as a result of the aircraft being hanagered when 
not operating. Again the best way to determine the need for LU adjustment here is to examine 
historical data on system failures or especially on lab reports on filter efficiency after removal from 
the aircraft. This subject will be looked at in detail later also when examining in operational data for 
identifying the effectiveness of the maintenance programme and the necessary adjustments to task 
details or intervals. 
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Adjustment Consideration: Q4 Action 1. 
A Yes reply to Question 4 Is this task at all a function of the operating style? Leads to adjustment 
consideration which can be examined by the following question... 
Q4-1 Who will fly the aircraft and how? 
This question tries to examine the need for LU adjustment resulting similarly from the previous 
question Q3-1, (perhaps again a more custornised question than generic, but non the less 
symptomatic of LU operations). It considers that fact that LU operations often have only a few core 
pilots that are often experienced captains but now flying irregularly. The second consideration after 
the capability of the pilots is the standard operating procedures of the LU operator. Is it standard to 
get off the run way as quickly as possible, to land short and stop as fats as possible? Is it standard 
to descend quickly? Al of these issues contribute to the need to adjust the interval. 
Adjustment Consideration: Q5 Action 1. 
A Yes reply to Question 5 Is this task at all a function of the handling style? Leads to adjustment 
consideration which can be examined by the following question... 
Q5-11 Who will normally conduct the ground handling when away from Base? 
This question implies that the likelihood of AD (accidental damage) as defined in the MRBR is 
much less likely due to the nature of the LU operation. Firstly the LU operator does not use the 
international airports that are notorious of the AD possibilities and the LU operators does not carry 
the same extend of cargo on normal operations as the MRBR normal aircraft, thus again reducing 
the likelihood for AD. Usually the LU operator flies to regional rather than international airports so 
the traffic is much less and often the LU operator uses VIP or corporate ground handling agencies 
that undergo specialised training on handling LU VIP aircraft. So from this perspective adjustment 
to most AD identified MRBR task intervals may well be appropriate. 
Some MSI's or SSI's that were identified as requiring consideration for task interval adjustment 
leading from more than one of the LU questions must undergo consideration from all angles of the 
Yes replies. 
The previous Low Utilisation method describes on how to adjust an established airliner MRBR for 
low utilisation implication, but another method was previously mentioned where the Low Utilisation 
implications are considered not after the MRBR is produced but as an integral part of the MSG3 
analysis process undertaken on the aircraft type in question. This would involve the complete 
integration of LU questions 1,2,3,4 and 5 detailed in figure 3.2, into the MSG3 process from the 
beginning. Since most airliners are built with a target market in mind with a specific utilisation range, 
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for example the B737 NG targeted the transportation of 150 to 180 passengers with a utilisation of 
around 8 flight hours per day and 1.4 flight hours per cycle, so the MRBR objective Is to produce a 
scheduled maintenance programme that will maintain the inherent reliability within the context of 
the designed operational capability. So it is necessary due to the deviation of the assumptions of 
the MRB to consider the change in operation for a low utilisation operation, when adjusting the 
MRBR using the method described in Fig 3.2 
. 
But this adjustment will not be required if the 
aircraft's in operational role is within the defines of the design and the MRBR. For example the 
Bombardier and Gulfstream build business jets and have done for many years. These aircraft are 
designed from the beginning with the utilisation and the role of a business / VIP operation in mind. 
The first business jet manufacturers started using the MSG3 / RCM concept in the late 1990's, 
Bombardier being the pioneers, prior to this the business and general aviation aircraft 
manufacturers detailed their scheduled maintenance requirements using other than MSG3 
analysis. This resulted in expensive and extensive maintenance downtimes. Once adopting the 
MSG3 / RCM process the MRB used MSG3 / RCM analysis to established the MRBR scheduled 
maintenance tasks and in the initial stages they established the operational parameters as those in 
line with the design and the low utilisation operation. So the low utilisation factors were inherently in 
the analysis process hence no need for LU adjustment at a later stage. This is not the case for the 
airliner manufacturers whose products, such as the B737, B727, A320 and even the B747 are then 
adapted for low utilisation business jet operations. 
4.3 An Economic Model for Comparison of the Effects of RCM / MSG 3 PhilosophV. 
We have up until now defined and described how to conduct the process to produce an RCM / 
MSG3 Maintenance Programme, we have stated that the philosophy will take advantage of the 
inherent reliability of the original design and reduce the amount of maintenance tasks accomplished 
during the life of the aircraft, its components its systems and its structures. In this section we will 
compare the effects of this departure from Life Limited tasks to Inspection tasks with regards to the 
economic impact. 
Percent 
Fig 4.4 Operating Cost Breakdown. (Taken from Boeing ýs The History of the Maintenance 
Programme)., 
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Form this Boeing diagram, where data was taken from Boeing operators starting from 1968 to 1991 
we can see that in the late 1960's before RCM / MSG3 the maintenance costs were as much as 
30% of the total operating costs in the first stage of cost monitoring reducing to 16% in the early 
1990's when RCM / MSG3 was now in common use for new airliners. This represents 
approximately a 15% reduction in cost per period. Each period represent a time when significant 
changes were made in the maintenance philosophy. This also represents almost a total reduction 
of 45% in the period of study. This 45% can be attributed to two reasons.... 
1. Improved design, components, production and materials. 
2. Improved Maintenance Programmes and maintenance philosophy. 
Exactly what amount is attributed to either is unclear, but remembering that the RCM / MSG3 
Maintenance Programme philosophy also can lead back to better design and better maintainability 
lets assume both contribute significantly. 
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Fig 4.5 Reduction in number of MRB tasks. 
(Taken from Boeing's The History of the Maintenance Programme). 
Fig 4.5 shows three aircraft that have been subjected to MSG philosophies. The B767 MSG 2, 
B747-400 MSG 2 with some MSG 3 and the B737 total MSG 3. The x axis shows months in 
operation, while the y axis shows number of scheduled maintenance tasks to be accomplished. 
The B777 shows a reduction of 45% in the amount of tasks. This can be attributed directly to the 
MSG 3 process removing non effective and non applicable redundant tasks as well as the 
improved design, production and component reliability. Rigorous MSG 3 analysis and design 
193 
improvements have resulted in 754 fewer tasks for the B777 compared to the B747-400 and 1072 
compared relative to the B767. 
Considering New Technoloav and Design Factors versus MSG 3 in Reducing the 
Maintenance Costs. 
New Materials: In the last three decades many varieties of composite materials have been 
introduced into aircraft including the primary structure. The metallic alloys have been continuously 
developed to improve strength, crack growth characteristics and corrosion resistance. 
New Design Philosophies: The most significant aircraft design philosophy changes have occurred 
since 1975. The four major changes in design philosophy can be segregated into two fields, theory 
and practice. In the theory field we have seen damage tolerance evaluation (regulated by FAR 
25.571) and system safety assessment (regulated by FAR 25.1309). In practice we have seen the 
evolution of MSG 3, which as we have seen can to some degree influence design. MSG 3 put 
certain constraints on designers. The designer will evaluate in advance preventative maintenance 
requirements (concurrent engineering). It goes even further by involving the end user (Mechanics 
and Pilots) taking an active part in the system design. 
The Removal of Hard Time Life Limits. 
We saw in the RCM / MSG 3 analysis through the top down approach of analysis of the effects of 
failure that we can eliminate almost completely the need to apply hard time life limitations for the 
removal of components. But we did see that in certain circumstances we must maintain the hard 
life limit when the failure of the component would have catastrophic failure effects, such as engine 
shafts or landing gear struts, where the component is a monolithic item with a single stress bearing 
load path. These components remain with the life limitation. If we review the removal of life 
limitation over the period of introduction or RCM / MSG 3 philosophy we can see the economic 
impact of component costs and the requirements for holding inventory. 
1960's B707 had around 200 hard time life limited components that had to be removed no matter 
their in service condition. 
1990's B777 has around 5 aircraft components and 8 engine components with hard life limitations. 
The remaining components undergo in service on wing functional, operational or visual inspections 
and only removed as they approach failure. 
This improvement of realising in service component inherent reliability again is attributed to the 
MSG 3 philosophy but also in large part to the new technology of design where components are 
much more reliable as a result of improved technology and design. 
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Comparina Non MSG 3 Maintenance Proarammes with MSG 3 Maintenance Prourammes. 
MD 80 MSG 2 Scheduled Maintenance Man Hours 
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Fig 4.6 MD80 MSG 2 Maintenance Programme Labour Hours. 
(Taken from McDonald Douglas's MD80 MSG 2 maintenance planning document). 
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Fig 4.7 MD80 / B717 MSG 3 Maintenance Programme Labour Hours 
(Taken from Boeing's MD80 / B717 MSG 3 maintenance planning document). 
Note: Boeing renamed the MD80 the B 717 for marketing purposes. 
After Boeing bought McDonald Douglas they conducted a complete review of the MSG 2 (non 
RCM) maintenance programme re assessing the aircraft using MSG 3 (RCM) analysis. The result 
was a 40% plus saving on scheduled maintenance task man-hours over a 20 year period (177,882 
MSG 2 man hours versus 99,280 MSG 3 man hours), and a disappearance of the major D Check 
every 100 months and the Life Limited components were reduced to two on the aircraft and 8 on 
the engine. The dispatch reliability was not improved or reduced staying at 98.6% thus concluding 
that the MSG 3 process in itself attributes all the cost saving in this case to the new maintenance 
programme practice, MSG 3 analysis eliminated the redundant non effective non applicable tasks 
that only contributed to increasing the scheduled maintenance cost of maintaining the aircraft and 
increased the non available cost for operation. This of course remains to be fully seen as the 
aircraft has only been operating and maintained to the new MSG 3 Maintenance programme since 
2002, whether the dispatch reliability is maintained as high as the aircraft ages will be reviewed in 
future. It should also be noted that this comparison does not include Non Routine man hours. As a 
result of this study Boeing have now re assessed all their in operation fleet using MSG 3 analysis 
having just completed the final aircraft type in March 2004 and have in every case reduced the 
scheduled man hours by a factor of at least 30% each time. 
So a model for comparing RCM / MSG 3 maintenance programmes against non RCM / MSG 3 
would be by considering the following factors... 
Scheduled Maintenance man hours for a conditional period. (MHsm) 
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2. Non Routine man hours generated from scheduled maintenance for a conditional period. 
(MHnr) 
3. Life Limited components for a conditional period. (LL) 
4. *Dispatch Reliability for a conditional period. (DR) 
5. Aircraft non availability due to due to scheduled maintenance + non routine maintenance. 
(ACna) 
*Note: DR =% of flights that depart within 15mins of scheduled departure time. 
In figures 4.6 and 4.7 we are comparing only the scheduled maintenance man hours which is 
an indicator of maintenance time reduction due exclusively to scheduled maintenance. To get 
a more accurate model we should consider the following... 
Total Maintenance Man hours for the Maintenance Life Cycle. 
MHt = MHsm + MHnr 
(Note Maintenance Life Cycle would be the estimated in-service time for the aircraft). 
.. 
to do this we would need to have a sample size of the aircraft type on a non MSG3 maintenance 
programme to compare against a MSG3 same aircraft type sample. For now all we can do is 
compare the theoretical MHsm as we do not have available the MHnr data but that could be 
estimated as a ratio of SM. Below is for the MD 80 programmes in the figures above for a 
scheduled maintenance life span of 20 years using only SM data from the available maintenance 
programme.... 
x- MD 80 MSG 3 MHsm = 99,280 
y- MD 80 Non MSG 3 MHsm 177,882 
(Y-X)/y 
(177,882 
- 
99,280) / 177,882 0.44 
MSG 3 analysis can account for a 44% reduction In total scheduled 
maintenance man hours. For no DR chance for a 20 year Period. 
Assuming 4500 flight hours per year therefore 4500x2Oyrs = 90,000 flight hours for the 20 year 
period. A standard model for comparing scheduled maintenance programmes in an operational 
context could be the amount of scheduled maintenance man hours required for 1 hour of flight. 
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Total Scheduled Maintenance Man hours per Flight Hour (Tsm/fh) 
Tsm/fh = MHsm / FHt 
x- MD 80 MSG 3 Tsmlfh = MHsm / FHt 
99,280 MHsm / 90,000 fhrs 
1.103 scheduled maintenance man hours per flight hour for MSG 3. 
y- MD 80 Non MSG 3 Tsm/fh = MHsm / FHt 
= 177,882 MHsm / 90,000 fhrs 
= 1.976 scheduled maintenance man hours per flight hour for non MSG 3. 
Summarv of the Economic Comparison. 
We can say that with figure 4.5 RCM / MSG3 analysis does reduce the amount of scheduled 
maintenance tasks and with figure 4.6 and 4.7 the MD 80 exercise shows that it will also reduce the 
man hours required to be spent on the scheduled maintenance tasks compared to a non RCM / 
MSG 3 generated scheduled maintenance programme. It will also reduce the Life Limited parts to 
be removed from service thus reducing the need for inventory holding of replacement parts. These 
reductions appear not to affect the dispatch reliability thus suggesting that there is no penalty for the 
reduced amount of maintenance actions with regards to aircraft reliability and serviceability. We go 
further to devise a model for comparison and we can see that by comparing the total maintenance 
life cycle scheduled maintenance man hours we see for the case of the MD 80 a reduction of 44% 
in man hours. We then take this reduction into the operational context applying it to the total flight 
hours to obtain a scheduled maintenance cost for each flight hour flown and we get a figure of 
1.103 for the MSG 3 maintenance programme. This model of Tsm/fh could be used in all cases to 
compare scheduled maintenance programmes. The ideal will be to get a Tsm/fh figure as low as 
possible with out an increase in the DR (dispatch reliability). 
This can conclude that MSG 3 independent of design and technology improvement does contribute 
considerably to a large reduction in the cost of conducting scheduled maintenance on aircraft. But 
it must be recognised that design considerations to the maintainability of the aircraft will also keep 
scheduled maintenance man hours down. What remains to be seen is if the man hours for the non 
routine tasks generated from the routine tasks are affected by the application of MSG 3 analyses. 
For a non aviation application of the model instead of DR being used non availability due to 
unserviceablity could be used but still MHsm and MHnr can be used. 
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5. Maintenance Engineering Planning, 
5.1 Getting the Scheduled Maintenance Task Done. 
Chapters 1,2 and 3 details how to produce an aircraft scheduled maintenance programme to 
maintain the inherent reliability of the original design. We have seen that the Scheduled 
Maintenance Programme is a collection of tasks to be accomplished at certain intervals. Prior to the 
successful and efficient accomplishment of these tasks there is a series of other tasks that need to 
be conducted. The series of tasks can be referred to as maintenance engineering planning 
activities. These activities start with taking the Scheduled Maintenance Programme and identifying 
what tasks are to be done when they are to be done, then preparing for the tasks to be done then 
getting the tasks accomplished. 
Aircraft Maintenance Engineering is just like any other technical management discipline. Five main 
activities can be identified the need to take place... 
1. Defining what has to be done. The Scheduled Maintenance Programme & the additional work 
programme. 
2. Planning what has to be done. The Maintenance Planning sections tasks. 
3. implementation of the Plan. The Production Planning and Control section in close co- 
ordination with the Maintenance / Production section. 
4. Completion of the Plan. The Maintenance / Production section assisted with the Maintenance 
Production Planning and Control section. 
5. Evaluation and Review of tasks 1 to 4 above and on going review of the in operation findings. 
This is the first time I have mentioned the 5 stages of aircraft maintenance engineering as I see it. 
At this stage of the thesis I shall continue to examine and consider these five activities as core to 
the successful and effective maintenance of an aircraft. I believe by understanding the 5 stages as 
a basic principle in the context of Maintenance Engineering of Aircraft the complete cycle of tasks 
can be identified and defined. This will be done in detail latter, but for now it can be said that the 
one common central entity to the complete cycle is Maintenance Engineering Planning more 
commonly known as Maintenance Planning and Production Planning. 
Below fig 5.1 shows the centrality of the Maintenance Engineering Planning (MEP) Section in the 
complete cycle of Aircraft Maintenance Engineering. This diagram and the functions of each 
section, will be developed further later in the thesis. Suffice for now for the diagram to be identified 
as an example of the information flow into and out of the MEP section. This section of the thesis, 
Section 5, will explain, define and propose developments on procedures and methods of 
conducting Maintenance Engineering Planning. It can be seen from Fig 5.1 that the MEP section is 
essential to the successful and efficient technical management of a fleet of aircraft. 
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Maintenance Planning starts with the Scheduled Maintenance Programme. Maintenance Planning 
is to take the scheduled maintenance programme and plan for accomplishment of the tasks at 
times prior to their individual intervals are exceeded. This involves planning for maintenance 
downtimes where you can accomplish individual or a series of scheduled maintenance. Remember 
the scheduled maintenance tasks have intervals of hours, cycles or calendar days. It is always 
desirable to get the most out of an interval as possible, for example consider the following... 
Task 27-010-00-00 Lubricate the Aileron Bell crank every 1000 flight hours. 
Task 27-100-00-00 GVI the Aileron Push Rods every 1000 flight hours. 
Task 32-020-00-00 GVI the Main Gear Down lock assembly every 600 cycles. 
The aircraft is planned for a downtime and the estimated total hours and cycles of the aircraft when 
put down is 900 flight hours and 550 cycles. It would be an appropriate time to accomplish these 
three tasks as we are with in 10% of the actual due time, but consider the following tasks... 
Task 27-220-00-00 Lubricate the Horizontal Stabiliser Hinge Bearings every 1500 flight hours. 
Task 27-300-00-00 GVI the Flap Drive Gimble Ring Joint every 1500 flight hours. 
Task 32-300-01 
-00 GVI the Gear Up Lock Mechanism every 1000 cycles. 
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The planned down time detailed above would not be the appropriate time to accomplish the second 
group of three tasks, in one case 40% of the task life remains., There is too much life remaining 
before they should be accomplished thus if accomplished the tasks would not be effective or 
applicable. 
With the Schedule Maintenance Programme consisting of hundreds of tasks it would not be 
convenient for an airline to have its aircraft grounded every hundred flight hours or so it is not un 
common for the Maintenance Planning section to group a series of tasks for accomplishment at the 
same time for example. 
--- 
Airline XYZ estimates a utilisation of 250 flight hours and 100 landings/cycles per month. The 
following task grouping could be followed.. 
Monthly Check:: All tasks due at 250 flight hours, 100 landings/cycles and 30 days 
1A Check:: Al task due at 750 flight hours, 300 landings/cycles and 90 days. 
2A Check: : AJI tasks due at 1500 flight hours, 600 landings/cycles and 180 days. 
This type of grouping is termed as block checks or letter checks where a series of like interval tasks 
are grouped together and planned for their accomplishment at the same point in time, as close to 
their due times as possible. 
This is one of the essential skills for the Maintenance Planning section where with careful co- 
ordination with the Operations section for aircraft availability and with the Maintenance section for 
manpower availability and hanger space, an aircraft maintenance downtime can be planned that 
disturbs the aircraft operational availability to the minimum while accomplishing the scheduled 
maintenance programme tasks as close to their intervals as possible. This activity takes place on 
three levels that will be explored in detail later, these levels are Long Term Maintenance Planning, 
Medium Term Maintenance Planning and Short Term Maintenance Planning. 
Back to the example above, Tasks that fall due between the groupings for example 900 flight hour 
tasks or 400 landings tasks can either be accomplished on their own as and when they fall due or 
can be grouped with the lesser check interval loosing the time remaining on them for the sake of 
packaging. This task of packaging higher interval tasks with lower interval checks must be with 
careful consideration as hinted upon with the example of a task being planned for With 40% of its 
life remaining. (This subject will be discussed further within this section). In the letter check or block 
check system each lesser check is normally complied with as part of the greater check. For 
example... 
The 2A Check will contain the 1A and the Monthly check tasks as it is a multiple of the lesser 
checks. It was the practice in the past and remains still with some operators, to go as far as 
replacing the intervals in the Scheduled Maintenance Programme with letters such as 1A, 2A etc. 
This was even also the practice in the MPD that was produced by the Manufacturer. This in my 
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opinion is not good practice as it looses the actual interval identified during the MSG3 process 
which must always be considered when planning to accomplish a scheduled maintenance task. 
The tasks that are left to float and be accomplished on their own when they fall due are referred to 
as Out Of Phase scheduled maintenance tasks, (OOP). These tasks are usually simple tasks that 
do not need substantial down time and can be done with out too much effort as they are not labour 
or time intensive. If an OOP task is intensive it would normally be aligned to a schedule 
maintenance downtime package or permanently aligned to a letter check package that is 
appropriate for its interval. AJso component lives such as oxygen bottle hydrostatic tests are left as 
OOP tasks as a component life is linked to a specific individual component that could be changed 
in the field at anytime as a result on an in operational failure or finding. Remember that the MSG3 
process attempts to remove all life limitations on components preferring to introduce failure finding 
tasks that identify a need to remove a component rather than the unsubstantiated removal of a 
component. 
The Maintenance Planner conducting the planning activity for a particular downtime, must have the 
following crucial task in place prior to at least four weeks before a minor down time (this depends 
upon the size and extent of the input of course, four weeks is a good minimum guide for an input 
that has a significant level of work).... 
1. The Scheduled Maintenance Routine Work Scope. Identifying significant tasks. 
2. The Routine Work Documents required to accomplish the Work Scope. 
3. The Additional Work Scope other than the Scheduled Maintenance tasks to be aligned at this 
down time with the Work Scope. i. e. Service Bulletins, Airworthiness Directives, Component 
Changes, etc. Identifying significant tasks. 
4. The Additional Work Documents required to accomplish the Additional Work Scope. 
5. The complete Work Scope material requirement, tools and parts. Shortages must be 
identified at this time also. 
6. The Work Scope man-hour and manpower requirement to accomplish the complete Work 
Scope. This includes the skills required, identifying where external assistance may be needed. 
7. The total Work Scope required elapsed down time required to complete the complete Work 
Scope. 
8. A point in the future, a Maintenance Slot, before the exccedance of any task intervals in the 
work scope, where the aircraft is taken out of operation with the Operation Departments 
agreement and the Maintenance Sections agreement. 
A "minor" downtime can be considered as a traditional A Check taking anything from 40 man-hours 
with an elapsed time of 1 day to a 200 man-hour input with an elapsed time of 5 days. Referring 
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back to section 3.2.4, where the operator defines the classification of checks, along with the 
approval of his authority The example given was.. 
15. Definition of Line Maintenance: A package of scheduled maintenance tasks that do not require 
extensive access or downtime. Daily, Transit, Night Stop, Daily Non Flying, & Day Non Flying 
and the Monthly series are considered line maintenance. 
16. Definition of Minor Maintenance: A package of scheduled maintenance tasks that may require 
some extensive access or downtime. The A-check series is considered minor maintenance. 
17. Definition of Major Maintenance: A package of scheduled maintenance tasks that do require 
extensive access or downtime. The C-check series is considered major maintenance. 
With the 8 planning activities detailed above accomplished and in place the next planning 
activity can take place, Production Planning. This subject will be discussed further in more 
detail after defintlion of the three Maintenance Planning time periods or the short, medium 
and long term. 
Short, Medium and Long Term Maintenance Planning. 
So far we have spoken about the Planning roles of Maintenance Planning and Production 
Planning. We identified these two areas as distinct areas in the discipline of Maintenance 
Engineering Planning. It has been considered that in small organisations that these two planning 
disciplines are often conducted by a single section, this is often the case. What has not been 
discussed so far is the third area of Long Tenn Planning or also called Master Planning. 
The Maintenance Engineering Planning has three definable time frames. Two of the time frames 
have been hinted at already by separating Production Planning from Maintenance Planning. Where 
Production Planning is the short term implementation of the Maintenance Plan and Maintenance 
Planning is the more medium term Planning time frame. In fact the three distinct time frames are as 
follows 
1. Long Term Maintenance Planning: from 18 months to 6 years. 
2. Medium Term Maintenance Planning: from 3 months to 18 months. 
3. Short Term Maintenance Planning : from I day to 3 months. 
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Long Term Maintenance Planning. (18 months to 6 years. ) 
See attachment 1. 
To be able to budget cash flow properly and effectively plan downtime and significant tasks Long 
Term Planning must take place. Long Term Planning also referred to as Master Planning, looks into 
the long term future at high level significant tasks such as Minor and Major Checks, Major 
component changes, or Major modification programmes. The idea of Master Planning is to identify 
all points in time for up to 6 years into the future a down time slot in the maintenance hanger and a 
rough cost of what needs to be done. The staff in Long Term Planning must be aware of the 
Maintenance Programme and be able to project due times based on operational estimations of 
utilisation. They must also be aware of the major modification programmes the Development 
Engineering section have in the pipe line, such as a Flap Retrofit Programme or an Interior Design 
change. The Master Planning section should allocate down times into the future for these routine 
checks or special projects. One other consideration for the Long Term Planning section is 
significant material and tool availability and long term man power requirements. It is the Master 
Planning section that define both man power requirements for the future as well as facility 
requirements and can identify significant short falls or manpower excesses or facility requirements 
such as insufficient maintenance hangarage. 
Inaccurate Long Term Planning can result in the following 
Insufficient maintenance slots identified versus the operational requirements: If a bottle neck of 
maintenance is identified in the Long Term plan perhaps all falling due in the summer of 4 years 
ahead, is not identified early, the maintenance falling due will disrupt the operation and could result 
in massive loss of revenue due many aircraft not being available at the same time. It is Long Term 
Planning tasks to identify and stagger conflicting inputs in the long term. 
Insufficient skilled manpower: If a significant modification programme is not identified early as 
requiring specialist skilled man power then come the time the activities are to be carried out the 
staff will struggle with accomplishing the new tasks., AJso if an increase in man power requirements 
or the opposite a reduction in man power availability due to training or retirements is not identified 
early then the downtimes will have to be stretched. 
Insufficient Maintenance Facilities: If due to many aircraft requiring their C Check accomplished at 
the same time there is insufficient maintenance bays and maintenance access docking. If this is not 
identified years in advance there could be a terrible bottle neck and demand on resources. Long 
Term Planning should identify this just like it should all other bottle necks or Maintenance 
Engineering Section demands well in advance and allow for the Management to plan for 
increasing in house capability or by preparing to contract out some of the excessive maintenance 
tasks. With out Long Term Planning these requirements will become apparent far too late. 
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The Long Term Maintenance Planning section must work closely with the Maintenance 
Programmes Section to understand when the significant scheduled maintenance tasks are failing 
due, also with the Material Planning section for tooling and spare requirements as it should also 
with Development Engineering for identification of significant modification or Service Bulletin 
requirements. Long Term Planning should be involved in the budgeting process for identifying long 
term maintenance costs that require annual allocation of tasks (maintenance accruals). 
Medium Term Maintenance Planning. (3 months to 18 months. ) 
See attachment 2. 
In the medium term most of the hard work in planning is conducted. Identifying downtimes, 
negotiating maintenance slots, building work scopes, co-ordinating requirements with other 
sections. In this time period the theoretical inputs become actual inputs. This time frame is where 
detailed budgeting is also done. Conflicts in downtimes and work scopes should have been 
identified in principle in the long term planning but in medium term planning the details of the 
downtimes become more apparent. It is the Maintenance Planning sections responsibility to ensure 
all scheduled maintenance and inspection and modification programmes are conducted before 
they fall beyond their due times. This means the Medium Term Plan must consider the whole fleet, 
the available manpower, the available facilities in more detail than the long term planning. During 
this period of time the detailed work scope becomes more defined and all requirements to 
accomplish the works copes become more apparent. As the end of the Medium Term period 
approaches the Planning section should have almost completed the first stage of the work scope 
definition and have formed a rough work scope for the input. It is also the medium term planning's 
responsibility to start the coronation with other section. Material and tooling, manpower, and 
facilities. 
Short Term Maintenance Planning. (I day to 3 months. ) 
See attachment 3. 
The Short Terrn Planning is the final phase before Production Planning and continues right up until 
the day before the aircraft starts it's downtime. There is an overlap with Short Term Planning and 
Production Planning. During the short term planning phase the work scope is closed and the 
downtime is defined and claimed with actual dates of start and finish. These dates are used by the 
Operations Section to remove the aircraft from service. During this period Planning still continue to 
liaise with Operations even thought he dates are defined in case an operational emergency calls for 
the aircraft downtime to be changed. It may be a very difficult activity but Planning must keep in 
mind at all times that the business they are in is air transport and if the need to change input dates 
or to cut down on maintenance downtimes occurs they must try their best to assist. In Short Term 
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Planning the down time dates should be as close to the due date as possible of the work scope. 
The work scope due date should be driven by the significant check included in the work scope, 
such as the C check. Other due tasks prior to the due date should normally be attempted to 
accomplished out of phase. For example is the Work Scope consists of the IC Check due at 3000 
flight hours, S13 737-27-1055 due at 3100 flight hours and IDG change due on 14 May 2003. It is 
anticipated that using current utilisation the aircraft will be at 2950 flight hours on the 1 Sh May 2003, 
so the downtime is planned to start on the Monday ISh May 2003. This way two important things 
are achieved. 1. The maximum time in operation for the aircraft is achieved before the IC and the 
work scope is due. 2. The input will start on the first day of the week then giving a clear run for the 
five day input when manpower is best available and at its best productively. It is during the short 
term phase that the pre input meeting task place and the hand over of the work package takes 
place from the Short Term Planning section to the Production Planning section. It is not unusual 
also for some Operators to have a Line Maintenance Planning section. This is not unlike the 
Production Planning section in that they only deal with line maintenance such as Weekly or Monthly 
checks or Out of Phase tasks that have a repeating interval of a short period, or indeed any tasks 
that are accomplishable in less than a turn around time. But care must be taken in Line 
Maintenance Planning in that a contingency is available if during the Line Maintenance tasks a 
finding calls for a longer downtime than initially anticipated. This in fact is a consideration that need 
to be taken every time the Maintenance Planning section plan for a downtime of any sort, i. e. what 
if we have findings. This will be considered in more detail in the next section. 
The Maintenance Plans shown above as Short Term, Medium Term and Long Term must be 
published, controlled and available to all concerned in Operations, Maintenance Engineering, 
Marketing, Materials, and Finance. These three plans form one of the basis of the operation with 
regards to airworthiness and safety, management of manpower, equipment and facilities, 
management of inventory, management of finances and budget and ultimately management of the 
operation. 
Modification and Service Bulletin Planning. 
As the manufacture receives feed back from in service aircraft and from engineering studies 
conducted by the manufacturer in testing or by computer simulation, the need to revise the original 
design of the aircraft may become apparent. Remembering that scheduled maintenance is to 
restore the inherent reliability of the original design, Service Bulletins are to revise the original 
design or to address design imperfection that may cause airworthiness issues. The manufacturer 
will inform the operators of these requirements through issuing Service Bulletins (SB's). The SB's 
can call for modification to address changes to the original design or inspection SB's to look for 
possible airworthiness issues. The operators will receive relevant SB's from the manufacturer only 
applicable to the serial numbers of the aircraft type they operate. Normally aircraft in production and 
those in pre production will automatically be subjected to the modifications prior to delivery. 
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Example of a Modification SB.. 
SB 737-27-1053: Rudder Trim Actuator Replacement. 
The SB will be received by the Operator and will describe in the SB the reasons why the SB has 
been issued, will identify the SS as Alert, Recommended or Optional. Alert SB's are normally 
addressing a condition that is safety or airworthy related. Often Alert SB's become later mandated 
by the regulatory authorities when they feel the subject is of a considerable airworthiness or safety 
level of importance. How each operator manages and plans for incorporation can change and vary 
depending upon Engineering Policy. The issuer of the SB, the Original Equipment Manufacturer, 
(OEM) after classifying the SB as AJert, Recommended or Optional may go on to give a time frame 
when the SB should be accomplished as well as planning information such as material required, 
man-hours to accomplish the task, tooling required, and then will give the work steps on how to 
accomplish the SB. In the case of SB 737-27-1053, the rudder trim actuator is recommended for 
replacement introducing a new improved modified actuator with a different part number. The varied 
operator approaches to managing the SB's usually start with a section in Engineering appraising 
whether or not the SB should be accomplished. Some of the considerations for the appraising 
engineer when deciding to recommend to the management for incorporation of the SB are as 
follows.. 
Company fleet data should be looked at to see if an issue exists within the company that the SB 
addresses. Does this SB address a know problem that has been an issue with the fleet already? 
Does the SB address an issue of importance to the company, safety or airworthiness? 
Consideration as to fleet strategy should be made, for example will the aircraft type be in operation 
for some time? 
investment pay back. By accomplishment of the SB will the fleet type become more reliable hence 
less maintenance or is the resale value affected?., A return on investment calculation may be 
devised. Both material cost, downtime cost and manpower cost should be considered. 
Is the SB a warranty issue where the OEM will reimburse the time and material? 
Once the appraising engineer of the operator has appraised the SB it will normally be sent to 
Engineering Management for review. If the it is agreed upon to be accomplished it becomes a 
Modification Planning issue often the responsibility of the Maintenance Planning section, subject to 
planning activities just like scheduled maintenance tasks i. e. material ordered, work documents 
written, accomplishment planned. It is not unusual for operators to only accomplish Alert SB's or 
only those that are concurrent with engineering policy for example cabin appearance or safety 
related. Often those not concurrent with Company Engineering policy are filed and only referred to 
in the future if an issue occurs later in time that the SB addresses. 
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Example of an Inspection SB.. 
SB 737-53-1128: Horizontal Stabiliser Attachment Inspection. 
The OEM recommended this SB as a result of in service findings reported back to them of cracks 
found on two occasion. One at 50,000 flight cycles and one at 57,000 flight cycles. The 
recommended inspection time frame is at a threshold 40,000 flight cycles repeating at every 10,000 
flight cycles after. Operator Engineering policy may differ for inspection SB's as often these call for 
a known manifested condition. The appraising engineer will submit his recommendations to the 
engineering management in a similar way to how he did in with the Modification SB. Even though it 
is an inspection and not a modification, the planning section treat that task in a similar way. Once a 
final decision is made the Inspection SB will then be subjected to planning activities by the 
Maintenance Planning section. 
It is my opinion that the Maintenance Planning section should review all open Service Bulletins 
where the company engineering decision is to accomplish them, along with the engineering section 
responsible for appraising SB's and other relevant sections on at least a two monthly basis. This 
will ensure that the Planning activities are co-ordinated with the relevant section, material section to 
follow up on tooling or part requirements, maintenance section to inform them of the approximate 
work involvement, and the engineering section responsible for writing the work documents. It is the 
Planning sections responsibility to ensure that the SB is accomplished, modification or inspection, 
at an appropriate downtime prior to the compliance time frame allocated to it by the appraising 
engineering section. To plan for a 100 man-hour modification on a light 2 day A check downtime 
may not be appropriate. For those SB's that any one on the engineering management decision 
team who review the S13 recommendations from the appraising engineer, disagree with the 
accomplishment recommendation, those SB's should be discussed individually until a consensus 
of decision is made. The Technical Director, or his delegate often the senior engineering manager, 
will make the final decision when there is no concurrent agreement. The subject of engineering 
policy on SB accomplishment should be made with careful consideration. Company guidelines for 
the appraising engineer should be clear and considerate as should his recommendations. To make 
a decision to do every SB that an OEM issues regardless, is in my opinion not a wise one. Just as 
with scheduled maintenance SB tasks can be non effective or applicable and even invasive and 
can be resulting from a reason that is not completely relevant to your particular fleet. Equally to 
make a policy that only alert SB that have been mandated by the Authorities are to be 
accomplished and no others, is also in my opinion not a wise decision. If an SB regardless of being 
mandated address an important issue on safety or airworthiness careful consideration should be 
given to its accomplishment with in an effective period of time also regardless of the OEM's 
recommendations. Communication with the OEM and with the industry can help an operator in his 
decision to accomplish SB's. Just because an operator has not yet experienced an issue 
addressed by an SB doesn't mean it should be recommended not for accomplishment. 
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5.1.2 Production Planning and Control. 
After completion of the preparation tasks defined as Maintenance Planning, the next stage for a 
well planned successful maintenance input is the Production Planning and Control phase. 
Production Planning is often conducted by the Maintenance Planning section, in small 
organisations, after the Maintenance Planning phase, by the Maintenance section or as with larger 
maintenance organisation by the Production Planning and Control section. How ever the 
distribution of tasks, the Production Planning function is essential to the success of the 
maintenance input and to minimise the down time spent on the work scope, remember every hour 
the aircraft is on maintenance is an hour of operational revenue lost. Production Planning and 
Control is taking the Work Scope produced by the Maintenance Planning section and subjecting 
the work scope to detailed planning activities ultimately resulting in the implementation of the work 
scope. 
Major Production Planning Activities 
Task Sequencing: taking the work scope built by the Maintenance Planning section and splitting 
the tasks into common sequences of events. Eg 
Seq 1: Pre Hanger Tasks. 
Seq 2: Pre Power Off Tasks. 
Seq 3: Cleaning & Access Tasks. (panel opening). 
Seq 4: Inspections Tasks. 
Seq 5: Lubrication & Servicing Tasks. 
Seq 6: Pre Power On Tasks. 
Seq 8: Power On tasks. 
There can be many more or only a few of the above sequences when sequencing a work scope 
depending upon the size of the work scope. Task Sequencing, even in its most basic form, is 
essential to an efficient maintenance input. In an A Check there may be as little as 30 task or as 
many as 200 tasks, sequencing makes sense of all the work to be done and orders it in a logical 
manner. 
Production Plan: The Production Plan is a flow chart, also known as a Gantt Chart. This diagram 
shows the activities and milestones of the work scope. This diagram can be completed using 
detailed planning software showing many activities in order of sequence, showing also a critical 
path or it can be more simple showing only major miles stones and a few critical activities. If being 
used to plan and control a maintenance input, firstly the Production Plan must be bought into by the 
Production section, agreeing with the major activities and milestones and committing to achieving 
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them. During the input the Production Plan must be dynamic, and must change when required as 
the input progresses. If this dynamic aspect of the Production Plan is not their or the Production 
section does not commit to meeting the Plan, the Production Plan becomes nothing more than a 
pretty picture that doesn't really reflect or mean anything to do with the progress of the input. This is 
often the case. Common mistakes made with the Production Plan are... 
It is too vague. 
It is too detailed. 
It is not achievable. 
It is not based on credible past history. 
It is not bought into by the Production Line Managers. 
It is not dynamic and doesn't change as new information is known as the input progresses. 
If all of the above do not occur and the Production Plan is a credible accepted plan by the 
Production section, it can drive the input to a successful downtime, giving clarity of information as to 
what has been done and what is still to be done. The sequencing of the tasks goes hand in hand 
with the Production Plan and often the sequencing titles form the major mile stones of the input. A 
very important mile stone that has not been mentioned so far is "Inspections Complete". A good 
guide as to when inspection tasks should all be complete is prior to the completion of the first third 
of the input. This is essential as to know where you stand with findings resulting from the fault 
finding scheduled maintenance tasks in the work scope. It would not be production planning to 
assume the scheduled maintenance would result in no findings. This leads to the author of the 
Production Plan allowing in his plan for time to rectify defects. This can be difficult unless you have 
a data base of past findings on the same type of aircraft with a similar operating role and similar 
age and utilisation. Some rough guidelines for routine (scheduled tasks) versus non routine 
(findings resulting from schedule tasks) are as follows.. 
Aircraft Age of around 1.5 years with a normal utilisation: 
I hour routine generates 0.5 hours of non routine. 1: 0.5. 
Aircraft Age of around 3 years with a normal utilisation: 
I hour routine generates 1 hour of non routine. 1: 1. 
Aircraft Age of around 5 years with a normal utilisation: 
I hour routine generates 2 hours of non routine. 1: 2. 
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This is not an industry standard but based upon my experience. The figures used by an operator 
must be based upon historical data. 
See attachment 4. (a simple Production Plan). 
JAR 145, the Maintenance Regulation for JAA Sate Countries maintaining aircraft recently has 
included a section on Human Factors for Maintenance where Production Planning has been 
identified as required to take into consideration in the Production Plan the factors that can effect 
human performance such as 
, 
shift patterns, man power allocation and planned activities. This 
aspect levitates the Production Plan from being a nice to have concept as it was in the past to a 
required maintenance management tool. A good Production Plan will take into consideration not 
only the flow of work sequence but also the loading of maintenance tasks to the available work 
force. This leads us to the next aspect of Production Planning, Man Power Planning. 
Manpower Planning : taking the work scope from the Maintenance Planning section and planning 
and producing a detailed man hour / manpower capacity plan. This includes comparing the 
required man power for the work scope versus the available man power from the Production 
section. A good Production Plan show a sequence of maintenance activities that is achievable with 
the man power availability of the Production section. Shift manpower allocation, leave, sickness, 
training should all be reflected in the Manpower Plan and that in turn should be considered in the 
Production Plan. The occasion when the Production Plan shows that on day 2 that 30 man hours 
on Avionics skill tasks is required for the first half of the day, when in fact only 20 man hours of 
Avionic man hours are available. This situation can occur in the initial phase of producing the 
Production Plan and the plan then shows a short fall in the required manpower for that activity, the 
resulting action should then be that the plan is adjusted to suit the available Production man power 
or supplemental manpower is planned for that activity. If the available man power can not meet the 
Production Plan, then it is incorrect to leave the plan unchanged. This puts unfair pressure on the 
Production section. This is why JAR 145 is heading in the direction of mandating good Production 
Planning as it can see a relationship with Human Factor events with inaccurate planning. Further 
more a Production Plan should not be bought into by the Production section that also shows new 
activities that training or experience is required. 
Material Planning: this can be split into two areas, tools and equipment and parts and spares. 
Tools and Eguipment: The Planner for the in put should know what tools and what equipment is 
required to accomplish the work scope. This should be detailed in the work scope when the 
Maintenance Planning section defines the task in the work scope. The Maintenance Planning 
section should not include a task requiring tools or equipment that can not be provided in time for 
the input. The Production Planning section should with draw tasks from the work scope when it is 
confirmed that the tools or equipment will not be available in time when the Production Plan show 
that the activity should take place. This is only capable if there is time remaining on the task, if not 
the order for the tool or equipment should be raised to critical and the Production Plan changed to 
reflect a reasonable time when it is forecasted that the tool will be available on site. It is important 
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that the Production Plan should not reflect an acUvity that requires tools when they are not 
available, again this can result in Production pressure as they are unable to complete the tasks that 
are planned. Not only does this apply to tooling but also to equipment. Hanger access platforms for 
example, over head cranes and especially safety equipment. The Production Planning section 
should not be the first to identify a tooling need. Maintenance Planning know well in advance from 
the Scheduled Maintenance Programme what task are to be done when. They are therefore in the 
position to pre order tools or equipment long before the requirement for them occurs due to 
scheduled maintenance requirements. Often Material Planning is a section in itself, with dedicated 
staff who review the Scheduled Maintenance Programme for material requirements. The Material 
Planning section along with the Maintenance Planning section should work very closely. By the 
time it comes to the Production Planning section no scheduled maintenance requirement should be 
new to the Material section, all the Production Planning section do is tell the Material section when 
exactly the material is required. For non Scheduled Maintenance requirements such as 
modifications, Maintenance Planning section should have frequent modification co-ordination 
meetings with the Material section identifying special tooling and material required to accomplish 
the mods. It is not unusual that a section in the Maintenance Planning section is dedicated to 
master planning for major modification programmes and for major component replacements. Such 
as landing gear changes or engine changes. These expenditures are so significant that it is worth 
while to dedicate a section to co-ordinate the programmes attempting to align the major activities 
with the closest and most appropriate down time. Small operators often do not have that luxury and 
the Maintenance Planning section carry out the Master Planning, Maintenance Planning and the 
Production Planning activities. 
Parts and Spares: The Maintenance Planning section producing the work scope should not only 
identify the tools and equipment required to accomplish the tasks but also a material pre load sheet 
detailing all the spares and parts required to accomplish the work scope. This includes the 
components such as generators or fire extinguishers, the consumables such as seals o-rings or oils 
and greases, the mod kits to accomplish modifications. The exact same rules apply to the parts 
and spares that apply to the tools and equipment. Material Planning again should be planning for 
the scheduled maintenance parts well in advance of the input, in fact the aircraft manufacturer will 
provide for the operator a Recommended Spare Part List (RSPL). This is a list of parts and spares 
required as a result of the scheduled maintenance programme provided by the manufacturer (MPD 
/ MRBR) as well as a list of un scheduled parts that through the manufacturers experience may well 
be needed in the course of operating the aircraft. This list is available and adjustable depending 
upon utilisation and service level. One thing to keep in mind is that the manufacturer will also offer 
to sell you the parts in the RSPL, so a little home work is a good idea, perhaps looking closely at 
the Minimum Equipment List when making material orders based upon the RSPL. Some operators 
pool parts with other operators of the same type to minimise the inventory cost, or it may be 
possible to loan components if required due to an unscheduled occurrence, but this is often a very 
expensive. The common pricing for a loan component is 11% per day of the cost of the component. 
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After 100 days you have paid for the component. This decision has to be taken with some risk 
assessment., for example.. 
An Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) for a B737-NG is totally on condition and has no scheduled 
life. The IDG has an industry mean time between unscheduled removal (MTBUR) of 65,000 flight 
hours. The cost of the IDG is around 250,000 US Dollars. In addition the B737-NG can be 
dispatched with only one IDG operative according to the MEL for normal operations, but not for an 
ETOPs flight. An non ETOPs operator has no reason to buy an IDG according to the statistics. 
Scenario. 
1. The operator does not buy an IDG. If the unit fails he places an AOG (Aircraft on Ground) order 
paying a premium of an extra 20% to get the unit on short notice if he can. He operates the 
aircraft under the MEL until the replacement IDG is available. He is able to negotiate apart 
exchange with his unserviceable IDG. 
250,000 x 1.20 = 300,000 USD but gets back 150,000 for his u/s unit =a total cost of 200, OOOUSD. 
By not planning for this unit replacement the operator is opening himself to risk. The risk of not 
being able to get a unit, the risk of paying over the odds for the AOG unit, the risk of a second 
failure while the first failure is un addressed and also the budget allocation may not be available for 
such a large expenditure. 
2. The operator buys a spare IDG at 250,000 USD and holds it in store. It sits there for 3 years 
and is never called upon to be installed. 
On great advantage of having the unit in stock is that your are prepared in the event of the IDG 
failure and no disturbance to the operation will take place and no expensive AOG orders will be 
required. Aso you are in a position to trade the units use and make the inventory work as a 
capital investment for the owner. It can be offered for loan for AOG requirements at 1% per 
day. The period that you have it out on loan increases the risk of course, and also 
consideration to the usage on the spare by another operator is of concern. 
3. The operator does not buy a complete IDG unit, but along with an other operator pools the unit, 
both owning 50% of the spare and both being able to call upon the spare at any time due to 
component failure. This is a good agreement as not only do you have access to a spare IDG 
you pay only 50% of the cost of owning that IDG, of course you only actually own 50% of the 
capital but you reduce your risk of requiring an IDG and not being able to get one massively. 
There is a remote possibility that both of the owners require the IDG at the same time, this 
means some agreement needs to be made that in that case the cost of getting another IDG 
must be bome by both parties, thus in that situation the benefits of pooling parts is often lost. A 
consideration to an additional charge to the operator that actually uses the spare IDG should 
be made, perhaps an hourly cost over and above the 50% owner ship cost. 
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4. Another common method of meeting the requirement for a component when it is required due 
to an unscheduled reason is by paying a subscription to a service provider who has an 
inventory of parts. He in effect becomes your available RSPL inventory. Often you are charged 
a subscription to have access to the inventory and a further charge when you use a part, often 
based on an hourly utilisation charge. For example 
An operator of four B737-NGs does not want to spend the 12,000,000 USD on an RSPL 
Boeing recommend for a four aircraft fleet of B737's operating at 6,000 flight hours per year. 
Since he is a low cost start up airline he can not afford the capital expenditure. He equally can 
not risk the cancellation of a flight due to non availability of a spare as this will also cost 
massively in lost revenue. The answer he goes for is to pay KLM a 40 B737-NG fleet operator 
a subscription to have access to their inventory. In addition to the annual subscription based on 
an estimated flight hour utilisation an additional cost is charged per flight hour when a 
component is claimed. The unit removed from the low Cost Operator then goes into the 
inventory of KLM available for the KLM fleet or indeed any other operators in the subscription 
deal. There are of course a few conditions to the deal. Many major components are not 
included in this deal, such as engines or landing gear. The Low Cost operator must maintain 
their mod standards of their aircraft to that of KLM, which means accomplishing ETOPs mods 
and some other optional mods that perhaps the Low Cost Operator would have chosen not to 
do. 
It is the responsibility of the Material Section along with the Finance section to calculate the 
best scenario for the operator. It be seen that to take a flight cancellation is a better business 
decision than to hold an expensive part in stock on the presumption it may be needed. 
Documentation Availability: The Maintenance Planning section define the work scope and 
provide the task cards to accomplish the work scope. Often the task cards refer to maintenance 
manuals or other controlled documents. The Production Planning should ensure that the 
referenced documents required to accomplish the work scope are complete and readily available. 
This may mean identifying maintenance manual section required and printing them off or obtaining 
referred to procedures. If this is not done it will result in the maintenance technician not having the 
complete instructions to carry out the task, which is a situation that will either waste time or result in 
the possible compromisation of the technician. This rule applies definitely to tasks in the work 
scope, to those generated as non routine tasks during the work scope accomplishment it can also 
be argued that the Production Planning section also play an important role. This will be discussed 
next. 
Pro Input Meeting: It is the Production Planning section responsibility to call the pre input meeting 
once all the Production Planning tasks are accomplished or at least on the way to being 
accomplished. This should be done as soon after the Maintenance Planning section has handed 
over the Work Scope and the Production Planning section has had time to review it and at least 
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start the Production Planning process. The pre input meeting should take place no later then two 
weeks prior to an input for minor maintenance and three weeks for major maintenance. For Line 
maintenance it can be as short as one week and be in a form of a pre input hand over for simple 
tasks. The Production Planning section should chair the meeting and invite representatives from 
the following sections... 
Production (maintenance) Section: To explain the work scope and the Production Plan including 
the shift patterns, as they are the people who will accomplish the work scope. Liaison with 
Production must be constant and almost daily to ensure manpower is understood and available 
and that the Production Plan is accepted. The work scope should be read through by the 
supervisors that will be leading the individual trades during the input. 
Material Section: To be able to present the material shortages and estimated expected dates. 
Material section need also to know the shift patterns as they may be required to supply store 
personnel. 
Qua Lity section- They need to be aware of the work scope and input dates so as to scheduled any 
audits or to review any procedures. 
Development En-qineerinq Section: They are the section responsible for writing any Engineering 
Orders for modifications or special inspection, they need to be aware of any special tasks being 
accomplished. Also they need to be on stand by in case of any problems or findings requiring 
Engineering assistance. Also the Development Engineering section may well be responsible for 
revising documents or manuals such as the MEL or AFM or AMM, for this reason they need to be 
aware of any modification being accomplished. 
Operations and Flight Crew sections: In the event that significant changes to the aircraft will be 
made at an input, such as the installation of Satellite Communication (SATCOM), are to be made it 
is important that the Operations section and the Flight Crew representatives are aware in order to 
revise their manuals or to plan for training for the crew as required. The Flight Crew Fleet Manager 
should be aware of any significant modification programme on his fleet long before Production 
planning start their planning activities. 
Production Control. 
Though the Production Planning Engineer who has carried out all the Production Planning activities 
prior to the input, effectively hands over the management of the maintenance input on the day the 
input starts to the Production Line Manager (some times known as the Forman), it should not be 
the end of his involvement. The Production Planning Engineers role now changes from that of a 
Planning Engineer to that of a Check Controller. The main duties here are assisting the Production 
Line Manager in implementing a downtime that is in accordance or as close as possible to the 
Production Plan. The Production Planning Engineer may have a team of check planner or also 
called doc planners who assist the Production Crew with the following activities... 
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Non Routine Finding Planning: This involves the scheduling of the NRC's that arise as a result of 
the scheduled maintenance tasks. To ensure that the findings receive as much as scheduled tasks 
with regards to task planning all the activities described above, task sequencing, production 
planning, manpower planning, material planning, documentation availability, all these planning 
tasks are as applicable for noun routine findings as they are for scheduled maintenance tasks. It 
should be the Production Planning sections tasks to carry them out. 
Task Sequencing: The Production Planning section should receive all NRC's raised as soon as 
they are raised, then identify where the NRC can be best addressed. For example does it require 
power on, does it require special conditions, what access does it need etc. Each NRC should be 
prioritised with in the greater scheme of the complete check. It would be incorrect if as soon as the 
routine task is completed the maintenance technician then goes onto the NRC*s that he generated. 
It is important to identify that the routine tasks should all be completed first, then the NRC's 
addressed unless the NRC's is identified as requiring urgent special attention then it will be 
sequenced to start immediately. 
Production Planning: The master production plan should be referred to every day. The morning 
meetings should have a routine agenda where reviewing the production plan versus where the 
production is actual at should be one of the prime issues discussed. The Morning Input Production 
Meeting Agenda should contain the following items.. 
1. Are we on target with the Production Plan? 
2. What are the critical NRC's? 
3. What are the material shortages? 
4. How is the manpower? 
The Production Meeting should be chaired by the Production Line Manager responsible for the 
input, but the Production Planning section are key in this meeting and the relationship with the 
Production Line Manager and the Production Planning Engineer (Check Controller) is one of 
information and support. 
Production Plan: If the answer to 1. above is no then the reasons why the production is not in line 
with the plan should be asked. If possible remedial action should be taken to get back on target or 
inevitably the plan should be changed. It is not the end of the world if the plan has to be changed as 
many occurrences during the input will cause reason for the plan to possibly change. This is 
especially true for findings. This is why it is important for the inspections to be completed as quickly 
as possible or at a pre agreed milestone, so as the Production Line Manager and the Production 
Planning Engineer know where the they stand with respect to the generation of NRC's. The 
Production Plan should reflect the NRC's as they are raised and should show milestones for 
NRC's or show adjustment of already defined milestones as required for example, if a structural 
crack is found and the NRC calls for NDT of the crack, this along with other NRC's requiring NDT 
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should appear in the Production Plan as a milestone, similarly if corrosion Is found In the pylon 
resulting in major access being required, or if a hydraulic leak defect is found that prevents the 
milestone for hydraulic power on from being achieved then the milestone needs to be adjusted 
accordingly. The new activities associated with an NRC should appear in the Production Plan as 
NRC milestones or activities but just as not every routine task appears as an activity or a milestone 
not every NRC should appear only the key significant NRC*s. It is the Production Planning 
Engineers job to identify where the actual production progress is behind the plan and where 
discussion should be focused as to adjust the plan or the work methods to attempt not to delay the 
final milestone of check completed. So it can be seen that with proper use and continuous update 
of the Production Plan that the Plan during the execution of the check has six major roles.. 
1. Allows for comparison of actual progress with planned progress. 
2. Alows for the inclusion of significant findings in the Production Plan. 
3. Alows for the Production section to be aware of the next work to be accomplished. 
4. Adlows for identification and following of critical task accomplishment (routine and non routine). 
5. Alows management to more easily consider theoretical adjustments to Production to attempt 
to meet milestones. 
6. Enables an actual record of progress for future inputs. 
Manpower Planning: The initial Production Plan assumed a man power availability. It is the 
Production Planning Engineers task to ensure that the Production Line Manager has in fact 
scheduled the agreed man power on each shift. If the Production actual progress is behind the 
Production Plan the Production Planning Engineer should suggest the reallocation of man power or 
supplementation of non planned man power (internal or external contracted man power) to enable 
the plan to get back on track. One of the reasons additional man power may be required is as a 
result of the NRC*S. The rate of findings may be in excess of the estimated planned time for defect 
rectification, thus either a compromise in mile stone adjustment or man power reallocation needs to 
be made if supplemental manpower is not available. The value of this exercise is also for future 
inputs. So it can be said that manpower planning during the check has three values.. 
1. To identify that the planned manpower is actually being used. 
2. To identify and co-ordinate manpower requirement changes as a result of findings (NRC*s). 
3. To keep a historical record for future planning of the man power requirements of tasks and 
activities accomplished on the focus input. 
Material Planning: This function is not really the role of the Production Planning section but is of 
the Material Planning Section. Each input should have a material planner assigned to the input. it is 
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his task to progress the material requirements that occur during the input as a result of findings 
(NRC's). One of the most important questions of the daily Production Meeting is what are the 
material shortages, because with out the required material, spares or tools, the task can not be 
addressed and rectified. It is not unusual that major milestones of a plan have had to adjusted due 
to the non availability of a component. This issues goes back to that described in the first 
explanation of material planning of what material to hold and what not and the risks associated with 
that decision. It may be an idea for the Production Planning staff assigned to the Check Controller 
for an input to conduct the material requisitioning as a result of Production raising NRC's. This 
could an advantage in that the Production staff could be kept on the aircraft carrying out scheduled 
tasks while the Production Planning section carry out the material requisitioning and follow up with 
the material section. This may show a need for a skilled Production Planning staff member who is 
capable of researching and identifying the material (and tooling) requirement to address an NRC, 
but just as Production Planning do this for routine they in theory should be capable for non routine. 
It is my opinion that this is a delicate subject and if managed correctly could result in improved 
production man power availability to carry out on aircraft tasks. A few skilled material or production 
planning researchers could take the NRC from the Maintenance Technician and carry out the 
research and co-ordination required to identify what is required to address the particular NRC. This 
would should be in my opinion finalised with feedback to the originating technician for conformation. 
Documentation Availability: The last paragraph talked about how to maximise the Production 
sections time on "on aircraft" tasks by enabling the Production Planning staff to take on some 
administrative technical roles such as material research. Similarly I would like to expand that role by 
including certain documentation research. It is the Production Planning sections role to supply all 
task cards, manuals and documents referred to in the complete work scope before the input starts, 
similarly it should in my opinion be the Production Planning tasks to supply all the required manuals 
or documents required by the Production section for the addressing of findings resulting in NRC's. 
SRM, AMM, IPC or indeed drawing research can be done by Production Planning staff with the 
necessary skills and training. Of course this should be finalised by the acceptance of the research 
document outcome by the originating Production technician. The reference should then be 
attached to the relevant NRC. For example, a Maintenance technician raises a NRC as follows... 
NRC Finding Details: Hydraulic Fluid Leaking from the Rudder Actuator over and above the 
maintenance manual limits. Replace the actuator. 
From this the Production Planning staff allocated to the maintenance input in my opinion should 
carry out the following tasks... 
1. Document Research: They refer to firstly the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) and find the 
procedure for replacing the actuator. They then move on to the Illustrated Parts Catalogue 
(IPC) and locate the subject component. This attached to the NRC. 
2. Material Research: From the AMM and IPC they identify the spares including seals & 
lubricants, the tooling to carry out the replacement. Once reviewed and confirmed by the 
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originating technician they then go ahead and raise the requisition for the material planner to 
progress. They get feed back on availability. 
3. NRC Task Sequencing: The Production Planning staff then sequence the task. This involves 
understanding the implications of the task, the man hours to conduct it and how the task fits In 
to the complete maintenance input. 
4. Adjusting the Production Plan: The Production Plan will have allocated time for defect 
rectification and the major milestones should take into consideration a certain amount for 
findings. It is upto the Production Planning staff member whether or not to include the Non 
Routine Component Replacement as individual activities or as a grouped activity. Only after all 
NRC's are raised can the complete routine and non routine work scope be known and hence 
whether the Production Plan major mile stones need to be adjusted. 
5. Manpower Planning: In this case the NRC finding does not require a specialist that needs 
external co-ordination. Non the less the NRC task requires manpower to rectify, this needs to 
be planned for at some point in the near future, where the in Production Plan it is planned for 
rectification. 
A Meeting Schedule for the Maintenance Planning Sections. 
A recommended meeting schedule where all the departments and sections concerned with 
downtime should meet is as follows... 
The Daily Flight Line Technical Operation 
Schedule Section Attending Agenda 
Daily Chair: Line Maintenance. Yesterdays flight operation. 
Base Maintenance, Delays, defects, flight line 
Maintenance Planning, material shortages, saftey & 
Technical Services, Material airworthiness issues. 
section, Quality Assurance. Tomorrows flight operation. 
AOG occurances (aircraft On 
Ground). 
Weekly Chair: Line Maintenance. Last weeks flight operation 
Base Maintenance, Maintenance & Engineering 
Maintenance Planning, issues. Open Deferred 
Technical Services, Material Defects. Last weeks Line 
section, Quality Assurance Maintenance activities 
planned & unplanned & next 
weeks planned Maintenance 
I 
Acticities.. 
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The Maintenance Planning Meeting 
Schedule Section Attending Agenda 
Weekly Chair: Maintenance Planning. One week into the future in 
Operations section, Line detail, planned maintenance 
Maintenance, Base activities. 
Maintenance, Four weeks into the future, 
planned maintenance 
activities. 
Monthly Chair: Maintenance Planning. 4 months into the future 
Operations section. Line planned maintenance 
Maintenance, Base activities. 
Maintenance. 
2 Monthly Modification Chair: Maintenance Planning, Review all open modification 
Planning Meeting Base Maintenance, Technical & bulletins that have been 
services, Material section. accepted for accomplishment 
to the each fleet. 
3 Monthly Chair: Maintenance Planning. 12 months into the future 
Operations section. Line planned maintenance 
Maintenance, Base activities. 
Maintenance, 
6 Monthly Chair: Maintenance Planning. 36 months into the future 
Operations section. Line planned maintenance 
Maintenance, Base activities. 
Maintenance, 
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The Production Planning & Control Meeting 
Schedule Section Attending Agenda 
4 Weeks Prior to Input. Pre Chair: Production Planning & Deatils of a specisific 
Input Meeting. Control, Base Maintenance, maintenance input. 
Technical Services, Material 
section, Quality Assurance. 
1 Week Prior to Input. Chair: Production Planning & Details of the actual 
Production Plan Meeting. (for Control, Base Maintenance, Production Plan. Final 
large or complex inputs) Technical Services, Material coordination meeting before 
section, Quality Assurance. the input starts. Handing over 
the work scope to Base 
Maintenance. 
Daily (input Progress Chair: Base Maintenance & Last days progress, todays 
Meeting). Production Planning & plan & tomorrows review. 
Control (joint). Technical Q*s to be asked.. 
Services, Material section, Are we to Plan? Quality Assurance. 
What are the material 
shortages? 
What are the signifcant 
defetes? 
What are the man power 
requirements? 
1 week Post Input (input Chair: Production Planning & To review & evaluate the 
Wash Up Meeting) Control / Base Maintenance maintenance input that just (joint). Technical Services, took place. Q's to be asked.. 
Material section, Quality Were we to Plan? Assurance. 
Does the Plan need to be 
ajusted? 
What were the significant 
defects? 
Man power/ Human Factor 
Issues? 
Work Scope / Task Issues? 
Documentation Issues? 
Material Issues? 
Safteyissues? 
Were we to budget? 
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5.1.3 Task Cards, Work Documents & The Maintenance Manual. 
Scheduled Maintenance Tasks work instruction on how to accomplish the task will be detailed in a 
Routine Task Card, RTC. The scheduled maintenance task can originate from a variety from 
sources, the majority being from the MRBR. Remember earlier in section 2.2.4 the MPD was 
introduced as a document produced by the manufacturer clarifying the MRBR in a more usable 
form. Most of the RTC tasks will originate from the MPD and be available as manufacturers task 
cards that are available with the MPD from the manufacturer. Provided these task cards are not 
generic and are custornised to correspond to the configuration of the operators aircraft, these cards 
will detail totally acceptable work accomplishment instructions for the operator to follow to comply 
with the scheduled maintenance task. It is my opinion that not to use these cards and to re write the 
cards into a company format should be decision taken with careful consideration. If the MPD task 
card work details do differ from the operators configuration for example the aircraft has been 
modified then the MPD task card should be revised to reflect the aircrafts actual configuration. For 
example if MPD scheduled maintenance task 21 
-010-00-01 calls for the replacement of the H EPA 
Filter gaining access to the filter access through the forward cargo lining, when the aircraft has had 
auxiliary fuel tanks installed in the forward cargo area blocking the access to the filter, the card 
would not be applicable as it does not reflect the correct aircraft configuration, and should be 
subject to revision perhaps replaced by a company written task cards rather then utilising the MPD 
task card. Or another example could be MPD task 27-030-00-01 calls for lubrication of the Flap 
Track Screw Jack and the MPD task card details the procedure to be followed identifying the 
lubrication point at the top left hand of the screw jack main body, but screw jack installed has the 
lubrication point at a different location, then the MPD task cards would not reflect the correct 
configuration, then the MPD task card would need to be revised. The first example where the 
auxiliary fuel tasks were installed after delivery by a modification company through an 
Supplemental Type Certificate STC, would possibly result in a differing configuration from those 
reflected in the MPD task card set, since using the STC method the manufacturer of the aircraft 
Boeing, may well not be aware of the configuration change. But the second example of the flap 
screwjack could of resulted from a modification SB from the manufacturer being accomplished on 
the flap screw jacks. In this case the manufacturer who issued the S13 should be aware through 
operator feedback of all S13 accomplishment to ensure the relevant manufacturer supplied 
documents, in this case the MPD and task cards set, are subsequently revised, thus eliminating the 
need for the operator to write his own task card. So it can be seen it is important to inform the 
manufacturer of SB accomplishment for relevant revisions to the Manufacturer provided documents 
such as the AMM, IPC and MPD task Card set. For those configuration changes that are not 
originated by OEM SB's that have scheduled maintenance implications, the operator must consider 
revision of the existing scheduled maintenance procedures by writing their own RCT. AJso for those 
tasks in the operators scheduled maintenance programme that do not originate from the MPD, 
such as company added tasks or regulatory authority required tasks, must be included in the 
maintenance programme with their own written RTC. 
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SB accomplishment whether it is a modification or an inspection should also have their own 
detailed work instruction. Often operators produce Engineering Orders, EO*s, to accomplish SB's. 
These work instructions should reflect operators aircraft configuration and once accomplished 
trigger a series of events where the manufacturer is ultimately informed when he will then revised 
the relevant manufacturers supplied documents to reflect the new configuration. 
in the case of RTC's or EO*s both should reflect the relevant maintenance manual procedures to 
conduct the tasks. In modem MSG3 aircraft the manufacturer supplying the MPD RTC has set up 
his aircraft maintenance manual and RTC systems so that the AMM is auto printed on the relevant 
RTC, thus eliminating the need to revise two procedures when a revision take place. This has only 
started to be seen in the modem MSG 3 aircraft whose MRBR / MPD has been generated from the 
most recent MSG 3 methodology, such as the B777, B737-NG & A330. In the past the philosophy 
was that the RTC was for scheduled maintenance and the AMM was for defect rectification. This is 
no longer the philosophy. The AMM previously regarded as a tool for defect rectification is now a 
document that details all maintenance procedures both scheduled tasks and defect rectification. 
The AMM now uses a standard called AMTOSS, aircraft maintenance task support system. The 
AMTOSS number is a twelve digit AT code that leads to a specific section in the AMM. For 
example/ with the B737-NG. 
- 
AMM AMTOSS 27-41-71-700-801 Details the Horizontal Stabiliser Trim Motor Test. 
This task though in the AMM is also a scheduled maintenance task. (Note: AMTOSS ending in 801 
is standardised as a test procedure always. ). Task Card (RTC) 27-120-01 
-00 is to conduct A Trim 
Motor Test of the Horizontal Stabiliser. The RTC refers on the first line to the AMTOSS & the task 
work details is a complete extract from the AMM. This means an operator has now an option to 
continue to use the RTC's as has been the standard in the past or to use directly the AMM through 
the AMTOSS reference. The latter being quite controversial as is has been industry standard in the 
past to stage work steps on task cards enabling multi signatures for work step that culminate to 
accomplish a scheduled maintenance task. It is my opinion that middle ground can be found 
satisfying the need to stage complex work steps addressing Human Factor issues, while 
eliminating the need to require a lengthy texts to be issued, stamped, returned and stored for future 
reference. Provided a complete reference is made utilising the AMTOSS and those scheduled 
maintenance tasks that are complex are identified, thus accommodated by multi step enabling, a 
single line calling for the task accomplishment should suffice as the permanent record of the work 
accomplished, eliminating the need to issue, stamp and return a multi page RTC. This method I 
believe is clear, reduces waste and minimises on non required non-essential paper. Caution should 
be used as there are times the complete RTC may be the relevant vehicle to be used. 
See Attachment 7 for a Sign Off sheet that includes over 50 scheduled maintenance tasks, but 
requires on 5 pages, while the RTC's for those 50 scheduled maintenance tasks would result in 
150 pages. The choice can still be made to use the RTC as a referenced working document that is 
recycled time again, or to use the AMM ATOSS directly. It is my opinion that depending upon the 
circumstances wither is relevant for use. For example on the A Check the RTC's should be 
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available for work reference, as technicians may wish to take the complete procedure to the aircraft 
as they conduct the task, as they should, but on a Line check where one technician is caring out 10 
scheduled maintenance tasks the AMM AMTOSS directly on a Lap Top computer with a single 
sign off sheet referring the AMTOSS is more relevant than a folder of RTC's. Remember both the 
RTC and the AMTOSS are in effect the exact same procedure word for word. See Attachment 7 for 
a sign off sheet that refers directly to the AMTOSS with out using the RTC. In the second example 
shown in Attachment 7 the RTC may need to be produced for reference if the operator has written 
his own RTC, since that procedure may not be in the AMM and will not have a relevant AMTOSS. 
Though many criticise this system as opening the possibility of procedures not being followed, as if 
each RTC work step needs to be signed off each work step procedure will be accurately followed, 
while if it is just referred to, the temptation may be not to read each individual work step. This a valid 
issue and does need addressing through Human Factor training, but remember defect rectification 
can be done in a technical log and is often a single sentence, for example what can be a bigger 
defect rectification than an engine change 
.... 
Engine CFM56-7B Serial No 1234 has been replaced by CFM56-7B Serial No 2345 law with AMM 
72-00-02-000-801 
-FOO & 72-00-02400-FOO. 
The Technical log book entry and work step details for one of the most complex of tasks is shown 
above. We must remember technicians and engineers are trained from the beginning to follow 
referred to procedures always in aircraft maintenance. I must say that with the example I use 
though it is often the practice, I do believe that with such complex tasks it is relevant to give 
extended work step details, but the principle remains, those complex scheduled maintenance tasks 
can be identified in advance and catered for. 
So in summary the AMM has undergone a massive change in philosophy and we as maintainers of 
aircraft should task use of its new possibilities removing wastage and inefficiencies. 
One of the observation I have made with the RTC and the new AMM, is that if you operate a mixed 
fleet type, e. g. B737-200, B747-800, since these aircraft are from differing periods of time and 
subsequently differing MSG philosophies with their Maintenance Programmes and with the AMM's, 
a case does exist for the operator to define his own inspection definitions and RTC's rather than 
using the manufacturers products for scheduled maintenance. 
For example.. 
The B737-200 MRBR is not the same revision of MSG as the B737-800 hence the inspection 
definitions for structural and Zonal inspections are different. The general Visual Inspection of the 
B737-800 calls for "within arms length" while the B737-200 does not. By issuing to the same 
technicians who will conduct the same type of scheduled maintenance on both types of aircraft 
there may be confusion. One type does not use AMM ATMOSS while the other does also adds to 
the possible confusion. This may well justify what a lot of the big world operators do, that is write 
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completely their own Scheduled Maintenance Programmes using their own written RTC's referring 
to their own company defined inspection definitions. This means they need a large department to 
write their own RTC's completely for the sake of constant maintenance standards. This means the 
operator will not take advantage of the progressions made in aircraft maintenance as his fleet 
modemises. While this is definitely a Human Factor issue, in my opinion it can be over come with 
good MSG3 training for technicians and engineers, who until now have not been trained or involved 
with the new MSG3 concepts. I believe this is a flaw in our industry with our standard system of 
training maintenance technicians and inspection staff. This issue will be dealt with in detail in the 
section 5.3 entitled Human Factors Associated with Accomplishing the Maintenance Programme. 
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5.2 Non Routine Findings: The Results of Scheduled Maintenance. 
5.2.1 Non Routine Findings: Classification. 
Remembering that the Scheduled maintenance tasks are mostly fault finding tasks. An effective 
maintenance programme when carried out will result in findings. These findings are referred to as 
Non Routine, the maintenance actions required to correct the findings are referred to as Non 
Routine Maintenance Tasks, (also as unscheduled maintenance tasks). It is normal that on during 
a scheduled maintenance input the Non Routine Findings are detailed on a Non Routine Card, 
NRC. So as a result of Routine Cards, RCs, NRCs are raised. A more detailed definition of the 
NRCs are 
Non Routine Findings are those findings resulting from carrying out Routine Maintenance Tasks, 
(Scheduled Maintenance), that indicate a reduction in the inherent reliability of the original design of 
the aircraft. These findings should be registered and detailed onto a Non Routine Card referring 
back to the Routine Task that detected them in the first place. On the NRC reference should be 
made to the RC that detected them and a detail of the finding indicating exactly where the reduction 
in inherent reliability is and when relevant quantifying that reduction. 
For example 
Routine Task Card 57-200-00-01 is a Scheduled Maintenance Zonal Task that calls for a GVI of 
the Left Hand Wing Underside in board of the P&n. 
Non Routine Task Card, NRC 100200 was raised as a result of the RC. Details entered on the 
NRC are as follows.. 
Finding: Ref RC 57-200-00-01 Slight surface corrosion was found in zone 510 underwing just 
inboard of Noll pyllon. 
Rectification: Corrosion removed in accordance with SRM 57-10-00 and removed metal 
measured using a DTI and found to be 1 thousands of an inch, within allowable damage tolerance 
as detailed in SIRM 57-10-00 hence corrosion level 1. Bare metal re protected, primed & repainted 
law SIRM 57-10-01. 
Other details required on the NRC will include categorising the ATA chapter 57, the man-hours to 
conduct the rectification action, any parts used during the rectification action and the name and 
certification of the certifying technician or engineer. 
Another example.. 
Routine Task Card 26-100-00-00 is a Scheduled Maintenance Operation Check Task that calls for 
an Operation Check of the Fire and Overheat Detection System.. 
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Non Routine Task Card, NRC 100201 was raised as a result of the RC. Details entered on the 
NRC are as follows.. 
Finding: Ref RC 26-100-00-00 When conducting Fire Detection Overheat Ops check AMTOSS 
26-10-00-710-801 the APU IN OP DET light remained on. 
Rectification: Ref FIM 26-10 Task 801. Task 26-10-00-810-801 carried out. APU Fire Detection 
Control Module BITE Test. APU Overheat Detector Element found defective. Removal carried out 
iaw AMTOSS 26-15-01-000-801, Replacement carried out law AMTOSS 26-15-01-400-801. RC 
26-100-00-00 carried out again, system working normally. 
Other details required on the N RC will include categorising the ATA chapter 26-10, the man-hours 
to conduct the rectification action, any parts used during the rectification action in this case part 
number and serial number of the off and on detector and the batch number of the on detector, and 
the name and certification of the certifying technician or engineer. 
it can be seen in both cases above that the result of conducting the failure finding scheduled routine 
maintenance tasks that non routine unscheduled findings occurred. They were registered and a 
NRC raised and rectification action was taken restoring the inherent reliability of the original design. 
AM actions were detailed in the NRC and the NRC should be linked back to the RC. The important 
issues here are that the maintenance programme that defined the scheduled maintenance task 
worked, and the NRC details are comprehensive enough showing exactly what the technician / 
engineer found and exactly what he did to rectify the findings referring back to the maintenance 
documentation available each time to guide him through the rectification process. The section 
responsible for defining the maintenance programme should register the finding accordingly in a 
database for future reference to later support the maintenance programme tasks. In the case when 
the RC is carried out resulting in no findings then no NRC is raised. A continued of absence of 
findings may result in an interval escalation application of the task, conversely the continued 
occurrence of findings could result in a more detailed examination of the reasons and perhaps 
result in a interval de escalation of the task or further reliability studies. 
5.2.2 Unscheduled Component Changes. 
Example 2 above showed a NRC resulting in a component change. This component change can 
be classified as an Unscheduled Component change because the component was replaced as a 
result of failing an operation check and not as a result of a planned removal. Another scenario 
when an unscheduled component change can have been considered to have taken place is when 
an in service defect, PIREP (Pilot Report) detailed in the Technical Log, result in finding a defective 
component hence the component change takes place to rectify the occurrence. This is also an 
unscheduled component change, but should be regarded as slightly different to that when a 
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component is replaced as a result of scheduled maintenance. The PREP resultant unscheduled 
component change is when a component actually fails in the field evident to the flight crew hence at 
the end of ifs P-F range, while with the scheduled maintenance operational check resultant 
unscheduled component change, the component can be considered to have not failed in the field 
but failed an operational check hence starting to decline down the P-F range but not yet at the 
end. Thus again the maintenance programme fault finding task has been effective. AM unscheduled 
component changes should be reviewed and followed up. Conformation of the failed component 
should take place through reviewing the shop report that returns with the unscheduled removed 
component. This report will detail two important factors, a) whether the component did actually fail, 
b) the root cause of failure. 
Unscheduled removals of component should be tracked and with the help of the shop report 
component reliability tracking should be conducted. Mean Time Between Failures and Mean Time 
Between Unscheduled Removals should be recorded for components. If the MTBF and MTBUR 
are followed and compared against the manufacturers data. this will indicate if there is an issue with 
this particular component or system that it exists as a part of. 
A further question raised here with regards to the two scenarios of unscheduled component change 
are as follows... 
When tracking unscheduled component replacements we can have two reasons for the component 
removal... 
1. A component is replaced as a result of a PI REP, hence the component failed in the field, in 
operation. 
2. A component is replaced while on scheduled maintenance when an operational check is 
carried out, but did not fail in the field. 
With both scenarios the shop report (strip report) is reviewed on return of the component from the 
repair shop. Both are confirmed the component required maintenance actions to return it to its 
inherent reliability., but... 
1. Should both removals be strictly classified as unscheduled removals? Since one was not really 
a failure but a degradation of function while the other was an actual failure in the field? 
2. Should both removals be classified if we are calculating MTBF, or one MTBF & the other 
MTBUR? 
This subject will be considered further later in the thesis under the section of Component Reliability 
Monitoring. 
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5.3 Human Factors Associated with Accomplishing the Maintenance 
Programme. 
What Is the definition of Human Factors? 
Boeing Human factors Work Group: 
OHuman Factors (HF) is a disciplined approach for incorporating human capabilities and limitations 
into the design, operation and maintenance of technological systems" 
US FAA Human Factors Process Overview Work Took 
"Human factors is a multidisciplinary effort to generate and compile information about human 
capabilities and limitations and apply that information to. 
- 
Equipment 
- 
Systems 
- 
Software 
- 
Facilities 
- 
Procedures 
- 
Jobs 
- 
Environments 
- 
Training 
- 
Staffing 
- 
Personnel management 
to produce safe, comfortable, effective human performancew 
JAA JAR 145.5: 
"Human factors are principles that apply to aircraft design, certirication, training, operation and 
maintenance that enable a safe interface between the human and other systems and components 
giving proper consideration to human performance. " 
"Human performance is the human capabilfties and limitations, which have an impact on the safety 
and effidlency of aeronautical operations. 11 
These three international definitions of Human Factors lean towards basically the same thing, that 
is the understanding of human capabilities and performance with in the context of design, operation 
and maintenance of the aircraft or indeed ancillary activities related to the design, operation and 
maintenance of the aircraft. 
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Around 80% of all aircraft losses today are attributed to human error, the other 20% attributed to 
mechanical failures. And it is envisaged by HF professionals as the mechanical design becomes 
more expert and computerised human induced failures percentages will only increase. 
Significant Human Factors Events. 
Chicago 1979, DC 10. 
The manufacturers detailed procedure for removing and installing an engine and a pyion was 
available in the aircraft maintenance manual. In that procedure it detailed that the engine first and 
then the pylon should be removed giving the exact part number of tooling, hoists and equipment 
the manufacturer approved to be used to accomplish the procedure. The airline was conducting a 
programme of engine and pylon removals on the DC 10 fleet and had identified an alternative 
procedure that cut on aircraft downtime and required man hours. This alternative procedure involve 
removing both the pylon and the engine while attached to each other at the same time utilising a 
fork lift truck. He fork lift truck would be elevated to take the weight of the engine and pylon then the 
attachments of the pylon to wing would be removed. Unknown to the airline that adopted this 
alternative procedure they were inducing excessive strain to the attaching structural members. The 
resultant weakening of the metal eventually manifested itself in the separation of the engine and 
pylon one DC 10 during take off. The aircraft hence yawed massively out of control and crash 
landed on the ground. 
The outcome of the investigation was that proper procedures were not followed resulting in the 
accident. 
Hawaii 1988, B737-200. 
The B737-200 fleet were being subjected to an inspection programme that looked closely at the 
aircraft external crown for evidence of defects. After the programme was carried out on one specific 
B737, the complete crown skin of the aircraft separated from the rest of the aircraft structure, 
exposing the complete cabin interior. The two inspectors that carried out the programme on that 
particular aircraft had 28 and 30 years respective maintenance experience. 
The outcome of the investigation identified many issues, one being that the hanger where the 
inspections were conducted was simply too dark and could of assisted in the inspectors not 
noticing the cracks. 
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Miami 1983, L-1 011 Tristar. 
The L-I 011 aircraft underwent regular engine oil system magnetic chip detector inspections, where 
a technician would remove the magnetic chip detectors, install new detectors from stores and send 
the removed ones to the lab for checking. The normal procedure was that new o rings should also 
be taken from the store and installed on the new chip detectors prior to installation on the engine. 
on one occasion after carrying out the magnetic chip detector task and after aircraft take off all 
three engines lost engine oil. The pilot noticed the flight deck warnings and went around to carry out 
an emergency landing. The third engine shut down seconds after the pilot managed to make that 
emergency landing. 
The outcome of the investigation was a new technician carried out the task for the first time but 
failed to install new o rings on the newly installed chip detectors. 
AM three examples of incidents resulted from Human Factors. The first showed the use of a non 
standard procedure, the second inadequate equipment and environment, the third incorrect training 
and incorrect procedure. 
Human Factors and the Regulations In Aircraft Maintenance. 
Identifying Human Factors as a significant contributing element to aircraft safety in maintenance 
engineering the organisations and authorities started to revise their recommendations and 
regulation to consider Human Factors... 
ICAO added Annex 6, Chapter 8. 
'rhe training programme established by the maintenance organisation shall include training in 
knowledge and skills related to Human Performance, including co-ordination with other 
maintenance personnel and flight crew. " 
. 
"The design and application of the operators maintenance programme shag observe human factors 
principles. " 
The ATA added Specification 113 - Maintenance Human Factor Programme Guide Lines. 
The JAA recognising that Human Factors needed to be taken into consideration in the 
Maintenance Organisation started to formalise consideration to HF issues in Dec 1998 through the 
set up of the JAA maintenance Human Factors Working Group. Which resulted in March 2003 
publication of JAR 145 amendment 5. The JAA identified also in JAR 66 the need for HF training 
and in JAR 145 amendment 5 the need to consider HF in almost all aspects of aircraft 
maintenance. 
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As a result of Amendment 5 the following changes were recognised 
JAR 145.47 The need for Production Planning. To assist in enabling the best possible preparation 
prior to conducting aircraft maintenance. 
JAR 145.60 Elaborated on Occurrence Reporting, to identify and document areas that need 
attention noticed or detected by maintenance personnel. 
JAR 145.45 c, The need for clear and correct maintenance data available at all times to 
maintenance personnel. 
The JAA Human factors Working Group went on in detail to recognised two distinct areas requiring 
to address HIF issues... 
1. Organisational Issues: Those that can be addressed through an organisational rule change. 
2. Training Issues: Those that can be addressed through dedicated HF training. 
Three Criticality Levels were defined by the Work Group 
Criticality 1: the most critical. 
Criticality 2: moderately critical. 
Criticality 3: the least critical. 
Omanisational Issues 
Criticality 1: 
a. Design: Manufacturers documentation and Maintainability. 
b. Fatigue: Working hours. 
c. Safety Culture: Blame free for reporting purposes. 
d. Inspection: Understanding what inspection methods are to be used. 
e. Non Compliance with procedures: Developing alternative procedures or not following approved 
methods. 
f. Poor Planning of Tasks: Production Planning & Control. 
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g. Shifts / Handover: Clear communication methods. 
h. Signing of Task not seen: Certify only the tasks you witness. 
I. Shortage of Maintenance Staff: Adequate amount of Inspector and Technicians. 
Criticality 2: 
a. Technical Documentation: Access to and revision control. 
b. Pressure: Turn around times and down times. 
c. Tools and Equipment: Design, maintenance, accessibility and availability. 
d. Work Place: Lighting, environment/climate, noise. 
Criticality 3: 
a. Computerisation: Appropriateness and adequacy of computerised systems. 
Traininq Issues 
Criticality 1: 
a. Behaviour: Error provoking, alternative procedure culture. 
b. Communication: Meetings and reporting. 
c. Fatigue: Leave and tiredness. 
d. Human Training: Leadership., team work. 
Safety Culture: 
Interruptions while performing tasks. 
g. Poor Planning. 
Criticality 2: 
a. Technical documentation: Ability to use. 
b. Pressure: How to manage ones own work. 
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Criticality 3: 
a. Personal Performance: Health check ups. 
b. Repetitive Tasks: Complacency. 
c. Cultures: Possible intercultural issues. 
Maintenance Resource Management. 
In the 1990*s it was seen required by the FAA to issue an Advisory Circular to address the issue of 
Crew Resource Management, CRM, AC 120-51 D was issued explaining what the FAA regarded 
as acceptable methods for the management of flight crew human resource issues. This AC was 
seen as required to address those human factor issues that if managed properly could result in a 
reduction in pilot error. Early in 2002 the FAA gave the same regard as they did to flight crew to 
maintenance crew and produced a draft AC 120xxx to address the issues linked to Maintenance 
Resource Management, MRM. This was the FAA starting to recognise in writing the importance of 
human factors in the realm of aircraft maintenance. The FAA AC though not mandated is a strong 
recommendation and identifies areas that require an operator to look carefully at. Draft AC120xxx 
approached MRM from the aspect of education of personnel to enable them to manage Human 
Factor issues better. The draft AC started with guidelines for developing, implementing and 
assessing a Maintenance Resource Management training programme. The AC identified MRM 
training should focus on the following..... 
Situation awareness 
Communication 
Team Work 
Task Alocation 
Decision Making 
In more detail an effective MRM training programme would hope to impart four major aspects to 
students... 
1. Human Factors KnoWedge 
a. Understanding the maintenance operation as a system. To often maintenance staff are not 
completely aware of the complete system. By undergoing training that will make them 
aware of where the reasons and implications of aircraft maintenance better practices will 
be followed. 
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b. Identifying basic human factor issues. To some HF issues may be common sense but to 
other they may not. 
c. Recognising contributing causes to human factors. An error results always from a chain of 
events, not just a single event. 
2. Communication Skills. 
a. Clear and accurate communication standard in every day maintenance activities is 
essential to the elimination of errors. 
b. Communication skills can assist in preventing an occurrence but also can assist in the 
investigation of why an event occurred. 
3. Team Work Skills. 
a. By understanding the best way for a team to work together again errors can be reduced. 
b. By establishing good practices as normal practices. Peer pressure will frown upon non 
standard procedural usage. 
4. Performance Management and Situation Awareness. 
a. Worker Health and Safety. 
b. Team situation awareness. 
C. Leadership. 
The above MRM programme recommendations recognised that every staff member involved in 
aircraft maintenance must undergo MRM training. By educating the shop floor members of staff on 
the issues of Human Factors and MIRK errors can be reduced greatly. In addition to the training of 
shop floor staff on MRM and HF, it is also essential that for an effective Human Factors programme 
to be addressed by a MRM training programme the system of maintenance management must 
also be included. 
Additional Elements to The MRM Programme applicable to the Maintenance Management 
System 
1. Senior management support. 
The MRM programme and a commitment to the reduction of human errors must be clear in the 
management philosophy for the senior management. They must be committed to MRM and 
HF issues. This commitment should be clear in their job descriptions as it should also be in the 
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job description of every maintenance employee. The senior management are responsible for 
providing the correct resources, facility and equipment to address all MRM and HF issues. The 
budget must allow for this. 
2. Identification of a responsible manager. 
Even though regulation require the appointment of a accountable manager with regards to the 
technical operation, MRM and HF's requires a "Champion7 to manage the MRM programme. 
This manager should be part of the maintenance system management team, not a new post, it 
should be a part of his task to monitor and manage the MRM programme. He should have both 
the authority and means to enable an adequate and effective MRM programme. The obvious 
manager for this task may be the Quality Manager or the Maintenance Manager, but it must be 
someone with a commitment to MRIVI and someone who is trained in MRIVI and HF issues. 
The addition of this task to a managers duties should not over load him and should be a daily 
function of his management duties. 
3. A defined error investigation procedure. 
MRM recognises that HF errors will always occur. A good MRM programme attempts to 
educate staff to attempt to reduce as far as possible the occurrences of HF errors. When a HF 
error does occur the management of the situation and the subsequent investigation of the error 
to get to the root cause of the issue is essential. A pre defined clearly written procedure for 
error investigation should exist. Trained members of staff should be prepared to carry out 
interviews and error investigation that will include correct approach, clearly documented and 
consistent reports that state facts only. The resulting actions from an investigation is the 
responsibility of the management. The investigators should be separate from the management 
and as impartial as possible. An investigation should be conducted in a methodological way, 
examining contributing factors, procedures, processes and should always involve feedback to 
those involved. Contributing factors to the error could be, 
a. Technician Based: Knowledge, skills, ability, personnel issues. 
b. Local Factors: Environment, design, tooling, manuals, task, time pressures, 
communication. 
c. Supervision: Planning, organisation, delegating, instructing. 
d. Organisation: Philosophies, norms, procedures, policies, labour relations. 
4. A discipline policy that encourages participation in the process of MRM. 
The occurrence of an incident is as a result of many small HF issues that fall un reported or un 
noticed through the gaps of our daily work. It is good policy that staff are encouraged to report 
even the smallest HF issue noticed or discovered by them. This can be encouraged through a 
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policy of Blame Free reporting or Anonymous reporting. By allovVing staff members to be free 
from blame as a result of their proactive reporting of noticed incidents, them the culture of free 
from the fear of reprisals will promote the reporting and subsequent elimination of FIF errors. 
Staff must be encouraged to report even the smallest incidents and they even should be 
encouraged to suggest remedial action to resolve the issue. A policy of disciplining the reporter 
of a HF event will only result in staff trying to hide or ignoring FIF issues that when go un 
addressed could culminate in an occurrence. 
5. Technical support and training. 
The maintenance management system should support the IVIRM programme with at its 
disposal a budget to train all shop floor staff, to conduct investigations, to enable rectification 
action to take place, to put the MRIVI programme and HF training as a standard In the 
development of all staff in the maintenance system. 
Maintenance Error Decision Aid, (MEDA). 
Boeing recognising the need for HF issues to be addressed and investigated properly started a 
work group within the company that along with the airlines started to devise a methodology for HF 
error investigation. Human Factor Physiologists, Industrial Engineers and Maintenance Technicians 
/ Engineers from the airlines assisted Boeing in producing MEDA in 1995. The MEDA process was 
a standardised process for investigating maintenance errors. Its main philosophy was that people 
do not make errors intentionally, but as a result of events happening an error occurred. The 
process had six sections to it and the process was essentially driven by a pre defined from where 
all details were documented and standardised. 
Section 1. General Information. 
Section 2. The Event. 
Section I Maintenance Error Description. 
Section 4. Contributing Factors. 
Section 5. Error Prevention Strategies. 
Section 6. Summary. 
See Appendix B Boeing MEDA form Revision g. 
Though only a few airlines and operators have adopted MEDA, it should be said the idea behind it 
is completely in line with an effective MRM and HF programme, where a standard pre defined 
process is used in a constructive defined manner to identify the issues and sub events that resulted 
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in the occurrence of a maintenance error. Not only does it involve those directly affected by the 
event it also goes on to give recommendations as to the future prevention of the event from 
occurring again. After that it is up to the management to accept or reject the recommendations. It is 
my opinion that this process should serve as a model and it should be not only mandated through 
regulations that such a system should be in place, that also the responsible MIRM programme 
manager should report all events to the Accountable Manager formally, and these reports and 
recommendations should be subject to Authority review from time to time, to ensure that the airline 
or maintainer is investigating errors, and taking adequate remedial action in the prevention of 
further errors. 
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6. The Reliability Programme: Reliability Monitoring and 
Development of the MSG3 Maintenance Proaramme. 
6.1 Reliability Programme is an Integral part of the IVISG3 / RCM 
Maintenance Programme. 
To recap on the objectives of an MSG3 / RCM based Maintenance Programme, its objectives 
are to maintain the inherent reliability of design through the accomplishment of scheduled 
maintenance tasks. The methodology of defining the scheduled maintenance tasks is by using 
MSG3 decision tree logic, which starts with the question of V the MSI or SSI fails will it be 
evident to the operating crew? It then goes on to examine the consequences of failure to assist 
in defining whether a scheduled maintenance task can be effective and applicable. Remember 
also that one of the major differences in MSG3 / RCM and MSG1 and 2 is the elimination of life 
limitations on components, allowing most components to enter their P-F range to be detected 
by scheduled maintenance tasks and even to fail in service as the redundancy of design 
prevents airworthiness compromises. For these reasons it is in my opinion essential that 
detailed review of in-service failures and events must be carried out to substantiate the 
effectiveness and applicability of the scheduled maintenance programme and of all 
maintenance practices. This is accomplished through an established Reliability Programme 
where Reliability Monitoring is carried out on the complete technical operation of the aircraft 
ensuring all maintenance practices and procedures are effective and applicable in establishing 
the continued airworthiness of the aircraft or fleet. Without establishing a Reliability Programme 
and conducting Reliability Monitoring I believe a massive gap exists in the maintenance 
programme of the operator. 
A Maintenance Program Is a Set of Rules and Practices for Managing Maintenance and 
Controlling and Developing the Scheduled Maintenance Program. The Reliability 
Programme Is an Integral part of the Maintenance Programme that supports and verifies the 
effectiveness and applicability of the scheduled maintenance tasks through monitoring the 
in-service findings resulting from the technical operation of the fleet and maintenance 
findings resulting from the scheduled maintenance tasks. 
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1. Defines, operating 
norms for tasks & 
intervals, the MSG3 
RCM maintenance 
programme. 
5. Monitors, the 
effectiveness of 
the corrective 
actions. 
The Reliability 
Programme 
4. Enables, 
corrective action to 
re-establish 
normal operating 
conditions thro* 
adjustments to the 
MSG3/RCM 
maintenance 
programme or 
design 
modifications. 
Fig 6.1 The Refiabilfty Programme objectives. 
2. Measures, the 
effectiveness & 
applicability of the 
MSG3/RCM 
maintenance 
programme. 4--ý 
3. Identifies, 
problem areas & 
initiates 
investigation & 
research. 
6.1.1 The Regulations and Requirements for Reliability Programmes. 
It is my opinion that the requirement for establishing a reliability programme is misunderstood 
by many operators and even by manufacturers and authorities. Some operators stop short at 
establishing the maintenance programme, often adopting only manufacturer recommended 
revisions with out consideration to their operation or environment. The Reliability Programme is 
an integral part of the complete Maintenance Programme without the inclusion of even the 
simplest of reliability programmes the maintenance programme is only a schedule of 
maintenance tasks that may or may not be applicable or effective for the nature and 
environment of a particular operation. 
Joint Aviation Authority for European Member States Registered Alrcraft. 
JAR OPS 1.910 is one of the JAR OPS 1 regulations that must be complied with before 
issuance of a JAA Air Operators Certificate, (AOC). 
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"An operator must ensure that the aeroplane is maintained in accordance with the operator's 
aeroplane maintenance programme. The programme must contain details, including 
frequency, of all maintenance required to be canied out. The programme will be required 
include a reflabifity programme when the A uthQ& determines that such a reflability programme 
is necessa 
Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) 1.910 elaborates on that regulation to say that.... 
Where an operator wishes to use an aeroplane with the initial operatorýs aeroplane 
maintenance programme based upon the Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR) 
process, any associated programme for the continuous surveillance of the reliability, or health 
monitoring of the aeroplane should be considered as part of the aeroplane maintenance 
programme. " 
The AMC goes on to say more 
lReflability programmes should be developed for aeroplane maintenance programmes based 
upon MSG logic or those that include condition monitored components or that do not contain 
overhaul time periods for a# significant system components. 11 
The Federal Aviation Administration FAA for US Registered Aircraft. 
FAR 121.373 is one of the Federal Airworthiness Regulations that an air operator (121.373 is 
for commercial domestic & international operators, an identical FAR 135.431 exist for 
commuter & charter operators) must comply with prior to issues of an AOC. This FAR is 
concerned with "Continuing analysis and surveillance" (CASS). 
"/-I Each certificate holder shall establish and maintain a system for the continuing analysis I C11 
and surveillance of the performance and effectiveness of its inspection program and the 
program covering other maintenance, preventive maintenance, and alterations and for the 
correction of any deficiency in those programs, regardless of whether those programs are 
carried out by the certificate holder or by another person. 0 
The following Advisory Circulars go on to elaborate on acceptable methods to conduct the 
CASS 
AC 120-16D Air Carrier Maintenance Programmes chapter 9 out lines that an Aircraft 
Maintenance Programme should contain a CASS programme to assess and ensure the 
effectiveness of the Maintenance Programme, further more AC 120-17A Maintenance Control 
by Reliability Methods dated 1978. 
The FAA recommendations go much further than the JAA, who only give the AMC's detailed 
above. But even though the FAA are more thorough with their advice I believe the regulations 
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are not upto date and do not take fully into considerations the rational behind MSG3 analysis. 
The ATA along with the FAA have produced a draft revision to AC 120-17A, pending at 120- 
17B that deals considerably with the implications of MSG3 and the requirement for an 
adequate reliability programme. This draft revision brings the FAA AC better up to date 
dealing with reliability issues with the RCM / MSG3 maintenance programme but as of now 
this draft remains pending, leaving 120-17A an inadequate AC failing short of what really is 
required. 
6.1.2 Data Collection to Enable the Reliability Monitoring. 
The Reliability Programme starts with the collection of relevant technical data. Data sources 
that feed into the Reliability Programme enabling reliability monitoring come from almost all 
aspect of the technical operation of the fleet. 
a. Flight Operations. 
Pilot Reports enable in service crew evident findings to be noted in the Technical Log. This 
includes system faults and discrepancies, flight deck warnings. Cabin Reports detail non 
airworthiness faults such as cabin appearance items. Flight hours and cycles, fuel and oil 
uplifts, ETOPs flights, Operational performance and parameters, Auto Land flights, Engine 
condition parameter readings. Minimum Equipment List issues, delays and cancellations, 
journey reports, technical incidents. 
b. Flight Line Maintenance Operations. 
Component failures and removals, daily and line check maintenance accomplishment, 
deferred defects, Human Factor issues. 
c. Base Maintenance Operations. 
Routine check maintenance, Non Routine findings, Component removals, Human Factor 
issues, Man hour and elapsed times,. 
d. Production Planning and Control. 
Maintenance Check schedules and downtimes, Time controlled parts, Airworthiness Directives 
and Modification programmes. 
e. Marketing. 
Flight schedules, turn around times, destinations and routes. 
f. Accounting. 
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Maintenance costs per flight hour, Maintenance costs per man hour, Maintenance costs per 
base input, Maintenance costs per aircraft. 
g. Human Recourses. 
Employee data, skills, qualifications, experience, training. 
h. Material and Inventory. 
Stores holdings and re order levels, rotable times between failures, consumable usage, 
component receipts, shop reports, conformation of component failures, and component 
modification compliances. 
Capturing of this data is essential to an effective reliability programme, the source of data, the types 
of data, the integrity of the data and the format of the data is all important. The data can be 
gathered manually such as that in Technical Logs and Non Routine Cards or electronically such as 
with downloads of engine condition data through the Airborne Communication Reporting System, 
(ACARS). Transmitted to ground through the Satellite Communication system, (SATCOM). The 
quality of the data is essential as garbage into the reliability programme will result in garbage out in 
the reliability reports. 
6.1.3 Methods for Reliability Monitoring. 
a. Aircraft Reliability Monitoring. 
The method of monitoring and reporting on aircraft or fleet at a high level is to give a general 
impression of how the technical operation is performing. This form of monitoring and reporting 
is a very rough indicator of performance reliability rather than an indicator of the maintenance 
programme effectiveness and can not be used for specific maintenance programme 
adjustments but can be used as a starting point for high level triggers. The sort of data 
monitored at an aircraft or fleet level on a monthly basis are the following... 
1. Number of aircraft in fleet. 
2. Number of Aircraft in service. 
3. Number of Operating Days. 
4. Number of Days out of Operation. 
i. On Scheduled Maintenance 
ii. On Unscheduled Maintenance 
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5. Flying Hours & Cycles 
1. Revenue 
ii. Training 
iii. Other 
6. Daily Utilisation 
7. Ave Flight Duration 
8. Defect Rate for Aircraft. 
9. Deferred Defects & MEL items raised. 
10. Despatch Reliability. 
1. Technical Delays 
ii. Technical Cancellation 
11. Incidents. (IFSDs, ATO, IFTAs, etc) 
This kind of data is also of use for operational planning or for marketing. It is important that a high 
level review of such general performance data is taken on at least a monthly basis of the fleet as a 
whole. The more specific reliability monitoring methods contribute to the monitoring of the 
maintenance programme effectiveness. 
b. Systems Reliability Monitoring. 
Pilot Reports (PIREPS) are recorded in the Technical Log. Each one of these reports relate to 
a crew evident discrepancy that will fall in one of the ATA system chapters, for example air- 
conditioning systems ATA chapter 21, fuel systems ATA chapter 28, navigation systems ATA 
chapter 34, lighting systems ATA chapter 33 and so on. The ground technician or engineer that 
meets the aircraft on arrival at the destination will review the technical log entries and trouble 
shoot the discrepancies to try to rectify the occurrence. This will result in a rectification 
maintenance action. The PIREP and resulting maintenance action should be logged firstly in 
the technical log then into a data base of PIREPS back at the operators main base. The 
monitoring of the data base is the responsibility of the Reliability Section. With modem day 
computer programmes this is quite easy and the recurrence of defects in the same ATA 
chapter or an unusually high rate of discrepancies with the same ATA chapter can be easily 
identified. Note that with this method we take the four digit ATA chapter. This chapterisation 
system splits further the ATA chapterisation into sub systems 
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fig 6.1 Sub ATA Chapter table example 
ATA Chapter 27 Flight Controls ATA Chapter 73 Engine Fuel Control 
27-10 Aileron 73-10 Fuel Distribution 
27-20 Rudder 73-20 Fuel Control 
27-30 Elevator 73-30 Fuel Indication 
27-40 Horizontal Stabiliser 
ATA Chapter 32 Landing Gear ATA Chapter 35 Oxygen 
32-10 Main Gear & Doors 35-10 Crew Oxygen 
32-20 Nose Gear & Doors 35-20 Passenger Oxygen 
32-30 Extension & Retraction 35-30 Portable Oxygen 
32-40 Wheels & Brakes 
A recurrence of the same defect on the same aircraft, or within the same fleet type, with in a 
short period of time suggests that the maintenance action was ineffective or a chronic system 
discrepancy exists, while the rate of discrepancies is particularly high for a period of time for a 
particular ATA chapter suggests a system problem. The two different methods of Reliability 
Monitoring suggested, Le. recurring discrepancies monitoring or system rate monitoring are 
two effective approaches to use in the Reliability Programme. 
Monitorinq Recurrinq Discrepancies. 
The method of identifying and investigating recurring discrepancies either on a fleet type or on 
an individual aircraft is a historically based system. This means when investigation of recurring 
discrepancies showed further action that has been carried out by the ground technician was 
not completely effective in addressing the discrepancy. For example the Reliability Section may 
choose that on the second recurrence (third time raised) of a similar symptom discrepancy, 
merits a more detailed investigation by the Reliability section. PIREPs that do not exactly 
qualify as a discrepancy report can be entered into the discrepancy data base but should not 
be marked for inclusion into the reliability monitoring data. These type of PIREPS could for 
example be information entries. This system of identifying recurrent system discrepancies is 
called Notice of Recurring Defects (NORDs), the NORD should take the form of a report 
detailing the discrepancy PIREP, the individual occurrences, the date, hours and cycles when 
the discrepancies were noted, the aircraft disposition when the discrepancies were noted Le 
during taxi, -during take off, during climb etc, the reporting pilot each time and the exact 
rectification action taken by the ground technician or engineer and the name of the ground 
technician or engineer. AJI of this data can now lead to a detailed review and investigation of 
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the occurrence. Care should be taken to detail word for word the details as they were entered 
in the technical log and care should be taken to ensure the ATA chapter allocation is correct. 
The period of time used to identify the recurring discrepancies should be considered carefully, 
for example three occurrences of a similar ATA chapter sub system discrepancy in 100 days 
may not be appropriate for a high utilisation operation, perhaps a period of 50 hours or 10 
cycles would be more appropriate. The resultant investigation of a NORD should take place 
using a methodical process. Such question that should be asked during the research of the 
discrepancy are... 
a. Was it the same pilot reporting the discrepancy each time. Did he follow correct standard 
operating procedures. Sometimes misunderstanding of how a system works can result in 
wrongly identifying a discrepancy. Or even language used by the reporting pilot, is the 
PREP clear on what the discrepancy was? 
b. Was it the same ground engineer that addressed and attempted to rectify the PREP. Did 
he refer to correct procedures as detailed in the maintenance documentation? 
Maintenance documentation on modem airliners such as the B737-NG gives detailed 
trouble shooting steps to be followed in addressing a discrepancy, were these steps 
correct followed in total? Often the temptation is to go straight to a maintenance task that 
the ground technician is familiar with. 
c. Was the environment that the PREP was reported the same each time? E. g. was the 
defect related to a condition of flight? If the PREP was noticed at altitude could it be 
related to temperature drop. At 30,000 feet the temperature can drop to minus 40 degrees 
Celsius, this is referred to cold soak if the discrepancy is evident after a period of time at 
that temperature. 
d. Had the system worked on previously, perhaps subject to a scheduled maintenance 
action, or a modification? 
All of these question can assist in the Reliability Engineer finding a reason for the recurring 
discrepancy. The Reliability Engineer may well have technical information that the ground 
technician does not have e. g. world fleet reports on the type issued by the manufacturer, or 
similar discrepancies found on other aircraft with similar systems, this is when a good 
computerised data base of PIREPs, discrepancies and maintenance actions can assist in 
finding the root cause of a discrepancy. The whole objective of the Reliability Engineers 
research is to determine the root cause of the failure. This can result in many forms from a 
training issue or a procedural issue to a component failure. If a component replacement was 
carried out resulting from the PIREP, often the root cause can not be defined until a shop 
report of the removed component is received back verifying the failure mode of the component, 
if any at all. Later we will identify the importance of component shop reports and the 
importance of how to deal with "no fault found" (NFF) component shop reports. 
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Fig 6.2 Decision Tree for Reliability Monitoring, dealing with recurring PIREPs 
Action: PIREP is logged In tech log by crew. 
General Details: A/C Registration. Flight hours & cycles. Flight phase, 
Reporting Environment, Name of reporting crew. 
Discrepancy Details: Evidence & nature of failure. ATA chpt / subchpt & 
system relating to failure. Failure code if available. Resulting crew action. 
Action: Ground Technician / Engineer. 
Initial Review. Review general details. Review Discrepancy details. Consult 
crew if available. Review technical log for previous similar PIREPs or 
maintenance action taken on the system. Consult maintenance 
documentation using failure code if available. 
Maintenance Action: Trouble shoot the discrepancy using maintenance 
documentation work steps. Carry out maintenance actions as recommended 
by maintenance documentation until conformation of rectification & normal 
operation of the system confirmed. Return the a/c to service detailing exactly 
what maintenance action was taken. Send a copy of the technical log to Base. 
Action: Base Technical records section. 
Log The Report: Log the PREP & resultant action in the compute ised 
maintenance programme word for word. Alocate the correct ATA chpt 
subchpt to the PREP. Detail material or components used. 
Action: Reliability section. 
Review The Report: Review the PIREP & maintenance action & ensure the 
correct ATA chapter has been allocated. Mark for inclusion in the reliability 
programme if appropriate. 
Decision: Reliability section. 
Has this discrepancy or a similar discrepancy been logged before? 
No 
Action: Reliability Section. 
Save in reliability data base 
for future reference. 
Yes 
Decision: Reliability 
Section. 
Is this Ule second time 
raised (first recurrence)? 
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Decision: Reliability 
Section. 
Is this the second time 
raised (first recurrence)? 
No Yes 
Decision: Reliability Section. Action: Reliability Section. 
Is this the third time raised (second Note the PIREP for potential 
recurrence) with in a certain period of time? NORD if recurrence persists. 
No I Yes 
Action: Reliability Section. 
Raise a NORD. Detailing complete 
history of discrepancy. 
Action: Reliability Section. 
If this is more than the second 
recurrence a NORD should exist 
already. Add the new report to the 
existing NORD or if occurrence is 
beyond the period of time consider 
re activate the NORD if closed. 
Action: Reliability Section. 
Investigate to find root cause & 
recommend rectification action. 
Fig 6.2 cont' Decision Tree for Reliability Monitoring, dealing with recurring PIREPs 
The re activation of a NORD that has been closed perhaps due to the reliability time period 
having been exceeded, must not be done with out consideration. The period of time chosen by 
the reliability section for use in identifying recurrent discrepancies is important. That period of 
time should match the operation. The purpose of monitoring recurrent discrepancies is to 
notice a trend that is affecting the serviceability of a fleet or of an aircraft. If the time period is 
lengthy between recurrence it may not be a recurrent discrepancy. The period chosen should 
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be appropriate in its variable unit, such as for a landing system discrepancy perhaps a landings 
interval would be more appropriate than flight hours. There should be no fixed hard rule in the 
opening of closed NORDs good engineering judgement should be used. 
One important issue to understand is the recognition of fleet trends as apposed to individual 
aircraft recurrent discrepancies. A recurrent discrepancy that has manifested it self on three 
different occasions with in the reliability time frame on the same aircraft is a candidate for a 
NORD. But a discrepancy that has appeared on three different aircraft is still a recurrent 
discrepancy and should be subjected to a NORD but the Investigation should take slightly 
different slant and direction. While many of the same reasons may have contributed to the 
NORD on different aircraft, such as wrong procedures, inadequate training, misunderstanding 
of the system by the operating crew etc, also the time frame for a fleet recurrent discrepancy 
may well be different to that of an individual aircraft. Often a maintenance programme interval 
or task adjustment is more appropriate to the fleet NORD than to the Individual aircraft NORD 
as a fleet NORD suggest the issue is not symptomatic of an individual aircraft, while the 
individual aircraft NORD could be a chronic condition that has gone unaddressed. In both 
cases the NORD system allows a recurring situation to be registered and examined in a 
methodological way using exact historical data and utilising world fleet and manufacturers 
published data. Operator conferences held by manufacturers are often a good way to find out 
about world issues to a type, and also enable a platform for operators of the world to share 
technical data on failures or discrepancies. At times commercial pressures on airlines and 
operators prevent this kind of data from being shared world wide, but the manufacturers should 
enable by becoming the vehicle for publishing the data, but again this could only be done if the 
manufacturer is fed back the in operational data. It is my opinion in the interest of better 
airworthiness and more efficient technical operations regional operators of similar types should 
pusli the manufacturers to enable the gathering and publishing of appropriate technical data in 
a short efficient time frame, if they won't perhaps the operators should them selves cooperate. 
Statistical Trend Analyýis. 
While monitoring recurrence of discrepancies is one method to conduct reliability monitoring, 
the second method is a more statistical based method where PIREP data is gathered and 
trends are calculated for each ATA chapter, (while the NORD system goes to ATA sub 
chapter, trend analysis should not unless a specific system is targeted for monitoring, e. g. 23- 
30 In-flight Entertainment, this subject may be of particular importance for a commercial 
airline). After a period of data gathering alerts levels are calculated based upon the historical 
sample size using standard deviation methods to establish thresholds where most of the 
discrepancies should fall in. When a chapter has a rate of discrepancies that falls out of the 
calculated threshold that ATA chapter is said to be in alert and investigation and research into 
why that alert has been triggered is conducted. 
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As normal the pilot make technical log entries specifying events or discrepancies, the 
discrepancy is classified in to a relevant ATA chapter. The ground technician / engineer 
addresses the PREP, carries out rectification maintenance action and re certifies the aircraft 
for further flight. Adl details are fed back to base where the data is entered into the 
computerised maintenance programme. After all the data is gathered a "defect ratd" can be 
established for a fleet and for an ATA chapter.... 
e. g. 20 PIREPs were raised across the B737 NG fleet in ATA chapter 21 air-conditioning, 
during a total flying period of 1000 flight hours and 400 landings for a particular month. The rate 
is therefore 20 for this example. Note it is standard to use Pl REPs per 1000 flight hours for the 
majorifty of ATA chapters and also it is standard to plot rates on a monthly basis, flight cycles or 
landings may be appropriate unit of measure for calculating for example ATA 32 landing gear 
systems. 
After a period of data gathering, usually at least one year, standard deviation calculations of the 
sample are used to determine PREP alert rates. Normally 2 standard deviations from the 
mean rate per ATA chapter are used to capture a predicted 95% of future PIREPs. Those 
rates falling above the alert rate (5 /2=2.5% of PIREPs) a trigger / alert will be activated that 
will instigate the investigation focusing on a fleet type and a particular ATA chapter. This 
method of statistical reliability monitoring has been the normal standard utilised in airlines for a 
long time, and is an easy way to monitor and identify fleet wide technical deviation from the 
norm if you have a large fleet where hundreds of PIREPs are raised daily. Adjustment to alert 
rates should be made occasionally but care should be taken prior to alert rate adjustment, and 
consideration to season, operational changes, fleet changes and other variables that could 
influence the rate of PIREPs, e. g. to change the alert rate in the summer just before the holiday 
season operation using the last 18 months of PREP data would be a mistake. PREP data is 
seasonal, certain ATA chapters may well be affected by ground environment, precipitation, etc, 
the adjustment to an alert should be made only with consistent data that fairly represents a 
equal period of operating time. 
It is my opinion that statistically based reliability monitoring such as PREP rates and alert 
settings, is controversial in its effectiveness in supporting the Maintenance Programme. The 
process of data gathering, entering into the computerised maintenance programme, and data 
monitoring is good, but what does entering into the alert zone really mean? Is it worth getting 
excited about and triggering a frenzy in the maintenance management board room, "we are in 
alert in ATA 25 cabin interior". I feel it may miss lead and may miss appropriately apportion 
reliability engineering time. Entering into the alert range is to be expected, the reasons for 
entering into the alert range can be many for example, miss appointing ATA chapters to 
PIREPs, or PIREPs with no real technical value getting in to the calculations, or a particular 
difficult period of operating time. The value it does have is that an unhealthy increasing trend 
can be noticed by paying attention to monthly PREP rates, and if individual aircraft are 
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compared to the fleet rate a rouge aircraft can be noticed, these two benefits of statistical 
analysis do not require alert calculation and setting. 
E. g. 
A fleet B737 NG ATA 24 PIREP rate has been increasing monthly for the last 4 months. The 
trend was recognised by the Reliability Section and when looked at closer it can be seen as of 
last month 10 out of the fleet of 12 have also on an individual aircraft basis had experienced a 
PIREP rate increase every month. This lead to an investigation as to why and it was eventually 
found out that the B737-NG fleet were undergoing a electrical buss bar modification and as of 
last month all the fleet of 12 bar 2 were complete. The modification programme should now be 
looked at closer as being a potential reason for the increase in PIREPs and drop In reliability. 
The gathering of PREP data, calculating rates per fleet per ATA chapter did assist in firstly 
identifying the trend and probably did assist in getting to the root cause of the discrepancies 
causing the PREP rate to increase. 
So it is my opinion that the value of statistical methods for reliability monitoring is good in that it 
promotes data gathering and data classification and can be used in the recognition of 
discrepancy trends and hence instigating investigations, but as to the value of alert setting to 
instigate investigations I am suspicious of its worth and feel it is perhaps creates a falls sense 
of security when no alert has been triggered, yet our PIREP rate may be increasing fast on a 
monthly basis, or we have had one massive failure in a system yet it receives the same merit 
as a small non significant event as far as data pints go, or a false sense of alert that we are in 
an alert range for an ATA but really all is in control or our alerts are just out of date. The other 
issue I have is when is it recommended to set rates and alerts, for a fleet of 12 aircraft or 100, 
over a period of 12 months of 10,000 flight hours or 24 months of 50,000 flight hours? Should 2 
or 3 standard deviations be used, how often should the alerts be adjusted? Should we use the 
Normal, the Poisson or the Weibull distribution when calculating alerts? What is an expected 
rate increase as aircraft and their systems age? After a modification programme has been 
carried out should we start again gathering data? All of these questions lead me to be 
suspicious of the use of alert setting in Reliability Monitoring. 
c. Component Reliability Monitoring. 
Component Reliability is the statistical measurement of a components performance expressed 
in usage hours or cycles. The objective of a. component reliability programme is to set 
standards, evaluate performance, identify trends, take corrective action and continuously 
monitor performance. Remember earlier we mentioned that MSG3 reduced massively the 
amount of hard time lived components from as many as 130 to 4. This means that attention 
must be paid to component failure data in support of the MSG3 maintenance Programme. The 
main objectives can be described as follows... 
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1. To ensure the maintenance programme is effective and applicable with respect to 
component failures. 
2. To ensure optimal aircraft utilisation. 
3. To reduce maintenance cost with respect to components. 
The benefits that result from component reliability monitoring are as follows 
1. The ability to identify poor component performance. 
2. The gathering of data to assist in the determination of carr)(ing out component 
modifications. 
3. The identification of repetitive discrepancies related to component part no's or 
particular rouge serial no's. 
4. The ability to identify shop procedures that need improvements. 
The sort of component data that is gathered and used in component reliability monitoring is.. 
1. Unscheduled component removals. 
2. Confirmed component failures. 
3. Non Confirmed component failures, No Fault Founds. (NFF). 
4. Shop / Strip reports for components. 
5. Time since new, time since over haul & time installed for removed components. (Time 
flight hours, cycles & days) 
6. Calculated Reliability Times. The four most commonly used reliability calculation for 
components in the aviation industry are.. 
i. IVITBR: Mean Time Between Removals. 
MTBR= (Fleet Flying Hours x QPA) / Total No of Removals. 
I MTBUR: Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removals. 
MTBUR= (Fleet Flying Hours x QPA) / Total No Unscheduled Removals. 
ifl. URR: Unscheduled Removal Rate. 
URR= (1000 x Total No Unscheduled Removals) / (Fleet Flight Hours x QPA) 
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[Note that URR= 1000 / MTBURI 
iv. MTBF: Mean Time Between Failures. 
MTBF= (Fleet Flying Hours x QPA) / Confirmed Failures 
[Note QPA: Quantity Per Aircraft] 
Comparing MTBF to MTBUR is a good indicator that can take the attention of a component 
reliability programme as for each MTBUR more than MTBF the question should be asked why was 
that component removed yet was not confirmed a failure. To be able to do this the operator must 
track component shop reports confirming component failures, many operators do not review the 
shop report in fact many do not even request it from the shop. It is good practice that all shop 
reports are requested for NFF components and for expensive or critical components to give an 
understanding of how the reliability of these components can be improved. 
MTBUR versus MTBF. 
Both MTBUR and MTBF have value in monitoring with in the component reliability programme. 
While MTBF is a truer indicator of component reliability MTBUR is an all-round indicator of 
component reliability and operators trouble shooting success. MTBUR / MTBF the closer to I this 
value is a good indication. The smaller the value tending away from I indicates an issue with the 
components identified as the reason for a PREP or discrepancy. 
e. g. 
Cabin Pressure Controller Part No 26A432-1 ATA 21-30 
QPA =2 
Fleet Size: 50 
Flight Hours for the Fleet for the year = 54,750 
Unscheduled Removals for the year= 10 
Confirmed Failures =8 
MTBUR= (54,750 x 2) / 10 
MTBUR= 10,950 hours. 
MTBF= (54,750 x 2) /8 
MTBF = 13,688 hours 
MTBUR / MTBF = 10,950 / 13,688 = 0.78 
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0.78 is reasonably close to 1 indicating 78% of removed components thought to have failed, were 
confirmed failed. 22% of the components cost the company a lot of time and money and did not 
address the discrepancy. These 22% can be referred to as NFF (No Fault Found). NFF's cost the 
operator millions of dollars each year. If the only detailed component review that an operator carries 
out is to review the NFF's, that alone will contribute to the costs of maintenance. The reasons for a 
NFF component removal to address a discrepancy could be as follows.. 
1. In correct trouble shooting by the ground technician. He wrongly identifies the component 
as the reason for the PREP. 
2. In correct training. The ground technician or engineer addressing the PREP may have not 
been correctly or adequately trained, hence identifies the easy option, by removing the 
component. 
3. In correct manuals. Wrong or unclear maintenance manuals. 
4. Incorrect procedures. Wrong or unclear company procedures or maintenance procedures. 
5. A rogue component that shows intermittent random tendencies. Removal of that 
component from service could cost the operator the price of a new component but also 
save a lot on maintenance downtimes and man-hours. 
There are three levels of components reliability monitoring that an operator can conduct. 
Level 1. Operators track and report Unscheduled Removals. This indicates components that are 
not performing to the performance standards expected. 
Level 2. Operators track all kinds of removals, unscheduled, scheduled, convenience, modification 
programmes etc.. ), once removed and in the shop the operator review the shop report for that 
component to confirm those that have failed in service. The shop report is also referred to as the 
tear down report or strip report. 
Level 3. Operators carry out all that described in Level 1&2 but also go further to describe & 
review in detail the shop reports, identifying not only confirmed failures but also internal conditions 
of components. Those that are confirmed as failures, will trigger an investigation as to why the 
component failed in service and research a solution to address the failure. If the failure is not 
confirmed and the component is returned as No Fault Found "NFF", this also triggers a detailed 
review of the originating discrepancy that resulted in the component removal. The intension of this 
investigation is to get to the root cause of the discrepancy. Detailed Component Mapping may be 
carried out with this level of component reliability monitoring. Alerts can be set much in the same 
way as for systems statistical reliability monitoring, using standard deviation calculation of a sample 
of historical data and plotting monthly component removal rates against the calculated alerts levels. 
Also being able to compare operators rates to manufacturer or world rates assists in identifying is 
there is an issues with the operating environment or the individual operators method and 
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procedures. If the individual operators component removal rate or MTBUR / MTBF Is vastly 
different from others or the expected manufacturers MTBUR / MTBF an Investigation should be 
triggered. 
Component Mapping. 
Component Mapping is a very high level method of tracking component reliability, it involves 
identifying individual serial numbers and tracking their lives from manufacture to in-service 
performance to removal reasons to shop reports. All aspects of the component life is recorded and 
tracked. Computerised maintenance programmes can ease this task but to carry out such a task if 
you have a large fleet is quite an endeavour. Most operators with a good component reliability 
programme in place would only conduct this level of investigation for very serious discrepancies for 
large complex or expensive components, for example engines or auxiliary power units, or it may be 
carried out for those components that have been identified as NFF. But a method for recognising 
rogue serial numbers should be in place, a repeatedly removed component (same serial number) 
must be identified and removed from the spares holding unless the root cause of its continued 
failing is found. This level of component reliability will definitely assist in getting to the root cause of 
the failure but will cost a lot of time and resource to conduct. A balance is required using 
component tracking for those components identified as critical to the operation or expensive to 
replace. By solving a component reliability problem you will be saving the company potential 
millions of dollars through eliminating time wastage in man-hours and aircraft non availability and 
also in stores holdings to support the failures. 
d. Engine Reliability Monitoring. 
The engine is the single most expensive component installed on an aircraft and also probably 
the most important component with regards to airworthiness. Hence the engines deserve a 
detailed individual reliability monitoring programme that accomplishes four main objectives.. 
1. Maintains Engine Inherent Reliability & Airworthiness. 
2. Maintains Acceptable Engine Perforrnance Standards. 
3. Increases Engine Time on Wing. 
4. Reduces Engine Associated Maintenance Costs. 
A fifth objective also exists for Extended Twin Engine Operators 
5. Enables Continued ETOPs Operation. 
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Four significant parameters that should be used for monitoring power plant reliability, ATA chapters 
71 through to 80 are.. 
1. Inflight shutdowns per 1000 engine cydes or flight hours. 
Firstly what constitutes an IFSD (Inflight shut down) should be defined for example.. 
An In Right Engine Shut Down shall be considered to have taken place when the aircraft is 
airborne and the engine was shut down as a resuft of the following... 
a. Human intervention following an abnormal situation. 
b. An automatic shut down function. 
c. Any other involuntaty reason. 
Section 4.1.2 deals with IFSD's in the contexts of the ErOPS operation, but it is equally 
pertinent for all operations not only for ErOPS. The objective of monitoring IFSD is recognising 
that the engine shut down is one of the most significant technical events that can happened to 
an aircraft and therefore merits a heightened level of monitoring. IFSD can result from the loss 
of inherent design reliability as a result of mechanical failure of one or many of all the complex 
components and systems that contribute to the continued airworthiness operation of an engine. 
It can also result from human factors resulting from inappropriate ergonomic design of the crew 
controls or as a result of inappropriate crew procedures or practices. Remember that the 
reliability programme endeavours to maintain or improve the inherent design reliability through 
monitoring not only mechanical failures but human failures that contribute to technical events. 
Identifying an issue through reliability monitoring can result in changes to procedures as well as 
to maintenance actions. IFSD's for an operator can be compares to other similar type 
operators or to previous rates with the same operator. An increase in the rates of IFSD should 
trigger of an investigation. This investigation should take many directions.. 
Mechanical investigation of the failed engines. 
Procedural investigation of the crew. 
Shop practices that overhaul the engine. 
The resultant of the investigation could be.. 
Identification of a common failed part or system, thus a recommendation for a modification to 
the part or system. 
Identification of an incorrect procedures followed by the operating crew or the ground crew. 
Identification of an incorrect procedure followed by the engine shop. 
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Engine failures that do not qualify as an IFSD should not be included in the IFSD rate, but 
should be investigated in the exact same manner as any IFSD. The reason they should not be 
included is that if a particular operators rate does include other than IFSDs it can not be 
compared to that of the world fleet as it will be to a different standard, also the objective of 
tracking IFSDs is due to their shear importance and affect on the continued airworthiness of the 
operation. For example an engine shut down during a maintenance ground run is significant 
and must be subjected to a detailed investigation to get to the root cause of the failure, but it did 
not happen in flight and the conditions of the shut down may well be different from that of that 
in flight when the aircraft is conducting a standard revenue flight. It is also argued in some 
respects that an engine failure during a test flight should also be excluded from the IFSD rates, 
but it is my opinion that such a failure does constitute an IFSD as it meet the requirements in 
the definition of an IFSD. Any definition of an IFSD adopted by an operator should be 
accepted by the regulatory agencies that approves that particular operators Maintenance and 
Reliability Programme. 
2. Unscheduled engine removal rates for 1000 engine cycles or flight hours. 
An unscheduled engine removal can result from three evident sources. 
1. A PREP raised as a result of an evident flight deck warning or non 
standard occurrence that after trouble shooting results in declaring that 
engine unserviceable resulting in the removal of the engine. 
U. A scheduled maintenance tasks, such as a boroscope inspection, that 
detects engine internal deteriation beyond limits that results in declaring 
that engine unserviceable resulting in the removal of the engine. 
Engine Condition Monitoring (ECM), that detects either an adverse trend 
tending towards an unserviceable condition or an engine parameter 
exccedance. This normally leads to an internal boroscope and trouble 
shooting that results in declaring that engine unserviceable resulting in 
the removal of the engine. 
Al of these reasons should be tracked and recorded as a rate. IFSDs resulting in engine 
removals should also be included in this rate. By tracking the rate and comparing it to world 
fleet rates and also to other fleet type rates should be part of the Reliability Programme. The 
Reliability Programme can also then identify increasing trends in unscheduled engine removals 
and just as with component tracking result in the identification of issues requiring addressing or 
modification programmes requiring incorporation. 
3. Pilot Reports (PIREPS) per 1000 engine cycles or flight hours. 
This method has been described in the sections dealing with Monitoring Recurring 
Discrepancies and Statistical Trend Analysis earlier in this section. With regards to engines the 
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-, ATA chapters 71 through to 80 are relevant. The same process as with other ATA chapters 
should be adopted. 
4. Delays or cancellations per 1000 engine cycles or flight hours. 
Again earlier in this section we described the basic Reliability Programme monitoring fleet 
performance on a high level. In the same way those delays or cancellations resulting from 
engine discrepancies should be tracked. This will give an indication as to the trend of engine 
reliability. 
Enqine Condition Monitoring. (ECM). 
Engine Condition Monitoring, ECM, has come along way in the last few years with the 
introduction of Digital Flight Data Recorders (DFDR), Satellite Communications (SATCOM), 
Aircraft Communication and Reporting Systems (ACARS). ECM records and plots in flight data 
of the engine, Low Rotor Speed N1, High Rotor Speed N2, Exhaust Gas Temperature EGT, 
Vibration Vib, Fuel Flow Wf, Throttle Lever Angel TLA, Inlet Pressure P2, Inlet Temperature 
T2, in order to identify adverse tends of exceedances. The older methods required the flight 
crew to manually complete forms while in flight at climb, cruise and descent and these forms 
would then be submitted to the Power Plant engineering section for plotting and review. On 
modem systems this is done automatically by the DFDR and automatically transmitted through 
SATCOM to a ground station, either the operator him self or a service provider such as the 
engine manufacturer. Even today this data is live and can be monitored by the operator live on 
a computer as the aircraft makes it journey if the correct software and system is in place. ECM 
is a fantastic tool and in its present modem form can assist in the detection of engine internal 
deterioration enabling the operator to anticipate and prevent engine failure and pull that engine 
off for repair before the failure occurs thus accomplishing two critical activities, firstly preventing 
the aircraft from entering a compromised airworthy condition and allowing the recognition of a 
failing engine enabling a resultant repair that will be less expensive than that of what could be if 
the condition of the engine was allowed to deteriorate further. Most modem jet engines 
supported by ECM are completely on condition, that means they have no life limit and for that 
reason can remain on an aircraft until they fail, supported by a single scheduled maintenance 
task that may be a periodic internal boroscope. It is my opinion that to take advantage of the on 
condition concept of the engine ECM must be undertaken even in its simplest form of the crew 
filling in forms. To not conduct ECM and leaving engine deterioration detection to crew 
reporting evident failures through PIREPs or periodic boroscope inspections is incorrect and 
will result in costly engine repair bills and possible IFSD rate increase. The cost of 
implementing ECM will out way massively any cost related engine repairs or failures. 
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ECM Advantages and Limitations. 
Advantaqes. 
Maintains safe engine operation and effective maintenance practices through the following.. 
0 Reduces unexpected problems and unscheduled maintenance by detecting abnormal 
trend shifts. 
0 Chronological trending of engine parameters. 
o Fuel Bum & EGT trends. 
0 Rotor Speeds. 
9 Oil Pressure & Temperature. 
0 Engine Vibration. 
0 Throttle stagger. 
Limitations. 
Unreliable in finding unrelated to engine aerodynamic and thermodynamic performance, such as 
0 Bearing system problems. 
0 Fuel contamination. 
An oil consumption and monitoring programme can compensate for the short falls with ECM. 
Monitoring oil consumption rates is also an effective Method for monitoring the engine 
reliability. See section 4.1 for a detailed description. This method is inexpensive and can 
contribute to the reliability programme in detecting trends tending towards a failure. ECM 
including Oil Consumption Monitoring are mandated for ETOPs operation, it is my opinion that 
both methods should also be mandated for normal operations as they lend them selves to not 
only cost savings but also the detection of trends tending towards un airworthy conditions, that 
can enable rectification action taken earlier prior to an evident failure. As well as oil 
consumption oil quality monitoring methods can give indication of engine internal condition, 
through Magnetic Chip Detector (MCD) inspection, where a magnetic probe protrudes into the 
oil sump or oil line. The magnetic probe will pick up any ferrous material. The MCD can be 
inspected periodically for ferrous material build up, indicating bearing failure or other conditions 
where metallic particles can separate from a component and end up in the oil. Spectral Oil 
Analysis Process (SOAP) is another way of monitoring oil quality. An oil sample is taken from 
the oil return line or oil sump. That sample is then examined for chemical content compared to 
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its specification. This process will do two things, it will first tell the condition of the oil comparing 
it to its expected chemical state, and it will also show contaminants in the oil resulting from 
internal engine or component failures. AM of these methods can be considered as engine 
condition monitoring and do have their part in the engine reliability programme. 
6.1.4 ETOPs and Reliability Monitoring. 
Section 4.1.1,4.1.2 and 4.1.3 describes the requirements with regards to ETOPs and 
Reliability Monitoring. The three mandated areas required for ETOPs operation with regards to 
Reliability Monitoring are.. 
a. An Event Based Reliability Programme should be in place. 
b. An ECM programme should be in place. 
c. An Oil Consumption monitoring programme should be in place. 
We saw in the ETOPs section that the issues for the Maintenance & Engineering section vvith 
regards to ETOPs are.. 
e Propulsion System. 
Maintenance Programme. 
e Oil Consumption. 
9 ECM. 
9 MEL. 
0 Resolution of Discrepancies. 
* Training. 
Those primarily addressed in the Reliability Programme are Oil Consumption, ECM and the 
Resolution of discrepancies. It is in my mind that the best way to confirm the resolution of 
discrepancies is first of all by good training and dear procedures enabling the clear detailing of 
resolution steps and referencing of maintenance manuals. The part the Reliability section plays is 
through monitoring the recurrence of the discrepancy through the NORD system as described 
previously in this section. The NORD method of Reliability Monitoring is an Event Orientated 
method identify the recurrence of discrepancies and enables in a more detailed investigation of 
those discrepancies that are not rectiW. 
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6.1.5 Getting to the Root Cause of the Failures or Findings., 
The whole objective of the Reliability Programme is to support the existence of the Scheduled 
Maintenance Programme by identifying and rectifying evident failures and validation of the 
scheduled maintenance tasks and by enabling the establishment of what caused the In operational 
failures. Getting to the root cause of the failure will enable understanding of why it failed and how it 
can be prevented in future. The process that takes place before the reliability section get their 
hands on a PIREP can prevent NORDs form being raised. Good ground technician / engineer 
training and good practices of following the manuals is the start of getting to the root cause quickly, 
but with regards to reliability monitoring it is my opinion that a simple effective and robust reliability 
monitoring system can consist of three basic elements... 
1. Monitoring Recurrence of Discrepancies. 
2. ECM. 
3. Oil Consumption. 
The NORD system of monitoring discrepancy recurrence ensure that PIREPs and in operational 
failures are correctly resolved, and if not a detailed investigation is triggered resulting in modification 
recommendation or revision the the scheduled maintenance tasks. The ECM and the Oil 
consumption monitoring system focuses on the most expensive and significant single component 
installed on the aircraft, the engine. While it would be desirable to review every shop report for 
component condition, that could be expensive, but when a NORD is involved with a component 
removal the shop report must be reviewed to assist with the investigation, focusing on component 
shop reports that are reported as NFF's (No Fault Found). With these three systems in place and 
good initial trouble shooting the root cause of all failures and discrepancies can be found quickly 
and effectively. The resultant action take once the root cause of a discrepancy is known is the final 
part of the Reliability Programme. 
6.2 Developing the Maintenance 
. 
Programme Based on Scheduled Maintenance 
Findings and Reliability Monitoring. 
Remembering the Maintenance Programme consists of Scheduled Maintenance Tasks 
developed through the RCM / MSG3 philosophy and a supporting Reliability Programme 
monitoring in service events. Once the initial RCM / MSG3 Maintenance Schedule is produced 
the Reliability Programme monitors the effectiveness and applicability of the tasks in review of 
the findings, occurrences and events reported through PIREPs, Technical Log entries, Non 
Routine Cards and component shop reports. All of these monitored issues should be 
catalogued and presented to those responsible for the maintenance management to review 
and deliberate on resultant action. The Reliability section should periodically convene a 
meeting where they present the data and propose corrective actions. This meeting and those 
involved are referred to as the reliability Control Board, RCB. 
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6.2.1 The Reliability Control Board (RCB): Objectives, Functions and Processes. 
Depending upon the fleet size and the depth of reliability conducted, the frequency of the RCB 
meeting should be decided upon, for the RCB to be effective and efficient, this meeting should 
not take place any longer than quarterly, every second month would be more effective if 
possible. The RCB should have a terms of reference and the members of the RCB should be 
specified. Those selected as members should be briefed or should undergo basic training in 
the philosophy of RCM / MSG3 and Reliability Monitoring and should have basic knowledge on 
the aircraft type.. 
The RCB Members. 
Chair: The Reliability Section Senior Engineer responsible for the Fleet being studied 
supported by the responsible Reliability Engineer. 
Members: Development Engineers representing power plant, avionics, airframe and systems. 
Quality Assurance, Senior Maintenance Engineer for the fleet, Planning Engineer for the fleet, 
Material & Inventory, C' rew Fleet Manager. The civil aviation authority can have a 
representative present if they wish. 
The RCM objective is to present in a report with commentary description of the findings since 
the last RCB, meeting. The Reliability Report should detail all the monitored reliability 
parameters, the contents and depth of the parameters is decided upon by the Reliability 
Section at the out set of the process and accepted as adequate for the operation by the RCB 
and the civil aviation authority of the operator. The reliability report should detail and present all 
monitored parameters clearly and the accompanying commentary should present to the RCB 
all findings, identify all trends, identify issues requiring decisions and suggest resultant action to 
address any issues. The RCB meeting should ensure that all involved in the technical 
operation understand the technical disposition of the fleet in question and should be in 
agreement with any resultant action to be taken such as modification programmes, fleet 
campaigns and proposed scheduled maintenance changes. The scheduled maintenance 
changes do not take place at the RCB but may be identified as possibly required. The 
scheduled maintenance changes proposals should be deliberated upon by another meeting, 
the Maintenance Schedule Review Board, MSRB. 
6.2.2 The Maintenance Schedule Review Board (MSRB): Objectives, Functions and 
Processes. 
Remembering that the Maintenance Schedule's (MS) whole objective in life is to maintain the 
aircraft in an airworthy condition enabling the realisation of the inherent reliability of design with 
consideration to the optimisation of in service time and cost. Revision to the MS must take 
place to ensure that on going operational and environmental issues are addressed in the 
Maintenance Schedule to ensure the continued establishment of the inherent reliability of 
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design of the aircraft. The Engineer responsible for the production and development of the 
Maintenance Schedule for a particular aircraft should be expert in RCM / MSG3 philosophy 
and ideally should be involved with the manufactures MRB and ISC. No MS change should 
take place with out prior acceptance by the MSRB. All proposed MS changes should be 
documented and thoroughly researched for applicability and effectively, too many times tasks 
are added to an operators MS that do not bring value to the continued airworthiness and 
reliability of an aircraft and are often just knee jerk in effective reactions. It is sensible that the 
MSRB sits at the same frequency as the manufacturers MPD is revised. The MS should be up 
to date with all relevant manufacturer MPD revisions, none the less, even the MPD revisions 
should undergo investigation for applicability and effectively for the operators particular 
operation and environment. It is a mistake to blindly accept any MPD revision into the 
operators MS. Those selected as members of the MSRB should be briefed or should undergo 
basic training in the philosophy of RCM / MSG3 and should have basic knowledge on the 
aircraft type.. 
The MSRB Members. 
Chair: The Maintenance Programme Section Senior Engineer responsible for the Fleet being 
studied supported by the responsible Maintenance Programmes Engineer. 
Members: The fleet type Reliability Engineer, Development Engineers representing power 
plant, avionics, airframe and systems. Quality Assurance, Senior Maintenance Engineer for the 
fleet, Planning Engineer for the fleet, Material & Inventory. The civil aviation authority can have 
a representative present if they wish. 
The basic RCM / MSG3 rules should be applied continuing with the separation of System, 
Zonal and Structural tasks. The inspection standards identified by the ATA 1 Manufacturer 
should also be maintained. It is found sometimes that an operator develops their own 
inspection standards and definitions that may be related to their maintenance staffs 
qualifications. This should be considered carefully as the standard defined by the ATA and 
manufacturer may be used world wide and may be referenced to by the manufacturer in other 
documents such as the maintenance manual, to deviate from them may cause problems and a 
lot more work for maintenance staff who work on multiple types. Aso consideration should be 
made to the resale ability of an aircraft that may be affected if the aircraft is maintained to a 
standard that is peculiar to one operator only. 
Once the proposed changes to the MS are presented, explained and justified to the MSRB a 
vote should be taken. If all are in agreement the revision can be incorporated at the next issue 
of the MS. Contested proposed changes to the MS will require further research or rejection for 
incorporation to the MS. Care should be taken not to add tasks that do not directly contribute to 
airworthiness, maintenance of the inherent reliability of design or may well be addressed by a 
modification at a latter stage. Those tasks that may be temporary, or not confirmed as effective 
and applicable can be issued for compliance as required but can stay out of the MS until 
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conformation of their relevance is obtained. Too often also cost implication are not considered, 
perhaps failure in service is acceptable and less expensive than the scheduled maintenance 
task to prevent that failure. It should be noted that all sections involved in maintenance 
engineering should be encouraged to propose IVIS changes when they think relevant, no 
proposal submitted properly should be automatically rejected from the MSRB. Too often the 
ground technicians and engineers are discouraged from submitting IVIS change requests, while 
they are at the sharp end and do bring valuable practical suggestions based on actual 
experiences. Every proposed change should be documented, and every resulting revision 
should be thoroughly documented and all references and decisions made on the subject 
detailed in the minutes of the MSRB for future reference. All changes to the MS should be at all 
times accessible and clear for the complete life of that type. It is the responsibility of the 
Maintenance Programme Engineer to ensure all procedures are followed at the MSRB and all 
relevant information is documented. The Maintenance Programme Engineer is also 
responsible for composing and revising the MS after the MSRB and submitting it to the 
authorities for approval. Only once approval has been given by the authorities should the 
Maintenance Programme Engineer ratify the changes. This may include revision not only to the 
MS but to task cards sets, the writing of new cards or procedures and updating computerised 
maintenance tracking software. 
6.2.3 Development of the Scheduled Maintenance Tasks using in operational 
data & maintenance Findings. 
Earlier we say the various sources and elements that contribute to the initial development of a 
Maintenance Schedule. See again below. 
Schedule Development 
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Knowing what we know now we can determine that though this diagram is acceptable for the initial 
development of the MS, it is missing the main contributor to the on going development of the MS, 
the Reliability Programme. The MS along with the Reliability Programme can be referred to in total 
as the Maintenance Programme. As we discussed earlier this may be a term misunderstood. Many 
use the terms Maintenance Schedule and Maintenance Programme to mean the same. Other 
identify the Reliability Programme as something separate from the Scheduled Maintenance 
Programme. It is my strong belief, and I believe this has been shown on several occasions that with 
out the Reliability Programme, the Scheduled Maintenance Programme is incomplete and can not 
be referred to as a Maintenance Programme. As we have defined earlier... 
A Maintenance Program Is a Set of Rules and Practices for Managing Maintenance and 
Controlling and Developing the Scheduled Maintenance Program. The Reliability 
Programme Is an Integral part of the Maintenance Programme that supports and verities the 
effectiveness and applicability of the scheduled maintenance tasks through monitoring the 
in-service findings resulting from the technical operation of the fleet and maintenance 
findings resulting from the scheduled maintenance tasks. 
From this definition and what we have discussed so far we can see that the Reliability Programme 
enables the development of the scheduled maintenance programme through the Maintenance 
schedule Review Board as a result of two main aspects of reliability monitoring... 
1. In Service Operational Findings, PIREPs. 
2. On Maintenance Findings resulting from scheduled maintenance tasks, Non 
Routine Cards, NRC's. 
The development of the Maintenance Schedule can go in two direction.. 
1. Increased scheduled task activity, (task addition or de-escalation). 
ii. Decreased scheduled task activity, (task deletion or escalation). 
1. Developing the Maintenance Schedule as a Result of Monitoring In Service Operational 
Findings, PIREPs. 
1. Scheduled Maintenance Task Addition or Interval Reduction (de-escalation). 
Remembering firstly that the RCM / MSG3 philosophy recognises; crew evident failures and may 
well through the decision logic tree allow in service failures to happens as a result of the inherent 
reliability of the design. For this to be validated the crew evident findings must be reported and must 
be monitored PIREP reliability monitoring and tracking as detailed in earlier in this section. The two 
detailed procedures for PIREP reliability monitoring described in this thesis was Recurrent 
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Discrepancy Monitoring and PIREP Statistical Trend Analysis (PIREP Rate tracking), sometime 
using alert setting. 
Monitoring Recurrent Discrepancies. (Ref section 5.1.3 b) 
Once the recurrent discrepancy has been registered and the investigation started as to find the root 
cause. If the resultant conclusion shows that the inclusion of a new scheduled maintenance task 
could assist in addressing the root cause, perhaps through a failure finding task detecting 
degradation early before failure or reduction of an interval of an existing scheduled maintenance 
task. 
e. g. 1. 
Recurrent Discrepancy: ATA 27-50 In Board Flap Screw Jack Failure. 
Failure 1: 10,500 flight hours Shop Report confirm root cause oil loss. 
Failure 2: 12,200 flight hours Shop Report confirm root cause oil loss. 
Failure 3: 11,900 flight hours Shop Report confirm root cause oil loss. 
NORD investigation finally results in recommending a new scheduled maintenance task of 
Servicing of the flap screw jack oil reservoir every 9,500 flight hours. 
Note that the creation of a new MS task is not taken lightly. Prior to the final recommendation the 
engineer carrying out the NORD investigation would consider in service failure implications, 
component modification possibilities, component part number replacement possibilities, and 
possibly other alternatives in addressing the root cause. Cost would be a consideration taken into 
the equation also, perhaps it is less expensive to allow the component to fail in service than to carry 
out a modification programme or a new scheduled maintenance task. In this case the 
recommendation is the introduction of a new MS task. The reliability engineer then raises a 
Maintenance Schedule Change Request and submits it to the Maintenance Programme Engineer 
who puts it through he MSRB. 
e. g. 2 
Recurrent Discrepancy. ATA 79-35 Engine Oil Filter By Pass Light On. 
Failure 1: 8,500 engine hours filter replaced found clogged. 
Failure 2: 9,500 engine hours filter replaced found clogged. 
Failure 3: 10,500 engine hours filter replaced found dogged. 
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NORD investigation finally results in recommending a the reduction of an interval of an existing 
scheduled maintenance task 79-010-00-01 Engine Oil Filter Removal & Cleaning every 12,000 
engine hours to 7,500 engine hours. 
The reliability engineer then raises a Maintenance Schedule Change Request and submits it to the 
Maintenance Programme Engineer who puts it through he MSRB. 
Example 1 shows how through Recurrent Discrepancy Reliability Monitoring (in that case also 
component shop report monitoring was used) new scheduled maintenance tasks can be identified, 
and example 2 shows how existing scheduled maintenance tasks can be adjusted to address in 
service findings. Both examples are examples of reliability monitoring methods resulting in the 
development of the scheduled maintenance programme. 
Statistical Trend Analysis of PI REPs 
. 
(Ref section 6.1.3 b) 
Statistical Trend Analysis of PIREPs involves the gathering of PREP data and logging it then 
graphically presenting it monitoring the graphs for increasing trends or alerts. 
e. g. 1. 
ATA 33 Lights has had a steady PREP rate of between 50 to 100 (i. e. PIREPs per 1000 flight 
hours) for the months of May though to August. During the months of September to April the rate 
has increased to 200 to 300 for the year 2003. The reliability engineering is notified of the rate 
increase through the trend monitoring of the graphical presentation of the PREP rates for ATA 33. 
This triggers of an investigation. The investigation shows the rate increase is due to mostly the 
replacement of cabin interior filaments due to in service failures. The resultant root cause is 
believed to be increased usage of the cabin lights during the winter dark months of the year. This 
conclusion was got at after comparing a three year cycle of seasonal information. The reliability 
engineers recommendation was to ensure failed lights were reported and replaced by the reduction 
of an existing scheduled maintenance task 33-010-00-00 OPC of the Cabin Interior Lights from the 
present 36 months to 12 months, to be done just prior to the start of the winter season. 
Example 1 shows how the procedure will work but is quite a controversial example in so much as it 
introduces a failure finding task to detect a failure that could be considered as totally random. Aso 
by conducting the OPC task can induce failures, can give a false feeling of all is ok as the next time 
after the OPC the lights are operated they can fail, or if lights are replaced can introduce infant 
mortality. The best solution to address this example is to train the cabin crew to keep alert to 
filament failures and to report cabin light failures immediately as they occur to the ground crew 
through the cabin defect log. 
e. g. 
ATA 52 Doors has had a steady PREP rate increase in the last 6 months. After research by the 
reliability engineer noticed that six months ago was the start of the B737 ETOPs Operations across 
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the Atlantic. After review in detail of the PIREPs, noticing the PREP of "excessive door surround 
noiser and after consultation with other B737 ETOPs operators it was concluded that the door seals 
were freezing, becoming stiff and sealing badly causing air leakage and a resulting whistle from the 
door surround. This all was caused by the prolonged operation at cold soak altitude resulting from 
longer ETOPs flights. The investigating reliability engineer then consulted the MS noticed that there 
was no scheduled lubrication of the door seals, hence completed a MS Change Form to include a 
task every 12 months to lubricate the door surround seal with silicon gel to prevent freezing. 
Example 2 shows the value in Reliability Monitoring with regards to in operational data, the 
operation changed and this affected the serviceability of some of the aircraft systems, noticed by 
the reliability engineer who after identifying the root cause recommended development of the MS 
by inclusion of a new scheduled maintenance tasks to address the new failure mode. This example 
also emphasises the importance of customising the operators MS to take into consideration the 
operating condition. 
ii. Scheduled Maintenance Task Deletion or Interval Increase (escalation). 
In-service operational findings in them selves does not lend it self to task deletion or interval 
escalation, but the absence of finding does. This method of Maintenance Development will be more 
appropriately dealt with in the next paragraphs where the absence of in operational PIREPs can 
assist in extending task intervals or deleting task intervals. 
2.13eveloping the Maintenance Schedule as a Result of Monitoring On Maintenance Non 
Routine Findings, NRC*s. 
1. Scheduled Maintenance Task Addition or Interval Reduction (de-escalation). 
During the accomplishment of routine scheduled maintenance tasks often the resultant is non 
routine findings, as these findings are written up on a card they re referred to as Non Routine Cards 
NRC's. It is critical that when NRC*s are raise on a scheduled maintenance input that the task 
resulting in the finding is recorded against the NRC. Remember that the MSG3 failure finding task 
is to detect and rectify discrepancies, so to discover scheduled maintenance tasks result in NRC*s 
is nothing to be worried about provided the resultant NRC is repairable and not approaching too 
close to the end of the P-F range Le. close to the point of failure. Again if a scheduled 
maintenance task continuously detects NRC's that are repairable and rectifiable no further action 
needs to be taken, but if the NRC does result in an expensive or complex repair, meaning the 
inherent reliability of design was heavily compromised tending towards the end of the P-F range 
then adjustment of the scheduled maintenance task may be required to enable the detection of the 
potential failure earlier enabling a less expensive or less significant repair. This may in this case 
result in the reduction of the scheduled maintenance task interval or the creation of a new failure 
finding scheduled maintenance task. 
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e. g. 1 
Schedule Maintenance Task 27-200-00-00 Function Check of the Back Lash of the Horizontal 
Screw Jack and Gimble at every 5000 flight hours. This task measures the wear in the screw jack 
as a result of usage. Potential Failure of the screw jack would not be immediately evident to the 
operating crew until the operating characteristics were affected. This task hopes to detect the wear 
of the screw jack gimble before it becomes evident to the operating crew. The screw jack gimble is 
not expected to fail the check at the first check at 5000 flight hours, but in the last few checks 
NRC*s have been raised to replace the screw jack gimble at the second 5000 flight hours check, 
(i. e. 10,000 flight hours) and the resulting shop report scrapped the gimble as worn to far to 
economically repair. The reliability engineer reviewing the NRC's detects that on the last 10 checks 
3 gimbles resulted in this condition, with the same shop report. After detailed investigation. the 
Reliability Engineer recommended a decrease in the scheduled maintenance task to check the 
gimble and screw jack for wear at an interval of 4000 flight hours, with the repeat second inspection 
at 8000 flight hours. Indications of the investigation shows that the wear at that time will be sufficient 
to be detected by the scheduled maintenance task, an NRC being raised and the gimble being able 
to be repaired. The Reliability Engineer raises the MS Change form and submits it to the 
Maintenance Programme Engineer for deliberation at the MSRB. 
This example shows how through careful monitoring of NRC's development of the scheduled 
maintenance tasks can take place by task interval reduction. Of course the investigation and 
research that must take place before that conclusion is made must be complete and extensive. 
Questions that must be asked during the Reliability Engineers investigation will include review of 
other operators findings if available from the manufacturer, also manufacturers MTBUR and 
MTBF*s, service bulletin review to see if a modification exists that addresses the condition, review 
of other common systems for discrepancies that may implicate the screw jack and gimble leading 
to the wear, and review of the task its self to see if the procedure is correct and the tooling used is 
calibrated and accurate. Taking the same example another conclusion could be made that 
inclusion of a new task such as a lubrication task would prevent the failure. For example the 
Reliability Engineer may well recommend the development of the MS to include a lubrication task of 
the gimble and screw jack at intervals of 2500 flight hours if he can attribute the failure to the lack of 
lubricant leading to friction resulting in excessive gimble wear. In this case the Reliability Engineer 
would raise an MS change request to include a new scheduled maintenance task to lubricate the 
Horizontal Screw Jack and Gimble at intervals of 2500 flight hours, maintaining the Back Lash 
check at the initial 5000 flight hour interval. This resultant would be accompanied by on going 
monitoring of the NRC's raised to see if the removal rate of the gimble would decrease as a result 
of the lubrication addressing the root cause of the failure. 
ii. Scheduled Maintenance Task Deletion or Interval Increase (escalation). 
Reliability Monitoring through NRC review is not only to find deficiencies not addressed adequately 
through the scheduled maintenance programme but also to ensure the airworthiness of the aircraft 
268 
and its inherent reliability is maintained cost effectively. This may mean reduction in the amount of 
maintenance initially thought to have been appropriate, i. e. the increase in task intervals or the 
deletion of irrelevant tasks. If we remember in the initial stages of the thesis we detailed how the 
RCM / MSG3 process started by the IVIRB deciding upon appropriate major intervals for packaging 
scheduled maintenance tasks. This was done through the Policy and Procedures hand book, PPH. 
Where the MRB would allocate periods in time where scheduled maintenance tasks would be 
allocated appropriately... 
1 month, 3 months, 12 months, 36 months etc.... 
100 flight hours, 500 flight hours, 1500 flight hours etc 
IA Check, 2A Check, IC Check etc.... 
Theses intervals were ascertained through the best means available, through historical evidence of 
similar systems and through best engineedng judgement. These intervals may well be proven to be 
excessive and too frequent. This can be recognised through careful assessment of the scheduled 
maintenance tasks as packages through reviewing the NRC*s raised at the particular scheduled 
maintenance inputs. Absence of NRC's on the scheduled maintenance packages could suggest an 
increase in the scheduled maintenance interval. This activity should be an ongoing practice carried 
out continuously by the reliability section. Equally it can work both ways, if the scheduled 
maintenance packages are resulting in many significant NRC's so much so that it affects the 
planned estimated input time then the reverse could be the solution, to reduce the scheduled 
maintenance interval of the scheduled maintenance package. Escalation of a group of scheduled 
maintenance tasks should only take place is sufficient scheduled maintenance tasks have been 
carried out with no significant NRC*s raised against each task. Care should be taken to show that 
the interval was accomplished or very close to. Evidence of no findings of 5000 flight tasks when 
the tasks were accomplished at 4000 flight hours is not evidence to support interval escalation. 
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Below is an example of an escalation study carried out on a fleet of B737-NGs 1000 flight hour 
scheduled maintenance tasks... 
Compliance Time Findings 
AMS Task Interval G-XXXI G-XXX2 G-XXX3 G-XXX1 G-XXX2 G-XXX3 
21-125-00-00 1 000hrs 923hrs 989hrs 91 Ohrs PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. 
1918hrs 1970hrs 1890hrs NRC: 0 NRC: 0 NRC: 0 
21-150-00-00 1 000hrs 923hrs 989hrs 91 Ohrs PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. 
1918hrs 1970hrs 1890hrs NRC: 0 NRC: 0 NRC: 0 
28-060-01-00 1000hrs 923hrs 989hrs 91 Ohrs PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. 
1918hrs 1970hrs 1890hrs NRC: 0 NRC: 0 NRC: 0 
28-060-02-00 1 000hrs 923hrs 989hrs 91 Ohrs PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. 
1918hrs 1970hrs 1890hrs NRC: 0 NRC. 0 NRC: 0 
28-060-03-00 1 000hrs 923hrs 989hrs 91 Ohrs PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. PIREPS-. 0
1918hrs 1970hrs 1890hrs NRC: 0 NRC: 0 NRC: 0 
32-300-00-00 1000hrs 923hrs 989hrs 91 Ohrs PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. 
1918hrs 1970hrs 1890hrs NRC: 1 NRC: 0 NRC: 0 
78-120-01-00 1000hrs 923hrs 989hrs 91 Ohrs PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. 
1918hrs 1970hrs 1890hrs NRC: 0 NRC: 0 NRC -. 0 
78-120-02-00 1 000hrs 923hrs 989hrs 91 Ohrs PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. 
1918hrs 1970hrs 1890hrs NRC: 0 NRC: 0 NRC: 0 
79-020-01-00 1 000hrs 923hrs 989hrs 91 Ohrs PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. PIREPS: 0. 
1918hrs 1970hrs 1890hrs NRC: 0 NRC: 0 NRC: 0 
We have taken all the 1000 flight hour scheduled maintenance tasks and listed exactly when they 
were accomplished by the first three aircraft of the fleet. Note we have reviewed the first and 
second compliance. To review only the first compliance may not give an accurate reflection as this 
interval is a repeat interval so it is good practice to only review a task for escalation after two 
compliances of the task. Three separate aircraft compliances of the tasks would also be a good 
minimum to use to give a fair indication of findings. Not only should the findings be reviewed from 
when the scheduled maintenance task is accomplished, through Non Routine Cards (NRC) review, 
but also a review of the PIREPs raised for that system when the aircraft is in operational service. It 
should be noted that task accomplished long before the interval can not be considered as 
supporting data for the escalation. In the case above all were accomplished at least at 91 % of the 
interval time. The above data shows that only on one occasion has a finding been reported either 
as a PREP or as an NRC. This finding showed that task 32-300-00-00 the pressure of the brake 
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accumulator was found low at the second repeat at 1918 flight hours on aircraft G-XXX1 and had to 
be charged. So it can be deduced that on six separate scheduled inspection of this task one 
resulted in a finding. This data displayed in the manner above could be used to substantiate an 
escalation consideration of the 1000 flight hours tasks. The escalation amount should not be more 
than 10% to 15% of the original interval. In the case above an Maintenance Scheduled Change 
request to escalate the 1000 flight hours tasks to 1150 flight hours could be made to the MSR13 and 
if accepted could then be applied for through an AMS revision to the approving authority along with 
the substantiating data as detailed above. It should be also noted that Certificated Maintenance 
Requirements (CMF; Vs) as detailed in the MRBR are not candidates for escalation. The FAA 
identify some Maintenance Review Board Report tasks as single star tasks while the JAA can 
identify tasks as single or two start CMR tasks, the single CMR tasks are not allowed to be 
candidates for escalation by either the JAA or FAA. Also careful consideration should be given to 
the origins of the MSG3 analysis of the tasks that are candidates for escalation... 
Cat 6. Evident Operational Effect: The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is desirable if it 
reduces risk to an acceptable level. 
Cat 7. Evident Economic Effect: The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is desirable if the 
cost is less than the repair. 
Cat 8. Non Evident Safety Effect: The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is required to 
assure the availability necessary to avoid the safety effects of a multiple failure. 
Cat 9. Non Evident Non Safety: The selection of a scheduled maintenance task is desirable to 
assure the availability necessary to avoid economic effects of a multiple failure. 
Some opinions are that Cat 8 Non Evident Safety tasks should not be candidates for escalation. 
But it is my opinion that is they are identified and reviewed comprehensively, remembering that the 
MSG3 process is not claimed to be exact, that they also can be considered for escalation. 
The data above gives good technical justification based on actual findings resulting from the 
compliance of the scheduled maintenance tasks for escalation, but it should be remembered that 
task escalation can not take place with out the acceptance of the Maintenance Schedule Review 
Board, MSRB and also with out the approval of the aviation authority that approve the complete 
scheduled maintenance programme. Some aviation authorities may not accept the escalation if the 
new proposed intervals deviate from the Manufacturers Planning Document with regards to the 
new interval being greater than the MPD interval. This is also in my opinion not correct as the MPD 
is only a base line starting document. The manufacturer will not change the MPD task intervals until 
the world fleet return data to the manufacturer that suggest the intervals should be increased. This 
is done through the Industry Steering Committee, ISC, for that aircraft type, see section 2 for the 
construction of the ISC. This process can take a long time and the ISC will only escalate intervals 
when the world fleet data suggests it can. An individual operator should be able to apply for 
271 
escalation regardless of the ISC adjusting the MPD interval provided it is done in the manner 
described above and supported by sound actual reliability data. 
Deletion of a scheduled maintenance task is a serious issue and is not recommended unless a 
very good technical reason can be given in support of the removal of the task. Even if the 
scheduled maintenance task results in no NRC's and the reliability monitoring results in no PIREPs 
raised, the deletion of a task should only take place when the task becomes not applicable due to a 
modification of the system or the task is found to be completely irrelevant in maintaining the 
inherent reliability of the system or component. Normally the MPD will remove the applicability of a 
manufacturers recommended scheduled maintenance task when a Service Bulletin modification is 
carried out, the removal from the MPD is sufficient support for the operator to remove the task from 
their maintenance programme. For example task 27-140-02-00 calls for the replacement of the 
wing flap drive transmition oil every 12 years. SB 737-27-1036 modifies the flap system by 
replacing the old flap drives with new sealed units that the oil can not be replaced. In this case if SB 
737-27-1036 is carried out the task 27-140-02-00 becomes irrelevant and not applicable and the 
task can be removed from the operators maintenance programme. Another example is 25-200-00- 
00 calls for the crew escape lanyards to be operationally checked every 12 years. It has been 
discovered that by operationally checking the lanyards the rope and escape system are destroyed 
as they are designed for one use only. This task was removed from the MPD and operators could 
also remove it from their maintenance programmes. A final example is for category 7 MPD tasks. 
Remember these are economic tasks that are there only to save money. It was suggested earlier in 
the thesis that an operator should be able to consider the not incorporating cat 7 task if he so 
desires with out disagreement from his authorities and the MRBR / MPD should indicate this 
accordingly. If the operator does not feel the economic benefit of performing the task he should be 
permitted to remove these tasks. Most authorities will have trouble with this as they perhaps do not 
fully understand that the cat 7 tasks in the MRBR / MPD have no bearing on airworthiness safety 
but only economic Implications. It is my opinion that a manufacturer should highlight in the MPD the 
reasoning for the inclusion of the cat 7 tasks and that they are there only for economic reasoning. 
An operators should include these tasks if they feel they are of benefit but should continuously 
monitor there effectiveness through PIREP monitoring and resultant NRC's from carrying out the 
tasks. Deletion of these tasks should take place if the operator finds they bring no economic value 
to there particular operation. 
Though task escalation as an ongoing practice is recommended, I do suggest that great care is 
taken in identifying candidates for escalation or deletion from the scheduled maintenance 
programme. It is often a subject approached with too much enthusiasm and "escalation fever" can 
result as well as with intrepid fear to deviate from the MRBR or MPD, both of these approaches are 
incorrect. While it is the duty of the Maintenance Programme & Reliability Sections to ensure that 
the Maintenance Programme is applicable, effective and appropriate with regards to maintaining 
the inherent reliability in a cost effective manner, it is also their responsibility to ensure that careful 
consideration is given to any candidate task before it proposed for escalation or deletion. 
Correspondence with the manufacturer is recommended even through the ISC or directly prior to 
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task escalation, while they may not give their exact approval for the changes they may give reason 
as to why the change may not be appropriate or indeed they may included it in the agenda for the 
next ISC to deliberate on. Operator involvement in the ISC will give them a chance to drive the 
tasks they have identified as candidates, and to benefit from the world fleet opinion. ISC 
involvement is encourages. 
6.2.4 Scheduled Maintenance Programme Task Optimisation. 
So far we have described the development of the Maintenance Programme through initially the 
MSG3 process and ongoing through reliability monitoring. This will ensure that the scheduled 
maintenance tasks carried out on the aircraft detailed in the Maintenance Programme of the 
operator, are appropriate, applicable and effective in maintaining the original design reliability of the 
aircraft including any implication of modification carried out since delivery. None the less it is in my 
opinion recommended practice for an operator to conduct a complete review of their maintenance 
programme from time to time. Some aircraft such as business jets and general aviation aircraft do 
not have a manufacturers recommended maintenance programme that is based upon MSG3 
principles or indeed even MSG2. These aircraft and even aircraft with MSG3 developed 
programmes can benefit largely from an optimisation review. A complete review of the scheduled 
maintenance tasks should be carried out approximately every 3 years as an optimisation process to 
identify the applicability and effectiveness of the programme as a whole. It is too easy even with the 
MSRB for scheduled maintenance tasks to enter into the maintenance programme, with all the 
good intentions in the world that are found after time to be in effective. Continued inclusion of these 
tasks at their intervals only inflates the maintenance programme resulting in increased expense 
and increased invasive maintenance activity. As service experience is gained by the operator 
through operation of their fleet, maintenance programme tasks are constantly updated and 
developed by addition, deletion and revision of tasks. This process can be controlled using the 
methods described previously, but a periodic review of the programme as a whole can assist in 
identifying task effectiveness and can assist in identifying candidate tasks for removal or revision 
ensuring that the scheduled maintenance programme is maintaining the inherent reliability of the 
aircraft in an appropriate and cost effective manner. 
Below fig 6.3 is a simplified summary of the Maintenance Programme and Reliability process that 
has been taken place continuously by the operator... 
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The Maintenance Programme Optimisation process is to ensure that each scheduled maintenance 
task in the maintenance programme is examined and reviewed for its effectiveness and 
applicability in maintaining the inherent design reliability of the aircraft, and its systems. Invariably 
most operators maintenance programme ends up containing scheduled tasks that can not be 
justified unless a very dynamic review process has been in operation. The two main reasons for 
maintenance programmes containing ineffective tasks are.... 
1. The initial maintenance programme of the aircraft is developed with out the full 
knowledge of the of inherent reliability characteristics of the aircraft and its 
systems. Some aircraft do not have an MRBR or an ISC these aircraft's 
maintenance programmes are developed through the design engineers 
assessment rather than through maintenance and reliability principles. Those 
aircraft that do have an MRBR and ISC perhaps due to the new design of that 
aircraft and lack of in service experience included tasks that after in service 
experience is gained were found to be ineffective and these tasks have never 
been examined in details for their value in maintaining tlýe inherent design 
reliability of the aircraft. 
2. Often operators end up including scheduled maintenance tasks into their 
maintenance programme as a result of operational problems or incidents. Often 
these tasks are an over reaction or a "knee jeW reaction in an attempt to do 
"something", with out proper evaluation of the root cause of the problem. Often 
also modifications that address these operational issues negate the need for the 
scheduled maintenance task that has been added earlier, but the task has never 
been removed. 
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The basic underlining principle with the optimisation review is that every individual scheduled 
maintenance task in the programme is subject to a critical review at a regular interval. The outcome 
of the review will be to retain the task, delete the task, revise the task content or revise the task 
interval. While the MSG3 analysis process starts with the system top down review approach, the 
optimisation process starts with the task review approach. This approach may at first look appear to 
be contradicting the MSG3 process with the respect that this process reviews the task itself, but in 
fact it is building upon the MSG3 process recognising that the task exists and reviewing that task in 
the light on now known actual in service experience. Remember for those tasks generated from the 
MSG3 analysis often there is no in service actual data available, the optimisation process validates 
those tasks developed from MSG3 or for those task generated from other processes, it reviews 
their effectiveness based upon actual findings and operation data. The process also take into 
consideration any modifications that have been carried out to the aircraft or its systems changing 
the original design. The process may indeed recognise that additional maintenance tasks are 
required, similar to that process described previously above. 
The optimisation process should take each task and review in detail the task re analysing the task 
for applicability and effectiveness in maintaining the inherent reliability of the aircraft including 
implication of any modification that has been carried out on the aircraft. 
The Optimisation Process is similar to the MSG3 process in that it is a decision logic process.... 
Identify the Task / MSI for review. 
Process 1. Task Tvpe Identification. 
Process 1 identifies three task types. The process reviews all maintenance programme tasks and 
attempts to categorise that task into one of the three types. The task type is defined through a 
series of decision logic considerations. It essentially tries to define the Maintenance Programme 
Task / MSI based upon the issue it address in its attempt to maintain the inherent reliability of the 
aircraft or its systems. 
Stop 1: Asses Airworthiness and Safety Implications. This part of the analysis attempts to 
identify if the Task or MSI has been included into the Maintenance Programme to address an 
airworthy or safety issue. This is done through a series of questions and consideration in a logical 
flow. A Yes answer to any of these questions identifies that MSI / task as an Airworthiness / Safety 
Task type. 
Stop 2: Asses the Operational Implications. This part of the analysis attempts to identify if the 
Task or MSI has been included into the Maintenance Programme to address an operational issue. 
This is done through a series of questions and consideration i  a logical flow. A Yes answer to any 
of these questions identifies that MSI / task as an Operational Task type. 
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Stop 3: Asses the Economic and Customer Care Implications. This part of the analysis 
attempts to identify if the Task or MSI has been included into the Maintenance Programme to 
address an economic or customer care issue. This is done through a series of questions and 
consideration in a logical flow. A Yes answer to any of these questions identifies that MSI / task as 
Economic / Customer Care Task type. 
A MSI / task can be identified as more than one type. Depending upon the task type, further 
analysis is to be carried out to identify if that task is applicable and effective in maintaining the 
inherent reliability of the original design taking into consideration any modifications that have been 
carried out and any reliability data gathered during the in-service time of the aircraft. 
Process 2. Task Review & Validation. 
Process 2 ftirther reviews the Task / IVISI and scrutinises its validity for existing in the maintenance 
programme. Is the task still effective and applicable in maintaining the inherent reliability of the 
aircraft or its systems? In-service reliability data is key to this process. 
The Task / MSI is at the end of this process identified as a candidate for continued inclusion or for 
removal from the maintenance programme. 
Airworthiness I Safety Type Tasks. This part of the analysis attempts to identify if the Task or 
MSI continues to have validity in meeting the tasks original intentions of addressing a particular 
airworthy or safety issue. This is done through a series of questions and consideration in a logical 
flow. Similar to Process 1. At the end of the process each Task / MSI is identified as a candidate for 
either... 1. Interval escalation or task deletion or 2. To remain un revised or 3. Interval reduction. 
With AD's, CMffs, ALI's or Regulatory tasks, escalation or deletion is not permitted. Strong 
engineering substantiation will be required if an operator wishes to escalate or delete these tasks, 
only with their authorities authorisation. 
Operational Type Tasks. This part of the analysis attempts to identify if the Task or MSI continues 
to have validity in meeting the tasks original intentions of addressing an operational issue. At the 
end of the process each Task / MSI is identified as a candidate for either... 1. Interval escalation or 
task deletion or 2. To remain un revised or 3. Interval reduction. 
Economic I Customer Care Type Tasks. This part of the analysis attempts to identify if the Task 
or MSI continues to have validity in meeting the tasks original intentions of addressing an economic 
or customer care issue. At the end of the process each Task I MSI is identified as a candidate for 
either... 1. Interval escalation or task deletion or 2. To remain un revised or 3. Interval reduction. 
Maintenance Programme Optimisation Decision Diagram's 
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Process I. Task Type Identification. 
Decision diagram 1. Airworthiness / Safety Assessment. Fig 6.4 
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Task / MSI airworthiness or safety 
as Task 4 issuel 
Type Y 
Airworthv NNT 
Safety. 
Is the Task / MSI a CMR, ALI, 
Y 
4Regulabon 
or AD? 
I 
Task / MSI is not Task T 
Airworthy / Safety. 
277 
Decision Diaqram 2. Operational Implication Assessment. 6.5 
Continuing from Diagram 1. 
Operational Implication Assessment 
Is the Task / MSI generated from 
I MSG3 analysis? I 
YY f- 
I 
--+ N 
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ODerabonal. 
Decision Diagram 3. Economic / Customer Care Assessment. Fig 6.6 
Continuing from Diagram 2. 
Economic / Customer Care 
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Care. 
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Maintenance Programme. 
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Process 2. Task Review & Validation. 
1 
Iden Idenfifv Task ldenbfv Task 
Task / MSI MSI as Task MSI as Task 
as Task Type Type 
Type Overabonal. Economic 
Airworthy Customer 
Safetv. 
I f 
Care. 
4 
Task / MSI is identified as neither Airworthiness 
Safetv Tvpe or Operational Tvpe or Economic 
Customer Care Tvpe. Hence is identified as a 
Candidate for Deletion briming no value to the 
Maintenance Proqramme. 
From Process 1 we have identified all Maintenance Programmes as either a combination of Task 
Type 1,2 &3 or Task Type 4. Next we have to identify whether that task is applicable and effective 
or is a candidate for revision. 
1. Task Type Airworthy / Safety. Fig 6.7 
Check the task / 
IVISI against the 
current CMR, ALI 
Regulation or AD to 
ensure it is still a 
valid requirement. 
Consider y 
accomplishing the 
terminating action if 4 
the cost of the 
termination is less 
than accomplishing 
the repeat task 3 
times. Take into 
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Y 
Is there a termination action 
deleting the task requirement? 
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from NRC's or from PIREPs in the ata 
chapters addressed by this CMR, AD 
ALI or Reoulation task? 
risk & implications 
of findings. 
If a No decision to terminate is made. 
Y 
Check the task / MSI 
against current 
MRBR/MPD intervaf. 
y 
Is the Task / MSI IVISG3 Cat 5 
or 8? 
1 
N 
Have there been significant findings 
from NRC's or from PIREPs in the ata 
chapters addressed by this task 
MSI? 
y 
Do the findings merit interval N 
ucb 
I [=ction? 
NN T- y 
Task remains as is un revised. 
Task is a candidate for interval 
reduction. 
I 
Task is a candidate for interval 
escalation or task deletion. 
I Task Type Airworthy / Safety. 
Is the Task / MSI a CMR, ALI,, 
Regulabon or AD? 
I 
N 
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Note that tasks / MSI that originate from Mandatory CMR's, AD's, ALI's or Regulation do not have 
a decision route to escalate or delete the task. The only way shown above to eliminate the task in 
this case is this case is through termination action. This is not strictly true. To escalate or delete 
Mandatory tasks takes strong engineering support from the operator and detailed coordination with 
regulatory authority that imposed the restriction and the regulatory authority that the operator 
answers to. 
2. Task Type Operational. Fig 6.8 
Check the task / MSI 
against current 
MRBR/MPD interval. 
Task Type Operational. 
Is the Task / MSI MSG3 Cat 
8? 
1 
Y 
N 
Have there been significant findings 
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MSI? 
Y 
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reduction? 
I 
Y 
Task is a candidate for interval 
reduction. 
I 
N 
Task remains as is un revised. 
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N 
Task is a candidate for interval 
escalation or task delebon. 
I 
3. Task Type Economic / Customer Care. Fig 6.9 
Task Type Economic 
Customer Care. 
Check the task / MSI 
against current 
MRBR/MPD interval. 
Task is a candidate for interval 
reduction. 
I 
4. Task Type Open. 
N 
Careful consideration 
should be given to any 
Customer imposition. 
A task that can affect 
Customer Care can 
have economic 
repercussions rather 
than airworthy 
implications. 
Task is a candidate for interval 
escalation or task deletion. 
I 
A task that failed to be identified as task type Airworthiness / Safety or Operational or Economic / 
Customer Care is immediately a candidate for deletion from the Maintenance Programme. The 
origins of the task must be identified and re considered, as if the task does not bring airworthy or 
safety value, operational value, economic or customer care value then it does not contribute to the 
maintenance of the inherent reliability of the aircraft or its systems. If this can be determined the 
task should be removed. We spoke earlier of the possibility of maintenance tasks being added to 
the Maintenance programme as a "knee jerk" reaction rather than through a methodological 
decision process to address a valid issue. Even with the best intentions and this can still happen. 
These tasks will be identified when carrying out the Optimisation study of the maintenance 
programme. If the task does have traceable origins that do have some validity that task can be 
Is the Task / MSI MSG3 Cat 7 
or 9? 
1 
Y 
N 
Have there been significant findings 
from NRC*s or from PIREPs in the ata 
chapters addressed by this task 
MSI? 
Y 
Do the findings mrit interval 
reduction? 
I 
V N 
Task remains as is un revised. 
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retained but should reviewed and revised to optimise the task intentions other wise the task should 
be removed from the maintenance programme in total. 
Fig 6.10. Task Type Open. 
Task / MSI is identified as neither Airworthiness 
/ Safe! y Type or Operational Type or Economic 
/ Customer Care Type. Hence is identified as a 
Candidate for Deletion brinqinq no value to the 
Maintenance Proqramme. 
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I 
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V 
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V 
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yN 
Retain Task but review in Delete Task 
detail task interval & oDntent. 
N 
Section 6.2 detailed how to develop the scheduled maintenance programme using in service 
reliability data and findings resulting from carrying out the scheduled maintenance tasks. By strictly 
following this process utilising the MSRB for all task inclusions or adjustments should ensure in 
theory tasks that are not based on good maintenance engineering reasoning should not get into 
the maintenance programme. But we recognise that this is not actually the fact and that over time 
the scheduled maintenance tasks that were thought to be based on good MSG3 / RCM basis are in 
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fact not as valid as first thought. The optimisation process described in 6.2.4 will ensure that all 
scheduled maintenance tasks are validated and those that are found to in valid will be deleted or 
adjusted. His is the continuation of MSG3 / RCM methodology in practice even after the initial 
MSG3 development of the maintenance programme. These process are not complicated, but are 
time consuming and do rely on the collection of good accurate data. These process will ensure that 
the maintenance programme is as cost effective and applicable for the operation as it can be. 
6.3 The Role of The Operating Crew In MSG3 Maintenance Programmes. 
6.3.1 A Reminder of The RCM Dependency on Operating Crew Evident Failure Modes. 
As early in the thesis as Section 1 described the role of the operating crew has been described as 
pivotal in the complete RCM / MSG3 Process. The first question asked in the RCM / MSG3 
processis 
"is the failure evident to the operating crew during their nonnal dutiesr 
This shows the importance of the operating crew in the definition of the scheduled maintenance 
programme. The reliance of the operating crew in this process is I believe a fact not completely 
understood by the majority of operating crew in aviation today. Section 4.1 on ETOPs starts to try to 
define the importance of the operating crew and the requirement for operating crew training in the 
maintenance programme cycle, to ensure they understand their role in reporting evident failures 
and in reporting any non standard situation they may find them selves in. 
6.3.2 Flight Crew Training To Understand the MSG3 Philosophy. 
Maintenance Programme Training for Operating Crew should in my opinion manifest itself in the 
following areas... 
Thorough training in the standard operating procedures for all aircraft systems focusing on 
the basic technical design capability of the systems. This will enable them firstly to 
understand exactly how the aircraft and its systems is suppose to operate and enable 
them to be able to identify non standard operating situations. 
Basic Familiarisation training on the RCM / MSG3 philosophy and the'maintenance 
programme cycle. This will enable them to understand their individual role in the complete 
maintenance programme cycle and how their reports can affect the subsequent 
maintenance actions carried out by the maintenance engineering division in attempting to 
re instate the inherent design reliability. They should be completely aware of the particular 
aircraft types ability to supply defect codes from their central monitoring computers and 
who they can use these codes when reporting. 
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Basic aviation technical writing skills to enable the operating crew to report clearly and 
accurately the evident failures or non standard situations detected by the operating crew 
when operating the aircraft. The maintenance engineers and technicians start their failure 
trouble shooting with the Pilots Report in the technical log. This report (PIREP) should give 
a good clear indication of exactly what the situation was and the environment the situation 
occurred, supported by indications or failure reports through the computerised systems. 
6.3.3 Maintenance Crew Training To Understand the MSG3 Philosophy. 
Not only is it noticeable that the operating crew often fail to understand their role in the maintenance 
programme cycle, but surprisingly also the maintenance crew are untrained in their exact role in the 
maintenance programme cycle. It has been my experience that maintenance technicians and 
engineers rarely have undergone RCM / MSG 3 philosophy training of any sort, yet they are 
involved in maintaining the continued airworthiness of an MSG3 concept maintained aircraft. 
Maintenance Programme Training for Maintenance Personnel should in my opinion manifest its self 
in the following areas... 
Detailed Familiarisation training on the RCM / MSG3 concept of developing a scheduled 
maintenance programme to maintain the inherent reliability of design. Enabling them 
appreciation of the scheduled maintenance tasks origins and the decision logic that 
defines the scheduled maintenance tasks. They should be aware of the different 
scheduled maintenance basic tasks and the definitions of the tasks, after all it will be the 
maintenance staff that carry out the General Visual Inspections. For example do they fully 
understand the differences between an Operational Check and a Functional Check? 
Detailed understanding of the maintenance documentation that is available to them in 
assisting them in maintaining the aircraft. Maintenance manuals and illustrated parts 
catalogues are often understood but Fault Manuals/Codes, BITE Manuals, and even the 
MEL are often not fully appreciated. 
Basic aviation technical writing skills to enable the maintenance crew to report clearly and 
accurately the actions they take to address PIREPs. They should be able to raise Non 
Routine Findings when carrying out scheduled maintenance that clearly explains the 
findings and their subsequent rectification action. They should understand what happens 
to the NRC that they raise and the PIREP rectification action that they carry out and detail 
in the technical log. 
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7. Maintenance Programme Control Software. 
The Maintenance Programme in its entirety has been defined in the previous 5 sections of the 
thesis. Starting with the development of the initial Scheduled Maintenance Task utilising the 
MRBR MSG3/RCM process, then custornising it for a particular operators environment, we 
then have the Operators Maintenance Schedule. Accomplishing the NIS with Task Cards and 
monitoring the MS with an on going Reliability Programme all constitutes the complete 
Maintenance Programme. This complete process is a complex series of controlled activities 
and can be accomplished and applied by utilising efficiently with a Maintenance Programme 
Control Software, MPCS. There are many MPCS available today in the Aviation world. Some 
stand alone controlling only the MS, some included the Reliability Monitoring, some go much 
further in supporting all aspects of the technical operation of an aircraft or a fleet. 
Maintenance Programme Control Software Modules in their complete form can be able to 
control and monitor the following.... 
1. Fleet Operational Activities: Flight hours, Flight Cycles, Arrival Stations, 
Departure Stations, Fuel Burn, Flight Performance Data. 
2. Scheduled Maintenance Task Control: Controlling all scheduled maintenance 
tasks with their intervals. Showing when they fall due and how much time is 
remaining until they fall due. 
3. Technical Records Management & Control: Stores all aircraft technical records 
detailing all installed components, fleet flight hours & cycles, fleet modiflcation 
status. 
4. Task Card Control: Linking all task cards to the scheduled maintenance tasks or 
bulletin task, enabling task card printing for the controlled scheduled maintenance 
tasks. 
5. Bulletin Control: Controlling all Service Bulletins, Airworthiness Directives and 
other Bulletin types, modifications and inspections. 
6. Reliability Monitoring & Defect Control: Carries out the complete Reliability 
function from storing all PIREPs, setting alerts and notification of recurrent defects. 
Also manages all defects raised as a result of scheduled maintenance tasks, 
linking them to the scheduled maintenance task that resulted in the defect finding. 
7. Manpower & Capacity Management: Controls manpower requirements 
required to carry out the scheduled maintenance tasks & monitors manpower 
availability. 
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8. Inventory & Material Management: Controlling all inventory material. Defining all 
material requirements to accomplish the scheduled maintenance programme & 
modification programme. Controlling the purchasing of material to support the 
technical operation. 
Depending upon the operators requirements often the above eight aspects of an MPCS are 
available as modules. A small operators may only require a few of the modules while a large airline 
may require all modules detailed above and even many more such as a Flight Planning module, 
Crew Management Module or even a Financial Control Module. Modules 2 to 6 are essential in my 
mind required to conduct proper and complete Maintenance Programme Management. 
Before an operator decides upon the MPCS they wish to use to manage their maintenance 
programme function, there are four definite phases they must undertake to ensure they purchase 
the correct MPCS for their particular operation. These are... 
6.1 User Team Selection and Preparation. 
6.2 Software Assessment. 
6.3 Software Selection. 
6.4 Soffivare Implementation. 
These for phases must be carried out by a group of representatives from each section involved in 
the management and accomplishment of the Maintenance Programme. Each section 
representative or User, will be involved from the start to the completion of the project. Carrying out 
the four phases lead by a Project Manger whose task is to ensure all decisions, tasks, activities are 
planned and made in a timely manner in coordination with all representative Users. 
7.1 User Team Selection and Preparation. 
The user team should be completely representative of the sections that intend to use the software. 
A team member should be completely familiar with the procedures and processes followed by the 
section he represents. He should understand the important functions and the less important 
functions with in his section. The team member should understand that being in the team means 
extra work and extra hours. It is often difficult for the User Team members to split their time 
between their daily routine duties and their project demands, but unless the team members are 
100% dedicated to the project the result will not be as good as it should be. 
Once the User Team has been selected it should be clearly written down what is expected of the 
team members and what deliverables they are required to produce. It should also be clear that the 
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Project Manager and selected team leaders do have authority to set deadlines and to distribute 
action items with regards to the project for all User Team Members. 
Summary of Written instructions required.. 
Clear job descriptions for each team member, including the team leaders and Project 
Manager. 
o Clear deliverables expected from each team member. 
0 Clear reporting lines in the context of the project. 
Once the User Team has been selected and written instructions are clear and accepted by the 
team, it is now required that the User Team starts to prepare to assesses a number of software 
available in the market. The Project Leaders have first before getting the User Team involved, 
define the following... 
0 What is the operators budget available for the software? 
a What is the operators exact requirements? 
What software is available in the market that meets the budget & the general 
requirements? 
Once the Project Leaders have identified the three issues above, the team can prepare for the 
assessment. 
7.2 Software Assessment. 
Software assessment should take three phases. 
Phase 1: The identification of appropriate software available in the market. 
The Project Leaders should conduct the Phase 1 identification of available software in the market. 
This first search and find activity should select software that merits the review based upon the three 
criteria detailed in 6.1 above. The Project Leaders should eliminate that software that does not 
meet the criteria of operators budget and operators requirement. Too expensive software should 
be eliminated as should software that does not meet the requirements. Project Leaders should be 
careful not to eliminate non aviation software at first glance often good aircraft maintenance 
software was derived from plant maintenance software. Those left from the Project Leaders search 
should be entitled to Phase 2 Initial Review. The Project Leaders should research software 
available from the following source... 
I. Aviation Magazines. 
287 
2. Aviation Trade Shows. 
3. World Wide Web searches. 
4. Word of mouth from other operators. 
5. Any other sources available. 
Phase 2: The initial review of the available software. 
This is the first time when the User Team are brought in to review. The User Team should have 
prepared with a matrix of major general section functions. This matrix should identify the major 
function that each section assessing the software are expected to carry out. A box should be 
beside each function where the assessing User can score 0 to 3 rating the software for his 
functions. 0 means it is not capable of the function while 3 means it is highly capable. Those 
selected by the Project Leaders for Phase 2 can be assessed by the User Team through a variety 
of methods.. 
1. Internet Presentation. 
2. Software Provider Presentation. 
3. Existing User Visit. 
4. Any other method where the User Team can score the capabilities listed in the Phase 2 
See attachment 5, Phase 2 Initial High Level Assessment Matrix: AssesmentDetailed. xls 
Phase 3: Second Review. Detailed Assessment. 
This is the second User Team review of the software that scored highest in the first User Team 
review in Phase 2. This Phase takes the software that the Users wish to examine further for 
possible selection. This time the User Group have to do much more preparation by developing a 
detailed functional review matrix for each user section. Each User should define every detailed 
function carried out by his section in support of the Maintenance Programme, each function is 
weighted 1 to I Weight 1 being desirable function weight 2 being required function weight and 3 
being pssential function weight. Those functions that are mandatory required should be weighted 3 
but identified as RED, meaning if the software is not capable it is rejected. The matrix should go on 
to have a box to score each function once assessed 0 to 5.0 meaning it is not capable, 5 meaning 
it is completely capable in all ways. 2,3, and 4 are levels of capability between as determined by 
the assessing User. 
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See attachment 5, Phase 3 Detailed Assessment Review, Attachment 5: AssesmentDetailed. xls 
This detailed assessment should take place at the operators base with the software presenter bring 
along a copy of the product with good current usable data. This may involve requesting an existing 
user to allow access to his data for review purposes. It should also be noted at this stage the 
following information should be attempted to be received.... 
0 How many operators in the world are using this product? 
0 How long has the product been in circulation? 
0 How is the product supported? 
0 How do the individual operator users now feel about the product? 
The detailed assessment should take at least three days and each User Team member should be 
given full ability to completely review all aspects of the detailed functions in the detailed matrix. The 
assessment of the software should be conducted with good data that the User is familiar with, for 
example if the operators fleet is mainly B737's it is ideal that B737 data is used for the assessment. 
If the software presenter is unable to provide good data then the assessment will not be of as high 
value as could be. Aso if the software presenter is not familiar in detail with the software functions 
in total again the assessment will not be of as value as it could be. Users should not settle for 
explanations of how the software works, but should them selves carry out the function they are 
assessing and see its capability first hand. Remarks are important at time against the each 
function. The assessing User should describe any issues he wishes positive or negative and note 
them against the score in the matrix. 
The IT section should be represented by a User Team member, he must carry out also a thorough 
review and assessment from an IT perspective. Their appraisal is as important as the User function 
assessment. IT considerations should be given to software platforms, programming language, data 
integrity, hardware requirements and very importantly to legacy system data migration issues and 
other system integration issues. 
7.3 Software Selection. 
Once the detailed assessment has been carried out satisfactorily the User Team Leaders should 
ensure that the matrix has been completed correctly, all calculations are working correctly then he 
should compile a summary of the total scores for management review with the detailed functional 
scoring available for review by senior management. 
See Attachment 5, Phase 3 Detailed Review Matrix with Executive summary & Score Comparison: 
AssesmentDetailed. xls 
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The User Team have now conducted a detailed assessment of a number of software against many 
detailed functional issues. This is important for many reasons. 
e The Users in the Team will be those responsible later for implementing the software. 
The Users in the Team will be responsible for using the software in their daily duties once 
implemented. 
These two points must be re iterated to the Users Team many times from the start of the project to 
the finalisation of scores in the detailed assessment matrix. 
Selection of the software will be ultimately a decision taken by the Senior Mangers for Maintenance 
Engineering and for Information Technology (IT). As company accountable managers they both will 
be responsible for the compete success of the software so before they select the software to be 
purchased they must review the Users Teams assessment and even meet with the Team to 
discuss any issues that will assist them in their decision. In theory you would think the top scoring 
software should be selected, but there are other business issues to be considered by the senior 
managers prior to selection.... 
0 Software total cost & recurring cost. 
0 Staff training requirements. 
0 Does the software meet the corporate mission at this stage of the operator's business 
situation? 
Additional hardware cost. 
Software providers economic stability. There are many companies available that can be 
hired to conduct a company review of the software provider, this is referred to as a Due 
Diligence Report. 
Other User Operators experiences with the software. This may involve a site visit to an 
established user operator of the software. 
Once all of these considerations have been taken and the detailed assessment matrix has been 
thoroughly reviewed then the senior management will be in a position to take the decision of which 
software is to be purchased. 
7.4 Software Implementation. 
The implementation of a Maintenance Programme Control Software is a complex project involving 
many sections and departments. During the assessment phases of the MPCS the User Team 
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became very familiar with the capabilities of the software selected and with the detailed functions of 
their section and even other sections. This means that that group of users would be ideal to 
become involved in the implementation of the software. 
The Project Leaders of the selection and assessment process should ideally take the project 
through to implementation. They should lead the group selected as the "Super Users! '. The Super 
Users will be ideally the users that were involved earlier in the assessment process. Just as the 
User Team in the assessment phases were representative of all sections involved in the 
Maintenance Programme, the Super User group should also represent all sections that the 
implementation involves. Once the definition of the Super User group has been made it is 
imperative that in such a complex project as software implementation that Job Descriptions for the 
Super Users are defined. There should essentially be three major Job Descriptions.... 
- 
1. The Project Manager. Usually this is a senior IT member preferably one who has been 
involved from the beginning of the assessment process. 
2. The Project Leader. This should be a Maintenance Control Progarnme expert that will 
assist the Project Manger and may even seem to be in charge at times. 
3. The Super Users. This should be a group that represent the complete spectrum of 
sections involved with the Maintenance Control Programme. He Super Users will be 
responsible for the successful implementation of the MPCS in their section, this must be 
understood by all of them. This way they are motivated to get involved in detail rather than 
let the Project Leaders take all the responsibility. 
The Super User methodology is prime to the success of the implementation project. The fact 
that the Super User group were involved from the beginning with the initial assessment and the 
detailed assessment and essentially recommended the MPCS for purchase, it is then natural 
that they are involved in the final implementation stage. This method enables a feeling of 
ownership of the MPCS- It promotes a sense of affinity with the success of the MPCS, this is 
very conducive to enabling a successful and efficient implementation. 
Implementation Preparation. 
0 Appoint Project Manager and Project Leader. 
Appoint Super Users. 
0 Define Job Descriptions for project team. 
* Conduct Super User MPCS Training. 
0 Define Implementation Plan. Detailing major tasks, milestones and completion dates. 
0 Identify a medium for communication. E. g. Project Intranet Page, or group email. 
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Identify a recurring weekly internal project meeting time. Stick to it even if there is no 
agenda. It is important that the Project Leaders and the Super Users meet regularly to 
discuss the implementation. 
Identify a recurring weekly external project meeting time. At this meeting the Project 
Leaders should meet with the software providers to discuss implementation issues. 
This can be through internet meeting, speaker phone if the provider can not be 
present. 
Ensure that the software provider is continuously involved in the implementation. Note 
that often software providers assist in software implementation by appointing one of 
their staff as the Implementation Coordinators, even if this is so it is essential that the 
purchasing operator manages the project as it is he and the users that will be left with 
the project after implementation, but it must be realised that the software provider will 
have a lot of valuable information and experience that could be invaluable to the 
success of the implementation. 
The implementation will start with the new Maintenance Programme Control Software being loaded 
on the Super Users desk top PC's. The Super Users will be familiar with the new MPCS since they 
have been involved in detail in its assessment and then have undergone functional training. The 
access the Super Users will have at this stage is in a test database. There will be of course be no 
operators data at this stage but the Super Users can practice their new skills knowing that they will 
not corrupt any data. 
The implementation tasks and milestone will be detailed in the Implementation Plan. The dates and 
deadlines will be recommended by the project leaders but they must be accepted by the Super 
Users and adjusted if the Super Users feel they are too ambitious. The initial Implementation Plan 
can often be given to the project leaders by the software providers, but adjustments to suite the 
operator and the Super Users should be made. While the Super Users conduct user familiarisation 
testing with the software, the project leaders should start one of the major activities the legacy 
system data migration. 
Data Migration. 
The implementation plan will identify this stage as a major mile stone. The IT section should identify 
all legacy systems presently used by the operator that need to be migrated. This activity is detailed 
and essential to the projects success. If the operator uses an existing MPCS this task may be quite 
easy, but there may be multiple systems in use that all Super Users require migrating into the new 
MPCS. The more legacy software there is to migrate the more complex the task is. The IT 
representative on the project must with each Super User identify all the legacy systems to be 
migrated... 
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Maintenance Programme Control Software Ma*Or Areas for Migration. 
., 
Maintenance and Engineedng Records. 
0 Aircraft Type Fleet data. 
o Scheduled Maintenance Tasks. 
o Task Cards. 
Historical Compliances. 
0 Historical Defects. 
0 Historical Aircraft Flight Hours and Cycles. 
Engine, Aircraft and Part Service Bulletins, Service Letters, Airworthiness Directives and 
Modifications. 
0 Component installations and removals. 
0 Component Controls and Limitations. 
Stores and Invento! y Records. 
0 Inventory On Hand Parts. 
0 Component Storage Limitations. 
* Component Effectivities. 
0 Component Interchange abilities. 
Other areas that may require migration are 
e Human Resources. 
0 Financial data and General Ledger. 
* Purchasing data. 
0 Staff Qualifications and Training data. 
0 Technical Library and Manuals data. 
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The data migration should involve the Super Users. The Super Users should identify the 
mapping of where legacy system data should be migrated into the new MPCS. This process 
can be largely Vial and error, where the migration programme is adjusted each time. Data 
migration is often done by the software provider as they have the programming source data for 
the new MPCS. The process of migrating should take place continuously until the Super users 
are satisfied it is as best as it can be. Parallel to this the Super Users should continue their 
familiarisation with the new MPCS practicing transactions, and identifying where coordination 
issues are between Super Users. The project leaders should ensure that coordination between 
Super Users takes place. They should arrange coordination meetings where it is felt required 
between Super Users. 
It is understood that no migration will give 100% satisfactory results, there will be required data 
verification and clean up by the Super Users. 
Data Verification and Clean Up. 
After the migration is completed as best as it can. The Super Users must start to prepare to 
going live by reviewing in details the data migrated and validate that it is acceptable. This will 
also involve cleaning the migrated data to ensure accurate and usable data for the MPCS to 
take over from the legacy systems. If the Super Users daily duties are too demanding to allow 
them to spend sufficient time conducting data clean up, it may be necessary to employ other 
staff with this function. This is not only required to ensure correct data for use with the MPCS 
but it is also a chance to introduce other users than the Super Users with the new MPCS. After 
all they will also be expected to use the new MPCS. Prior to going live it is necessary that all 
users of the MPCS are adequately trained on the new MPCS. This task may be a duty of each 
Super Users, to ensure their section staff are trained in the areas they will use the MPCS. An 
alternative is to employ the software provider to conduct training for the users, but it is at times 
better if the Super Users conduct the training as they not only understand the MPCS in detail 
they also understand the operators procedures and how the MPCS shall integrate into the 
operators work processes and procedures. 
Quality Assurance. 
All through the project a representative from the Quality Assurance section must be involved. 
OA will assist in identifying regulatory requirements with regards to MPCS and Will identify 
existing work processes and procedures that have to be changed to enable the acceptance of 
the MPCS. No new MPCS will fit completely the operators work processes and procedures 
unless a large amount of money has been spent to customise the new MPCS. QA will also 
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conduct audits on the new MPCS and the migrated data to ensure all is as it should be and the 
new MPCS will be acceptable to the regulatory authorities. 
Customisations. 
As mentioned, no new MPCS will fit exactly the operators current processes and procedures, 
this may require operator procedural adjustments or it may be the case that custornisations are 
required. It is the Super Users task to identify where custornisations are required with the new 
MPCS with respect to transactions, fields, functions and reports. The project leaders should be 
very careful when a Super Users identifies a required custornisation as this will usually cost 
extra money and may take the operator away from the standard usage of the new MPCS 
which may at times be unadvisable as future improvements by the software provider may be 
affected by any customisations. As a general rule custornisations to the should be avoided 
unless absolutely necessary. 
Preparation for Going Live. 
Once the data has been migrated successfully, once the data clean up and verification is 
completed, once the training is completed of all users, once the customisations are identified 
and once the procedural changes are identified the operators can start planning to go live with 
the new. Before this it is advisable to conduct a complete week or more of simulation, where 
every user section starts to use the new MPCS in its entirety. From this exercise many issues 
will arise, especially coordination issues. Once these issues are addressed and solved and all 
coordination issues are solved and QA are in a position to accept the new MPCS, it is time to 
go live. 
Going Live and the Parallel Run. 
Only once a Super User group decision has been taken to go live must the parallel run start. 
Going live is a highly demanding final phase of the implementation project. Going live means 
you must parallel run both the legacy systems and the new IVIPCS, entering data twice, 
carrying out transactions twice, producing reports twice. This means extra work load on staff. 
Aso going live means final data clean up. The data that could not be sorted with the migration 
has to be "cleaned" in the actual live system. Each Super Users must have a final plan in mind 
and coordinated With other Super Users for the Going Live Parallel Run phase. Primary data 
must be recognised as being more important than secondary data with regards to clean up and 
parallel run. Primary data can be considered as data that is essential to the MPCS.... 
Examples of MPCS Primary Data 
1. Flight hours and cycles. 
2. Scheduled Maintenance Tasks. 
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3. SB's and AD's. 
4. Component installations and removals. 
5. Inventory issues 
Any data that is essential to the correct running and monitoring of the MPCS should be considered 
as Prime data and should be focused on and audited for correctness during the parallel run on the 
live data. 
The time the parallel run should take place can be anything from 3 weeks to 6 months. The 
decision of when the parallel run should stop should be made by the Super Users in conjunction 
with the Quality Assurance section who should be in coordination with the aviation authorities. It is 
possible that there can be different phases of going live. Phase I being the primary users of the 
new MPCS and phase 2 being the secondary users. But the complete maintenance programme 
cycle should be considered before deciding to split the implementation into phases. While Finance 
and purchasing may on the face of things be able to be left till a later phase you may find that there 
will be a gap period in your records if different phases periods of implementation are used. All of 
this must be considered. 
Weekly Super User progress meetings must continue, but the Project Leaders must on a daily 
basis meet with each Super User to talks about how the parallel run is going, how any final data 
clean up is going, how the work load increase is being coped with and other intersection 
coordination issues. Super Users should on a daily basis reconcile the data on the legacy system 
and on the new MPCS. This should be by done reporting on both system and comparing the 
reports. Inaccuracies should be investigated and corrected. This should take place continuously 
until each Super Users can say they are ready to stop the legacy systems and the parallel run. 
Examples of essential comparison reports that should be regularly run during the parallel run of the 
new MPCS and the legacy system... 
Due List Forecasts: The new MPCS should correctly forecast all due maintenance tasks. 
Scheduled Maintenance tasks, Service Bulletin Tasks, Airworthiness Directives etc. Any 
differences should be investigated and corrected. 
Compliance Status: A historical status report of compliances for all accomplished tasks should be 
regularly run. This should especially focus on mandatory compliance e. g. AD's. 
Component Installations Status: Reports detailing currently installed components and life limited 
parts should be run and compared again all discrepancies should be investigated and corrected. 
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Flight Hours and Cycles: It is essential that the flight hours and cycles are correctly calculating. 
This is especially important for MPCS that use dates to define total hours and cycles. 
After a period of time the parallel run can stop, only once each Super Users is in agreement, 
Quality Assurance should be in agreement, each section manager should be in agreement that the 
new MPCS is functioning correctly. Even though a section manger may not be a Super User he will 
be responsible for the on going maintenance of the data in the new MPCS, so he must be in 
acceptance that it is completely ready. With all new procedures in place, all users trained, all 
reports tested, all custornisations accepted, all intersection procedures harmonised then the legacy 
system can be turned off to rest. The legacy system should be retained as a reference source if 
required and a few appointed staff should have access to it to conduct periodic audits of historical 
maintenance programme transactions. 
The workload and the cultural changes when introducing a new MPCS are considerable. It is 
essential as this section has shown that a group of Super Users are involved with every step of the 
way, making decisions along with the Project Leaders from the beginning. This is the only way the 
correct product will be selected and implemented. Once the implementation is completed it is 
important that the Super User group is rewarded for their efforts. One method is to include the 
project in their annual appraisal scoring them extra credits for their involvement, or alternatively a 
letter of congratulation from the Technical Director. 
The contribution of an effective Maintenance Programme Control Software should not be 
underestimated. It is essential as a management tool making the Maintenance Programme much 
more manageable and efficient. A good MPCS contribute to the airworthiness of the aircraft as well 
as to the business of maintaining aircraft. But the full potential of a good MPCS will not be realised 
unless the four Stage process defined in this section has not been carried out efficiently and 
effectively 
Stage 1: User Group Selection and Preparation. 
Stage 2: Software Assessment. 
Stage 3: Software Selection. 
Stage 4: Software Implementation. 
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8. The Orqanisation and the Maintenance Proqramme. 
8.1 The Maintenance and Engineering Division. 
The Maintenance and Engineering division (M&E) of an operator is one of the most cost consuming 
business units of the operation. Their involvement in the operation is essential and prime to the 
success of the operator. The M&E division is involved in almost all aspects of the operation, from 
selection of aircraft types for the operation to the minimising of aircraft non availability maximising 
aircraft availability and dispatch reliability. The efficient management of the Maintenance 
Programme is the centre of the M&E operation. 
We have seen in the previous section that the ME division involves many technical disciplines 
0 Maintenance Prograrnmes. 
o Maintenance Planning. 
0 Engineering Development. 
0 Engineering Technical Services. 
0 Reliability Monitoring. 
9 Technical Records. 
0 Technical Library. 
0 Line Maintenance Production. 
* Base Maintenance Production. 
0 Shop Maintenance Production. 
0 Stores and Inventory. 
0 Quality Assurance. 
The structure and management of these disciplines can vary from operator to operator, but each of 
the functions must be carried out in support of the Maintenance Programme and the Technical 
Operation of the fleet. 
An example of a common structure and reporting line is shown below 
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Technical Director Mgr Quality 
Assurance 
Mgr Maintenance 
Planning & 
Technical Records 
Mgr Engineering 
Development 
Technical Services 
&Technical Ubrary 
Mgr 
Maintenance 
Programmes 
Reliability 
I Mgr Mgr Shops II Mgr Stom 
Maintenance J Inventay 
Productim II 
Fig 8.1 
Fig 8.1 Details a common Maintenance and Engineering structure for a significant size operation. 
Variations of this structure do occur but the structure above details all M&E functional disciplines. 
Technical Director. 
This position holds the responsibility and authority for the complete Maintenance and Engineering 
function from a technical airworthiness point of view as well as from a business management point 
of view. 
Maintenance Planning &Technical Records. 
As defined in section 4. The main purpose of this section is to plan get the work done as defined in 
the Maintenance Programme. Technical Records record compliances and historical records of the 
work accomplished so often fall under the section managed by the Manger Maintenance Planning 
and Technical Records but it is not uncommon to find Technical Records as a separate section 
Engineering Development, Technical Services & Technical Library. 
This section is often also referred to as Engineering. The prime responsibility of this section is to 
define the modification and configuration standard of the fleet. This section will also takes on the 
engineering issues of the operation coordinating with the manufacturers and authorities when 
required. Production of Engineering Orders, interpretation and production of Technical Publications 
is also the responsibility of this section, hence often the Technical Library fit in here. This section will 
also support the Maintenance section With regards to engineering issues that occur when carrying 
out maintenance rectification. 
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Maintenance Programmes & Reliability. 
This section is responsible for the definition and production of the Scheduled Maintenance 
Programme and the accompanying task cards and work instructions. It is their responsibility that 
the most efficient and effective maintenance programme is followed and through Reliability 
Monitoring the Maintenance Programme is revised. This section can also be found in the 
Maintenance Planning section or in the Engineering section depending upon the structure of the 
M&E division. 
Maintenance Production. 
This section is the technical front line and most staffed section in the M&E division. They are 
responsible for accomplishing the scheduled maintenance and the defect rectification maintenance 
to keep the fleet operating. This section is often split into two sub sections; Line Maintenance and 
Base Maintenance. 
Shops. 
This section is responsible for the maintenance of components and the repair of off aircraft parts. 
Depending upon the capability of the organisation this can involve a multiple of shop types. Engine 
shop, composite shop, electrical & avionic component shop, mechanical & hydraulic component 
shops etc. 
Stores & Inventory. 
This section is responsible for ensuring the availability of tools and equipment and parts required to 
support the technical operation. Often millions of dollars of inventory are controlled by this section. it 
is their responsibility to ensure that the inventory is held correctly in a safe environment and that all 
inventory conform to correct specification. This section is often a section pulled in two directions, 
with financial implications of holding so much expense the financial division often feels they should 
control this section. Though perhaps not initially apparent but this section is essential to the 
continued airworthiness of the fleet. If non conforming parts are allowed into inventory they can be 
installed on the aircraft, this is why primarily the section belongs under the Technical Director rather 
than the Financial Director, but often today it is seen with the financial division. 
Quality Assurance. 
This section does not report directly to the Technical Director, but are a crucial section in the 
Maintenance and Engineering function. The QA section shall normally today report directly to the 
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Chief Operating Officer or the Chief Executive. QA have the responsibility for auditing the 
processes and procedures carried out by the maintenance and Engineering Division sections. 
Ensuring good practices that conform with the regulations are carried out. The prime function of the 
QA section is to conduct on going audits of every WE function on a regular cycle, to this 
successfully and to be able to report findings from the audits impartiality is required, that is why they 
do not report directly to the Technical Director. 
Technical Director 
------------- 
LIgr Quality 
Assurance 
Mgr Technical Mgr ktr Stores & 
Support Services Maintenance 
II 
Inventory 
Fig 8.2 
Fig 8.2 Details a smaller organisational structure for the ME division for a smaller operator, where 
there are only three main section. The difference is detailed below.. 
Technical Support Services. 
Responsible for Maintenance Programmes, Maintenance Planning, Development Engineering, 
Technical Services, Reliability Monitoring, Technical Library and Technical Records. 
Maintenance. 
Responsible for Line Maintenance, Base Maintenance and Shop Maintenance to support the 
technical operation of the fleet. Carrying out scheduled maintenance tasks, defect rectification, and 
modifications. 
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8.2 Maintenance Implications for the Requirements for an Air Operators 
Certificate: JAR OPS. 
An Introduction to Air transport Regulations. 
In 1943 the USA initiated studies of post war civil aviation issues on an international scale. This 
resulted in 1945 in the first International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago USA. From this 
convention an international body concerned with international air transport guidelines was formed 
called "The International Civil Aviation Organisation" ICAO. ICAO was a specialised agency of the 
United Nations (UN). ICAO's mission was defined as the following... 
* Safe and coordinated growth in international civil aviation. 
0 Guidelines for design and operation of civil aircraft. 
Development of airways, airports and air traffic control facilities. 
0 Promotion of aviation resources and fair competition for member states. 
* Promotion of member states to be able to operate international air carriers. 
0 Promotion of air safety standards in international civil aviation. 
ICAO went on to define and publish Standard Recommended Practices (SARPs) that all member 
states should follow. This was the first step towards regulating practices and procedures for 
international air carriers. At around the same time, 1945, the "International Air Traffic Association" 
IATA, was formed with 57 members from 31 nations. Today this number has grown to 267 
members. IATA was a commercial operators association whose members would meet to discuss 
and advice on international air transport issues with the intention to provide feed back into ICAO 
who would if in agreement consider including issues discussed by IATA into the SARPs. 
As recent as 1994 the IATA members re defined their mission goals with the intention to represent 
the aviation commercial industry, with the following goals 
To represent and to serve the airline industry in the fields of 
1. Safety and Security. 
2. Industry Recognition. 
3. Financial Viability. 
4. Product and Services. 
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5. Standards and Procedures. 
in the mean time ICAO member states as well as non members started to formulate their own 
national aviation regulations. ICAO member states used SARPs as their standards while others 
not. ICAO recognising the individual national aviation authorities requirements offered SARPs as a 
standards for them to build their own national regulations. In the UK the Civil aviation Authority 
produced the regulations for British registered carriers, while in the US the federal Aviation 
Administration did. In France the DGCA, in Germany the LBA, in Switzerland the FOCA and so on. 
The one common standard the SARPs were used by the ICAO member states. 
As European governments were working together in common marketing regulation and in building 
a new airline building manufacturer, Airbus, in 1970 the European Joint Airworthiness Authorities 
were formed. The intentions of this was to assist in a common standard for the manufacture of the 
new products offered by Airbus, that would conform to a common European build standard. This 
was built upon when in 1978 the JAA started to expend from not only a standard for the 
manufacturing of aeronautical products, but of air transport maintenance and operational licensing. 
The JAA member states all had national aviation representatives on the JAA board. Again the JAA 
respected and followed the guide lines of the ICAO SARPs in its attempt to define a common 
European regulation governing the design and manufacturing of aviation products, the 
maintenance of aviation products and the operation of aviation products. 
This philosophy started by the ICAO has now come complete circle and now the JAA and the FAA 
are working together to harmonise regulations. The benefit of this harmonisation is seen as having 
three major contributions 
... 
A common world standard for the manufacture of aircraft and aviation products. 
2. A common world standard for the licensing of operators of aircraft. 
3. A common world standard for the licensing of maintenance crew and flight crew. 
The JAA started to define Airworthiness Standards by issuing JAR's, Joint Airworthiness 
Requirements for member states to adopt into their own national regulations. Some examples 
are 
JAR 21: The Certification procedure for aircraft and related products and parts. 
JAR 36: The requirements for aircraft noise. 
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JAR 145: The Certification requirements for approved maintenance organisations. 
JAR 66: The Certification requirements for the licensing of aircraft maintenance staff. 
JAR OPS 1: The Certification requirements for an operators certificate for commercial air transport 
aeroplanes. 
Jar OPS 2: The Certification requirements for an operators certificate for commercial air transport 
helicopters. 
JAR OPS The European Requirements for Issuance of an Air Operators Certificate (AOC). 
Today any JAA member state whishing to operate in commercial aviation with civil aeroplanes 
must first be awarded an AOC from their national aviation authorities. The issuance of that AOC will 
be dependant upon the operator showing compliance with JAR OPS 1. 
The structure of JAR OPS I is sub parts as follows... 
A: Applicability. 
B: General. 
C: Operator Certification & Supervision. 
D: Operational Procedures. 
E: All Weather Operations. 
F: Performance. 
J: Mass and Balance. 
K: Instruments and Equipment. 
M: Aeroplane Maintenance. 
N: Flight Crew. 
0: Cabin Crew. 
P: Manuals, Logs and Records. 
Q: Flight Duty times and Rest Periods. 
R: Transport of Dangerous Goods. 
S: Security. 
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It can be seen from above the sub parts concerning the maintenance of aircraft and the complete 
maintenance programme are defined in sub part M and P. The details of the JAF; Vs are defined in 
the Acceptable Means of Compliance documents, AMC's. The AMC's go into details of how to 
comply with the JAF; Vs. These are further explained in the Interpretive Explanatory Materials, IEM's. 
JAF; Vs define the policy while AGM's, Administrative and Guidance Materials and Us, Information 
Leaflets give advisory information or guidance. 
JAR OPS I Organisational Structure. 
Accountable Manager 
Flight Ops (Post Ground Ops Maintenance 
holder) 
II 
(Post holder) (Post holder) 
Fig 8.3 
------------- 
Quality 
Assurance 
Training (Post 
holder) 
Accountable Manager: Normally the CE. This position holder must be nominated and acceptable 
to the aviation authorities with regards to experience and qualifications. The Accountable Manager 
is responsible for the compliance with the regulation for issuance of the AOC. 
Flight Operations Post holder: Normally the Chief Pilot. This position holder must again be 
nominated and acceptable to the authorities with regards to experience and qualifications. The 
Flight Operations Post Holder is responsible for compliance with the regulations pertaining to flight 
crew, cabin crew and other flight operational issues. 
Ground Operations Post holder: Normally the Director of Ground Operations. This position 
holder must again be nominated and acceptable to the authorities with regards to experience and 
qualifications. The Ground Operations Post Holder is responsible for compliance with the 
regulations pertaining to ground handling and other ground operational issues. 
Maintenance Post holder: Normally the Chief Engineer or Director of Maintenance. This position 
holder must again be nominated and acceptable to the authorities with regards to experience and 
qualifications. The Maintenance Post Holder is responsible for compliance with the regulations 
pertaining to maintenance crew, the maintenance programme, maintenance records and other 
maintenance and engineering issues. 
Training Post holder: Normally the Director of Training. This position holder must again be 
nominated and acceptable to the authorities with regards to experience and qualifications. The 
Training Post Holder is responsible for compliance with the regulations pertaining to all staff initial 
and recurrence training issues. This position is recently added as a nominated post holder position. 
305 
It may be acceptable to the national aviation authorities to nominate the training requirements to 
each nominated post holder thus eliminating the need for a separate position, but the processes of 
correctly managing the training of staff must be clearly assigned to a post holder. 
Quality Assurance: Normally the Director of Quality Assurance. This position is not a post holder 
or a nominated person, but must show acceptable experience and qualifications to hold the 
position. The QA position is as shown above directly under the Accountable Manager. This enables 
impartial reporting back to the person responsible for the maintenance of the AOC requirements. 
The QA section is an audit section, who conducts regular audits of the operators procedures of 
operation to ensure compliance with the regulations. It should be noted that the JAR's define the 
QA audit role as imperative to the continuation of compliance with the regulations. The audit role 
not only should involve maintenance and engineering but also all the flight operational and ground 
operational requirements. The process of parallel auditing is recommended by the JAIT s rather 
than in line monitoring, that was the tradition of previous quality control systems. 
JAR OPS 1 sub part B, C, M and P Requirements Concerning the Maintenance of Aircraft. 
The compliance requirements with regards to the maintenance of the continued airworthiness fo 
an aircraft are as previously stated defined mainly in JAR OPS I sub part M, but relevant 
requirements can also be found in JAR OPS I sub part B, C and P. 
The seven main maintenance regulations pertaining to the issuance of JAA AOC are as follows 
Maintenance Management (JAR OPS 1.895) :A JAR OPS operators that is not a JAR 145 
approved maintenance facility must have in place a, contract with a JAR 145 approved 
maintenance organisation. This contract must define in detail the following.. 
Duties and responsibilities of both the JAR OPS I operator and the JAR 145 approved 
nominated maintenance organisation. 
Procedures followed for the exchange of technical,, maintenance and engineering 
information between the JAR OPS I approved operator and the nominated JAR 145 
approved maintenance organisation. 
The over all responsibility of the management of the maintenance of the aircraft lies with the 
nominated Maintenance Post Holder. 
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Maintenance Management Exposition (JAR OPS 1.905): This is a document that defines how 
the operator complies with the maintenance requirements of the JAR OPS. It details the technical 
procedure that the operator will follow. In the case when an operator is not JAR 145 approved, this 
document will define what JAR 145 approved organisation will be contracted to carry out the 
maintenance of the fleet and how the coordination of the maintenance will take place. The MME 
must also contain the operators policy of compliance with the Maintenance Programme, Air 
Worthiness Directives and optional Service Bulletins. The document should contain four distinct 
parts. 
Part 0: The General Organisation of the Maintenance Division. 
Part 1: JAR OPS Maintenance Procedures. 
Part 2: Quality System. 
Part 3: Contracted Maintenance. 
The Maintenance Post Holder is named in this document as the responsible manager for ensuring 
the procedures are followed. This document and its procedures must be approved and accepted by 
the national aviation authorities. 
Operator Maintenance Programme (JAR OPS 1.91o) : This document contains all scheduled 
maintenance tasks with their intervals that the operator will comply with to ensure the continued 
airworthiness of the fleet. The Maintenance Programme will also define the processes and 
procedures followed to maintain the aircraft to the maintenance scheduled and should define how 
the maintenance schedule is developed including a reliability monitoring programme. The 
maintenance programme must include a Pre Flight Inspection programme that must be carried out 
prior to every flight. The responsibility of compliance with the Pre Flight Inspection programme must 
be clearly defined. Each aircraft type operated must have its own Maintenance Programme. 
Maintenance and Engineering Records (JAR OPS 1.920) : The operators must ensure that the 
technical records of the aircraft are maintained and stores in a way acceptable to the authorities. 
This includes all maintenance and engineering activities carried out on the aircraft and all flight 
hours and cycles accomplished by the aircraft. Compliance with this requirement is the 
responsibility of the Maintenance Post Holder. 
Quality System (JAR OPS 1.900 & 1.035) : The operators must have in place Quality Assurance 
processes and procedures that the operator will follow in conducting a Quality Assurance System 
of audit programmes of the technical maintenance operation. Compliance with this document is the 
responsibility of the Quality Assurance manager. 
Aircraft Technical Log (JAR OPS 1.915) :A document that will be called the Technical Log must 
be defined and accepted by the aviation authorities for the following function... 
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0 To record defects and malfunctions discovered during the operation of the aircraft. 
0 To record maintenance activities carried out on the aircraft. 
0 To record the operational activities of the aircraft. 
0 To record operating safety information. 
Minimum Equipment List (JAR OPS 1.030) : An operator must have in place a Minimum 
Equipment List (MEL) that is based upon the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) issued by 
the Manufacturer, approved by the Type Certificate issuing authority. The operators MEL must be 
acceptable to and approved by the national aviation authority. The MEL gives details of authority for 
operation with defective or non operational systems that deviate from the original design. The 
operator must comply and refer to the MEL when operating with un serviceable systems and must 
comply with the requirements of the MEL at all times. The production and development of the 
operators MEL is the responsibility of the Maintenance Post Holder with coordination with the Flight 
operations Post Holder. 
The above maintenance regulations must be shown to be in place before the JAA member state 
national aviation authority will issue an AOC in accordance with JAR OPS 1. Attached is a model 
plan including a time frame for establishing such a plan. It also details the appointment of the 
nominated post holders. 
See Aftachment 6, A Plan for preparing for an AOC under JAR OPS 1., 
.. 
\Personal\, JAAOps. xis. 
it can be seen that emphasis of the JAR's with regards to maintenance is to establish the 
following 
Responsible managers accountable for the compliance with the regulations. These 
managers must not only be qualified but also be acceptable to the authorities. 
Clear procedures and processes in place that will ensure the maintenance of the 
continued airworthiness of the aircraft operated by the JAR OPS approved operator. 
On going monitoring through a Quality Assurance System that will ensure the continuation 
of compliance with the procedures and processes required by the issuance of the JAA 
AOC and identify deficiencies that may occur during the operation. 
it should be noted that today the Joint Aviation Authorities are in the process of transitioning from 
the JAA to EASA (European Aviation Safety Authority). It is intended that the EASA will take over 
the role of the JAA by publishing and maintaining the requirements as regulation for state 
members. The main issue here is that while in the past each JAA member state aviation authorities 
accepted and adopted the JAR's, EASA will in fact replace the member state aviation authorities 
and issue and enforce the regulations directly from EASA and not through the national aviation 
308 
authorities. This means the disappearance of the national aviation authorities and the introduction 
of EASA as the aviation authority for all member states. EASA Rules will then replace the JAR's 
and be enforceable under European Law for EASA member states. The Management Board of 
EASA was established in October 2002 and is meeting with a high frequency to make the 
necessary decisions for facilitating the starting of the Agency as planned by 28 September 2003. 
The exact date when EASA will take over from the JAA is still under review. 
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9. Thesis Conclusions. 
This thesis is entitled "Aircraft Maintenance Engineering: The Development of an Aircraft 
Maintenance Programmd. It brings together and explains an area that the author feels Is not well 
documented or published today in the world of aviation maintenance management, yet it is 
fundamental to the continued airworthiness of an aircraft. It is the authors experience that too many 
times operators have attempted to carry out the function of maintenance engineering without full 
understanding of the reasons and implication of their actions. Thus ending up with an ineffective 
and non-applicable collection of maintenance activities that can only add to the expense of the 
technical operation and even at times contribute to the possibility of occurrences. The thesis also 
goes on to develop new decision tree diagrams for the use in developing the Maintenance 
Programme and incorporating new aspects of aircraft operation. 
The maintenance programme is the building block of ensuring the continued airworthiness of an 
aircraft and in meeting the regulatory requirements for the technical operation of civil commercial 
aircraft. If the initial production of the maintenance programme is done correctly and the ongoing 
development of the programme is taken into consideration correctly, the maintenance management 
process of the aircrafts complete technical operation will only lend itself to a safer and more cost 
effective technical operation. The conclusions defining the new and original suggestions are within 
each of the detailed sections but are again reiterated below... 
Section 2. Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM). 
This section introduces the concepts of why maintenance is required and why systems fail. It 
identifies RCM as the most efficient and preferred method for producing a scheduled maintenance 
programme as its motivation are in realising the inherent reliability of the original design and 
elimination any tasks that do not contribute to the maintenance of the inherent design. It introduces 
RCM in aviation as MSG3 detailing the exact decision tree diagrams and makes critical 
examination of the diagrams identifying areas in the process that can be improved. The section 
defines damage tolerance and shows areas where RCM I MSG3 is insufficient in ensuring the on 
going airworthiness of the aircraft and at times life limitations do need to be introduced. This 
departure from RCM / IVIGS3 philosophy is required when the failure of a system or component 
would result in catastrophic failure effects, on these occasions an alternative method to RCM / 
MSG3 must be applied and the additional cost of applying this kind of concept must be absorbed. It 
is shown in section 3 that this may be required for those structural items that are identified as 
Principle Structural Elements, such as single load bearing monolithic elements, landing gear, 
engine discs or engine shafts, whose function is critical and whose failure can not allowed to occur 
in-service, these items must have life limitation applied to them. In this section the decision tree 
analysis is identified as a valuable method for decision making and does again many times 
influence the way maintenance decisions are made through out the thesis. 
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Section 3. The Maintenance Steering Group. (MSG). 
This section takes from that described in section 2 on RCM and defines how it has developed and 
how it is today applied and managed today in aviation defined as MSG3. It details the evolution of 
how MSG developed over the years in the aviation industry and it bring together and shows how in 
aviation that the industry and the regulators have organised and developed the management of the 
production and development of the scheduled maintenance programme and have identified RCM / 
MSG3 as today's industry standard. The section goes on and identifies the regulation in place with 
regards to the production and development of the scheduled maintenance programme and shows 
how those regulations are complied with by the manufacturers and the operators of modem air liner 
aircraft. It defines a system in producing an aircraft maintenance programme for an operator that 
conforms to present day regulations and industry standards then leads into section 4 where 
enhancements and improvements are developed to the present day standards. 
Section 4. New Enhancements to the MSG3 Process. 
Extended Twin Operations has made regulators and manufacturers think again about ways of 
improving the maintenance programme of an aircraft. This has been done by the regulators 
defining new rules for design, manufacture and operation of twin engined aircraft. The author has 
established how to comply with these rules and has taken the philosophy of the rules further to 
apply the ETOP theories to also three and four engined aircraft. The conclusions here are two fold 
- 
1. The complete philosophy should introduce to the MSG3 / RCM initial analysis the ETOPs issues 
by inserting an ETOPs question in the initial analysis rather than adding them in as an addendum 
by the operator at a later stage. This way the ETOPs issue is impregnated inherently into the 
process resulting in the identification and definition of ETOPs significant items and tasks. Figure 4.1 
in section 4 inserts the ETOPs question in the MSG3 analysis by determining a new failure 
category Operational ETOPs Effect Cat 6ER, then again in figure 4.2 Hidden Non Safety Effect Cat 
9ER. As a result of this new identified MSG3 category the maintenance tasks can be selected and 
applied with the ETOPs philosophy inserted from the inception of the development of the 
scheduled maintenance programme produced and issued in the MRBR. 
1 2. The second part of the conclusion here is that the increased airworthiness that such a philosophy 
brings to an aircraft is as relevant to all aircraft and not just twin jets. Inclusion of ETOPs standards 
into the normal technical operation of all aircraft makes safe airworthiness sense for a slight 
increase in cost. This means the introduction of ETOPs Philosophy training for three and four 
engine aircraft maintenance staff making them aware of sensitive systems and the reasons for 
maintenance tasks, introducing simple ETOPs style reliability monitoring of oil consumption and 
recurrent defects, avoiding multiple maintenance tasks on similar systems at the same time by the 
same maintenance staff, the use of specific and clear English in reporting and detailing findings and 
maintenance actions and finally the avoidance of swapping components between an aircrafts 
similar systems. 
311 
Section 4.2 goes further to define improvements to the development of the maintenance 
programme by introducing the need to include a consideration for utilisation, specifically Low 
Utilisation. The author defines what should be considered as low utilisation and the conclusion is 
that low utilisation should be and can be relevantly considered in the development of the scheduled 
maintenance programme by two methods... 
Method I by adjusting the originally MRBR MSG3 defined tasks and intervals for low utilisation. 
Method 2 by inserting a low utilisation question in the original MSG3 analysis process. 
Figure 4.3 proposes a MSG3 style analysis for low utilisation that applies a new set of five 
questions to make the MSI or SSI relevant for low utilisation. The author defines that method is the 
correct conclusion for an effective and applicable low utilisation maintenance programme, where 
the MRBR provides a programme for such an operation inherently rather than an adaptation of an 
established programme for none low utilisation operations. The author expresses that if this method 
is not applied then the maintenance programme will be inefficient and possible non effective. 
Section 4 finishes with section 4.3 an economic comparison of a non MSG3 scheduled 
maintenance programme versus an MSG3 scheduled maintenance programmes. It uses an actual 
in-service modem aircraft (MD80) that has underwent both types of analysis where it was shown 
that a reduction in life limited components was realised as well as a 40% plus reduction in the man 
hours to carry out the scheduled maintenance tasks. The figures were then applied to a model that 
take into consideration the operating life of the aircraft, using scheduled maintenance man hours for 
the life cycle and the anticipated total flight hours for the in-service life of the aircraft to define a ratio 
of scheduled maintenance man hours required for 1 hour of flight. The MSG 3 scheduled 
maintenance programme was shown to require about 40% less man-hours per flight hour, thus 
defining that while modem manufacturing techniques and improvements in design technology and 
materials can influence a reduction in maintenance requirements, MSG3 could be attributed as the 
single most significant contributor to a reduction in cost in maintaining the inherent reliability through 
the scheduled maintenance programme. A simple model was developed that could be used to 
compare scheduled maintenance programmes. It should also be noted that it was identified that at 
times MSG3 was not sufficient in it self in maintaining complete airworthiness with requirements on 
occasion to revert to the introduction of life limitations for those structural items that were identified 
as whose failure would result in catastrophic failure consequences. These Principle Structural 
Elements (PSEs) were identified through the MSG3 process but life limited by other engineering 
analysis methods. So while MSG3 can be considered as the most efficient maintenance analysis 
method available today it must on occasion be supplemented by the introduction of life limits to 
those Principle Structural Elements. - 
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Section 5. Maintenance Engineering Planning. 
This section defines Maintenance Engineering Planning as the process of enabling the 
accomplishment of the scheduled maintenance tasks identified in the previous section in the most 
efficient and effective manner. In this section 5 processes are identified 
1. Defining, 2. Planning. 3. Implementation, 4. Completion and 5. Evaluation and 
Review. 
The conclusions to be made in this section is that the planning tasks are essential to a cost 
effective and efficient maintenance programme. With out good planning and management the 
established maintenance programme can become ineffective and very costly to the operation. 
Section 5 establishes the 4 forecast levels of maintenance engineering planning.. 
1. Short term, 2. medium term, 3. Long Term and 4. Production Planning. 
Section 5.3 deals with a very new and totally relevant issue of human factors in maintenance 
engineering of aircraft and concludes that to avoid the consideration of human factors 
-in 
the 
maintenance of aircraft is irresponsible and potentially can affect the airworthiness of the aircraft. 
This section defines a process that can efficiently incorporate consideration to human factors in the 
maintenance programme and promotes the use of a simple and efficient error reporting mechanism 
that encourages a culture of human factor awareness. 
Section 6. The Reliability Programme: Reliability Monitoring and Development of the MSG3 
Maintenance Programme. 
This section is perhaps the most relevant part of the thesis as it addresses where the author 
believes is a significant gap in the industry. That is the misunderstanding that the reliability 
programme is an integral and completely necessary part of the complete maintenance programme 
of an aircraft. At the beginning of the section there is a paragraph that states... 
A Maintenance Program is a Set of Rules and Practices for Managing Maintenance and 
Controlling and Developing the Scheduled Maintenance Program. The Reliability 
Programme is an Integral part of the Maintenance Programme that supports and verifies the 
effectiveness and applicability of the scheduled maintenance tasks through monitoring the 
In-service findings resulting from the technical operation of the fleet and maintenance 
findings resulting from the scheduled maintenance tasks. 
The conclusion the author is making here is that since MSG3 analysis considers maintenance 
actions based upon evidence of failures and inherent reliability of the design it is essential to 
the programme that findings and defects are monitored and studied for their implications to 
the maintenance programme. The author goes further to conclude that not only do operators 
fail at times to understand this even the regulators also by not mandating that reliability 
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programmes are put in place by operators. The author goes on to suggest simple effective 
methods that can enable relevant reliability studies. Figure 6.2 continues in the MSG3 I RCM 
style of decision tree analysis and defines a method of analysing and tracking recurrent 
defects that may be symptomatic of an ineffective maintenance programme. The conclusions 
also made in this section suggest that at times the recording and reporting of data is not the 
most relevant or efficient method of conducting reliability studies. Too often significant defects 
can be lost with in a mound of data, the author goes on to recommend that getting to the root 
cause of findings or failures confirming rectification action is the most relevant way of 
addressing reliability issues. The author concludes that the three most relevant methods that 
can identify reliability issues can be enabled through.. 
1. The monitoring of recurrent discrepancies. 
2. Engine Condition Monitoring. 
3. Oil Consumption Monitoring. 
These three monitoring methods can instigate the research required to get to the root cause of all 
events. 
Section 6.2 is a very important part of the thesis and defines how to improve and develop the 
maintenance programme in the most efficient way utilising reliability monitoring. The conclusions 
here are that the maintenance programme can be developed and adjusted from two different 
origins, from in operation findings and from on maintenance findings. To consider one but not the 
other would not be correct. Section 6.2.3 defines a relevant and efficient method of establishing and 
developing an effective maintenance programme which is in the authors opinion an essential 
practice. The author then goes on in section 6.2.4 to describe a process that is not in common use 
today with operators that is an occasional complete review of the maintenance programme to 
ensure that the scheduled maintenance tasks are continuing to provide validity in maintaining the 
inherent reliability of the original aircraft design. This optimisation process is detailed and time 
consuming but the author concludes that it is necessary even when conducting a simple reliability 
monitoring programme. Figures 6.4,6.5,6.6,6.7,6.8,6.9 and 6.10 again use the MSG3 / RCM 
decision tree style analysis to identify redundant tasks that do not contribute to the continued 
airworthiness of the aircraft or task that need to be introduced or developed. Continuing to expand 
the MSG3 / RCM philosophy the author in section 6.3 returns to one of the initial tenants of MSG3 
philosophy that involves the operating crew. The author concludes that their part in the continuation 
of the airworthiness of the aircraft through the development of the maintenance programme is not 
fully understood as it perhaps is not also with the maintenance crew. The author concludes that 
training of the crews is essential ensuring they understand the complete philosophy behind the 
maintenance programme nabling them to play a more relevant part in the reporting of events and 
in the rectification of those events. 
Section 7. Maintenance Programme Control Software. 
Section 7 deals with the availability of software to enhance the maintenance programme 
management. It identifies a process that can be followed to asses, select and implement a relevant 
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MPCS. The conclusion in this section are that by utilising the "Super User" group philosophy this 
will enable success by involving all relevant maintenance engineering sections in the complete 
process. The methods the author defines in the section along with their attachments can be 
concluded as being an efficient and effective process ensuring the optimisation of an MCPS in the 
management of the maintenance programme. 
Section 8. The Organisation and the Maintenance Programme. 
The thesis ends with section 8. In section 8 the author defines a simple organisational structure that 
can efficiently carry out and manage the maintenance programme that will satisfy the European 
JAA standards, he goes on to clarify the relevant regulation in effect today concerning the technical 
operation and maintenance of civil aircraft for a European Operator who belongs to a JAA member 
state. The conclusion here is that a maintenance organisation does not have to be heavily layered 
and complex and by using the organisational structure suggested in figure 8.1 or 8.2 the 
maintenance engineering functions can be efficiently managed and served. 
In summary it can be concluded that the author has described the basic philosophy of IVISG3 /
RCM in the early parts of the thesis defining the need to maintain the on going airworthiness of the 
aircraft. He has then gone on to identify and conclude that to stop there and to just apply the 
scheduled maintenance tasks without further consideration is not effective and does not enable an 
efficient and effective maintenance programme. He has established that the concept of the 
maintenance programme includes on going review and development of the programme through 
reliability monitoring and training of those involved with the maintenance and operation of the 
aircraft. Using the already established concepts of MSG3 / RCM and decision tree logic the author 
has continued these methods in a variety of other applications for example in the introducing of 
ETOPs standards for all operations, for the consideration of low utilisation, for the monitoring of 
recurrent defects and for the complete optimisation review of the maintenance programme. It was 
also shown that at times RCM / MSG3 analysis required supplementing with life limitations to 
PSE's, this is an important point that must be understood, with out the inclusion of PSE life 
limitations catastrophic failures could occur. In conclusion the author suggests that through better 
understanding of the concepts of the maintenance programme, better development of the 
maintenance programme, better monitoring of the reliability of the operation and better 
management of the maintenance programme will only result in a more airworthy fleet and cost 
effective maintenance engineering operation. 
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10. Recommendations for Further Work. 
The author believes that during the research for this thesis he has identified a gap in the guidance 
and documentation available in the maintenance management of civil aircraft. This thesis brings 
together the variety of subjects concerned with maintaining civil aircraft and suggests the adoption 
of existing sound standard practices and the adoption of new processes and procedures based on 
his research and experiences. 
Over the period of this thesis the author has consulted with many operators, maintainers and 
manufacturers in the aviation industry and debated and discussed the ideas in this thesis. During 
this processes he began to realise that clarification of the complete Maintenance Programme 
process was required and a document that details the complete maintenance programme and 
maintenance management process is needed in the industry, further more he believes that we 
have now experience around 12 years of the successful use of RCM / MSG3 with large civil 
airliners, it is time again to review the process and take another step further to develop a more 
efficient and effective Maintenance Programme standard. It is the authors belief that this thesis is 
on its way to providing that requirement. Continuing the concepts and practical application of this 
thesis the author has started to implement the conclusions defined in the thesis for a small Boeing 
fleet of B737-NG's and B747-400's where he is the Maintenance and Engineering Planning 
Manager. The MPCS process has been followed by the author and shown to be a great success. 
The implementation of the reliability monitoring processes described in this thesis has also been 
implemented by the author for the Boeing fleet as has the inclusion of the ETOPs standards to twin 
jets and to four engined aircraft. Aso the introduction of the low utilisation concepts into the 
maintenance programme also has been implemented. The process of the maintenance 
programme optimisation study has still to be done on the subject Boeing fleet. The author regards 
this optimisation process as a test and indicator of the success of all the improved procedures and 
conclusion defined in this thesis. The author feels that once he has accomplished the optimisation 
process depending upon the findings of that process, i. e. will that process identify significant 
changes required to the complete maintenance programme, this will be conformation that the 
recommendation with in this thesis do contribute to an effective, applicable and efficient 
maintenance programme. The author intends to conduct the optimisation process with in the next 
year for the B737-NG's, after four complete years of operation of the fleet, once sufficient data has 
been gathered. 
In addition to continuing the development of the Maintenance Programme concepts described in 
this thesis for the fleet managed by the author he will continue to work with the Aviation Standard 
bodies such as IATA and ICAO as well as the aircraft manufacturers Boeing and Airbus in 
improving the scheduled maintenance programmes that operators of airliners utilise. Also the 
author will attempt to take the maintenance programme philosophy out of aviation and encourage 
the application of the standards into other industries such as marine vessels, tanks and even 
plants. The standards described and developed with in this thesis are totally transferable into non 
aviation applications meaning other industries could benefit in reduced maintenance times, more 
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effective maintenance tasks, better reliability monitoring as well as all the other management 
benefits from what has been developed in the aviation world over the last 20 years. While there. is 
evidence that RCM / MSG3 has been adopted in part in non aviation applications, the author feels 
the full understanding that RCM/MSG3 in itself is not sufficient and must on occasion be 
supplemented by life limitations and that RCM/MSG3 must include reliability monitoring adopting 
the philosophy at least of simple event based reliability monitoring in support of defining the 
effectivity and applicability of the scheduled maintenance tasks. The author has approached BAE 
Systems a manufacturer of marine vessels (submarines and battle ships) as well as land and air 
vehicles (tanks and fighter jets), on the adoption of civil aviation MSG3 Maintenance Programme 
Standards and the use of MPCS in managing the maintenance programme on those craft. This is a 
great opportunity in the discipline of maintenance engineering to share with non aviation 
applications the aviation standards that have been developed due to strict regulations and safety 
concerns, the author will explore this further and continue to work with BAE Systems in this area. 
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ATTACHMENTS. 
Long Term Maintenance Input Plan. 
ii. Medium Term Maintenance Input Plan. 
iii. Short Term Maintenance Input Plan. 
iv. Maintenance Input Production Plan. 
V. Software Assessment Report. 
vil. JAA OPS I Maintenance Requirements Project Plan. 
vii. Routine Task Sign Off Sheet. 
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Glossarv. 
ATA: The Air Transport Association. A group of commercial aircraft operators. 
CAA: The Civil Aviation Authority. The National Aviation Authorities of the UK. 
Extended Twin Operations (ETOPS) : Operation of a civil large aircraft for a time of 60 minutes or 
more from an adequate airport that could accommodate that aircraft landing. 
FAA: The Federal Aviation administration. The National Aviation Authorities of the US. 
FAR: Federal Aviation Regulations. 
Failure: The inability of an items to perform with in previously specified limits. 
Failure Cause : Why the functional failure occurred. 
Failure Effect: What is the result of the functional failure. 
Function : The normal characteristic actions of an item. 
Functional Check :A quantities check to determine if one or more functions of an item performs 
within specific limits. 
Functional Failure : How an item failed to perform its function. 
Industry Steering Committee (ISC) :A group of aircraft and component manufactures who along 
with the operators of an aircraft would develop the MRBR and MPD based on in service operational 
data and findings. 
Inherent Reliability: The reliability of the original design. 
ICAO : The International Civil aviation Organisation. A group of National Aviation authorities. 
IATA: The International Air Transport Association. A group of commercial aircraft operators. 
JAA: The Joint Aviation Authorities. An organisation of European National Aviation Authorities. 
JAR: Joint Airworthiness Requirements. 
Low Utilisation : The operation of an aircraft at a rate that is less then the original design. 
Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) :A group of aircraft maintenance professional organisations 
that include aircraft and component manufacturers, aircraft operators and regulatory authorities. 
Maintenance Review Board (MRB) :A group of aircraft and component manufacturers who along 
with operators using MSG-1 or 2 or 3 philosophy would develop a schedule maintenance 
programme for a new aircraft. 
Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR) : The report that was issued as a result of the MRB 
for a new aircraft. 
Maintenance Planning Document or Data (MPD): The manufacturer produced document that 
would detail the MRBR in a method so as it can be used by an operator to develop his own 
customised Schedule Maintenance Programme. 
Maintenance Programme: The activities conducted by an aircraft operator to control and conduct 
scheduled maintenance and to ensure the on going development of the scheduled maintenance 
through Reliability Monitoring. 
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Maintenance Programme Control Software (MPCS) :A computerised software that assists in 
managing the Maintenance Programme activities. 
MSG-1: A decision tree philosophy used to establish the B747-100 schedule maintenance 
programme. Developed by the Maintenance Steering Group. 
MSG-2: A development of the MSG-1 philosophy. 
MSG-3: A further development of the MSG-2 philosophy incorporating RCM to develop a schedule 
aircraft maintenance programme. 
MSI: Maintenance Significant Item. 
Non Routine Maintenance :A maintenance activity that results from carrying out scheduled 
maintenance, its objective is to return the aircraft or component to it state of inherent reliability. 
Notice of a Recurring Defect (NORD): method for monitoring and instigating the investigation of 
recurring in service defects. 
Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) :A methodology to identify schedule maintenance using 
decision tree logic. 
Reliability Programme: A sub part of the Maintenance Programme that includes the monitoring of 
findings and non routine maintenance to ensure the effectiveness and applicability and on going 
development of the scheduled maintenance programme. 
Schedule Maintenance :A maintenance activity that is designed to identify when the inherent 
reliability of an aircraft has been reduced. 
SSI : Structural Significant Item. 
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Published by Maintenance 1991. 
The Reality of Reliability Centred Maintenance by R. Barnes, Published by Safety & Reliability 
Society 1996. 
Practical Application of Reliability Centred Maintenance by R. Hoch, Published by The American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers 1990. 
322 
Economic Consideration Underlying the Adoption of Reliability Centred Maintenance by D. J. 
Bowler, Published by IEE Conference Publications 1994. 
Websites. 
www. JAA. or-q. nl: The Joint Aviation Authorities. 
www. FAA. 
-qov: 
The US federal Aviation Administration. 
www. Boeinq. com: Boeing Commercial Aircraft. 
www. Airbus. com: Airbus Industries. 
www. Gulfstream. com: Gulfstrearn Aircraft Manufacturer. 
www. Falconoet. com: Dassualt Falcon Aircraft Manufacturer. 
www. Bombardier. com: Bombardier. Aircraft Manufacturer. 
www. Reliabili! yweb. com: Reliability Engineering. 
www. SMRP. com: The Society for Maintenance and Reliability Professionals. 
www. aviationnow. com: Aviation Weeks magazine Website. 
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Maintenance Proqramme Control Software Assesment. 
Phase 2: Hicih Level Review. 
Date of AMS 
Dem ismosess, Planning 
Mods 
Planning & 
Eng'g 
Prod 
Planning 
Technical 
Records 
Technical 
Library Reliability Defect Mgmt QAAudit Inventory Purchasing Operations Security 
Interfacability! 
ofeach 
Audit trail module Total Cost Project Leader WE Remarks project Leader IT Rimuorks 
-4 
---- -- 
j5eAmlaWwmwi an top of all the products we looked at frorn an IT - 
P. P. 'tvio. the tools mod we very good, it is a dienusenee model that 
would WK befter than a thin client I wob model that other vendors we trying 
Moder programme/ Client Server Based. XX% extra  for ongoing service to cam up wdh. It "a fast. *earned reliable & had 10 diffirent ways to ok at 
& updates. $XK par add'usw ow 25. Used by wound 30 airlines world yaw data It mod by a local airline (N*ed to check on that). 
Software I 15-Jan-02 John SmAh 3 3 2 3 33323303 33 37 xxx'Xxx wide with sit soft of a/c types Including Boeing, Cost would be around XXX)(XX USD in total once Installment. orruning & on going servii; es ors, 
payed for. 
The product looks fhmy. acma of the modluln we stAl running an the old 
template. some an the new one, system kept crashing in owns wass, 
seemed at" to work with. Thin is purely trom an IT perspective all other 
I things being equal, such as product functionality, oft which you we 
supposed to analyze. 
Software 2 28-Jan-02 James 9- 3 3 2 3 33323303 33 37 xxx'Xxx Used by a lot of national Wifines inUS & Europe &Asia. Big system trying to modernise No additiomil costs for Installation. 
They wed old type data bass vftch Is great for small scale aWicstOns but 
should not be used for a Product of this magnitude. Sam price as Trax, III 
Software 3 29-JWV-02 11-901- 22230? 202 
Old type database using Funcirm keys & not mus* Basic visual display tmes mre expensivit than Dispatch 2001 (Ridiculow). 
20322 22 XXX, XXX Welf wed m UK by emit GA operators, flying schools & awforce for tranong, 
a/c. No anknes usens No additional costo for installabon. 
---, From an IT perspectrw the platform is old and the PmWOMMI language hall 
,a reputation of having bugs. WN be afficuit to rnigrato into. 
This is used try about 15 airlines Mamuseris"gair. Aninternotdom 
Software 4 23-Oct-02 Jeff Oka 33233332330333 37 XXX, XXX ILMS seen & accorchng to the dam ments the next stage. It is server based (VIAndave NT *tc) & mten in C. The cost is for 50 users. 
They have the nam, and the possible Integration of the mmf4ckWs 
clocurnentrabon gmg for thern, but there about it You gel back Into the 
'Soft-me cleveloPrnerd cycle that vra m* uffering frorn th AJS except you 
I don't how an existing product you con rely on In the M*N*M. The prim too 
PC Web Srovser based Add'3162K Q service charge. No users, brand is in the stratosphere, I tank price is high. 
Software 5 21-jan-02 Mot Fted 11011 13 xxx, xxx - 
product Score I for all 'caw* no dam of product, only Povgm Plant 
shrles Idea fainlasbc, total rnbgrabon of AMMAPCISRM etc with Piannrnq 
so*-*. 
Score :3 high level of capability. 2 capability. I partial capability. 0 no capability. 
Users Names: 
Maintenance Programme Control Software Assessment. 
Phase 2: Detailed Functional Review. Executive SummarV 
See folder tabs below for each stage of the assesment process 
1. Tops Summary: This page. Links to Words Report & shows Summary of second level scores. 
2. Score Comparison: Compares all software header scores on one sheet. 
3. Second Level Review: Detailed functional review of all candidate software. 
Summary of Scores % Functional 
Software 1 1543 61% 
Software 2 1522 60% 
Software 3 2275 90% 
Software 4 1056 42% 
Maintenance Programme Control Software Assessment. 
Phase 2: Detailed Functional Review. Score SummarV 
Functionality Check of System. 
Major Planning Functions. 
Maintenance Schedule Control. 
Maintenance Planning. 
Modification Control. 
Reliability & Defect Monitoring. 
Development Engineering 
Development Engineering Powerplant 
Technical Records. 
Technical Library. 
Major Maintenance Functions 
operations Schedule. 
Discrepency Management & Review. 
Work Order Review. 
Aircraft Records Review. 
Maintenance Manpower Management. 
Manufacturers Manual Links 
Major Quality Assurance Fum 
Major Stores Functions. 
Parts Catalog 
Onhand Parts Functions 
AOG 
Descrepancy module 
Warranty & Repair. 
Purchase Request & Purchase Orders. 
Major IT Functions. 
Major Other Functions. 
Software I Software 2 Software 3 Software 4 
User Score User Score User Score User Score 
Total 
Possible 
Score 
77 65 51 50 80 
84 44 73 44 85 
51 38 40 28 55 
116 106 90 55 120 
148 89 92 6 ISO 
95 51 54 20 125 
178 111 143 96 180 
0 18 20 0 30 
12 0 2 20 20 
59 52 44 28 65 
_21 
19 17 21 25 
20 16 18 18 20 
10 6 9 lo 
10 6 6 0 10 
. 
tions. 
48 31 48 30 80 
125 109 102 100 125 
132 105 110 5 
206 130 117 102 215 
70 34 39 23 85 
252 147 159 77 265 
320 170 168 95 330 
194 138 110 125 240 
47 37 31 16 70 
2275 1522 1543 1050 
Weighting :3 to 1.3 being a heavy weighting where the function is critical, 1 desirable but not critical. 
Scoring :5 to 1.5 being a high score where the function is met 100%, 0 function not met at all. 
Note: A more detailed functional breakdown score with remarks is available in each review folder. 
Maintenance Proqramme Control Software Assessment. 
Phase 2: Detailed Functional Review. 
Functionality Check of System. 
Major Planning Functions. 
Software Name: Software X 
Weighting I User XXX Score Remarks 
Maintenance Schedule Control. 
User Mark SPE 
AMS Item entry 3 4 Mark: Clones ok. Uses XXX No's like CAMP, but can use MS as main no. 
AIVIS Item control 3 3 Mark: Can control many UOM's & intervals 
Package control 3 2 Mark: This area was not clear. Seemed the subordinates of the A Chk do not get entered. Need further review. 
AMS Compliance control 3 2 Mark: Links cards to the letter chk not AMS task 
Task card control 2 5 Mark: Does have a link to the Boeing or Word / Excel card to the MS task but if the task is a subordinate of a letter check it links the card to the letter check not the MS task 
Task card relationship to AIVIS Item 2 4 Markýsee above. But can use cards & does create card links. 
Maintenance Plannin 
User Suliman PE 
Mark: The basic philosiphy of MS task items that are letter check subordinates needs further review. It seems that subordinate tasks are not controlled buttheir cards are linked to the letter 
check.?? Also the XXX number is an issue for me. Also the Task Cards & EO's depend upon an external system such as Word, but XXX can link to all of them. 
Due List & Forecast 3 5 Mark: Sorts due list on print not a live screen. Can s)rt & search many ways. Assumes utilisation when calculating due, not relavent for Amiri. 
Work Order creation 3 4 Mark: The WO pulls in all due list items then you remove items. Doesn't show on due list when an item is in a WO. WO print out totally customized. 
Work Order control 2 4 
Material / Tooling requirement 2 5 Mark: Can show all material required & tools for a task or a WO. 
Task Card Requirements 2 4 Mark: Can show all task cards required for a WO or a Task & can link directly to it & print off. Didn't see the print off. 
Man hour requirement 1 4 Mark: Details all the manhours for a task & so will the WO. 
Production Planning 1 4 Mark: Great use of VIS Project. Can link WO tasks wi ite into the project to create a gantt chart for the WO. 
Short Term Input Planning 1 4 Mark: I didn't see any ability to do a maintenance input plan for short medium or long term. I will need to revisit this. 
Medium Term Input Planning 1 4 Mark: I didn't see any ability to do a maintenance input plan for short medium or long term. I will need to revisit this 
Long Term Input Planning 1 4 Mark: I didn't see any ability to do a maintenance input plan for short medium or long term. I will need to revisit this 
Modification Control. 
User Suliman PE 
AD/SB cycle control 3 5 Mark: TDR process set up, maybe a bit long but is there. 
AD/SB/ integration to Due List 3 5 Mark: All Bulletins with due times are in the Due List also all Bulletins in total are in the bulletin Log. 
AD/SB/ Material control 2 5 Mark: Same as a the MS tasks, has a field to eneter all the material, & makes a kit fo the material & can process the order. Need to review further 
EO link to SB/AD 2 5 Mark: The AD SB & EO can all be linked in the Bulletin Log, but you do make separate entries. The EO needs to be written in word there is no EO writing facility. 
Component / VSB Mod control 1 5 Mark: For this to work you need to set up each component as a mini aircraft to track VSB's against it. Needs closer consideration before taking on the task. 
Reliability & Defect Monitoring. 
User Pankaj RE 
Capturing PIREPs per ATA/Pirep Graphs 3 3 
Pankaj: Filtering of PIREPs Required. Mark: Capable of 6 ATA No's & will build PIREP graphs automatically. The Relibaility module used XXX Web the new application ofXXX. Itwas a very 
clear presentation. 
Tech log defect monitoring 3 5 Pankajý Option of Repetitive Code/Defect Cat. Avibl. Mark: Can treport on almost all Techlog / Defect fields. T/Log defects are entered directly at the Log page. 
NRC monitoring 2 3 Pankaj: Can Transfer to Defect Log. Mark: Similar to T/ Log can report on most fields. Also NRC's are linked to the WO that raised them. 
ADD monitoring 2 5 Pankaj: Meets all functional requirements Mark: Again works well & is clear. The T/Log entry is not closed but the ADD number is identified against the T/Log entry 
Alert Levels 2 4 Pankaj: Alert Level Computations possible. Mark: Uses CAP 418 the CAA Reliability standard. Alerts levels are auto calculated & update on a rolling average. 
Utilisation data 3 5 Pankaj: Reliability Reporting on XXXweb quite good. Mark: Reports well on the required urtilisation data automatically. 
ETOPs Events Identification 2 0 Pankaj: Existing software doesn't support. Mark: Though it didn't exist they did say they were putting a field in for DAW that could be reported on. 
Identify Recurring Defects 3 5 Pankaj: Using Repetitive Code field it can be ident. Mark: A report will identify the recurring ATA set up as required by the user. 
Component Removal Rates / NFF 2 3 Pankaj: Most of the features still under development, Mark: Component removal rates was not yet available but will, be very soon. NFF could be activated now requires Stores input. 
Engine Oil Trending 2 3 Pankaj: Graphical trends not available, Mark: Figure, ý, only available at this time 
Development Engineering 
User Rikhi SDE 
EO production/task cards 
EO production 
- 
inclusion of Figures 
Link between EO & SBNSB/AD etc. 
SB compliance status 
- 
by fleet 
SB compliance by unit part number & S/N 
SIB compliance by engine 
EO compliance by Revision No. 
Repetitive EO compliance 
Link between EO applicability and Tech 
Records/Materials compliance up-date 
EO materials page link to Materials Module 
Link between component upgrade and 
Materials Module 
Link between Tech Library, TDR & EO 
Assigned documents 
Mod status by P/N & S/N from birth 
Development Enplineerinq Powerplant 
User: Taco 
Engine/APU Modification Standard control 
Link between EO and Mod. Standard 
Life Limited Parts control 
Engine Components control 
SIB comliance linked to eng. S/N (not pos. ) 
Engine AD control 
Workscope linkage to Mod. Stanclard 
Engine shop Kitty stock control 
Engine removal/shop visit history 
Engine Module control 
Technical Records. 
User Lye TRS 
AMS Compliance update 
WO Compliance Update 
Mods compliance update 
Mod Partial Compliance 
Lived Component control 
O/C Component control 
Engine / APU Records control 
Engine / APU change 
Component history / Tracking 
Tech log defect entry / ata-subata 
NRC entry 
ADD Defect Entry & Control 
Extension / Over Fly 
Hours & Cycles Update & History 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
0 Rikhi: Work card imported from from Word. Header and footer added by XXX 
0 Rikhi:: Work card imported from from Word. 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
0 Rikhi: EO imported from Word. 
0 Rikhi: EO imported from Word. However, at the document assessment level in XXX, there is a materials page which is linked to the Materials Module. 
0 Rikhi: Does not exist at present. Capability exists. NEeds to be demonstrated. 
2 Rikhi: The XXX equivalent to the TDR does not meet the requirement. No link to an EO which is imported from Word. 
0 Rikhi: Does not exist at present. Capability exists. Needs to be demonstrated. 
0 Rikhi: Capability exists. Needs to be demonstrated. 
0 Taco: Has to be demonstrated, I will send an electronic sample by e-mail, in order to test this capability. 
0 Taco: Although not directly demonstrated, it is likely that this will cause no problems 
4 Taco: The LLP control has been demonstrated, but it should be kept in a separate file per engine, probably only a question of set-up. 
3 Taco: Capability has been demonstrated, details of linking to each engine not clear. 
3 Taco: Not completely convincing because engine Moc. Standard example does not exist 
4 Taco: AD control has been demonstrated, but it should be possible to separate Engine Ads from all other Ads. 
0 Taco: Could not be tested because an engine Mod. Standard was not available. 
0 Taco: New item not checked 
4 Taco: Engine removal history was demonstrated, shol) visit history should not be a problem 
4 Taco: Should be possible, but doubtful if Amin Flight will need this feature. 
4 
Lye : MS Reference numbers not identified in the work card. Mark: Done from the WC. Struggled to link to MS. Didn't show the MS task no. Closed A Chk with out closing subordinates. U 
XXX no. 
3 Mark: Much like D2001XG where you have opend & closed WO's. 
5 Lye At one entry level both related AD/SB/SL can be updated at same time. Mark: SB/AD/EO all complied with at one level. 
2 Lye Same function as D20001XG. Mark: No real furction but can work same as D2001XG. 
4 Mark: TS info from stores, not clear on how the component control relates back to MS. TS calander may be an issue. 
3 Mark: TS clander didn't work 
4 Lye Capable of handling sub- Assembly level entries needs more demonstration. Mark: Records linked to an engine serial number, 
4 
Lye All sub-Assemblies can be removed at engine/Apu change needs more demonstration. Mark: XXX showed an engine change that seemed to work need further review. 
4 Mark: Shop reports can be hyper linked, 
5 Lye All the fields are available for entry. 50 defects can be entered from one T/log page. Mark: Straight forward T/Log page with all info, hours & cyles, 6 digit ATA capability defects. Oil, ETOPs missing 
4 Mark: NRC's eneterd into defect module & can be reported upon. NRC's are linked to a WO &a task card. Not linked to an MS item but task card. 
4 Lye ý ADD entry function can be done at the same time when you enter defects, there is no separate inquiry screen for ADD. Mark: Will show due time of ADD on Due List. 
4 Mark: Has ability to allow upto 10% extension of intental, but struggles with the next due after compliance. Was not clear on how it stops next due calculation not using the extension time. 
5 Lye 
. 
Entry screen meets all the requirerrints, needs more clemontration. Mark: Very good, has a detailed flight by flight detail, 
Technical Library. 
User Lye TRS 
Document Inventory Control 
Document Revision Control 
Document Loan control 
Major Maintenance Functions. 
Operations Schedule. 
User Les MCC / Mark SPE 
Scheduled Flight & Movements 
Maintenance activities 
Discrepency Manaqement & Review. 
User Les MCC / Mark SPE 
ADD review 
Material awaited for ADDs 
MEL ADDs 
Defect history (ata-subata) 
ETOPs status 
Work Order Review. 
User Les MCC / Mark SPE 
WO's Open Review 
Manhours / Manpower Review 
Aircraft Records Review. 
User Les MCC / Mark SPE 
Modification Status Review 
Components Installed Review 
Maintenance Manpower Manaqement. 
User Les MCC / Mark SPE 
Manpower Capacity Planning 
(leave, available, trades) 
Task Activity by Staff name 
Manufacturers Manual Links 
User Mark SPE 
Direct Access to Manufs Manuals 
2 
2 
2 
5 
5 
0 
2 
33 
2 
2 
5 
4 
14 
15 
23 
Major Quality Assurance Functions. 
User George QAM 
AD Monitoring 
Certificate of Maintenance Review 
ADD Monitoring. 
Audit Programme 
Non Conformaties 
LAE / Staff Training 
Form & Document Control 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Lye Auto printing of transmittal letter not available. Capable of creating this letter. Mark: Can catalogue all documents 
Lye Forecast of subscription can be printed. Mark: Will detail revisions status of each doc & its revision history. 
Lye Not available capable of creating this module. Mark: This aspect was not available but they did say could be very easily 
Mark: XXX does not have a flight plan or a maintenance plan. 
Mark: XXX uses the WO list for for this function which does not realy meet the requirement 
Mark: An ADD list is avilable Open & Closed. 
Mark: The ADD list can show material status but I didn't see it. Needs further review. 
Mark: The ADDs with an MEL interval such as with in 10 days, will appear in the due list, but there was no dedicated field for MEL ref. 
Mark: XXX was able to show a report on all defects, but they are working now on a history report. This should be available soon, but all eneterd defects could be seen. Needs further review. 
Mark: If you set up a report for the ETOPs ATAs the report will show only ETOPs sensative ata s Needs evidence 
Mark: All WO's open or closed can be seen. Serach is not great. 
Mark: If MAM uses the mapower module for detailing available manpower & planning use the WO I Task manpower requirements then the report will show manhour availability versus requirments 
Mark: Straight forward mod status report showing SBs/Ads etc complied with. 
Mark: Straight forward component status report, but not 100% clear. 
Mark: If MAM uses the mapower module for detailing available manpower & planning use the WO / Task manpower requirements then the report will show manhour availability versus requirments. 
Doesn't show trades 
Mark: can report on staff name & activitiy such as WO s closed, NRC's raised etc. 
Mark: Link to SB s AMM s, Task Cards, is very possible They convert to Word then link to the record. The Boeing task cards & Word EO s are already in use with users. 
Average score 3 given as QA not able to score. This will be done for other software to ensure no disadavantage. 
ADIADD Pop Up 
Too[ Calibration 
Extensions & Consessions 
Major Stores Functions. 
Parts Cataloq 
User: Jun AMM 
Parts Catalog Creation/Editing 
Life Limit & Shelf Life Set Up 
Alternate/Modified Parts Entry 
Flagging of Special Comments 
Reorder Parameters Set Up 
Inventory Codes Set Up 
(UOM, Mat'l Type & Acft Appl) 
Vendor File Creation 
Part Number/Keyword Search 
Default Location 
Onhand Parts Functions 
User: June AMM 
Parts Request/Issue 
Parts Reordering 
Receiving parts 
Stock Transfer 
Rotable Tracking 
Kit Management 
Stock Adjustment 
Life Limit and Shelf Life Control 
Inventory Reports 
AOG 
ADD input to AOG orders 
AD/SB/SL input to AOG orders 
AD/ADD/SB shortages interface 
Userbase 
System log in control 
Code updates 
Freight Forwarder data base 
Handling agent data base 
Creating orders outside the system 
Follow up & updates of order display 
Transfer FF and HA data from data bases 
Exchange/Loan order control 
Audit trail 
Other system interface (spec 2000 etc. ) 
AOG order accruals 
Reports 
Descripancv module 
Capture discrepancies from the system 
Send messages to relevant Sections 
Feed backs from the responsible Sections 
Supervisory control of the process 
Email interface to the system 
Reports 
Jun Entries can be edited 
Jun Entry during and after parts catalog set up 
Jun: Set up with comments 
Jun: Available in the Parts Catalog and PO 
Jun Auto and manual set up is available 
Jun Acft applicability should be set up at parts Catalog level 
Jun Same code used to process payment 
Jun: Available 
Jun Can be created at parts Catalog level 
Jun Parts can be issued through a user's request or direct from the issue counter 
Jun Items for reordering can be tagged 
Jun GRN, stock location and component hours (or cycles) are part of receiving 
Jun: Available 
Jun Tracks rotables in store, aircraft and repair entities 
Jun Able to generate kits for Eos and Checks 
Jun Inventory date is associated with stock adjustment 
Jun Reports can be displayed and printed any time required 
Jun System is able to generate inventory reports 
Charles 
- 
Able to import ADD related details without much hazzels 
: Charles 
- 
Able to import AD/SB/SL related details without much hazzels 
Charles 
- 
This funcntion may be possible but not clear 
Charles 
- 
Very well track the user base 
Charles 
- 
Fully satisfied log in control system 
Charles 
- 
Straight forward code update system 
Charles 
- 
Present module does not allow this functionality 
Charles 
- 
System has got provisions for this function but not functioning at the moment 
Charles 
- 
Flexible enough to do this 
Charles 
- 
Allows follow up updates with minor modifications 
Charles 
- 
XXX Is capable of this 
Charles 
- 
Satisfied with the present options 
Charles 
- 
Options are installed but not functioning at the moment 
Charles 
- 
Should be OK 
Charles 
- 
Generates this report 
Charles 
- 
Good system for the reports 
2 Charles 
- 
System can be upgraded to have access 
2 Charles 
- 
System can be upgraded to have access 
2 Charles 
- 
System can be upgraded to have access 
2 Charles 
- 
System can be upgraded to have access 
3 
3 
Charles 
- 
System can be upgraded to have access 
Charles 
- 
System can be upgraded to have access 
Warranty & Repair. 
Warranty claims 
Warranty follow up 
Strip reports scanning & update in system 
Warranty history 
Repair orders 
Repair charges & approval process 
No fault found parts 
Reliability reports 
Scrap authorization 
Scrap replacement 
Repair vendor data base 
AD/SB/SL input 
Modification control 
Special handling 
TSN/CSN/TSO/CSOITSR/CSR etc. 
Component history 
LOAM application for repair orders 
Repair invoices & finance module 
Calibration control 
Code updates 
Repair order accruals 
Reports 
Purchase Request & Purchase Orders. 
Aircraft parts request 
Approval of the requests as per LOAM 
Request for quotation 
Buyer work area 
Supplier selection & import supplier data 
Service orders 
Kit orders 
UOM 
- 
Fractions 
Parts pagetwebsite interface 
E mail interface 
Supplier approvals through the system 
Project control (Non finance) 
Display alternative parts on order 
Userbase 
System log in control 
Price catalog inputs 
Creating & printing multi currency orders 
Follow up & updates of orders 
Order receipt & GRNS' 
Cost code project management 
Freight selection 
Freight charges 
Selection of engineers/aircraft thru system 
Average price calculation for each part 
Order accruals 
Audit trail 
Reports 
Major IT Functions. 
User: Alain ITC 
Charles 
- 
Can generate and print 
Charles 
- 
Allows follow up data printing 
Charles 
- 
Very good for scanning & attaching strip reports 
Charles 
- 
Store in the system & data can be printed 
Charles 
- 
Good system to generate ROS'with technical data 
Charles 
- 
Should allow this function, not good for finance related transactions 
Charles 
- 
Tracking NFF parts successfully 
Charles 
- 
Generates all necessary data 
Charles 
- 
Good system to generate scrap authorizations 
Charles 
- 
Allows this function without much hassels 
Charles 
- 
Satisfactory vendor data base is available 
Charles 
- 
Very good facility available for this input 
Charles 
- 
Good facility available for this inputlimport 
Charles 
- 
Satisfied with the options available 
Charles 
- 
Syastern is integrated enough to import the data 
Charles 
- 
Very good component history is available 
Charles 
- 
Very poor for finance related transactions 
Charles 
- 
Very poor for finance related transactions 
Charles 
- 
Advance methods and data available 
Charles 
- 
Satisfied with the options available 
Charles 
- 
Very poor for finance related transactions 
Charles 
- 
Satisfied with the options available 
Charles 
- 
Online parts ordering facility is available 
Charles 
- 
Very poor for finance related transactions 
Charles 
-E mail interface is available 
Charles 
- 
Very poor for finance related transactions 
Charles 
- 
System allows the user to carry out this function without much hassels 
Charles 
-Very good Engineering interface 
Charles 
- 
Satisfactory options are available 
Charles 
- 
Facility is not available 
Charles 
- 
Instructor was not sure on this interface 
Charles 
- 
Very good e mail interface 
Charles 
- 
System should be able to do this 
'Charles 
- 
Good facilities are available 
Charles 
- 
Capable of meeting with this requirement 
Charles 
- 
Will be able to get this access 
Charles 
- 
Options are availble 
Charles 
- 
Should be able to this on sread sheet 
Charles 
- 
System is capable of meeting with this requirement 
Charles 
- 
Satistactory options are available 
Charles 
- 
Good facilities are available 
Charles 
- 
Available option could be modified 
Charles 
- 
Necessary options are available 
___ Charles 
- 
Very poor for finance related transactions 
Charles 
- 
The system is capable of this functionality 
Charles 
- 
The logic is built in the system 
Charles 
- 
Very poor for finance related transactions 
Charles 
- 
Capable of audit trail 
Charles 
- 
quite capable of generate & print various reports 
Audit Trail + Reporting 
Security including Password Encryption 
Conference 
Data Import/Export 
Tools used (Front End + Database) 
User Base 
Support Staff 
Development Staff 
Support availability 
Documentation (User & Technical) 
Training 
Newsletters 
Code Updates 
Maintenance contracts 
Costs (Fixed / Variable) 
Source Code 
Code modification rules 
Report Generator 
System Performance 
Quality Checks before releasing updates 
Code Maturity 
Data Reliability 
Drop Down Lists 
User defined/ System Code 
Other Important Functions 
User Alain ITC & Mark SPE 
Compatibility with Manuf s Digital Data 
Help Screen 
Interface with other AF systems 
Financial state of Company. 
Staff Size of Company 
How long has the company been around 
Inventory Integration Spares Ordering 
Inventory Integration Spares Preloading 
2 2 Alain: Existing audit trail Is weak, XXXWeb will use SL server log option 
2 3 average score 3 given 
2 1 no conference exists but user communications ok. 
2 3 average score 3 given 
2 3 Alain: Future product will be solid, currently using foxpro 
2 3 Alain: Average size user base (60) 
2 3 average score 3 given 
2 3 average score 3 given 
2 4 Alain: 24 hour support, might be located in DXB 
2 0 Alain: Samples yet to be provided 
2 3 Alain: Decent training can be organized either at AF premises or at XXXs 
2 0 Alain: Only marketing newsletters are produced 
2 3 average score 3 given 
2 2 Alain: On the high end, does not ne cessarily include free upgrades 
2 3 Alain: Acceptable product cost, high maintenance costs 
2 2 Alain: Can be given to solicitor in case XXX goes bust, we can get our hands on the code, preferred option would have been to have the code 
2 2 Alain: We have to pay for all mods, can do anything we want. 
2 3 Alain: Crystal reports 
2 3 Alain: Should be acceptable based on personal experience with Foxpro, but would need to see it at client site to be able to provide proper judgement 
2 2 Alain: Don't have proper procedure in place but Use of Visual Source Safe enhances tracking changes 
2 2 Alain: Current system 3 years old, new system not ready yet, 2 crashes during demo 
2 2 Alain: Foxpro not designed for large scale developments, SQL server will be good once it is available, system crashed a couple of times during demo 
2 1 Alain: A few drop down list, definitely not enough in th. - existing product 
2 3 average score 3 given. 
3 Alain: Manual process available to convert Boeing task cards to word documents. Mark: Seems to show total intigration by converting to word. Didn't see AMM intigration. 
1 3 Mark: Limited, but did have an online users manual that would be 100% customised. 
1 3 average score 3 given 
3 not assesed yet 
1 3 Mark: Dedicated staff of about 4 based in DX13 with an AustXXXian office & UK main office 
4 Alain: Company has been around for 16 years. Mark- j66ýýIsnoýt new but XXX Web Is. 
2 3 Mark: This subject is delt with Stores in detail. But frorn ýýreview it intigrates well. 
L2 13 Mark: This subject is dell with Stores in detail. But from my review it intigrates well. Even books parts for a WO in advance. Also liked the pick lable print out when a part is required. 
- Total Score 1 1543 1 
Weighting :3 to 1.3 being a heavy weighting where the function is critical, 1 desirable but not critical. 
Scoring :5 to 1.5 being a high score where the function is met 100%, 0 function not met at all. 
Location of Test: XXX Site Location 
Date of Test: XX/XX/XX 
Name of Assesing Users: 
Suliman 
Reliabýlq Pankal 
_____ b-eve-lopment Rikhi 
Development Taco 
ýt-o-re-s Jun 
Purchasing Charles 
Quality Assurance George 
Peter 
lWf6rmation Technoloqy Alain 
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Rii9w 1w0 
Card No: 05002A 
Task Card Sign Off A/C Reg: A6 
- 
TWO: 
Input se(luclice: Rev No 16 1 ask Insp I, 
_, 
III Doc 
Input Date Mnlirs 65 Rev Date I ý-I`eb-04 Frade Al, [, ()111-- -111 Ref: MUMS 
j%k Interval I ', mh No. Men 2 Author Mark /olle All A VA Re f: 
Cliked 1),, Arun 
I! TLE 
i 
A+ 2A Check. 
Lateriall/Tools Ret'CI-C_I1CC I)OCLI111CIltS Access 
Ile 2A material preload sheet. Task cards inust he folloiýed for 2A ýICCCýN I) MIC1 ý11CCI MWIITIý WN t0l 1)ýJjlcl 
ivork details. Refer to amin t'or anitoss, icilloNal 1 11ý(A[, Itlon Ukl, t, IL-quilcd 
Boeinu, Card Set Revision Status 
Rev Date PE 
'()rk stcP AM 
I aýk Car Trade 
No Task Details 
I Replace the control cabin temp sensor filters. 
21-150-00-00 AMTOSS 21-61-06-100-801 ýGRN: A 
-1 50-00-OOAF 
2 Replace Cabin Temperature Module Filter STA567, WI-292, 
21-60-1-02 AMTOSS RMM21-61-11-201 GRN: 1 A 
21-60-1-02AF 
3 Inspect & Clean or Replace the RH A/C Pack Coalescer Bag. 
21 
-1313-1-02-00 
AMTOSS 21-51-05-00-801 rr-, A 
21 
-1313-1-02-00 
ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
I 
4 Galley ventilation & recirculation louvers remove & clean. Aft Galley. 
'21-160-00-AF A 
21-160-00-AF 
5 Func Check of the Voice Recorder for Audio Fidelity. 
23-050-00 00 AMTOSS 23-71-00-730-801 E 
23-050-00-00 
6 Change Left IDG Oil ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
24-010-01-00 AMTOSS 12-13-21-600-802 C 
24-010-01 00 
7 Change Right IDG Oil ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
24-010-02 00 AMTOSS 12-13-21-600-802 C 
24-010 02-00 
8 Replace Left IDG Charge and Scavenge Filters. ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
AMTOSS 24 11 41 C 24-040-01-00 - - -400-801 24-11-41-200-801 GRN: 
24-040-01-00 24-11-41-000-801 
9 Replace Right IDG Charge and Scavenge Filters. ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
24-040-02-00 AMTOSS 24-11-41-400-801 24-11-41-200-801 GRN: C 
24-040 02 00 24-11-41-000-801 
10 Torque Check Left Qad. ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
24-OFIO 01 C)C) AMTOSS 24-11-61-200-801 Torque C 
24-05C) ()1-00 
Torque Check Right Qad. ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
-14-01,0-02-00 AMTOSS 24-11-61-200-801 ue C 
24-C)50-02 00 
12 Carry out Cabin Interior Condition Inspection 
25-000-01 AF A 
25-000-01 
-AF 
13 DVI Capt, FO, FOB, SOB Seat Harnes, Crotch Strap Shoulder Belt for condition & Security 
25-020-00 00 AMTOSS 25-11-00-200-801 A 
2ý 02-) ()ý) 00 
Completion Date 
Dcl'ect Raised YN 
Si-natul-e 
" ork r-ccorded aboNe ha, been carried out ill accoidance ýs ith the tequilement, of the I Ak. I e(jel-: 11 ( j% il itio, Ior that 
h, ing in force and ill that tespect the aircraft/equipment i, con, idered to he fit fol releaw to 'er% ice. (. ( \ "Iy-"d ] \1 '1 1) - 
MP15 RI 0397 Print Date 20/09/2005 
I aýk ( aid 
No 
4. 
- 
1 
'Fask Details 
Trade 
14 Inspect DVI, Detailed Pax & Cabin Crew seat Belts for Wear & Security 
25-020-01 
-AF A 
-020-01-AF 
15 Operationally Check the Lavatory Waste Compartment Flapper Door & Spring 
AMTOSS 25-40-08-200-801 A 
25-125-00-00 Mandatory task complies with AD74-08-09R2. 
16 Inspct (GV) the STA 396 Bulkhead Panels for Cond. Security 
25-140-00-00 AMTOSS 25-52-00-200-805 A 
25-140-00-00 
Inspt (GV) The FWD Cargo Compartment Floor, Ceiling & Side wall 125-160-00-01 
AMTOSS 25-52-00-200-803 A 
25-160-00-01 
18 Inspct (GVL) The AFT Cargo Compartment Floor, Ceiling & Sidewall 
,, ý-160-00-02 AMTOSS 25-52-00-200-803 A 
25-160-00-02 
19 Completely install the forward & aft cargo net, & inspect the nets & attachments for 
25-175-00-AF correct function fitting & servicability. A 
25-175 00-AF 
20 Visually Check the Life Raft Pressure Bottle for Proper Pressure 
115-310-00-00 AMTOSS 25-64-00-210-801 A 
25-310-00-00 Note ý Applicable to rafts only with guages installed 
21 Replace The Megaphone Batteries 
25-340-00-00 & carry out Operational check GRN. E '40-00-00 25- 
330 00-00 AMTOSS 25-64-00-900-804,25-64-00-710-801. 
22 Operationally Check the Emergency Flashlights. 
25 380-00-00 AMTOSS 25-64-00-200-802 E 
25-380-00-00 
23 Inspect (DVI Detailed) the Smoke Hoods for Condition. 
25-400-00-00 AMTOSS 25-64-00-200-801 A 
25 400-00 00 
24 Remove & Clean behind, the FWD & Aft Galley Ovens. Prior to reinstallation inspect 
510 01 AF the oven recepticals & pins for damage. E 25-510-01 
-AF 
25 Visually Check L&R& APU Eng. Fire Bottles Pressure Gage for Correct Pressure 
26 0', 0 00 00 
ý "')ý Iý 1) ") 
AMTOSS 26-20-00-210-801 C 
d from 2. A 
26,412, W, AF IHolingsheadHead manual R-66179 
27 Lubricate the Stablizer Trim Actuator and Actuator Gimbal Pins. 
27 
-102 00-00 AMTOSS 12-22-41-600-801 
27 
-102 OC) C)o 
28 Operationally Check the Flap Load Relief System 
27-154 00-00 AMTOSS 27-51-00-740-803 E 
27-154-00-00 
29 Operationally Check The Flap Skew & Asymmetry System by Initating a Bite Chk 
27 161 
-00-00 AMTOSS 27-51-00-740-802 E 
27-161-00-00 
30 Lubricate the Left Wing Trailing Edge Flap Actuation Mechanism 
27-170-01-00 AIVITOSS 12-22-51-640-816 12-22-51-640-815 12-22-51-640-814 A 
27 1 iO 01 
-00 12-22-51-640-813 12-22-51-640-812 
31 Lubricate the Right Wing Trailing Edge Flap Actuation Mechanism 
27 170-02-00 AIVITOSS 12-22-51-640-816 12-22-51-640-815 12-22-51-640-814 12-22-51-640-813 A 
27-170-02-00 
32 Functionally Check the Autoslat system to Include a Bite Check of the Flap. 
27 216-00-00 AIVITOSS 27-83-00-710-801 E 
27 '16 00 00 
Raised :YN 
I, ý, f, ý,,.. ýdI(,, I. t., d 
or-k le-1111-11 IM, b-) CM-6ed out in accoidance %i ith the ivilmicivicrit% (if the I AF I-ederal CiN it AN ati(ill ]ý; Ivj fit t1l; 1I 
t""'v ill foic'. and in that I e'llect file ailct aft/c(IIIIIIIII"Ill J, coll'idel"I I., h, fit f"' to "rlice. ( 
.(\\ q'I II %I PI I) v, 
'I ask Card 
No 
33 
27-224-00-00 
27-224-00-00 
Trade 
E 
opintil ( tuisloil 
I 
IA 
37 
28-100-00-00 
28-100-00 00 
38 
28-110-00-00 
Task Details 
Operationally Check the Leading Edge Devices Uncommanded Motion Protection 
AMTOSS 27-81-00-710-802 
Perform a Visual Inspection of the following Items on all the Fuel Pumps 
AMTOSS 28-22-00-210-801 
Perform an Insulation Resistance Test on all of the Fuel Pumps. AM 10 SS 00 '00 80 1 
Noile : ll, uel Ptimp Inspection Da(a Shect Illocing Cai-d 28-110-00-00 1)17&18 
fig 602 attached, details must be completed & submitted back with this task card. 
Replace A Hydraulic System Electric Motor Driven Pump (EMDP) Case Drain 
AMTOSS 29-11-41-400-801,29-11-41-000-801 6RN 
ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
I 
Replace B Hydraulic System Electric Motor Driven Pump (EMDP) Case Drain 
AMTOSS 29-11-41-400-801,29-11-41-000-801 GRN: 
ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
Replace A System EDP Case Drain Filters. 
AMTOSS 29-11-51-400-801 29-11-51-000-801 GRN 
ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
Replace B System EDP Case Drain Filters. 
AMOTOSS 29-11-51-400-801 29-11-51-000-801 GRN 
ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
I 
Check The A&B System Return Filter Module For differential. 
AMTOSS 29-11-61-210-801 
Clean Exposed Surfaces of the Left Main Landing Gear Shock Strut. 
AMOTOSS 32-00-10-100-801 
Clean Exposed Surfaces of the Right Main Landing Gear Shock Strut. 
AMTOSS 32-00-10-100-801 
Lubricate the Left Main Landing Gear Assembly 
AMTOSS 12-21-11-640-802 12-21-11-640-801 
Lubricate the Right Main Landing Gear Assembly 
AMTOSS 12-21-11-640-802 12-21-11-640-801 
Clean Exposed Surface of the Nose Landing Gear Strut. 
AMTOSS 32-00-10-100-801 
Lubricate the Nose Landing Gear Assembly. 
AMTOSS 12-21-21-640-802 12-21-21-640-801 
Check & Record Brake Accumulator Precharge Pressure, Service as Required. 
AMOTOSS 12-15-11-610-801 12-15-11-420-801 : 
Perform an External Zonal Inspection (GV) of the Nose Landing Gear and Land 
Det'ect Rarsed 
'm'-niature : 
A 
E 
A 
A 
c 
c 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
k cco, -ded AMONe 11A, been cM tell out tit accordance I, ith file requirements of the I kiý' 1-cile, ; 11 ( IN il I, N i; Ition I fol 111; lt 
1"n", in I OlCe and In Illat lespect tile ait craft/etinipment v, considered to be fit I'm iclease to sciAic, (, ý \\ jpj d 111 ) - 
A 
-9 ý 
ork Step AMS 
Task Card Trade Performed Certified 
No Task Details 
52 Eexternal 
- 
Zonal (GV): Left Main Landing Gear and Landing Gear Doors From Ground 
32-8134-011 
-00 A 
32-804-01-00 
53 External 
- 
Zonal (GV) : Right Main Landing Gear and Landing Gear Doors From Ground 
32-808-02-00 A 
32-808-02-00 
54 Function check the emer lights battery for capacity ( 15 mins min) & one 
33-055-00-00 complete deep cycle. Note: This task includes floor path lighting as detailed in RMM. E 
33455-00-00 AMTOSS 33-51-00-200-801 RMM33-51-00/202 & 211 
55 PERFORM A GENERAL VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE TRANSPARENT FAIRING 
3-090-00-00 LENS LOCATED ON THE FWD LE OF THE WINGLET. LHS & RHS. A 3-090-00-00 
56 Perform a Functional Pitot Static System Leak Check. 
U-010-00-00 AMTOSS 34-11-00-790-801 
34-010-00-00 
57 Visually (Cross) Check the Flight Crew Oxygen Cylinder Pressure Indicator 
35-050-00-00 AMTOSS 35-12-00-710-801 A 
35-050-00-00 
58 Service the Toilet Waste Lines. 
38-020-00-00 AMTOSS 38-32-00-110-80138-32-00-100-80138-32-00-780-802 A 
38-020-00-00 
59 Restore (Clean) or Replace the Vacum Blower Filter. 
38-030-00-00 AMTOSS 38-32-05-960-801 GRN: 11 A 
38-030-00-00 
60 Replace the Waste Tank Water Separator 
38-090-00-00 AMTOSS 38-32-02-400-80138-32-02-000-801 GRN A 
38-090-00-00 Note : if a cleanable filter is installed clean, inspect &reinstall if serviceable. 
6-1-- Carry out potable water disinfection. 
38-10-2-00 AMTOSS 38-11-04-960-801 A 
38-10-2-00 Note: Carry out filter changes detailed below after disinfection carried out. 
61a Replace Water Filter FWD Galley 222, 
AMTOSS RMM 38-11-04-401 AMM 38-11-04-960-801 GRN: A 
61b Replace Water Filter VIP LAV 232, GRN: A AMTOSS RMM 38-11-04-401 AMM 38-11-04-960-801 
61C Replace Water Filter AFT Galley 242. 1 GRN: A AMTOSS RMM 38-11-04-401 AMM 38-11-04-960-801 
62 Perform a General Visual Inspection of the Witness-Drain TEE For fluids Leak 
49-090-00-00 AMTOSS 49-16-11-200-801 C 
49-090-00-00 
U, Fuel Lines, Andinterfacing 
49-110-00-00 AMTOSS 49-31-11-200-801 C 
49-110-00-00 
r Plug. 
49-132-00-00 AMTOSS 49-41-51-200-801 
C 
49-132-00-00 
g By Interpirgating the cdu's APU 
49-140-00-00 AMTOSS 49-61-00-700-801 E 
49-140-00-00 
be Module and Lines Forleakage 
49-190-00-00 AMTOSS 49-91-11-200-801 C 
49-190-00-00 
67 Perform a Detailed Inspection of the Oil Filter Delta P Indicator. 
49-200-00-00 AMOTOSS 49-91-13-200-801 
49-2GO-00-00 
C 
Completion Date: 
Defect Raised: YN 
Signature : 
work recorded above has been carried out in accordance with the requirements of the UAE Federal Civil Aviation Law for that 
being in force and in that respect the aircraft/equipment is considered to be fit for release to service. GCAA approval 
. 
EWPFD/89 
1-----MPIS Rl 0.397 Print-Date-20/09/2005 
'ork Step AMS 
Task Card 
I 
Trade Performed Cerfified 
No Task Details 
68 FUNCTION CHECK THE THE ELECTRONIC ACCESS SYSTEM OF THE 
2-000-1 O-AF SECURE FLIGHT DECK DOOR. E 2-000-1 O-AF Note: Applicable on to those a/c with the secure flight deck door installed. 
69 Inspect (Detailed) The Airstair System (Extended) for Condition 
52-170-00-00 AMTOSS 52-61-00-710-801 A 
52-170-00-OOAF 
70 External 
- 
Zonal (GV): Lower Fuselage Perform an External Zonal Inspection (GV) 
53-800-00-00 Pay particular attention for sand, dust, dirt & debris build up in the wheel wells. A 
53-800-00-00 Clean & vacuum the areas as required to remove all foreign material. 
Note: Follow all AMM cautions for cleaning. Attempt to use only dry methods of cleaning if possible. 
71 Internal Zonal (GV): Forward Cargo Compartment Perform an internal Zonal Insp 
53-812-00-00 A 
53-812-00-00 
72 Internal 
- 
Zonal (GV): AFT Cargo Compartment Perform an Internal Zonal Inspection 
53-830-00-00 A 
53-830-00-00 
73 External 
- 
Zonal (GV): Wing to Body Fairng Perform an External Zonal Inspection. 
53-844-00-00 A 
53-844-00-00 
74 External 
- 
Zonal (GV): Fuselage Perform an External Zonal Inspection (GV) 
53-894-00-00 A 
53-894-00-00 
75 External 
- 
Zonal (GV) : Vertical Fin and Horizontal Stabilizer External Zonal. 
55-800-00-00 A 
5"00-moo 76 External 
- 
Zonal (GV): Left Wing Perform an External Zonal Inspection (GV) 
57-802-01-00 A 
57-802-01-00 
77 External 
- 
Zonal (GV): Right Wing Perform an External Zonal Inspection (GV) 
57-872-02-00 A 
57-872-02-00 
78 Zonal Internal GVl of CTR Wing Fuel Tank for Evidence of Microbiological Corosion. 
57-942-00-AF A 
57-942-00-AF 
79 Zonal Internal GVI of Left Wing Fuel Tank for Evidence of Microbiological Corosion. 
57-942-01 -AF A 
57-942-01-AF 
80 Zonal Internal GVI of Right Wing Fuel Tank for Evidence of Microbiological Corosion. 
57.942-02-AF A 
57.942-02-A 
_'i-_ 81 
57-95041-00 
External 
- 
Zonal (GV) : Left Winglet. Perform External Visual Inspection A 
82 
57-952-01-00 
Internal 
-Zonal ( GV) Left Winglet Perform Internal Zonal Inspection A 
57-952-01-00 
83 
57-96o-02-00 External -Zonal (GV) Right Winglet. Perform External Visual Inspection A 
57-960-02-00 
84 
57-962-02-00 Internal - Zonal (GV) Right Winglet. Perform Internal Zonal Inspection A 
67-962-02-00 
85 External 
- 
Zonal (GV) : Power Plant No. I Perform an External Zonal Inspection 
00 
C 
70-800-01- 
70-800-01-00 
Completion Date: 
L 
Defect Raised 
I 
YN 
S ignature 
trecorded above has been carried out 
in accordance with the requirements ofthe UAE Federal Civil Aviation Law for that 
te being in force and in that respect the aircraft/equipment is considered to be fit for release to service. GCAA approval, EWPFD/99 
MP15 Rl 0397 Print Date 20/09/2005 
Task Details 
Trade 
External 
- 
Zonal (GV) Power Plant No 2 Perform an External Zonal Inspection 
C 
Visually Check the Left Inlet Cowl (Inner Side and Outer Skin) 
AM70SS '1 11 K'-FDý C 
Visually Check the Right Inlet Cowl (Inner Side and Outer Skin) 
AMTOSS 71-11-01-200-801-FOý C 
Detailed Inspection of Left Engine Inlet and Fan Blades 
AMTOSS 72-21-00-220-801 
-FOO 
C 
Detailed Inspection of Right Engine Inlet and Fan Blades 
APATOSS 72-21-00-220-801-FOO 
Per-form Operational Check (Bite) on the Left Engine EAU 
AM()T0 ý3 ', 'Pý I' --1 0-ý -j 8 -- 
,-F -- -, ý 
Perform Operational Check (Bite) on the Right Engine EAU 
APA TOSS 78-31-00-700-804-FOý E 
Remove and Replace the Left Oil Supply Filter Element s( 111FIDI I H) ONODD N(). % ( Ilk. S. 
_ AMTOSS 79-21-03-400-801-FOO 79-21-03-000-802-FOO GRN: I 
ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
Por-, ve anj Ppnixýe ! he Riqh! C)d Supply Filter Element ETOPs Similar System Maintenance 
ArATOSS 79-21-03-400-801-FOO 79-21-03-000-802-FOO I (JRN: 
Detailed Inspection of the Left Oil Supply Filter Pop-Out Indicator 
AMTOSS 79-00 00 200-805 FOO 
ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
Detailed Inspection of the Right Oil Supply Filter Pop-Out Indicator 
AIVITOSS 79-00 00-200 805 F00 
ETOPs Similar System Maintenance Task 
Detailed Inspection of the Left Engine Scavenge Screens Onlobrication Unit 
AMTOSS 79-00-00-200-804-FOO I 11011's. Smidaf S. Nslem Nlainlenanct- I; i, k 
Detailed Inspection of the Right Engine Scavenge Screens Onlubrication Unit 
AMTOSS 79-00-00-200-804-FOO I 1(111'ýNimilar SNocin Nimim-mmic Ij, k 
Detail Inspection of the Left Enqme M(A) F TOP, Syo-, T. %k 
AMTOSS 80-11-01-200-801 
-F M 
1)(lad Inspection of the Right I n(im, M(A) t toF,, 1--l- Sy, t, - M-Aý T., k 
AMTOSS 80-11-01-200-801-F Of ý 
f. [)IJ (-. r)olin(j Air InJol ', rr(, Pf) tiwi l. (Ji-xi 
AMP)''" ý!- ".. , ý, 
lubricate the outside release mechanism for the #2 copilot sliding window 
AMTOSS 12-25-81-60-801 
( )[ IC of the inside release mechnatsm for the pilot & copilot #2 sliding windows frorn the OUtside 
AM 1 1,1 
- 
1,1 11 i'l 1, W) 1, 
('111pictioll Dilte 
.... ...... 
d, Ai 
N%IN% 
Print Da(c 20/09/20P. 
---- 
-9 '7 
rk Step AMS 
Task Card 
I 
Trade Perrormed Certified 
No Task Details 
104 General visual check of the pilot & co, pilots #2 sliding windows sil drain for obvious damage clogging 
56-050-00-00 damage & security. A 
%-050-00-00 AMTOSS 56-12-11-20-801 
105 Detailed Visual Insp of the fixed ELT for wear & damage caused by age, exposed eliments, vibrartion. 
25-600-00 Inspect for E 
25-600-OOAF A, ELT unit & mount- for proper installation & security. 
B. Wring & conduits-forimproper routing, insecure mounting. 
C. Bonding & shielding 
- 
for improper insulation& poor condition. 
D. Antenna- for poor condition, insecure mounting & improper operation. 
106 Replace fwd & aft Galley fridge air filters & clean condensor using a vacuum. Ref B/E Aerospace 
_ 5-540-00-AF 
5-540-00-AF 
SIL General 102 RN: 7 
Completion Date: 
Defect Raised: YN 
Signature 
work recorded above has been carried out in accordance with the requirements of the UAE Federal Civil Aviation Law for that 
t being in force and in that respect the aircraft/equipment is considered to be fit for release to service. GCAA approval : EWPFD/89 
MP15 RI 0397 Print Date 20/09/2005 
